Hutchinson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 5/16/17. CASE CLOSED. (Kaminski, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KNOLTS HUTCHINSON,

CIV. NO. 2:14-02398 WBS EFN

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, WARDEN R.
RACKLEY, WARDEN B. DUFFY,
ASSOCIATE WARDEN M. KAPLAN,
FACILITIES SARGEANT A.
ROMERO,

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Defendants.
----oo0oo----

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Plaintiff Knolts Hutchinson filed this action against

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defendants California Department of Corrections and

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Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Warden Rackley, Warden Duffy, Associate

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Warden Kaplan, and Facilities Sergeant Romero, for violations of

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the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation

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Act, the California Disabled Person Act (“CDPA”), the Unruh Civil
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Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), and deliberate indifference in

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violation of the Eighth Amendment.

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Civil Procedure 56, defendants now move for summary judgment

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against plaintiff.

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I.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of

(Docket No. 39.)

Factual and Procedural Background

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Plaintiff is a paraplegic inmate incarcerated by the

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CDCR.

He is paralyzed from the chest downwards, lacks bowel and

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bladder control, and requires the use of a wheelchair.

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In March 2013, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in federal

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court against the CDCR and several employees, alleging he had

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been injured at the California Medical Facility (“CMF”) because

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he was provided with a locker that did not comply with the ADA.

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That case was voluntarily dismissed on November 14, 2016.

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Hutchinson v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., Civ. No. 2:16-00620

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MCE AC (E.D. Cal.).

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See

On October 27, 2013, plaintiff was transferred from the

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CMF to the California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”).

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and treats inmates who require a higher level of care due to

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disability.

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25, 2014, and was the CHCF Acting Warden from August 25, 2014, to

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April 23, 2015.

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(“Duffy Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3 (Docket No. 39-2).)

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Warden prior to August 25, 2014.

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2.)

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CHCF houses

Duffy was the CMF Acting Warden from 2012 to August

(Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, Ex. C
Rackley was the CHCF

(Id., Ex. D (“Rackley Decl.”) ¶

On November 4, 2013, plaintiff filed a request for an

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adjustable trapeze bar that would allow him to transfer from his

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bed to his wheelchair by himself, similar to the one he had in

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the CMF.1

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2013, and prior to his First Level of Review for this request,

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plaintiff received a trapeze bar.

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Appeal”).)

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trapeze bar request at the First Level of Review based on

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plaintiff’s representation that “[t]he issue had been resolved”

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and based on their understanding that plaintiff was receiving

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assistance from medical staff when transferring from his bed to

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his wheelchair and could also transfer without assistance.

(Id., Ex. H (“Trapeze Bar Request”).)

On November 25,

(Id., Ex. I (“First Level

Romero and Kaplan subsequently granted plaintiff’s

(Id.)

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In March 2015, plaintiff received a different trapeze bar that

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was adjustable and moveable.

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No. 43-2).)

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(Hutchinson Dep. 96:15-97:4 (Docket

On November 10, 2013, plaintiff filed a request for a

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rolling commode chair.

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Ex. J (“Rolling Commode Request”).)

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part, so he could defecate in the shower.

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Williams Decl.”) ¶ 8.)

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request for a rolling commode chair because he could transfer

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himself from the toilet to the shower, assistance from medical

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staff was available, and medical staff determined it was not safe

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or medically necessary. (Id., Ex. F (“Romero Decl.”) ¶¶ 11-13.)

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Plaintiff instead received a stationary commode chair and shower

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chair.

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reaffirmed that the rolling commode chair was not safe and did

(Id.)

(Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts,
He wanted the chair, in
(Id., Ex. L (“Dr.

On review, Romero denied plaintiff’s

Dr. Williams reviewed Romero’s decision and

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Plaintiff had a moveable, or adjustable, trapeze bar at
the previous facility because all of the beds were secured to the
ground. In contrast, at the CHCF, plaintiff’s bed is mobile so
it is safer to have a trapeze bar that is fixed to the bed in
order to prevent a fall. (See Dr. Williams Decl. ¶ 7.)
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not provide better accommodation than the stationary commode

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chair.

(Dr. Williams Decl. ¶ 8.)

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Plaintiff brought this suit and alleges the following

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causes of action: (1) violation of Title II of the ADA (“Title

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II”); (2) retaliation in violation of Title V of the ADA; (3)

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violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section

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504”); (4) violation of the CDPA; (5) violation of the Unruh Act;

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and (5) deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs in

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violation of the Eighth Amendment.

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No. 33).)

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judgment on all causes of action.

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II.

(Second Am. Compl. (Docket

Now before the court is defendants’ Motion for summary
(Docket No. 39.)

Legal Standard

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Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

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P. 56(a).

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of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

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reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

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favor.

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(1986).

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burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

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fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

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negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

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Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the non-

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moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential

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element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.

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Id.

Fed. R. Civ.

A material fact is one that could affect the outcome

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

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Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

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burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific

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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

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324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

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the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is

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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

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“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be

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insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

Id. at

To carry this burden,

Matsushita

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reasonably find for the [non-moving party].”

Anderson, 477 U.S.

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at 252.

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allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude summary

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judgment.”

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Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

“[T]he non-moving party may not rely on the mere

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors

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In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must

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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

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party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

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weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate

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inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a

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judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . .”

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III. Discussion

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A.

“Credibility determinations, the

Id.

Retaliation in Violation of Title V of the ADA
Plaintiff argues the individual defendants retaliated

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against him by transferring him from CMF to CHCF and denying him

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a rolling commode chair and moveable trapeze bar because of his

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prior lawsuit against the CDCR.

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person shall discriminate against any individual because such

Title V of the ADA provides: “No

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individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this

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chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified,

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assisted, or participated in any matter in an investigation,

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proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”

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12203(a).

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42 U.S.C. §

To make out a prima facie retaliation case, the

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plaintiff must show “(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2)

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an adverse . . . action and (3) a causal link between the two.”

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Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003)

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(quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir.

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2000)).

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defendant has the burden to “offer[] legitimate reasons for the

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adverse . . . action.”

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840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004).

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reasons, the burden shifts to plaintiff “to demonstrate a triable

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issue of fact as to whether such reasons are pretextual.”

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

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Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d
If the defendant provides legitimate

Id.

Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case.

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First, there is no evidence that Duffy took adverse action

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against plaintiff.

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transfer plaintiff from CMF to CHCF.2

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Once at CHCF, Duffy was not involved in plaintiff’s request for a

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trapeze bar or rolling commode chair.

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74:11-19.)

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action against plaintiff, plaintiff’s retaliation claim against

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He was not involved in the decision to
(Duffy Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.)

(Id. ¶ 6; Hutchinson Dep.

Because there is no evidence that he took an adverse

Plaintiff attempts to dispute this evidence by pointing
to an excerpt of plaintiff’s deposition. However, this portion
of the deposition discusses Duffy’s knowledge of plaintiff’s need
for a locker at CMF (the subject matter of the prior lawsuit),
not Duffy’s involvement in the decision to transfer plaintiff to
CMF. (See Hutchinson Dep. 68:20-69:11.)
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Duffy must fail.

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As to defendants Rackley, Kaplan, and Romero, there is

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no causation evidence.

If a defendant did not know of a

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plaintiff’s protected activity, the defendant could not take

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adverse action against the plaintiff based on that activity.

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Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a

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retaliation claim failed because there was insufficient evidence

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that defendants knew of the prisoner’s protected activity).

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There is no evidence that Rackley, Kaplan, and Romero knew

See

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plaintiff previously filed an ADA suit.

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plaintiff’s prior suit when they were served in this action.3

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(Rackley Decl. ¶ 3; Kaplan Decl. ¶ 7; Romero Decl. ¶ 14.)

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is also no evidence that Rackley, Kaplan, and Romero were

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involved with plaintiff’s transfer from CMF to CHCF.4

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is undisputed that they did not know plaintiff filed a previous

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lawsuit when any alleged adverse action occurred, plaintiff

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cannot establish that they retaliated against him.

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They only learned of

There

Because it

Plaintiff argues that the temporal proximity between

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the filing of his prior lawsuit and his transfer to CHCF

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establishes the causation prong.

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is admissible to prove causation, “mere temporal proximity . . .

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must be ‘very close.’”

While circumstantial evidence

Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532

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Plaintiff attempts to rebut this evidence by
referencing his Second Amended Complaint; however, he “may not
rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in order to
preclude summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630.
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The claim against Rackley also fails for lack of an
adverse action because he was not involved in the denial of
plaintiff’s modification requests. (Rackley Decl. ¶ 4.)
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U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (per curiam) (citing with approval cases

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in which three- and four-month periods were insufficient to

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establish a causal connection); see, e.g., Swan v. Bank of Am.,

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360 Fed App’x 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding four-month period

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was insufficient to show causation premised solely on temporal

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proximity); Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d

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1018, 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding eight-month gap between

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protected activity and termination was “too great to support an

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inference” that the protected activity caused an adverse action).

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The seven-month span between the filing of plaintiff’s previous

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lawsuit and his transfer to CHCF alone is not enough to establish

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causation.

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Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie retaliation

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claim against any of the defendants.

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grant summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim.

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B.

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Accordingly, the court will

Title II and Section 504
All defendants seek summary judgment on plaintiff’s

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Title II and Section 504 claims, arguing that they did not

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discriminate against him because of his disability and he was

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still able to complete his bowel program and access the shower.5

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Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified

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individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,

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Plaintiff cannot sue the individual defendants in their
individual capacities for violations of Title II or the Section
504. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“A plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate
rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.”) Plaintiff may still sue the individual
defendants in their official capacity for injunctive relief.
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be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of

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the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

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subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

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12132.

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“(1) he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was

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either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a

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public entity’s services . . . or was otherwise discriminated

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against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial . .

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. , or discrimination was by reason of his disability.”

42 U.S.C. §

To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must show

Duvall

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v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

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Weinreich v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978

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(9th Cir. 1997)).

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Rehabilitation Act are the same, except that it is limited to

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programs that receive federal financial assistance.

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Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 862 n.17 (9th Cir. 2001).6

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The requirements under Section 504 of the

Armstrong v.

The implementing regulations of Title II provide that

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“[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in

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policies, practice, or procedures when the modifications are

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necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,

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unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the

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modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the

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service, program, or activity.”

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duty to provide “reasonable accommodations” for disabled people

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arises only when a policy, practice, or procedure discriminates

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on the basis of disability.

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).

The

Weinreich, 114 F.3d at 979.

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Neither party disputes that the California prison
system receives federal financial assistance. See Armstrong, 275
F.3d at 862 n.17.
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“To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA

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or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional

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discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard

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for intentional discrimination is deliberate indifference.

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Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138.

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knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is

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substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.”

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Id. at 1139.

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“Deliberate indifference requires both

It is undisputed that plaintiff is disabled and CDCR is

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a public entity.

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provided reasonable accommodations and whether defendants

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intentionally discriminated against plaintiff.

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bears the burden of establishing the existence of specific

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reasonable accommodations that the defendant public entity failed

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to provide.

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a modification or accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific,

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context-specific inquiry.

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F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999).

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deference to the expert views of the facility administrators, a

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detention or correctional facility’s legitimate interest . . .

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when determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable.”

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Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1216 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Here, plaintiff’s requested accommodations were unreasonable and

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defendants provided reasonable accommodations.

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Thus, the inquiry is whether defendants

See Weinreich, 114 F.3d at 978.

The plaintiff

Determining whether

Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166
The court may “consider, with

It is undisputed that the rolling commode chair and

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adjustable trapeze bar were unsafe and medically unnecessary at

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CHCF.

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requested trapeze bar is unsafe because plaintiff’s bed is mobile

(Romero Decl. ¶ 10; Dr. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.)

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The

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and the requested trapeze bar would be affixed to the wall, which

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could cause the bed to move during transfer.

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Decl. ¶ 7.)

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(Id.)

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permits plaintiff to defecate in the shower, and wet moveable

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equipment is substantially more dangerous than stationary wet

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equipment.

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commode chair is also more unsafe than to a stationary chair

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because a person is transferring between two moveable objects.

(See Dr. Williams

This increases plaintiff’s chances of falling.

The rolling commode is unsafe because it is not hygienic,

(Id. ¶ 8.)

Transfer from a wheelchair to rolling

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(Id.)

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controverting defendants’ expert testimony that plaintiff’s

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requested accommodations were unsafe.

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978.

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chair are unsafe, they are not reasonable accommodations.

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Plaintiff provides no evidence or expert testimony

See Weinreich, 114 F.3d at

Because both the requested trapeze bar and rolling commode

Even if plaintiff’s requested accommodations were

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reasonable, defendants only need to provide a reasonable

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accommodation, not plaintiff’s requested accommodation.

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Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.

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2002) (“An employer is not obligated to provide an employee the

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accommodation he requests or prefers, the employer need only

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provide some reasonable accommodation.”); Connor v. California,

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Civ. No. 1:10-1967 AWI BAM, 2013 WL 321703, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan.

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28, 2013) (McAuliffe, M.J.).

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defendants provided were reasonable accommodations.

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Williams’s expert declaration recommends both the trapeze bar and

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stationary commode chair provided by CDCR.

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¶¶ 13, 15.)

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the mobile beds at CHCF because it is attached to the bed itself,

See

The trapeze bar and commode chair
Dr.

(Dr. Williams Decl.

Plaintiff received an “optimally safe trapeze” for

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limiting his chances of falling if the bed were to move.

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7.)

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wheelchair, alone or with the assistance of medical staff.

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stationary commode chair is safe because it acts as an anchor

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when plaintiff attempts to transfer from the moveable wheelchair

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to the stationary commode chair.

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complete his bowel movement with the stationary commode chair and

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can then transfer to his wheelchair to shower.

(Id. ¶

Plaintiff is still able to transfer from his bed to

(Id. ¶ 8.)

The

Plaintiff can still

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Plaintiff argues in his opposition that he was unable

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to safely transfer alone; however, he concedes that it was “not

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that much of a problem” to transfer in and out of bed using a

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transfer board and trapeze bar and plaintiff demonstrated his

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ability to use the trapeze bar to medical staff.

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B; Hutchinson Dep. 79:16-21; 81:19-23.)

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no evidence that plaintiff’s requested devices “address his

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medical condition any better than the devices” provided at CHCF.

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(Dr. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15.)

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testimony to rebut defendants’ evidence that the accommodations

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provided were adequate, safe, and reasonable.

(Id. ¶ 9, Ex.

Additionally, there is

Plaintiff submits no expert

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Plaintiff also fails to show any evidence of

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intentional discrimination by defendants because of plaintiff’s

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disability.

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up to an hour for staff assistance if they were busy or it was

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around 2:00 a.m. and he once fell when staff was helping him

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transfer.

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plaintiff fell only once, (id. 99:11-23, 106:23-107:23), and

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isolated acts of negligence are insufficient for an ADA claim,

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Jamison v. Baillie, Civ. No. 2:10-124 KJM EFB P, 2016 WL 775746,

He argues that he would sometimes have to wait for

The delay occurred on only a few occasions and

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at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (Brennan, M.J.).

2

Curtis, 68 F. App’x 561, 563 (6th Cir. 2003) (alleging isolated

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instances of failure to accommodate disabled prisoner’s condition

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does not state a claim under the ADA); Calbart v. Denver Sheriff

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Dep’t, No. 10-cv-1385-LTB-CBS, 2012 WL 1229923, at *9 (D. Colo.

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Feb. 23, 2012) (finding interference with prescribed treatment

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regime does not constitute discrimination under the ADA).

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Further, this evidence does not show that defendants

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discriminated against him because of his disability.

See Moore v.

To the

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contrary, CDCR provided him with accommodations that allowed him

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to transfer from his bed, complete his bowel program, and shower.

12

Additionally, “when a prison regulation impinges on

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inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is

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reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”

15

v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

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to the statutory rights created by the [ADA and Rehabilitation

17

Act].”

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Here, he was denied his specific accommodations because they were

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unsafe, which is a legitimate penological interest.

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Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990) (holding prison

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officials have an interest and “duty to take reasonably measures

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for the prisoners’ own safety”).

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interest in taking reasonable measures to protect prisoner safety

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and defendants denied plaintiff’s requests for his safety,

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summary judgment is proper on this basis as well.

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Turner

“This is equally applicable

See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994).

See

Because prisons have an

Plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of fact as to

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whether defendants provided plaintiff with a reasonable

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accommodation and whether defendants intentionally discriminated
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against him.

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summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title II and Section 504 claims.

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C.

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Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’

State Law Claims
Plaintiff brings CDPA and Unruh Act claims against

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defendant CDCR.

Defendant CDCR seeks summary judgment because

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CDCR, as an agency of California, is immune from suit under the

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Eleventh Amendment.

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The Eleventh Amendment bars any suit against a state or

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state agency absent a valid waiver or abrogation of its sovereign

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immunity.

11

(1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

12

applies to state law claims brought into federal court under

13

pendent jurisdiction.

14

465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).

15

consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from

16

entertaining a suit against the state, or one of its agencies or

17

departments, based on a state law.”

18

759, 761 (9th Cir. 1986).

19

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54
This immunity

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
“[A]bsent a state’s unequivocal

Hall v. Hawaii, 791 F.2d

The Unruh Act and the CDPA have the same substantive

20

standards as the ADA.

The Unruh Act and the CDPA do not,

21

however, address the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment or

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California’s consent to suit in federal court.

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Code § 51(f) (Unruh Act); Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(d) (CDPA).

24

Plaintiff argues that California explicitly abrogated state

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sovereign immunity because (1) Congress explicitly abrogated

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state sovereign immunity in enacting the ADA and (2) the

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California legislature explicitly incorporated the ADA into the

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Unruh Act and the CDPA.

See Cal. Civ.

(Pl.’s Opp’n 17:3-20:22.)
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1

The courts that have considered plaintiff’s argument

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have rejected it.

See, e.g., Barker v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. &

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Rehab., Civ. No. 2:13-1793 KJM KJN P, 2015 WL 3913546, at *7-8

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(E.D. Cal. June 25, 2015) (Newman, M.J.); Hutchinson v. Cal.

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Dep’t Corr. & Rehab., Civ. No. 2:13-620 MCE AC, 2013 WL 5569984,

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at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“Plaintiff does not explain how

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mandating that the baseline substantive standards under the Unruh

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Act and the CDPA comport with the ADA unequivocally demonstrates

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that the State of California intended to subject itself to all

10

suits brought under those provisions.”); Myers v. Cal. Dep’t of

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Rehab., Civ. No. 2:12-497 GEB GGH, 2012 WL 3529784, at *3 (E.D.

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Cal. Aug. 14, 2012) (“[Plaintiff] fails to demonstrate that

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California made a ‘clear declaration’ in the Unruh Act of an

14

intent to waive its sovereign immunity . . . .”).

15

CDCR is presumptively entitled to immunity, Franceschi

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v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995), and plaintiff

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provides no basis to deviate from these prior orders.

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also cites no authority, nor has the court found any, that

19

supports plaintiff’s argument that the same substantive standards

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in the Unruh Act, CDPA, and ADA demonstrates an unequivocal

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consent to suit under the Unruh Act and the CDPA.

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Plaintiff

Because plaintiff fails to establish that California

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unequivocally consented to suit under the CDPA and the Unruh Act,

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CDCR is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

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Accordingly, the court must grant summary judgment on plaintiff’s

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CDPA and Unruh Act claims.

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D.

Section 1983 Claim
Plaintiff argues the individual defendants violated his
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Eighth Amendment rights by not providing him with his requested

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trapeze bar and rolling commode chair.

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To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate

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medical care under the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must show

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that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his

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serious medical needs.

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(1976).

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the condition could result in further significant injury or the

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unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat

Jett v. Penner, 439

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F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

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plaintiff has a serious medical need as a paraplegic who lacks

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bowel and bladder control and requires a wheelchair, catheter,

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and diapers.

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Here, it is undisputed that

For the same reasons that defendants were not

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deliberately indifferent under Title II when they provided

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plaintiff with reasonable accommodations, defendants are not

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deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs

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under the Eighth Amendment.

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medical staff recommendations, provided plaintiff with a trapeze

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bar, stationary commode chair, and shower chair to satisfy

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plaintiff’s medical needs.

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1830 KJM KJN P, 2013 WL 76288, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2013)

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(finding appeal reviewers were not deliberately indifferent for

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relying upon the recommendation of medical specialists handling a

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prisoner’s medication).

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these devices instead of his requested devices amounts to

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defendants “disregard[ing] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s]

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health and safety.”

Defendants, after reviewing the

See Coats v. Kimura, Civ. No. 2:09-

Plaintiff fails to show how providing

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38
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(1994).

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plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment as to

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

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summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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Dated:

May 16, 2017

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