Kuang v. Bel Air Mart

Filing 13

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 5/22/2015 DENYING 6 Motion to Dismiss. (Donati, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JIMMY KUANG, an individual,

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2:15-cv-00160-JAM-EFB

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS

BEL AIR MART, a California
Corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff Jimmy Kuang (“Plaintiff”) alleges that his

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employer breached a collective bargaining agreement by

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discharging him without cause.

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(“Defendant”) now moves to dismiss on the basis that the claims

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are barred by the federal statute of limitations. 1

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Defendant Bel Air Mart

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for May 20, 2015.
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I.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As a cook at Defendant’s store, Plaintiff was party to a

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collective bargaining agreement.

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permitted Defendant to discharge Plaintiff only for “cause.”

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¶ 8.

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Compl. ¶ 7.

The agreement
Id.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated this agreement by

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discharging him for consuming store products in April 2011.

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¶¶ 9-18.

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Id.

that his supervisor directed him to wait to pay, so the

He asserts that he intended to pay for the products and

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termination could not have been for “cause” as defined in the

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agreement.

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Id. ¶¶ 9-11, 18.

Plaintiff sued Defendant in state court alleging breach of

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contract and discrimination claims.

See Defendant’s RJN Exh. 1.

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Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his discrimination claims, and

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the state court dismissed the contract claims as preempted by

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section 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act

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(“LMRA”).

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action in January 2015, asserting breach of contract and breach

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of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

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Although the parties are not diverse, the Court has jurisdiction

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in this matter because Plaintiff’s claims are “substantially

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dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between

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the parties in a labor contract[.]”

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Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); see 29 U.S.C. § 185.

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moves to dismiss (Doc. #6) and Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc.

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#9).

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See id. Exhs. 2-3. Plaintiff then filed this federal

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Compl. ¶¶ 20-34.

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Defendant

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Judicial Notice

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Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the

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pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss.

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take judicial notice of matters of public record, provided that

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they are not subject to reasonable dispute.

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see Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d

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1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

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F.3d 662, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

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But the Court may

Fed. R. Evid. 201;

Defendant requests judicial notice of three documents (Doc.

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#6-2).

All are contained within the public record as court

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filings and Plaintiff does not contest them, so the Court grants

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Defendant’s request.

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B.

Analysis

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The sole basis for Defendant’s motion is that the suit is

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barred by the statute of limitations.

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implicated here, LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, contains no

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limitations period.

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Supp. 743, 748 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

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Court should look to the six-month statute of limitations

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described in 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).

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(governing unfair labor practices).

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Court should instead borrow the California limitations period of

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four years for a breach of contract claim.

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The federal statute

O’Sullivan v. Longview Fibre Co., 993 F.
Defendant contends that the

Mot. at 4; see 29 U.S.C. § 160
Plaintiff argues that the

Opp. at 5.

Plaintiff is correct that a four-year statute of limitations

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applies.

The Supreme Court has established a “norm” of borrowing

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an analogous state law statute of limitation where none is

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specified in the federal statute.
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DelCostello v. Int’l Broth. Of

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Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1983) (citation omitted).

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norm holds for “straightforward” claims involving collective

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bargaining agreements – that is, “suits alleging solely a breach

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of contract.”

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Murray, Inc., 828 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Int’l

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Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers

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of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)).

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This

Gen. Teamsters Union Local No. 174 v. Trick &

As Defendant points out, the Supreme Court has carved out an
exception to this norm.

But that exception is far narrower than

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Defendant contends.

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interpretation of terms within a [collective bargaining

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agreement] are [subject to] a six month statute of limitation.”

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See Reply at 3:4-6.

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proposition, DelCostello, held that the six-month limitations

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period applied to a “hybrid” action that alleged both an

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employer’s breach of a collective bargaining agreement and a

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union’s breach of its duty of fair representation.

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165.

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analogy in ordinary state law,” because it implicated “a direct

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challenge to the private settlement of disputes under the

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collective bargaining agreement.”

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marks, and alterations omitted).

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involve these type of “hybrid” claims.

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& Comm’l Workers Int’l Union, 43 F.3d 424, 426 (9th Cir. 1994);

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Milne Employees Ass’n v. Sun Carriers, 900 F.2d 1401, 1405, 1414

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(9th Cir. 1991); Appellant’s Reply Brief, Grant v. McDonnell

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Douglas Corp., 163 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-55351), 1997

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WL 33551572, at *5-*6.

Defendant states that “cases involving the

The case Defendant cites for this

462 U.S. at

The Court reasoned that this kind of action had “no close

Id. (citations, quotation
Defendant’s other cases also

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See Allen v. United Food

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Here, in contrast, Plaintiff alleges only that his employer

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breached the collective bargaining agreement by discharging him

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without “cause.”

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representation.

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limitations period for a breach of contract claim.

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Pencikowski v. Aerospace Corp., 340 F. App’x 416, 418 (9th Cir.

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Aug. 7, 2009) (affirming application of state limitations statute

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where plaintiff alleged that his employer violated the collective

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bargaining agreement by failing to notify the union of his

He brings no claims concerning union
The Court therefore applies the analogous state
Accord

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dismissal); Trustees for Alaska Laborers-Constr. Indus. Health &

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Sec. Fund v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1987)

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(concluding that plaintiff’s claim “c[ould] only be characterized

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as a straightforward breach of contract claim” where he alleged

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that his employer failed to make the required contributions under

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agreement).

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California law allows a plaintiff four years to bring a

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breach of contract claim.

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Plaintiff here filed his complaint in January 2015.

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alleged breach occurred in April 2011, his claims are timely.

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Because the

Resolving the motion on this basis, the Court does not reach
the parties’ further arguments concerning tolling.
III.

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Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 337(1).

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

May 22, 2015

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