Smith, III v. Hamilton
Filing
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FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd on 4/28/15 RECOMMENDING that the 2 Motion to Proceed IFP be denied and this action be dismissed without leave to amend. Referred to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller. Objections due within 14 days. (Manzer, C)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CORNELL J S SMITH III,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
No. 2:14-cv-2445 KJM DAD PS
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
JOY L. HAMILTON,
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Defendant.
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Plaintiff, Cornell Smith, is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to
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the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff
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has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
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Plaintiff‟s in forma pauperis application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §
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1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma pauperis
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status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “„A district court may deny leave to
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proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that
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the action is frivolous or without merit.‟” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th
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Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)). See
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also Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District Court to
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examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the
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proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is
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bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”).
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Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of
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poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
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state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune
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defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an
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arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v.
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Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a
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complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the
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factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
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To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to
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state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as
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true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most
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favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v.
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Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245
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(9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
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lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true
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conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western
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Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
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The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court‟s
jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand
for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
Here, plaintiff‟s complaint fails to contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon
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which this court‟s jurisdiction depends. Moreover, in his complaint plaintiff alleges that both he
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and the named defendant are California residents and yet plaintiff has attempted to assert only
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state law causes of action. Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that must precede the adjudication
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of any case before the district court. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of
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Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal courts are courts of limited
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jurisdiction and may adjudicate only those cases authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v.
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Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37
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(1992). “Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, „unless the contrary appears
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affirmatively from the record.‟” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting
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Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)).
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Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court at any time during the
proceedings. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir.
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1996). A federal court “ha[s] an independent obligation to address sua sponte whether [it] has
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subject-matter jurisdiction.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). It is the
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obligation of the district court “to be alert to jurisdictional requirements.” Grupo Dataflux v.
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Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004). Without jurisdiction, the district court
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cannot decide the merits of a case or order any relief. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380.
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The burden of establishing jurisdiction rests upon plaintiff as the party asserting
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jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974)
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(acknowledging that a claim may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if it is “so insubstantial,
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implausible, . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy
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within the jurisdiction of the District Court”); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)
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(recognizing that a claim is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction where it is “wholly
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insubstantial and frivolous” and so patently without merit as to justify dismissal for lack of
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jurisdiction ); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that even
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“[a] paid complaint that is „obviously frivolous‟ does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction
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. . . and may be dismissed sua sponte before service of process.”).
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Moreover, the factual allegations of the complaint concern plaintiff‟s assertion that the
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defendant, plaintiff‟s former spouse and the mother of his child, “began collecting cash-aid and
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medi-cal through Sacramento County welfare, claiming custodial paternity for [their] daughter,”
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which resulted in plaintiff being ordered to pay child support. (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1.) at 1-2.)
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Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a federal district court is precluded from hearing
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“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
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rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
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rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
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284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state court orders and
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judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state court as well.
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Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Worldwide
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Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986).
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state
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court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also apply where the parties
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do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine prohibits a federal
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district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a
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state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008)
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(internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a „de facto appeal‟
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forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when „a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly
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erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that
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decision.‟” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d
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at 1164). See also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman
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doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in
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„which a party losing in state court‟ seeks „what in substance would be appellate review of the
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state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party‟s claim that the state
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judgment itself violates the loser‟s federal rights.‟”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
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997, 1005-06 (1994)), cert. denied 547 U .S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief
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from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also
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alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013).
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[A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a
forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court
must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it
must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is
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„inextricably intertwined‟ with an issue resolved by the state court
in its judicial decision.
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Doe, 415 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). See also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 286 n. 1 (“a
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district court [cannot] entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the
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state court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack [is]
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„inextricably intertwined‟ with the state court‟s judgment”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.
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16)); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898, 900 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“claims raised in the
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federal court action are „inextricably intertwined‟ with the state court‟s decision such that the
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adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to
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interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16,
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485).
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Here, plaintiff failed to prevail in state court, is now complaining of injuries caused him
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by a state court judgment rendered before this federal action was commenced, and is inviting this
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federal court to review those state court proceedings to find error. As recognized by the
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authorities cited above, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine this federal district court is precluded
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from hearing such an action.
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LEAVE TO AMEND
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For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff‟s complaint should be dismissed for lack of
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subject matter jurisdiction.
The undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff may amend his pleading to
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state a claim over which the court would have subject matter jurisdiction. “Valid reasons for
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denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California
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Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988). See also
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Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass‟n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983)
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(holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile
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amendments). In light of the obvious lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the undersigned finds
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that it would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend in this case. See Nadolski v. Winchester,
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No. 13-CV-2370 LAB DHB, 2014 WL 3962473, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014) (“Nadolski‟s
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claims are a similar attempt to challenge, here in federal court, an adverse family court ruling in
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state court. These claims are barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.”); Mellema v. Washoe
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County Dist. Atty., No. 2:12-cv-2525 GEB KJN PS, 2012 WL 5289345, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23,
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2012) (“In this case, plaintiff‟s request that this court „cancel‟ the family court order and child
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support debt owed plainly amounts to a forbidden de facto appeal of the state court‟s order
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directing plaintiff to pay child support.”); Rucker v. County of Santa Clara, State of California,
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No. C02-5981 JSW, 2003 WL 21440151, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2003) (“Rucker challenges his
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original child support order on jurisdictional grounds, disputes his total child support arrearages,
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and alleges that Santa Clara County‟s garnishment order against his disability benefits payments
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is invalid. Thus, Rucker‟s claims are „inextricably intertwined‟ with the state court‟s ruling.”).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
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1. Plaintiff‟s October 17, 2014 application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No.
2) be denied;
2. Plaintiff‟s October 17, 2014 complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed without leave
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to amend; and
3. This action be dismissed.
These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge
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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14)
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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written
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objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to
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Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file
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objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal
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the District Court‟s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Dated: April 28, 2015
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DAD:6
Ddad1\orders.pro se\smith2445.ifp.den.f&rs
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