Terras et al v. Trinity River Lumber Company

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 11/16/15 ORDERING Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, and Motion for a More Definite Statement 33 are DENIED. Defendant must file a responsive pleading not later than fourteen (14) days following the date that this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed. (Becknal, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOSEPH TODD TERRAS, BOBBY
TYLER and DARREN SHANE
PANTER, as individual California
Residents, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,

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No. 2:14-CV-02277-MCE-CMK

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
TRINITY RIVER LUMBER COMPANY,
a California corporation,
Defendant.

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Through this class action, Plaintiffs Joseph Todd Terras, Bobby Tyler and Darren

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Shane Panter (“Plaintiffs”) bring claims for violation of the Federal Labor Standards Act

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(“FLSA”), the California Labor Code, and California’s Unfair Competition Law against

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Defendant Trinity River Lumber Company (“Defendant”). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege

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that Defendants have failed to pay proper overtime, neglected to provide required rest

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and meal periods, and have thereby generated inaccurate wage statements. Presently

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before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6).1 ECF No. 33. Alternatively, Defendant moves for a more definite statement

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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless

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pursuant to Rule 12(e) and requests that the Court strike Plaintiffs’ class action,

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collective action, and willfulness allegations. ECF No. 33. All of Defendant’s arguments

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are directly contradicted, either by allegations in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint

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(“SAC”) or controlling precedent. Defendant’s Motions are therefore DENIED.2

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BACKGROUND3

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Defendant operates a lumber mill in Weaverville, California, and employed
Plaintiffs as non-exempt employees. Defendant operates the mill from 5:30 AM to

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approximately 3:00 AM every workday and schedules its employees to work in shifts.

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Plaintiff Panter and all other non-exempt employees working in and around the mill itself

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were subject to a “bell system” in which Defendant sounds an alarm to signal the

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beginning and ending of each meal period and rest period. Plaintiffs Tyler, Terras, and

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other non-exempt employees who worked as millwrights and fab shop employees were

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not subject to the same bell system.4

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Defendant’s Employee Handbook (“Handbook”) states that “Employees are

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provided with at least a one-half hour meal period, to be taken approximately in the

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middle of the workday.” The Handbook does not make an off-duty meal period available

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to employees within the first 5 hours of a shift, nor does it make a second meal period

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available when an employee works in excess of ten hours. According to the SAC, Bell

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System Employees, including Panter, were often unable to take their first meal periods

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on time due to the nature and urgency of their work. They were also unable to take

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otherwise noted.
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Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this
matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(g).
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The following recitation of background facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32).
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The Court will refer to these distinct groups of non-exempt employees as “Bell System
Employees” and “Non-Bell System Employees” hereinafter.

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second meal periods when they worked 10 or more hours in a single day because the

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bell system did not take the need for a second meal period into account.

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Plaintiffs also contend that Non-Bell System Employees were regularly denied off-

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duty meal periods due to work demands. Plaintiffs aver that Non-Bell System Employees

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were generally not permitted to take their first meal periods until after the sixth hour of

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their shifts, and they never received a second meal period on ten-plus hour workdays.

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Despite the fact that non-exempt employees were regularly denied timely meal periods,

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Plaintiffs claim their supervisors required them to indicate that they had taken timely

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meal periods on their time cards every day. Similarly, non-exempt employees were

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often denied the rest periods mandated by California law.

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Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant’s non-exempt employees were required to

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work swing shifts (the period of time between the morning shift and the night shift). The

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Handbook mandated a $0.20 premium per hour for employees who worked a swing

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shift, but, according to Plaintiffs, Defendant’s non-exempt employees were never paid

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this premium nor was the premium accounted for on their wage statements.

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Plaintiffs also maintain that their overtime hours were illegally computed. Non-

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exempt employees either received no overtime pay at all, received pay lower than what

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they were entitled to, or were required to “bank” certain hours by their supervisors so that

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Defendant could avoid paying them overtime wages. Finally, plaintiffs claim that non-

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exempt employees were required to purchase specific, steel-toe work boots at a cost of

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up to $500.00 but were never reimbursed for this expense.

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Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges eight causes of action for violations of the FLSA, the

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California Labor Code, and California Business and Professions Code section 17200.

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Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, a Motion to Strike, and a Motion for a More Definite

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Statement. Plaintiffs timely opposed these motions, and Defendant filed a timely reply.

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STANDARDS

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A.

Motion to Dismiss

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On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and

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construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

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Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

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47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require

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detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of

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his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and

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quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion

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couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

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above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright &

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Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the

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pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a

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suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)).

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Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket

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assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and

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quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard

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to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of

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the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright &

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Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their
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claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”

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Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge

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that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and

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unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

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A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to

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grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no

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“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice

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to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the

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amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v.

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Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to

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be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors

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merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . .

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carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183,

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185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that

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“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group,

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Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006,

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1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir.

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1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . .

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constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

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B.

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Rule 12(f) enables a court to strike “from any pleading . . . any redundant,

Motion to Strike

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immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Courts treat motions to strike with

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disfavor. Mag Instrument, Inc. v. JS Producs, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106. The

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purpose of a motion to strike is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must

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arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.”

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Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). A court may

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grant a motion to strike if “it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible

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bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. LeDuc v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co.,

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814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

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C.

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A motion for more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) attacks “the

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unintelligibility of the complaint, not simply the mere lack of detail . . . .” Neveau v. City

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of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2005). Courts will deny the motion if

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the complaint is specific enough to give notice to the defendants of the substance of the

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claim asserted. Id. A Rule 12(e) motion should be granted only if the complaint is “so

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vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial,

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in good faith or without prejudice to himself.” Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, Inc., 189

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F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also Bautista v. L.A. Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 843 n.1

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(9th Cir. 2000) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (party can move for more definite statement on

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those rare occasions where a complaint is so vague or ambiguous that party cannot

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reasonably frame a responsive pleading).

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Motion for More Definite Statement

“Rule 12(e) is designed to strike an unintelligibility rather than want of detail.... A

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motion for a more definite statement should not be used to test an opponent's case by

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requiring him to allege certain facts or retreat from his allegations.” Neveu, 392 F. Supp.

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2d at 1169 (quoting Palm Springs Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Desert Hosp., 628 F. Supp. 454,

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464-65 (C.D. Cal. 1986). If the facts sought by a motion for a more definite statement

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are obtainable by discovery, the motion should be denied. See McHenry v. Renne,

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84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996); Neveau, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70; Sagan v.

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Apple Computer, 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994). “This liberal standard of

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pleading is consistent with [Rule] 8(a)(2) which allows pleadings that contain a ‘short and

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plain statement of the claim.’ Both rules assume that the parties will familiarize

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themselves with the claims and ultimate facts through the discovery process.” Neveu,

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392 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (citing Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at 1077 (“Motions for a more

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definite statement are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted because of the

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minimal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules.”)).
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ANALYSIS

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss asserts that all of Plaintiffs’ claims are factually

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deficient and must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Alternatively, Defendant

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asks the Court to strike the collective action, class action, and willfulness allegations

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contained in the SAC. Defendant also requests an order requiring Plaintiffs to file a

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more definite statement. The Court addresses each of Defendant’s arguments in turn.

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A.

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Motion to Dismiss
1.

Collective and class action allegations

Defendant argues that the SAC must be dismissed because it does not explain

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how Plaintiffs are similarly situated to all of the other employees encompassed in the

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putative class. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have defined their class

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as consisting of “hourly, non-exempt, non-unionized employees” and that this definition

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could encompass employees who are not similarly situated to Plaintiffs, such as clerical

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workers.5 Defendant argues further that Plaintiffs fail to provide job descriptions or job

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duties of the unnamed class members and contends that this failure requires dismissal

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of the entire complaint.
The SAC’s allegations make it clear that the putative class includes only similarly

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situated employees. Plaintiffs define their “Non-Exempt Employees” class as a

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combination of Bell System Employees and Non-Bell System Employees. ECF No. 32

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at ¶ 19. Bell System Employees are defined in part as employees working in and around

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Defendant’s lumber mill, while Non-Bell System Employees are defined in part as

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“millwrights” and “fab shop employees.” Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Accordingly, there is no danger

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that Plaintiffs’ class action allegations encompass secretaries or bookkeepers. See ECF

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No. 34 at 9. Furthermore, Defendant’s argument that the SAC does not contain job

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Defendant also argues that a typographical error in the SAC warrants dismissal. This argument
lacks merit and the Court will not address it.

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descriptions or duties of unnamed class members is directly contradicted by Plaintiffs’

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general description of class members’ job duties in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the SAC.

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Defendant’s arguments against Plaintiffs’ collective and class action allegations

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are therefore unavailing. Defendant is free to challenge the makeup of the putative class

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at the class certification stage, but Plaintiff’s allegations are more than sufficient to

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survive a challenge to the pleadings.

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2.

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First and Second Causes of Action for failure to pay overtime
compensation

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for failure to pay

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overtime compensation under the FLSA and California law because the only allegations

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that support their First and Second Causes of Action are that they “regularly worked in

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excess of forty (40) hours per week.” Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must allege why

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they worked overtime without pay, and how and who knew about it, in order to

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successfully state a claim. Citing a case decided by the Eastern District of New York,

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Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs must estimate the amount of hours worked for

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which they were not paid in order to state claims for failure to pay overtime

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compensation.

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The Ninth Circuit has not determined the level of factual detail required for a

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plaintiff to state a claim for failure to pay overtime compensation. This Court, however,

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has previously dismissed a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) in which the sole allegation

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supporting a claim for overtime compensation was that “Plaintiff and class members

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consistently worked in excess of eight hours in a day, in excess of 12 hours in a day

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and/or in excess of 40 hours in a week.” Anderson v. Blockbuster Inc., No. 2:10-cv-

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00158, 2010 WL 1797249 at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2010).

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Here, Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges a significant number of facts in addition to the

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allegation that Plaintiffs “regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week.”

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Indeed, the SAC states that Panter “banked” approximately 73 hours of work for which

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he did not receive overtime compensation and that Defendant manipulated Terras’ and
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Tyler’s time cards to avoid paying overtime. ECF No. 32 at ¶¶ 54-57. The SAC further

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alleges that Defendant failed to account for overtime due to the variation between

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Defendant’s work weeks and pay periods. Id. at ¶¶ 59-61. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that

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their supervisors knew that they were not paid properly for overtime because they

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instructed Plaintiffs and class members to “bank” hours and manipulated their time cards

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at the request of Defendant’s management. Id. at ¶¶ 53-57.

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These detailed allegations go far beyond the conclusory statements of liability that

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have resulted in dismissal by district courts within the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Anderson,

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2010 WL 1797249; Weigele v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., No. 06-CV-1330,

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2010 WL 4723673 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2010). Furthermore, Defendant’s reliance

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on DeSilva v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc. is misplaced. In that

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case, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that a complaint should,

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“at least approximately, allege the hours worked for which these wages were not

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received.” DeSilva v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d

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497, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, it would be unfair to

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require a plaintiff-employee to approximate the number of overtime hours worked when

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defendant employers generally control the information needed to make such an

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approximation and numerous other facts can establish the plausibility of an overtime

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claim. Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2014). Under this

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standard, the SAC contains factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for

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failure to pay overtime wages.

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3.

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Third and Fourth Causes of Action for meal and rest period
violations

Without citing any case law, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Third and Fourth

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Causes of Action for meal and rest period violations are too vague and factually deficient

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to state a claim. Defendant observes that “Plaintiffs do not allege why Plaintiffs did not

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take meal and rest breaks” and that “Plaintiffs do not state when, how often and the

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approximation of the total number of times that they worked through their meal and rest
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periods.” Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for meal and rest period

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violations are factually deficient because the SAC does not specifically allege who

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supervised Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and that Plaintiffs must allege

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whether those supervisors knew about Plaintiffs working through their meal and rest

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periods.

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The SAC directly contradicts Defendant’s arguments. For example, the SAC

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alleges that “Bell System Employees, including Mr. Panter, were unable to take their first

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meal periods on time several times a month . . . due to the nature and urgency of their

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work that day.” ECF No. 32 at ¶ 22. Plaintiffs further allege that Bell System Employees

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could not take their second meal periods when they worked ten or more hours in a single

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day because the bell system did not account for a second meal period. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.

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These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for meal and rest period violations.

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The SAC also contains allegations that permit the Court to infer that Dennis

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Swanson supervised Defendant’s Bell System Employees and that Patrick Solometo

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supervised Non-Bell System Employees. ECF No. 32 at ¶¶ 44-45. Furthermore,

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California law does not require Plaintiffs to establish knowledge, willfulness, or the

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impacts of company policy on their inability to take meal and rest periods. See Brinker

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Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040 (employer’s duty under

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California Labor Code section 512 is “to provide a meal period to its employees.”); Cal.

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Labor Code § 226.7. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated plausible claims for relief for

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meal and rest period violations.

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4.

Fifth Cause of Action for failure to itemize wage statements

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Defendant makes three arguments in support of their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

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claim for failure to itemize wage statements. Defendant first asserts that Plaintiffs have

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failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendant’s failure to provide accurate wage

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statements was “knowing and intentional.” Second, Defendant argues that the SAC

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does not show that Plaintiffs suffered an injury as a result of inaccurate wage

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statements. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ claim alleging a statutory
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violation for failure to furnish timely and accurate wage statements is barred by Plaintiffs’

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failure to comply with California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”). All of

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Defendant’s arguments lack merit.

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Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are more than sufficient to show that Defendant’s

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failure to provide accurate wage statements was knowing and intentional. The SAC

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sufficiently alleges that Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and class

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members for regular wages, overtime wages, meal period premium pay, and rest period

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pay. ECF No. 32 at ¶¶ 38-40, 44-49, 53-55. Defendant’s knowing failure to pay these

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wages leads to the required inference that it knowingly provided Plaintiffs with false

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wage statements.

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Second, Plaintiffs have easily satisfied their obligation to allege facts sufficient to

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establish that they were injured by the inaccurate wage statements. Labor Code section

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226(e)(2)(B) provides that “[a]n employee is deemed to suffer injury” if the total hours

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worked by the employee or the number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the

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employee cannot be readily determined from the wage statement. Plaintiffs allege that

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Defendants failed to pay proper overtime wages, manipulated Plaintiffs’ time cards, did

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not pay meal and rest period premiums, and failed to account for “swing shift” premiums.

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Assuming these allegations are true, it follows that an employee could not readily

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determine from its wage statement how many total hours he worked or the rate of pay

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that should have applied to all hours worked. Plaintiffs have therefore alleged facts

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sufficient to show that they suffered injury pursuant to Labor Code section 226(e)(2)(B).

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Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim for statutory penalties under Labor Code section 226 does

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not require them to comply with the PAGA. A plaintiff’s claim for relief is only subject to

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the PAGA if it seeks recovery of a civil penalty. Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior

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Court, 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Here, Plaintiffs seek only

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statutory penalties under Labor Code section 226(e), not civil penalties. Accordingly,

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Plaintiff has stated a valid claim pursuant to Labor Code section 226(e).

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5.

Sixth Cause of Action for unreimbursed business expenses

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for unreimbursed business expenses under

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California Labor Code section 2802 is factually deficient because Plaintiffs “fail to allege

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any facts regarding alleged company-wide policies to show when or how often they were

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required to purchase boots.” Defendant also argues that the SAC does not identify

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which employees were required to purchase such boots. Again, the SAC directly

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contradicts Defendant’s arguments.

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Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant required its “Non-Exempt Employees

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to purchase specific, steel-toe boots as a condition of their employment.” ECF No. 32 at

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¶ 71. This allegation is sufficient for the Court to plausibly infer that Defendant had a

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policy of requiring Plaintiffs to purchase steel-toe boots. Moreover, “Non-Exempt

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Employees” is a defined term that applies to all Plaintiffs and all class members. In light

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of these specific allegations, Defendant’s arguments come dangerously close to frivolity.

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6.

Seventh Cause of Action for wages upon termination

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for wages upon termination is factually

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deficient because Plaintiffs fail to allege the amount of their unremitted wages.

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Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for wages upon termination fails as to the

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unnamed class members because the SAC does not allege “which non-exempt

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employees were not paid all of their wages when their employment terminated, when

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those employees were terminated, when their wages were due, and the amount not

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paid.” Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive.

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As detailed above, Plaintiffs have specifically alleged that Defendant refused to

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pay overtime wages, meal and rest period premiums, and reimbursable business

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expenses. Furthermore, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged

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that members of the Non-Exempt Employee class were similarly not paid such wages.

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Given these allegations, Plaintiffs need only plausibly allege that Defendant willfully

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refused to pay these unpaid wages. Plaintiffs have done so. ECF No. 32 at ¶¶ 193-194.

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Nothing requires Plaintiffs to allege the amount of wages due to them unless there is a
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question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. Baker v. Chin &

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Hensolt, Inc., No. CV-09 4168, 2010 WL 147954 at *5 fn. 6 (N.D. Cal. Jan 12, 2010).

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Defendant has not challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over this claim, and provides no

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support for the proposition that Plaintiffs must make specific allegations about each of

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the unnamed class members’ termination dates in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

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motion. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for wages upon termination.

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7.

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Eighth Cause of Action for violations of California Business
and Professions Code section 17200

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Defendant’s argument that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under

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Business and Professions Code section 17200 is premised on the dismissal of Plaintiffs’

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claims for overtime and missed meal and rest breaks. Given that the Court has found

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that the SAC has stated claims for overtime compensation and missed meal and rest

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breaks, Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200

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states a claim as well. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in its

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entirety.

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B.

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Defendant requests that the Court order Plaintiffs to file a more definite statement

Motion For A More Definite Statement

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pursuant to Rule 12(e) because the SAC is so devoid of factual allegations and

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explanations of how Defendant purportedly committed the wrongs alleged that it cannot

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form a responsive pleading. Defendant’s argument is wholly conclusory, and belied by

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even the most cursory review of the SAC. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are far from

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being so vague, ambiguous, or unintelligible that Defendant cannot form a responsive

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pleading. See Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal.

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1999). Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement is accordingly DENIED.

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C.

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Defendant’s failure to address the relevant standard in its Motion to Strike the

Motion to Strike

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SAC’s willfulness and class allegations requires its denial. In order for a Motion to Strike

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to succeed, the moving party must show that the allegations to be stricken are
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“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f). Defendant

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has made no such showing. Instead, Defendant merely regurgitates the arguments it

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made in seeking dismissal of the SAC under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court therefore

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DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike,

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and Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 33) are DENIED. Defendant must

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file a responsive pleading not later than fourteen (14) days following the date that this

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Memorandum and Order is electronically filed.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 16, 2015

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