Johnson v. Vu et al

Filing 42

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 6/29/17, ORDERING that Plaintiff's 37 motion for attorneys' fees and expenses is GRANTED and AWARDS a total of $10,999.00.(Kastilahn, A)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11
12

SCOTT JOHNSON,

13
14
15
16
17

No.

2:14-cv-02786-JAM-EFB

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

BACH THUOC VU, in his
individual and representative
capacity as Trustee--Vole
Irrevocable Family Trust;
KIMBERLY T. LE, and Does 110,

18
Defendants.
19
20

Plaintiff Scott Johnson (“Plaintiff” or “Johnson”) sued

21

Defendants Bach Thuoc Vu (“Vu”) and Kimberly T. Le (“Le”)

22

(collectively, “Defendants”) in November 2014 alleging

23

Defendants’ Boomer Medical Clinic did not comply with state and

24

federal disability access laws.

25

Johnson brought four claims against Defendants: (1) violation of

26

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (2) violation of the

27

Unruh Civil Rights Act, (3) violation of the California Disabled

28

Persons Act, and (4) negligence.

Compl. at 1, 4-7, ECF No. 1.

Id. at 4-7.
1

In April 2015,

1

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Vu without prejudice.

2

11, 12.

3

portion of the case[] relating to issues of injunctive relief.”

4

Consent Decree at 2, ECF No. 24.

5

Court should not dismiss the case in its entirety because

6

“monetary issues are still at issue . . . [and] these issues may

7

still proceed to trial.”

8

moved for partial summary judgment on his first and second

9

claims.

ECF Nos.

In February 2016, the parties stipulated to “settle the

The parties noted that the

Id. at 3.

In February 2017, Johnson

Mot. Summ. J. at 3-9, ECF No. 31-1.

Johnson did not

10

address his third or fourth claims in his motion for summary

11

judgment.

12

April 2017, Johnson voluntarily dismissed his third and fourth

13

claims.

14

first and second claims.

The Court granted Johnson’s motion.

ECF No. 38.

ECF No. 35.

In

Johnson now requests attorneys’ fees on his
ECF No. 37.

15
16

I.

OPINION

17

A.

Legal Standard

18

A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees

19

and expenses under the ADA and the Unruh Act.

42 U.S.C.

20

§ 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a).

21

actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the

22

legal relationship between the parties by modifying the

23

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the

24

plaintiff.”

25

determine a reasonable fee, courts calculate “the number of

26

hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a

27

reasonable hourly rate.”

28

433 (1983).

“[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992).

To

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

2

1

B.

2
3

Analysis
1.

Hours Reasonably Expended

District courts have discretion in determining the number of

4

hours reasonably expended on a case.

See Chalmers v. City of Los

5

Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986).

6

exclude from a request for attorneys’ fees hours that were not

7

reasonably expended, “such as those incurred from overstaffing,

8

or ‘hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

9

unnecessary.”

A court should

The Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Prot.

10

Agency, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting

11

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).

12

not attempt to impose its own judgment regarding the best way to

13

operate a law firm, nor to determine if different staffing

14

decisions might have led to different fee requests.”

15

City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008).

16

Despite its discretion, a court “may

Moreno v.

Plaintiff’s motion requests $16,199 in fees and costs, but

17

his reply reduces the request to $14,274.

18

Fees (“Mot.”) at 16; Reply at 4.

19

Plaintiff submitted a billing statement itemizing the hours

20

expended by attorneys Mark Potter, Phyl Grace, Isabel Masanque,

21

Chris Carson, and Amanda Lockhart.

22

No. 37-3.

23
24
25
26

Mot. for Attorneys’

In support of his request,

Billing Statement at 1, ECF

Defendant Le asks the Court to reduce several of the billing
entries.

Opp’n at 2.
a.

Mr. Potter’s 9/30/2014 Entry

Le argues Mr. Potter’s billing entry of 0.9 hours on

27

9/30/2014 is unreasonable in light of “the hundreds of cases

28

Plaintiff’s firm has filed in this District.”
3

Id. at 2.

Given

1

that this case mirrors dozens of others brought by Johnson, the

2

Court finds Le’s argument meritorious.

3

9/30/2014 entry to 0.3 hours.

4

b.

The Court reduces the

Mr. Potter’s 11/3/2014, 11/18/2014, and
2/3/2015 Entries

5
6

Le argues a more junior attorney or staff member could have

7

completed the public records request, review of cover sheet, and

8

drafting discovery for which Mr. Potter billed a total of 3.4

9

hours in the November and February billing entries.

Opp’n at 2.

10

Johnson responds that the Ninth Circuit rejected the same

11

argument in Moreno.

12

court cannot reduce attorneys’ fees solely because a more junior

13

attorney could have completed the work.

14

1115.

15

11/3/2014, 11/18/2014, and 2/3/2015 billing entries solely based

16

on Le’s argument that Mr. Potter could have delegated the tasks

17

to a more junior attorney.

Under Moreno, a district

See Moreno, 534 F.3d at

In following Moreno, this Court will not reduce the

18

c.

19

Reply at 1-2.

Mr. Potter’s Estimated Entry for Reply Brief

Mr. Potter initially estimated 7 hours to “review opposition

20

brief, draft the reply brief, [and] attend oral argument.”

21

Billing Statement at 3.

22

hours.

23

reviewing Le’s opposition and drafting a response.

24

motions and complaint in this case, Johnson’s reply brief does

25

not appear to be a near carbon-copy of replies filed by Johnson

26

in other cases.

27

///

28

///

Mr. Potter now reduces that entry to 1.5

The Court finds it reasonable to spend 1.5 hours

4

Unlike the

1

d.

2

Ms. Masanque’s 2/7/2017 Entries

Le argues Ms. Masanque’s entry for 2.4 hours to draft

3

Johnson’s and the expert’s declarations are unreasonable because

4

the declarations were nearly identical to that in dozens of other

5

cases.

6

cursory and amount to little more than condescending jeremiads.”

7

Reply at 4.

8
9

Opp’n at 2.

Johnson responds that “these objections are

The Court agrees with Le.

Johnson’s declaration in support

of his motion for summary judgment was only three pages long and

10

used language very similar to the complaint and to other

11

declarations by Mr. Johnson filed with this Court.

12

31-5.

13

See ECF No. 31-10.

14

hours to draft and get signatures on two three-page declarations.

15

The Court therefore decreases Ms. Masanque’s 2/7/2017 billing

16

entry for drafting declarations to 1 hour.

17

See ECF No.

The expert’s declaration was also only three pages long.
The Court finds it unreasonable to bill 2.4

Le also argues Ms. Masanque’s 7 hour billing entry for

18

drafting Johnson’s summary judgment motion is unreasonable

19

because Johnson’s motions are “almost a ‘form’ by now.”

20

2.

21

on 2/7/2017.

22

Opp’n at

Le also notes that Ms. Masanque billed a total of 9.4 hours
Id.

The Court disregards Le’s implications regarding Ms.

23

Masanque billing 9.4 hours in one day and finds that it was not

24

unreasonable for Ms. Masanque to work and bill hours beyond an

25

eight hour workday.

26

unreasonable to expend 7 hours on Johnson’s summary judgment

27

motion.

28

contained ten substantive pages.

The Court agrees with Le however that it was

First, Johnson’s motion for partial summary judgment
See ECF No. 31.
5

Of those ten

1

pages, the first five pages include facts about Johnson and legal

2

standards that appear in the complaint in this case and in other

3

motions for summary judgment brought by Johnson in this court.

4

See id.

5

summary judgment motion occupies a maximum of five pages.

6

id.

7

seven hours to write a mere five pages of substance.

8

therefore reduces the second 2/7/17 billing entry to 4 hours.

The substantive analysis specific to this case in the

The Court finds it unreasonable for Ms. Masanque to bill

9
10

See

e.

The Court

Chris Carson’s 5/11/2016 Entry

Le argues Chris Carson’s entry of 2.3 hours for pretrial

11

statement tasks is unreasonable because there was no need for a

12

pretrial statement because the Court granted Johnson’s motion for

13

summary judgment.

14

pretrial documents were filed a year before the summary judgment

15

motion and they can be found on the docket.

16

Opp’n at 2.

Johnson responds that these

Reply at 4.

The Court has reviewed the pretrial documents, and notes

17

that the pretrial statement contains only one page (page 3) of

18

information unique to this case.

19

the witness list contains only four names.

20

Given the brevity and simplicity of these documents, the Court

21

finds it unreasonable to expend 2.3 hours on this work.

22

Court reduces Carson’s 5/11/2016 entry to 1.3 hours.

See ECF No. 25.

Additionally,

See ECF No. 25-1.

The

23

Le does not ask the Court to strike any of Ms. Grace’s or

24

Ms. Lockhart’s billing entries or any other additional billing

25

entries.

26
27
28

2.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

The Court must now multiply the reasonable hours expended in
this litigation by the reasonable hourly rate for each attorney.
6

1

See Johnson v. Chan, 2016 WL 4368104 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15,

2

2016).

3

“prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”

4

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).

5

“produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are

6

in line with . . . lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

7

experience and reputation.”

8
9

Courts determine reasonable hourly rates by reviewing the
Blum v.

The party seeking fees must

Id. at 895 n.11.

Johnson seeks hourly rates of $350 for Potter, $250 for
Grace, and $200 for Masanque, Carson, and Lockhart.

Mot. at 9.

10

Johnson relies on John O'Connor's expertise on attorneys' fees,

11

ECF No. 37-4, and the 2014 Real Rate Report, ECF No. 37-5.

12

The Court is not persuaded that the requested hourly rates

13

are reasonable.

First, O'Connor's declaration is of little

14

assistance to the Court because O'Connor does not evaluate

15

disability access cases; instead, O'Connor's analysis primarily

16

pertains to labor litigation.

17

Real Rate Report addresses reductions to hourly fees for numerous

18

corporate practice areas, but not disability access.

19

37-5, at 29.

20

rate for attorneys in firms of less than 50 lawyers.

21

The Report does not provide a helpful benchmark for lawyers

22

litigating disability access cases for non-corporate clients.

23

In his reply, Johnson relies on an order issued by Judge

24

O’Neill in Fresno where Judge O’Neill relies on the Laffey Matrix

25

for awarding attorneys’ fees in an ADA case.

26

the Court is aware Judge O’Neill did not issue his order until

27

after Johnson filed his attorneys’ fees motion, Johnson did not

28

rely on this case in his motion and Le has not had the

See ECF No. 37-4.

Second, the

See ECF No.

The Report also does not provide a baseline hourly

7

See id.

Reply at 3.

While

1

opportunity to address it.

2

the Sacramento division of the Eastern District of California

3

have refused to rely on the Laffey Matrix for awarding attorneys’

4

fees in ADA cases.

5

cv-1610-WBS, 2014 WL 6634324, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014);

6

Johnson v. Lin, No. 2:13-cv-01484-GEB-DAD, 2016 WL 1267830, at *3

7

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016).

8

on the Laffey Matrix to determine reasonable fees in this case.

9

Additionally, at least two judges in

See Johnson v. Wayside Prop., Inc., No. 2:13-

The Court therefore declines to rely

Instead, the Court looks to rates awarded by other courts in

10

this district.

11

awarded by other judges in the same locality in similar cases.”

12

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir.

13

2008).

14

District of California have found the hourly rates of $300 for

15

Potter, $250 for Grace, and $150 for junior associates reasonable

16

for disability access cases in the Sacramento legal community.

17

See Johnson v. Castro, No. 2:14-CV-2008-JAM-CKD, 2016 WL 7324715,

18

at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016); Chan, 2016 WL 4368104 at *3;

19

Johnson v. Gross, No. 14-2242, 2016 WL 3448247, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

20

June 23, 2016); Lin, 2016 WL 1267830, at *4.

21

“District judges can . . . consider the fees

Recently, this Court and other judges in the Eastern

Accordingly, the Court awards the following attorneys’ fees:

22

Potter

23

Grace

24

Masanque

13.7 hrs

x

$300

=

$4,110.00

5.1

hrs

x

$250

=

$1,275.00

17.6 hrs

x

$150

=

$2,640.00

25

Lockhart

7.3

hrs

x

$150

=

$1,095.00

26

Carson

3.2

hrs

x

$150

=

$

=

$9,600.00

27
28
8

480.00

1
2

Lastly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to recover
$1,399.00 in litigation expenses.

3
4
5

II.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

6

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses and awards a

7

total of $10,999.00.

8
9

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 29, 2017

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
9