Halcomb v. City of Sacramento et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 6/18/15 GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 17 Motion to Strike. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED as to the first, second, and third affirmativ e defenses, and DENIED as to the fourth and sixth affirmative defenses in Defendants' Amended Answer. Because the deficiencies noted by the Court can be cured by amendment, Defendants are GRANTED LEAVE to file a Second Amended Answer within 20 days of the electronic filing of this Order. If Defendants fail to file a Second Amended Answer, this case will proceed on the First Amended Answer (ECF No. 14) with the first, second, and third affirmative defenses stricken therefrom. (Meuleman, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ARLIE HALCOMB,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:14-cv-02796 MCE DAD

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Affirmative

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Defenses (ECF No. 17). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in

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part and DENIED in part.1

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Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this
matter submitted on the briefs. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

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BACKGROUND2

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Defendants Justin Brown, Paul Fong, and Andrew Leal (“Defendants”) are police

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officers for the City of Sacramento. At midnight on August 8, 2014, Plaintiff awoke in his

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apartment to the sight of Defendants attempting to wrench the front window from its

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track. When Defendants spotted Plaintiff through the window, they informed him that

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they would kick down the front door if Plaintiff did not open it voluntarily. Defendants

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identified themselves as police officers and claimed they had a warrant.
When Plaintiff opened the door, Defendants entered, placed Plaintiff in handcuffs,

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threw him on a couch, and asked for “Rosa Davalos.” Defendants were not gentle in

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their handling of Plaintiff: they grabbed him “roughly,” “twist[ed] his injured right arm and

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shoulder over his back up to his neck,” and threw him on the couch “with such force that

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the main supporting center board was broken.” Although Plaintiff informed Defendants

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that Davalos lived in the neighboring unit—a fact “which was clearly labeled on the

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mailbox”—Defendants remained in Plaintiff’s residence “and abus[ed] Plaintiff and his

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fiancée” for almost an hour. Defendants left after running a warrant search and

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determining that there were no warrants for either Plaintiff or his fiancée.
Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Defendants: unreasonable search,

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excessive force, unlawful arrest, negligence, false arrest, intentional infliction of

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emotional distress, assault and battery, intrusion into private affairs, and interference

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with civil rights. Defendants have filed an Amended Answer to the FAC (ECF No. 14)

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that asserts six affirmative defenses. Through the pending Motion, Plaintiff requests that

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the Court strike five of Defendants’ affirmative defenses.

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The following statement of facts is based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amendment
Complaint (“FAC”). See ECF No. 10.

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STANDARD

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An affirmative defense is an “assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will

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defeat the plaintiff’s [] claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Black’s

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Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). An insufficiently pled affirmative defense may be

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stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). In this District, “affirmative

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defenses are subject to the heightened pleading standards announced in Twombly and

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Iqbal.” Dodson v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 595, 603 (E.D.

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Cal. 2013); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. 662 (2009). Thus, “each affirmative defense must be supported by factual

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allegations,” and “neither legal conclusions nor conclusory statements are themselves

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sufficient” to survive a motion to strike. Dodson, 289 F.R.D. at 603.

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“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the

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pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured

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by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

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ANALYSIS

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The Court will address each of the contested affirmative defenses in turn.

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A. Comparative Fault

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Defendants’ first affirmative defense, in its entirety, states:

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Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s conduct was aggressive and
threatening giving rise to the belief that he was a threat to the
safety of the officers. Plaintiff is barred from recovery, in
whole or part, because his sole or partial negligence was the
proximate cause of the acts and events alleged in the
complaint.

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Defs.’ Am. Answer at 7. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ first affirmative defense is

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insufficiently pled because it does not provide any facts in support of Defendants’ claim
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that Plaintiff was “aggressive and threatening.” Although Defendants need not provide

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“detailed factual allegations,” this first affirmative defense is nothing more than an

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“unadorned [] accusation” or “naked assertion.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED as to Defendants’ first affirmative

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defense.

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B. Immunity

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Defendants’ second affirmative defense, in its entirety, states: “Each act or

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omission alleged in the complaint falls within the immunities and defenses described in

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sections 800 through 995 of the California Government Code, including but not limited

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to, sections 815.2, 820.2, 820.4, AND 821.” Defs.’ Am. Answer at 7. Plaintiff contends

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that this affirmative defense is insufficiently pled because Defendants do not specify

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which of nearly 200 sections of the California Government Code it is based or to which

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“acts or omissions” the defense applies.

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Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the second affirmative defense does in fact

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identify specific sections of the California Government Code (specifically sections 815.2,

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820.2, 820.4, and 821). Additionally, Defendants’ Answer clearly states that the

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affirmative defense is applicable to “each act or omission alleged in the complaint.”

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Nevertheless, because Defendants have not pled any facts to support their claim of

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immunity, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED as to Defendants’ second affirmative

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defense.

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C. Good Faith

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Defendants’ third affirmative defense, in its entirety, states: “Defendants allege

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that they acted in good faith, without malice, without wrongful intent, and within the

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scope of the lawful performance of their regularly assigned duties as police officers at all

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times alleged in the complaint.” Defs.’ Am. Answer at 7-8. Plaintiff contends this is not

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an affirmative defense, but rather a simple denial of Plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff

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further argues that Defendants have not provided sufficient factual support for their

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assertion of good faith.
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The Court first rejects Plaintiff’s argument that good faith is not an affirmative

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defense, as the Ninth Circuit has made clear that good faith can be an “affirmative

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defense to punitive damages.” See Alvarado v. Fed. Express. Corp., 384 F. App’x 585,

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590 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212

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F.3d 493, 516-17 (9th Cir. 2000)).3 Nevertheless, Defendants’ third affirmative defense

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must be stricken, as Defendants’ Amended Answer does not provide any facts in support

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of Defendants’ assertion of good faith. To the extent that Defendants’ assertion of good

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faith is based on the arrest warrant for Rosa Davalos, the Amended Answer does not

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explain why Defendants suspected Davalos would be inside of Plaintiff’s apartment.

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Instead, these details are provided by Defendants in their Opposition. Cf. Defs.’ Opp’n

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at 1, ECF No. 19 (“Unbeknownst to the officers, Davalos switched apartments with

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Plaintiff a short time prior but there was no record of her move.”).4 Thus, Plaintiff’s

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Motion to Strike is GRANTED with leave to amend as to Defendants’ third affirmative

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defense.

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D. Failure to Mitigate

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Defendants’ fourth affirmative defense, in its entirety, states: “Plaintiff’s claims are

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barred, in whole or part, due to Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate the personal injury type

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damages alleged in the complaint.” Defs.’ Am. Answer at 8. Plaintiff contends that this

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affirmative defense is insufficiently pled and, in any event, is not relevant because

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Plaintiff has not alleged that his damages are “continuing.”5 Defendants counter that

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they included the affirmative defense because Plaintiff’s FAC does not clearly indicate

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whether he suffers continuing damages. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 6 (noting the Plaintiff has

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Plaintiff has specifically requested punitive damages. FAC at 9.

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The Court notes that Defendants’ Opposition is significantly more detailed than the Amended
Answer. See, e.g., Defs.’ Opp’n at 1-2 (“After Plaintiff threatened to shoot the officers in the head, he was
handcuffed while the officers searched the apartment for Davalos.”).
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See Valle De Oro Bank N.A. v. Gamboa, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1686, 1691 (1994) (“Typically, the rule
of mitigation of damages comes into play when the event producing injury or damage has already
occurred and it then has become the obligation of the injured or damaged party to avoid continuing or
enhanced damages through reasonable efforts.”).

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vaguely alleged that he “was harmed,” “was actually harmed,” and “did suffer severe

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emotional distress”).

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Although Defendants have not pled any facts in support of the affirmative

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defense, their pleading is only as bare as the allegation of damages in Plaintiff’s FAC.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to Defendants’ fourth affirmative defense.

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E. Warrant

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Defendants’ sixth affirmative defense,6 in its entirety, states:

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The entry into Plaintiff’s home, the search of Plaintiff’s home,
and the detention of Plaintiff to accommodate the necessities
of the search were lawful acts pursuant to a lawfully issued
arrest warrant for Rosa Davalos because Defendants had
reason to believe that Rosa Davalos was inside Plaintiff’s
home.

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Defs.’ Am. Answer at 8. Plaintiff contends that this affirmative defense is simply a denial

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of Plaintiff’s allegations, and that Defendants have not pled sufficient factual allegations.

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Plaintiff fails to appreciate that Defendants’ allegations—specifically, that

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Defendants had an arrest warrant for Davalos and that they had reason to believe she

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was inside of Plaintiff’s apartment—might defeat several of Plaintiff’s claims. See Heien

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v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment tolerates only

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reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be

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objectively reasonable.”); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221 (1981) (“An

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arrest warrant alone will suffice to enter a suspect’s own residence to effect his arrest.”);

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Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971) (“[W]hen the police have probable cause to

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arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party,

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then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest”). Additionally, although Defendants

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could have provided additional facts, the sixth affirmative defense is sufficiently pled.

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Plaintiff’s Motion is therefore DENIED as to the sixth affirmative defense.

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Plaintiff did not move to strike Defendants’ fifth affirmative defense.

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CONCLUSION

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Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED as to the first,

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second, and third affirmative defenses, and DENIED as to the fourth and sixth affirmative

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defenses in Defendants’ Amended Answer. Because the deficiencies noted by the

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Court can be cured by amendment, Defendants are granted leave to file a Second

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Amended Answer within twenty (20) days of the electronic filing of this Order. If

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Defendants fail to file a Second Amended Answer, this case will proceed on the First

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Amended Answer (ECF No. 14) with the first, second, and third affirmative defenses

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stricken therefrom.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 18, 2015

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