Hutchinson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 5/16/17. CASE CLOSED. (Kaminski, H)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 KNOLTS HUTCHINSON, CIV. NO. 2:14-02398 WBS EFN Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, WARDEN R. RACKLEY, WARDEN B. DUFFY, ASSOCIATE WARDEN M. KAPLAN, FACILITIES SARGEANT A. ROMERO, 19 20 21 Defendants. ----oo0oo---- 22 23 Plaintiff Knolts Hutchinson filed this action against 24 defendants California Department of Corrections and 25 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Warden Rackley, Warden Duffy, Associate 26 Warden Kaplan, and Facilities Sergeant Romero, for violations of 27 the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation 28 Act, the California Disabled Person Act (“CDPA”), the Unruh Civil 1 1 Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), and deliberate indifference in 2 violation of the Eighth Amendment. 3 Civil Procedure 56, defendants now move for summary judgment 4 against plaintiff. 5 I. Pursuant to Federal Rule of (Docket No. 39.) Factual and Procedural Background 6 Plaintiff is a paraplegic inmate incarcerated by the 7 CDCR. He is paralyzed from the chest downwards, lacks bowel and 8 bladder control, and requires the use of a wheelchair. 9 In March 2013, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in federal 10 court against the CDCR and several employees, alleging he had 11 been injured at the California Medical Facility (“CMF”) because 12 he was provided with a locker that did not comply with the ADA. 13 That case was voluntarily dismissed on November 14, 2016. 14 Hutchinson v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., Civ. No. 2:16-00620 15 MCE AC (E.D. Cal.). 16 See On October 27, 2013, plaintiff was transferred from the 17 CMF to the California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). 18 and treats inmates who require a higher level of care due to 19 disability. 20 25, 2014, and was the CHCF Acting Warden from August 25, 2014, to 21 April 23, 2015. 22 (“Duffy Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3 (Docket No. 39-2).) 23 Warden prior to August 25, 2014. 24 2.) 25 CHCF houses Duffy was the CMF Acting Warden from 2012 to August (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, Ex. C Rackley was the CHCF (Id., Ex. D (“Rackley Decl.”) ¶ On November 4, 2013, plaintiff filed a request for an 26 adjustable trapeze bar that would allow him to transfer from his 27 bed to his wheelchair by himself, similar to the one he had in 28 2 1 the CMF.1 2 2013, and prior to his First Level of Review for this request, 3 plaintiff received a trapeze bar. 4 Appeal”).) 5 trapeze bar request at the First Level of Review based on 6 plaintiff’s representation that “[t]he issue had been resolved” 7 and based on their understanding that plaintiff was receiving 8 assistance from medical staff when transferring from his bed to 9 his wheelchair and could also transfer without assistance. (Id., Ex. H (“Trapeze Bar Request”).) On November 25, (Id., Ex. I (“First Level Romero and Kaplan subsequently granted plaintiff’s (Id.) 10 In March 2015, plaintiff received a different trapeze bar that 11 was adjustable and moveable. 12 No. 43-2).) 13 (Hutchinson Dep. 96:15-97:4 (Docket On November 10, 2013, plaintiff filed a request for a 14 rolling commode chair. 15 Ex. J (“Rolling Commode Request”).) 16 part, so he could defecate in the shower. 17 Williams Decl.”) ¶ 8.) 18 request for a rolling commode chair because he could transfer 19 himself from the toilet to the shower, assistance from medical 20 staff was available, and medical staff determined it was not safe 21 or medically necessary. (Id., Ex. F (“Romero Decl.”) ¶¶ 11-13.) 22 Plaintiff instead received a stationary commode chair and shower 23 chair. 24 reaffirmed that the rolling commode chair was not safe and did (Id.) (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, He wanted the chair, in (Id., Ex. L (“Dr. On review, Romero denied plaintiff’s Dr. Williams reviewed Romero’s decision and 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff had a moveable, or adjustable, trapeze bar at the previous facility because all of the beds were secured to the ground. In contrast, at the CHCF, plaintiff’s bed is mobile so it is safer to have a trapeze bar that is fixed to the bed in order to prevent a fall. (See Dr. Williams Decl. ¶ 7.) 3 1 not provide better accommodation than the stationary commode 2 chair. (Dr. Williams Decl. ¶ 8.) 3 Plaintiff brought this suit and alleges the following 4 causes of action: (1) violation of Title II of the ADA (“Title 5 II”); (2) retaliation in violation of Title V of the ADA; (3) 6 violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 7 504”); (4) violation of the CDPA; (5) violation of the Unruh Act; 8 and (5) deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs in 9 violation of the Eighth Amendment. 10 No. 33).) 11 judgment on all causes of action. 12 II. (Second Am. Compl. (Docket Now before the court is defendants’ Motion for summary (Docket No. 39.) Legal Standard 13 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 14 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 15 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 16 P. 56(a). 17 of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 18 reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 19 favor. 20 (1986). 21 burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 22 fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 23 negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 24 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 25 Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the non- 26 moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 27 element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 28 Id. Fed. R. Civ. A material fact is one that could affect the outcome Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 4 1 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 2 burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 3 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 4 324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 5 the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 6 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 7 Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 8 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 9 insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could Id. at To carry this burden, Matsushita 10 reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 11 at 252. 12 allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude summary 13 judgment.” 14 Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). “[T]he non-moving party may not rely on the mere T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 15 In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 16 view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 17 party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. 18 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 19 weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 20 inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a 21 judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . .” 22 III. Discussion 23 24 A. “Credibility determinations, the Id. Retaliation in Violation of Title V of the ADA Plaintiff argues the individual defendants retaliated 25 against him by transferring him from CMF to CHCF and denying him 26 a rolling commode chair and moveable trapeze bar because of his 27 prior lawsuit against the CDCR. 28 person shall discriminate against any individual because such Title V of the ADA provides: “No 5 1 individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this 2 chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, 3 assisted, or participated in any matter in an investigation, 4 proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 5 12203(a). 6 42 U.S.C. § To make out a prima facie retaliation case, the 7 plaintiff must show “(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) 8 an adverse . . . action and (3) a causal link between the two.” 9 Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003) 10 (quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 11 2000)). 12 defendant has the burden to “offer[] legitimate reasons for the 13 adverse . . . action.” 14 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). 15 reasons, the burden shifts to plaintiff “to demonstrate a triable 16 issue of fact as to whether such reasons are pretextual.” If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 17 Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d If the defendant provides legitimate Id. Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case. 18 First, there is no evidence that Duffy took adverse action 19 against plaintiff. 20 transfer plaintiff from CMF to CHCF.2 21 Once at CHCF, Duffy was not involved in plaintiff’s request for a 22 trapeze bar or rolling commode chair. 23 74:11-19.) 24 action against plaintiff, plaintiff’s retaliation claim against 25 26 27 28 2 He was not involved in the decision to (Duffy Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) (Id. ¶ 6; Hutchinson Dep. Because there is no evidence that he took an adverse Plaintiff attempts to dispute this evidence by pointing to an excerpt of plaintiff’s deposition. However, this portion of the deposition discusses Duffy’s knowledge of plaintiff’s need for a locker at CMF (the subject matter of the prior lawsuit), not Duffy’s involvement in the decision to transfer plaintiff to CMF. (See Hutchinson Dep. 68:20-69:11.) 6 1 Duffy must fail. 2 As to defendants Rackley, Kaplan, and Romero, there is 3 no causation evidence. If a defendant did not know of a 4 plaintiff’s protected activity, the defendant could not take 5 adverse action against the plaintiff based on that activity. 6 Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a 7 retaliation claim failed because there was insufficient evidence 8 that defendants knew of the prisoner’s protected activity). 9 There is no evidence that Rackley, Kaplan, and Romero knew See 10 plaintiff previously filed an ADA suit. 11 plaintiff’s prior suit when they were served in this action.3 12 (Rackley Decl. ¶ 3; Kaplan Decl. ¶ 7; Romero Decl. ¶ 14.) 13 is also no evidence that Rackley, Kaplan, and Romero were 14 involved with plaintiff’s transfer from CMF to CHCF.4 15 is undisputed that they did not know plaintiff filed a previous 16 lawsuit when any alleged adverse action occurred, plaintiff 17 cannot establish that they retaliated against him. 18 They only learned of There Because it Plaintiff argues that the temporal proximity between 19 the filing of his prior lawsuit and his transfer to CHCF 20 establishes the causation prong. 21 is admissible to prove causation, “mere temporal proximity . . . 22 must be ‘very close.’” While circumstantial evidence Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Plaintiff attempts to rebut this evidence by referencing his Second Amended Complaint; however, he “may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. 4 The claim against Rackley also fails for lack of an adverse action because he was not involved in the denial of plaintiff’s modification requests. (Rackley Decl. ¶ 4.) 7 1 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (per curiam) (citing with approval cases 2 in which three- and four-month periods were insufficient to 3 establish a causal connection); see, e.g., Swan v. Bank of Am., 4 360 Fed App’x 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding four-month period 5 was insufficient to show causation premised solely on temporal 6 proximity); Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 7 1018, 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding eight-month gap between 8 protected activity and termination was “too great to support an 9 inference” that the protected activity caused an adverse action). 10 The seven-month span between the filing of plaintiff’s previous 11 lawsuit and his transfer to CHCF alone is not enough to establish 12 causation. 13 Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie retaliation 14 claim against any of the defendants. 15 grant summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim. 16 B. 17 Accordingly, the court will Title II and Section 504 All defendants seek summary judgment on plaintiff’s 18 Title II and Section 504 claims, arguing that they did not 19 discriminate against him because of his disability and he was 20 still able to complete his bowel program and access the shower.5 21 Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified 22 individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 Plaintiff cannot sue the individual defendants in their individual capacities for violations of Title II or the Section 504. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”) Plaintiff may still sue the individual defendants in their official capacity for injunctive relief. 8 1 be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 2 the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 3 subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 4 12132. 5 “(1) he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was 6 either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a 7 public entity’s services . . . or was otherwise discriminated 8 against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial . . 9 . , or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” 42 U.S.C. § To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must show Duvall 10 v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 11 Weinreich v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 12 (9th Cir. 1997)). 13 Rehabilitation Act are the same, except that it is limited to 14 programs that receive federal financial assistance. 15 Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 862 n.17 (9th Cir. 2001).6 16 The requirements under Section 504 of the Armstrong v. The implementing regulations of Title II provide that 17 “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in 18 policies, practice, or procedures when the modifications are 19 necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, 20 unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the 21 modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 22 service, program, or activity.” 23 duty to provide “reasonable accommodations” for disabled people 24 arises only when a policy, practice, or procedure discriminates 25 on the basis of disability. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). The Weinreich, 114 F.3d at 979. 26 27 28 6 Neither party disputes that the California prison system receives federal financial assistance. See Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 862 n.17. 9 1 “To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA 2 or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional 3 discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard 4 for intentional discrimination is deliberate indifference. 5 Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138. 6 knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is 7 substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” 8 Id. at 1139. 9 “Deliberate indifference requires both It is undisputed that plaintiff is disabled and CDCR is 10 a public entity. 11 provided reasonable accommodations and whether defendants 12 intentionally discriminated against plaintiff. 13 bears the burden of establishing the existence of specific 14 reasonable accommodations that the defendant public entity failed 15 to provide. 16 a modification or accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific, 17 context-specific inquiry. 18 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999). 19 deference to the expert views of the facility administrators, a 20 detention or correctional facility’s legitimate interest . . . 21 when determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable.” 22 Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1216 (9th Cir. 2008). 23 Here, plaintiff’s requested accommodations were unreasonable and 24 defendants provided reasonable accommodations. 25 Thus, the inquiry is whether defendants See Weinreich, 114 F.3d at 978. The plaintiff Determining whether Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 The court may “consider, with It is undisputed that the rolling commode chair and 26 adjustable trapeze bar were unsafe and medically unnecessary at 27 CHCF. 28 requested trapeze bar is unsafe because plaintiff’s bed is mobile (Romero Decl. ¶ 10; Dr. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) 10 The 1 and the requested trapeze bar would be affixed to the wall, which 2 could cause the bed to move during transfer. 3 Decl. ¶ 7.) 4 (Id.) 5 permits plaintiff to defecate in the shower, and wet moveable 6 equipment is substantially more dangerous than stationary wet 7 equipment. 8 commode chair is also more unsafe than to a stationary chair 9 because a person is transferring between two moveable objects. (See Dr. Williams This increases plaintiff’s chances of falling. The rolling commode is unsafe because it is not hygienic, (Id. ¶ 8.) Transfer from a wheelchair to rolling 10 (Id.) 11 controverting defendants’ expert testimony that plaintiff’s 12 requested accommodations were unsafe. 13 978. 14 chair are unsafe, they are not reasonable accommodations. 15 Plaintiff provides no evidence or expert testimony See Weinreich, 114 F.3d at Because both the requested trapeze bar and rolling commode Even if plaintiff’s requested accommodations were 16 reasonable, defendants only need to provide a reasonable 17 accommodation, not plaintiff’s requested accommodation. 18 Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 19 2002) (“An employer is not obligated to provide an employee the 20 accommodation he requests or prefers, the employer need only 21 provide some reasonable accommodation.”); Connor v. California, 22 Civ. No. 1:10-1967 AWI BAM, 2013 WL 321703, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23 28, 2013) (McAuliffe, M.J.). 24 defendants provided were reasonable accommodations. 25 Williams’s expert declaration recommends both the trapeze bar and 26 stationary commode chair provided by CDCR. 27 ¶¶ 13, 15.) 28 the mobile beds at CHCF because it is attached to the bed itself, See The trapeze bar and commode chair Dr. (Dr. Williams Decl. Plaintiff received an “optimally safe trapeze” for 11 1 limiting his chances of falling if the bed were to move. 2 7.) 3 wheelchair, alone or with the assistance of medical staff. 4 stationary commode chair is safe because it acts as an anchor 5 when plaintiff attempts to transfer from the moveable wheelchair 6 to the stationary commode chair. 7 complete his bowel movement with the stationary commode chair and 8 can then transfer to his wheelchair to shower. (Id. ¶ Plaintiff is still able to transfer from his bed to (Id. ¶ 8.) The Plaintiff can still 9 Plaintiff argues in his opposition that he was unable 10 to safely transfer alone; however, he concedes that it was “not 11 that much of a problem” to transfer in and out of bed using a 12 transfer board and trapeze bar and plaintiff demonstrated his 13 ability to use the trapeze bar to medical staff. 14 B; Hutchinson Dep. 79:16-21; 81:19-23.) 15 no evidence that plaintiff’s requested devices “address his 16 medical condition any better than the devices” provided at CHCF. 17 (Dr. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15.) 18 testimony to rebut defendants’ evidence that the accommodations 19 provided were adequate, safe, and reasonable. (Id. ¶ 9, Ex. Additionally, there is Plaintiff submits no expert 20 Plaintiff also fails to show any evidence of 21 intentional discrimination by defendants because of plaintiff’s 22 disability. 23 up to an hour for staff assistance if they were busy or it was 24 around 2:00 a.m. and he once fell when staff was helping him 25 transfer. 26 plaintiff fell only once, (id. 99:11-23, 106:23-107:23), and 27 isolated acts of negligence are insufficient for an ADA claim, 28 Jamison v. Baillie, Civ. No. 2:10-124 KJM EFB P, 2016 WL 775746, He argues that he would sometimes have to wait for The delay occurred on only a few occasions and 12 1 at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (Brennan, M.J.). 2 Curtis, 68 F. App’x 561, 563 (6th Cir. 2003) (alleging isolated 3 instances of failure to accommodate disabled prisoner’s condition 4 does not state a claim under the ADA); Calbart v. Denver Sheriff 5 Dep’t, No. 10-cv-1385-LTB-CBS, 2012 WL 1229923, at *9 (D. Colo. 6 Feb. 23, 2012) (finding interference with prescribed treatment 7 regime does not constitute discrimination under the ADA). 8 Further, this evidence does not show that defendants 9 discriminated against him because of his disability. See Moore v. To the 10 contrary, CDCR provided him with accommodations that allowed him 11 to transfer from his bed, complete his bowel program, and shower. 12 Additionally, “when a prison regulation impinges on 13 inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 14 reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 15 v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 16 to the statutory rights created by the [ADA and Rehabilitation 17 Act].” 18 Here, he was denied his specific accommodations because they were 19 unsafe, which is a legitimate penological interest. 20 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990) (holding prison 21 officials have an interest and “duty to take reasonably measures 22 for the prisoners’ own safety”). 23 interest in taking reasonable measures to protect prisoner safety 24 and defendants denied plaintiff’s requests for his safety, 25 summary judgment is proper on this basis as well. 26 Turner “This is equally applicable See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994). See Because prisons have an Plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of fact as to 27 whether defendants provided plaintiff with a reasonable 28 accommodation and whether defendants intentionally discriminated 13 1 against him. 2 summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title II and Section 504 claims. 3 C. 4 Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’ State Law Claims Plaintiff brings CDPA and Unruh Act claims against 5 defendant CDCR. Defendant CDCR seeks summary judgment because 6 CDCR, as an agency of California, is immune from suit under the 7 Eleventh Amendment. 8 The Eleventh Amendment bars any suit against a state or 9 state agency absent a valid waiver or abrogation of its sovereign 10 immunity. 11 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). 12 applies to state law claims brought into federal court under 13 pendent jurisdiction. 14 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984). 15 consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from 16 entertaining a suit against the state, or one of its agencies or 17 departments, based on a state law.” 18 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1986). 19 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 This immunity Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, “[A]bsent a state’s unequivocal Hall v. Hawaii, 791 F.2d The Unruh Act and the CDPA have the same substantive 20 standards as the ADA. The Unruh Act and the CDPA do not, 21 however, address the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment or 22 California’s consent to suit in federal court. 23 Code § 51(f) (Unruh Act); Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(d) (CDPA). 24 Plaintiff argues that California explicitly abrogated state 25 sovereign immunity because (1) Congress explicitly abrogated 26 state sovereign immunity in enacting the ADA and (2) the 27 California legislature explicitly incorporated the ADA into the 28 Unruh Act and the CDPA. See Cal. Civ. (Pl.’s Opp’n 17:3-20:22.) 14 1 The courts that have considered plaintiff’s argument 2 have rejected it. See, e.g., Barker v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & 3 Rehab., Civ. No. 2:13-1793 KJM KJN P, 2015 WL 3913546, at *7-8 4 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2015) (Newman, M.J.); Hutchinson v. Cal. 5 Dep’t Corr. & Rehab., Civ. No. 2:13-620 MCE AC, 2013 WL 5569984, 6 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“Plaintiff does not explain how 7 mandating that the baseline substantive standards under the Unruh 8 Act and the CDPA comport with the ADA unequivocally demonstrates 9 that the State of California intended to subject itself to all 10 suits brought under those provisions.”); Myers v. Cal. Dep’t of 11 Rehab., Civ. No. 2:12-497 GEB GGH, 2012 WL 3529784, at *3 (E.D. 12 Cal. Aug. 14, 2012) (“[Plaintiff] fails to demonstrate that 13 California made a ‘clear declaration’ in the Unruh Act of an 14 intent to waive its sovereign immunity . . . .”). 15 CDCR is presumptively entitled to immunity, Franceschi 16 v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995), and plaintiff 17 provides no basis to deviate from these prior orders. 18 also cites no authority, nor has the court found any, that 19 supports plaintiff’s argument that the same substantive standards 20 in the Unruh Act, CDPA, and ADA demonstrates an unequivocal 21 consent to suit under the Unruh Act and the CDPA. 22 Plaintiff Because plaintiff fails to establish that California 23 unequivocally consented to suit under the CDPA and the Unruh Act, 24 CDCR is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 25 Accordingly, the court must grant summary judgment on plaintiff’s 26 CDPA and Unruh Act claims. 27 28 D. Section 1983 Claim Plaintiff argues the individual defendants violated his 15 1 Eighth Amendment rights by not providing him with his requested 2 trapeze bar and rolling commode chair. 3 To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate 4 medical care under the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must show 5 that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his 6 serious medical needs. 7 (1976). 8 the condition could result in further significant injury or the 9 unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat Jett v. Penner, 439 10 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 11 plaintiff has a serious medical need as a paraplegic who lacks 12 bowel and bladder control and requires a wheelchair, catheter, 13 and diapers. 14 Here, it is undisputed that For the same reasons that defendants were not 15 deliberately indifferent under Title II when they provided 16 plaintiff with reasonable accommodations, defendants are not 17 deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs 18 under the Eighth Amendment. 19 medical staff recommendations, provided plaintiff with a trapeze 20 bar, stationary commode chair, and shower chair to satisfy 21 plaintiff’s medical needs. 22 1830 KJM KJN P, 2013 WL 76288, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2013) 23 (finding appeal reviewers were not deliberately indifferent for 24 relying upon the recommendation of medical specialists handling a 25 prisoner’s medication). 26 these devices instead of his requested devices amounts to 27 defendants “disregard[ing] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] 28 health and safety.” Defendants, after reviewing the See Coats v. Kimura, Civ. No. 2:09- Plaintiff fails to show how providing See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 16 1 (1994). 2 plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment as to IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 4 summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 5 Dated: May 16, 2017 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.

Why Is My Information Online?