Castillo v. County of Sutter, et al

Filing 23

ORDER signed by District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 3/1/2016 ORDERING 18 The first claim is DISMISSED without leave to amend as to defendant Parker; the second claim is DISMISSED without leave to amend as to all defendants; the third claim is DIS MISSED without leave to amend as to all defendants; and the fourth claim is DISMISSED without leave to amend as to defendant Parker; in all other respects, the motion is DENIED; An answer shall be filed within 21 days of the date this order is filed. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NELSON NED FIGUEIRA, deceased, by
and through JUDITE CASTILLO,

No. 2:15-cv-00500-KJM-AC

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Plaintiffs,
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ORDER

v.
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COUNTY OF SUTTER, et al.,
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Defendants.
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In a Second Amended Complaint, Judite Castillo alleges additional facts to support

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her claim that the defendants are liable for the suicide death of her son, Nelson Ned Figueira.

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Defendants move to dismiss. No opposition was filed, and the matter was submitted without

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hearing. The motion is granted in part without leave to amend and denied in part.

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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The court’s previous order describes in detail the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s

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First Amended Complaint. Prev. Order, ECF No. 15 at 2–4. The court does not repeat them here.

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The Second Amended Complaint alleges the same facts and the same claims and includes the

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following allegations in addition:

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(1)

“While Figueira was in custody plaintiff and other family members contacted the

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jail and vocalized their concern about Figueira’s mental health risk and risk of

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suicide.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 17.

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(2)

“Following the arraignment, plaintiff and other family members contacted the jail

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and informed jail employees of decedent’s distraught condition and expressed

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concern that he was at heightened risk of suicide.” Id. ¶ 20.

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(3)

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“Defendants, Samson, Bidwell, and Garza were working at the Sutter County Jail
on March 6, 2013.” Id. ¶ 21.

The court’s previous order denied defendant’s motion to dismiss as to defendant Brandwood for

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the first and fourth claims and granted plaintiff leave to amend as to the remaining claims and

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defendants. Prev. Order at 15–16. Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint on November

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20, 2015. ECF No. 17. She now asserts four of the five claims from her prior complaint:

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(1)

Violation of Figueira’s Fourteenth Amendment rights for deliberate indifference to

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serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants Brandwood,

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Parker, Samson, Bidwell, and Garza. Second Am. Compl. at 8–10;

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(2)

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Municipal liability under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), against defendant Sutter County, id. at 10–12;

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(3)

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Supervisory liability under § 1983 against defendants Parker, Samson, Bidwell,
and Garza, id. at 12–13; and

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(4)

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Violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights related to the loss of her parentchild relationship with Figueira, under § 1983, against all defendants, id. at 13.

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Plaintiff declined to pursue previously pleaded claims against Yuba County and the Doe

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defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss on December 4, 2015. ECF No. 18.

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The court first reviews the legal standard applicable to the defendants’ motion, and

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then addresses the remaining claims.

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II.

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LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a
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“cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory.

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Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court

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assumes these factual allegations are true and draws reasonable inferences from them. Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of

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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed

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factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands

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more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least

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plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of

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elements do not alone suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Evaluation under Rule

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12(b)(6) is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

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at 679.

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III.

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DISCUSSION
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Fourteenth Amendment: Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
The court’s previous order granted plaintiff leave to amend to allege facts to

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support the allegations against defendants Parker, Samson, Bidwell, and Garza. Prev. Order at 8.

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Plaintiff now alleges she and her family contacted jail staff after Figueira’s arraignment to

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express their concern over his distraught state and heightened risk of suicide when Samson,

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Bidwell, and Garza were at work in the facility.

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As to defendants Samson, Bidwell, and Garza, plaintiff’s Second Amended

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Complaint pleads sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. In Clouthier v. County of

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Contra Costa, as discussed in the court’s prior order, Prev. Order at 5–8, a defendant staff

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member knew of the decedent’s previously attempted suicide and heard reports that the decedent

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was “truly suicidal.” 591 F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Samson, Bidwell, and Garza are

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now alleged to have known of Figueira’s post-arraignment mental state. Combined with the

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alleged provisions of the jail’s policy, which may reasonably be interpreted to require the

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reporting of “significantly disordered behavior,” these allegations allow the court to “draw the

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reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 678
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Plaintiff may proceed on this theory regardless of defendants’ arguments that the

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newly alleged facts lack any nexus to Parker, Bidwell, Samson, or Garza and that plaintiff should

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have alleged specifically who contacted who at the jail. See Mot. at 5. At this stage, even

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relatively laconic complaints may survive. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (detailed factual

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allegations are unnecessary). Castillo need only allege facts that paint a plausible picture

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supporting recovery. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The motion is denied as to defendants Samson,

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Bidwell, and Garza.

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As to defendant Parker, however, plaintiff does not claim he was even at the jail
when the decedent’s family voiced their concerns. No factual allegations support a claim that

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Parker knew of Figueira’s post-arraignment mental state. The motion must therefore be granted

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as to defendant Parker.

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As a matter of course, district courts normally allow amendment, even without

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request. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987); Ascon Props., Inc.

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v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). Generally speaking, however, a district

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court may dismiss a claim without leave to amend if, among other reasons, amendment would

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cause undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or if amendment would be futile. DCD

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Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. Here, the court declines to allow further amendment because, despite

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the court’s prior explanatory discussion, plaintiff has not alleged necessary additional facts with

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respect to defendant Parker. Allowing the plaintiff leave to amend for a third time would cause

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undue delay; there is no indication she will satisfy the same specific directive if given one more

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chance.

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B.

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Municipal Liability
Plaintiff also has not alleged additional facts to establish that Sutter or Yuba

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Counties demonstrated acts of omissions that amounted to “deliberate indifference to a

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constitutional right.” Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1249 (quotation marks omitted); Prev. Order at 14.

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For the reasons stated in Section A above, the court grants the motion without leave to amend.

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C.

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Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would show defendants Parker, Samson,

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Bidwell, or Garza were aware of defendant Brandwood’s actions and acquiesced to them. See

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Prev. Order at 9. Also for the reasons stated in Section A, the court grants the motion without

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leave to amend as to all remaining defendants.

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D.

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Loss of Parent-Child Relationship
Plaintiff has alleged additional facts supporting an inference that defendants

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Samson, Bidwell, and Garza acted with deliberate indifference. For the reasons described above

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in Section A and in the court’s previous order, see Prev. Order at 9–11, the motion is granted

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without leave to amend as to defendant Parker, but denied as to defendants Samson, Bidwell, and

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Garza.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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The motion is granted as follows:

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(1) The first claim is dismissed without leave to amend as to defendant Parker;

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(2) The second claim is dismissed without leave to amend as to all defendants;

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(3) The third claim is dismissed without leave to amend as to all defendants; and

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(4) The fourth claim is dismissed without leave to amend as to defendant Parker.

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In all other respects, the motion is denied. An answer shall be filed within twenty-one days of the

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date this order is filed.

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This order resolves ECF No. 18.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: March 1, 2016.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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