Gardner v. California Highway Patrol et al
Filing
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ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 11/16/15 ORDERING for the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES McCullough's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Becknal, R)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DREW GARDNER,
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2:14-cv-02730 JAM-CMK
Plaintiff,
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No.
v.
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL;
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL
OFFICER J.J. FISCHER; TEHAMA
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;
TEHAMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT DEPUTY
INVESTIGATOR ED McCULLOUGH;
KENNETH MILLER; and DOES
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ED
MCCULLOUGH’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Defendants.
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Defendant Tehama County Sheriff’s Department Deputy
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Investigator Ed McCullough (“McCullough”) filed a Motion for
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Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, a Motion for Summary
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Judgment (Doc. #58) (“the current Motion”). 1
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denied McCullough’s request for reconsideration and now turns to
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his alternative request for summary judgment in his favor.
The Court has
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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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In support of the current motion, McCullough submitted a
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Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. #58-1) to which Plaintiff
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responded (Doc. #60).
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McCullough are in fact undisputed.
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Separate Statement of Disputed Material Facts (Doc. #61) to which
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McCullough responded (Doc. #65-1).
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five of the facts submitted by Plaintiff, and although he does
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dispute the remaining facts, he acknowledges that the Court must
Many of the underlying facts submitted by
Plaintiff submitted a
McCullough does not dispute
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take them as true for the purposes of the current motion.
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McCullough urges the Court to disregard those facts as immaterial
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to the Fourteenth Amendment claim at issue in the current motion.
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Below is a brief summary of the relevant facts that the Court
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takes as true for the purposes of the current motion only.
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On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a
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Jeep Wrangler that had been reported stolen.
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Patrol (“CHP”) Officer J.J. Fischer (“Fischer”) apprehended
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Plaintiff and took him into custody.
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was booked into Tehama County Jail (“the Jail”).
California Highway
Soon thereafter, Plaintiff
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Following Plaintiff’s arrest, Fischer wrote a Patrol Report.
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In his report, Fischer wrote that, during Plaintiff’s booking, he
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had confiscated a “clear white baggie with a white crystalline
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substance” - which tested positive for methamphetamine – from
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Plaintiff’s jacket, as well as a concealed hunting knife.
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Plaintiff alleges that neither of these statements was true.
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Plaintiff was charged with (1) unlawful driving or taking of a
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vehicle; (2) receiving stolen property – motor vehicle;
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(3) driving under the influence; (4) bringing contraband into the
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jail; (5) possession of a controlled substance; and (6) carrying
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a dirk or dagger.
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the Court ordered him detained on $315,000 bail.
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Plaintiff was arraigned on these charges, and
On January 3, 2014, the Shasta County Sheriff’s Office
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(“Shasta SO”) requested an “agency assist” from the Tehama County
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Sherriff’s Office (“Tehama SO”) regarding the incident.
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McCullough was tasked with conducting an investigation of this
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incident.
McCullough interviewed Plaintiff at the Jail.
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Plaintiff provided McCullough with a number of leads, and
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McCullough told Plaintiff that he would report back on his
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findings and adjust the criminal charges against Plaintiff if
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warranted.
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McCullough discovered evidence exculpating Plaintiff of the
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charges related to the theft and driving of the Jeep Wrangler
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(“the vehicle charges”).
As a result of his subsequent investigation,
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Upon discovering the exculpatory evidence, McCullough
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attempted to contact the point person at the Shasta SO, Deputy
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Meeker (“Meeker”), but was told Meeker was not on duty.
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January 9th or 10th, McCullough wrote an investigation report
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summarizing his findings (“the Report”).
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the Report to the “assigned Sergeant” for approval.
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21, McCullough discovered that the Sergeant had not yet approved
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or finalized the Report and immediately requested and received
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such approval.
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to a detective at the Shasta SO later that day.
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told the evidence and the Report would be forwarded to Meeker.
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///
On
McCullough forwarded
On January
McCullough delivered the evidence and the Report
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McCullough was
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During this time and while still detained at the Jail,
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Plaintiff made repeated attempts to contact McCullough, through
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written requests for interviews and phone calls.
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submitted his third written request directly to an officer at the
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Jail who told him he would either personally hand it to
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McCullough or put it directly into McCullough’s box.
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also enlisted his mother, who attempted to reach McCullough on
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her own and left numerous voicemails for him.
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responded to either Plaintiff or his mother.
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Plaintiff
Plaintiff
McCullough never
On March 12, Tehama County Deputy District Attorney James
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Waugh (“the District Attorney”) called McCullough regarding
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Plaintiff’s case.
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Report up to that point.
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Report later that day.
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dismissed the vehicle charges.
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exculpatory evidence regarding the remaining charges was
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discovered by an official at the Jail at the urging of Plaintiff,
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Plaintiff was released.
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The District Attorney had not received the
McCullough delivered a copy of the
On March 17, the District Attorney
On April 3, after additional
On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed the First Amended
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Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #33) alleging fourteen causes of action
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against various defendants.
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was a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§1983”)
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alleging McCullough violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due
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process rights.
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#36) the claims brought against him in the FAC.
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granted in part and denied in part (Doc. #45) McCullough’s
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motion.
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stated a claim for violation of his substantive due process
Included therein, and relevant here,
McCullough brought a motion to dismiss (Doc.
The Court
Relevant here, the Court found Plaintiff adequately
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rights under §1983 against McCullough and that McCullough was not
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entitled to qualified immunity on the claim.
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the motion without leave to amend as to Plaintiff’s claim that
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his procedural due process rights were also violated.
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The Court granted
The Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (Doc. #52) was
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subsequently filed and included the same substantive due process
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claim against McCullough, among others. 2
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current motion first requesting the Court to reconsider its Order
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denying the Motion to Dismiss the substantive due process claim
McCullough brought the
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on qualified immunity grounds.
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good cause for reconsidering its previous Order and denied that
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portion of the current motion (Doc. #70).
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the remaining portion of the current motion in which McCullough
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seeks summary judgment in his favor on the first cause of action
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in the TAC for violation of Plaintiff’s substantive due process
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rights. The Court has included in its consideration of this
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motion McCullough’s Statement of Recent Decision and the case
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referenced therein (Doc.#81).
The Court found there was not
The Court now takes up
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II.
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OPINION
In the current motion, McCullough contends the undisputed
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material facts demonstrate he is entitled to qualified immunity
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with regard to Plaintiff’s first cause of action in the TAC,
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which alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive
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due process right, and, therefore, the Court should grant summary
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A Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #46) was filed, but the
parties stipulated to amendment (Doc. #51) to correct various
errors shortly thereafter. No relevant changes were made in the
TAC.
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judgment in McCullough’s favor.
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As discussed in the Court’s earlier Order, in Tatum v.
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Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Tatum”), the Ninth
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Circuit held that a due process violation may occur when an
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individual is subject to “prolonged detention when the police,
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with deliberate indifference to, or in the face of a perceived
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risk that, their actions will violate the plaintiff’s right to be
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free of unjustified pretrial detention, withhold from the
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prosecutors information strongly indicative of his innocence[.]”
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The court placed limitations on this constitutional rule,
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however, restricting it to “detentions of (1) unusual length,
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(2) caused by the investigating officers’ failure to disclose
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highly significant exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, and
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(3) due to conduct that is culpable in that the officers
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understood the risks to the plaintiff’s rights from withholding
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the information or were completely indifferent to those risks.”
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Id. at 819-20.
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the analysis has two prongs: (1) whether the official violated
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the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and (2) whether the right
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violated was clearly established at the time of the official's
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conduct.
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2015).
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When a defense of qualified immunity is asserted,
Jones v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 802 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
Although the Court previously rejected McCullough’s
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qualified immunity defense, he now contends the undisputed facts
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establish that the key allegations in the FAC and the TAC are
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incomplete and incorrect.
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even if qualified immunity was not established based on the
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factual circumstances alleged in the FAC, the facts now before
McCullough essentially argues that
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the Court are so clear that there exists no genuine issue of
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material fact such that he is entitled to qualified immunity on
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Plaintiff’s due process claim.
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The Court disagrees.
McCullough argues that he timely completed and submitted the
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Report.
When he discovered that the Report was not approved, he
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timely took steps to get that approval and deliver it to the
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Shasta SO.
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Shasta SO, or directly with Meeker, or to deliver the Report
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directly to the District Attorney is of no consequence because he
McCullough argues his failure to follow up with the
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“reasonably believed that either the Shasta SO or the CHP would
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timely provide a copy of that report to the District Attorney.”
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Under such circumstances, McCullough argues his conduct was
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reasonable and appropriate, and therefore did not violate
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Plaintiff’s due process rights.
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However, based on the evidence put forth by Plaintiff, there
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was strong reason for McCullough to believe that a copy of the
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Report was not timely provided to the District Attorney.
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is evidence that numerous attempts were made by Plaintiff and his
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mother to contact McCullough to follow up on the matter,
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including interview requests that jail officials said would be
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relayed directly to McCullough and voicemails left for McCullough
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by Plaintiff’s mother.
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inferences therefrom in the manner most favorable to Plaintiff,
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McCullough was on notice that Plaintiff remained detained in the
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Jail and should have known that the Report and the exculpatory
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evidence discovered by McCullough did not make it into the hands
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of the proper authority.
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Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
There
Viewing this evidence and drawing
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
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There is no evidence that McCullough ever made direct
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contact with Meeker regarding the exculpatory findings or ensured
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that the Report was received by him.
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CHP would timely provide the Report to the District Attorney,
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McCullough directly submits that when he contacted the CHP, a
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staff person told McCullough that they “did not want to receive a
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copy of the report.”
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Plaintiff, the evidence could support a jury finding that
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McCullough acted with deliberate indifference to or reckless
As for his belief that the
Taken in the light most favorable to
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disregard for Plaintiff’s due process rights.
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Tatum, at 821.
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See Anderson v.
McCullough also puts forth a number of arguments that were
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already considered and rejected by the Court in its previous
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Order.
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violation so McCullough’s arguments regarding the pre-condition
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of a criminal conviction are unpersuasive.
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remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
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McCullough’s conduct prolonged Plaintiff’s detention in jail.
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appears undisputed that the receipt of the Report quickly led the
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District Attorney to drop the vehicle charges, which was then
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followed by Plaintiff being released from jail a few weeks later.
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Finally, the issue of whether the constitutional right was
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“clearly established” was sufficiently discussed in the Court’s
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previous Order where it found that at the time of the incident
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“the Ninth Circuit had clearly established the ‘constitutional
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right to be free from continued [pretrial] detention after it was
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or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to
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release.’”
First, Plaintiff’s claim is not based on a Brady
Second, there still
Order at pp. 22-23 (citing Lee v. City of Los
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Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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provided to the Court in conjunction with the current motion does
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not change the nature of the right underlying Plaintiff’s claim.
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The Court finds the violative nature of McCullough’s particular
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conduct was clearly established to the “required degree of
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specificity.”
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Accordingly, McCullough’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
The evidence
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308-09 (2015).
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III.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES
McCullough’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 16, 2015
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