Vodonick v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 3/30/2017 DENYING 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Michel, G.)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOHN VODONICK,
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2:15-cv-00539 JAM-EFB
Plaintiff,
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No.
v.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC., a federally
chartered corporation, all persons
claiming any right, title or
interest in certain real property;
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae” or
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“Defendant”) moves for summary adjudication on a portion of John
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Vodonick’s (“Plaintiff”) first claim for declaratory relief. 1
For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the
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motion. 2
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Although Defendant uses the term “summary judgment,” the
substance of the motion and the proposed order, ECF No. 28,
demonstrate that Defendant only seeks judgment as to part A of
Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim and not on Plaintiff’s
second claim related to his purported easement. Defendant
contends this claim was dismissed, Reply at 6 (citing ECF No. 18
at 13–14), but nothing on the docket indicates that the Court has
adjudicated the second claim for relief or part B of the
declaratory relief claim.
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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for March 21, 2016.
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff owns and resides at 15240 Willow Ridge Court in
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Nevada City, California.
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
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Statements of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUF”) at ¶ 1.
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August 2014, Fannie Mae was assigned the promissory note to the
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neighboring property, which was declared to be in default.
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at ¶¶ 2, 3.
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though Defendant disputes—that he has an easement over a portion
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of the property.
In
SUF
In addition to being neighbors, Plaintiff alleges—
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at ¶¶ 10–14;
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Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed
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Material Facts (“SDF”) at ¶ 8.
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notice of the foreclosure sale—to take place on November 26,
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2014, at 12:30 p.m.—at the main entrance of the Nevada County,
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California, Superior Courthouse.
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for Judicial Notice (“RFJN”), ECF No. 27, Exh. 6.
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Fannie Mae posted a copy of the
SUF at ¶ 4; SDF at ¶ 1; Request
Plaintiff was out of town on November 26, 2014, and
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dispatched an agent, Michael Nudelman, to appear at the auction.
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SUF at ¶ 6.
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Nudelman could have made a valid bid on that day, the parties
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appear to agree that he showed up for the scheduled sale.
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¶¶ 6–8; SDS at ¶ 4.
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to the amount of Fannie Mae’s lien, but to not get into a bidding
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war with another bidder.
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whether or not someone appeared to cry the sale or continue the
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sale to another date.
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a subsequent day.
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Upon Sale,” the property was sold “at public auction on
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12/01/2014 at the place named in the Notice of Sale[.]”
Although the parties dispute whether or not Mr.
SUF at
Plaintiff instructed Mr. Nudelman to bid up
SUF at ¶ 9.
SDS at ¶ 4.
SDS at ¶ 7.
The parties dispute
The actual sale took place on
According to the “Trustees Deed
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RFJN,
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Exh. 8 at 2.
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Plaintiff filed this action in March, 2015, and the Court
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granted Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with
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respect to claims three, four, and five, and part of the first
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claim in March, 2016.
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Defendant’s motion with respect to the part of the first claim
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seeking a declaration that the deed to Defendant is null and
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void.
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seeks declarations that the purported deed is null, void, and of
ECF No. 18.
ECF Nos. 1, 4, & 18.
The Court denied
For the surviving claims, Plaintiff first
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no effect and that Plaintiff is vested in title and interest to
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the easement. Second, Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the
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easement by implication.
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See FAC.
II.
OPINION
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A.
Jurisdiction
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The FAC states that the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction
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is federal question jurisdiction because Defendant’s “charter
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provides that it is empowered to sue and be sued, and to complain
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and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or
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Federal.”
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overruled the Ninth Circuit on this issue, holding that the sue-
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and-be-sued clause in Defendant Fannie Mae’s charter only permits
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suit in a court already endowed with subject-matter jurisdiction
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and is not an independent source of jurisdiction.
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Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S.Ct. 553 (2017).
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the parties of the change and permitted the parties to brief this
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issue.
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MMD-VPC, 2017 WL 899961 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2017) (relying on
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Lightfoot in remanding a case to state court where removal was
FAC at ¶ 1.
Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court
Lightfoot v.
The Court notified
See Thunder Prop., Inc. v. Treadway, No. 3:15-cv-00141-
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based on the “sue-and-be-sued” clause in Fannie Mae’s charter).
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The parties submitted a joint response conceding that the Court
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no longer has federal question jurisdiction over the case.
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No. 34.
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case under diversity jurisdiction because the parties are diverse
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and the property in dispute puts the amount in controversy over
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the $75,000 minimum.
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ECF
They argued, however, that the Court should retain the
The Court is satisfied that diversity jurisdiction applies
in this case.
First, Plaintiff is a California citizen, FAC ¶ 3,
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and Defendant is a citizen of the District of Columbia, 12 U.S.C.
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§ 1717(a)(2)(B).
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a declaration that the deed to Defendant is null and void.
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though the FAC does not allege damages, the parties provide
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persuasive authority and evidence that the requirement is met in
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this case.
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for the price of $393,824.21); Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d
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837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In actions seeking declaratory or
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injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in
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controversy is measured by the value of the object of the
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litigation.”) (citation omitted); Hendricks v. Wells Fargo Bank,
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N.A., No. CV-15-01299-MWF (JEMx), 2015 WL 1644028, at *5–6 (C.D.
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Cal. Apr. 14, 2015) (finding that, in an action seeking to enjoin
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the foreclosure sale, the value of the property was relevant to
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determining the amount in controversy).
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the case.
Second, Plaintiff’s first cause of action seeks
Even
See RFJN, ECF No. 35, Exh. 1 (Trustees Deed Upon Sale
The Court thus retains
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B.
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Defendant seeks judicial notice of several documents, most
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Judicial Notice and Evidentiary Objections
of which are not pertinent to the Court’s ruling on this motion.
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See RFJN, ECF No. 27.
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notice of Defendant’s Exhibit 6 ([“Notice of Trustee’s Sale”]
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dated October 29, 2014, recorded on October 31, 2014, in the
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official records of Nevada County as document number 20140021214)
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and Exhibit 8 ([“Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale”] dated December 2,
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2014, recorded in the official records of Nevada County on
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December 8, 2014, as document number 20140023981).
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again requests notice of the same “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale” in
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support of its jurisdictional argument.
Among those documents, Defendant requests
Defendant
RFJN, ECF No. 35, Exh.
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1.
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in the public record and not subject to reasonable dispute.
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Grant v. Aurora Loan Services, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263–
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64 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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as to these three documents.
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Plaintiff does not raise any objections.
These documents are
See
Thus, the Court grants Defendant’s requests
As for evidentiary objections, Defendant objects to portions
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of John Vodonick’s Declaration, ECF No. 30-1, and portions of
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Michael Nudelman’s Declaration, ECF No. 30–2, due to
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contradictions between the declarations and prior testimony or
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statements.
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turn on the declarations, the Court declines to rule on this
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issue.
Reply at 7–9.
Because the Court’s ruling does not
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C.
Legal Standard
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Summary judgement is proper if the movant shows that there
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is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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“A moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at
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trial . . . has both the initial burden of production and the
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ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.”
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210
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F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
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of production, the moving party must either produce evidence
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negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or
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defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough
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evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of
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persuasion at trial.”
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burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must
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persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material
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fact.”
Id.
“In order to carry its burden
“In order to carry its ultimate
Id.
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D.
Analysis
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Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Fannie Mae’s deed to the
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property is null, void, and of no effect due to procedural
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defects in the notice of sale.
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presumption is that a foreclosure sale has been conducted
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regularly and fairly.
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Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1284 (2001).
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the sale for failure to comply with procedural requirements,
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there must be evidence that the failure caused prejudice to the
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plaintiff.
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(2004) (finding that the premature mailing of the Sale Notice did
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not render the sale subject to attack); Benson v. Ocwen Loan
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Servicing, LLC, 562 Fed. Appx. 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2014)
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(rejecting a wrongful foreclosure claim premised on defendant’s
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failure to announce the new sale date because the plaintiff
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received actual notice of the new sale date and could not show
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prejudice).
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Compl. at ¶¶ 20, 24.
The general
6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortg.,
In order to challenge
Id.; see Knapp v. Doherty, 123 Cal. App. 4th 76, 96
Defendant argues that Plaintiff was unable to tender payment
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at the foreclosure sale scheduled for November 26, 2014.
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4–8; SUF at ¶¶ 7–10.
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inability, Plaintiff cannot show he was prejudiced by the alleged
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procedural defect.
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ability to tender on November 26, 2014 (the advertised sale date)
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are irrelevant because the sale did not occur on that date.
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at 1–2.
MSJ at
Defendant contends that, due to this
Plaintiff argues that facts concerning his
Opp.
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The Court agrees with Plaintiff; Defendant misses the mark.
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The alleged prejudicial procedural error was Defendant’s failure
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to announce the continuance of the foreclosure sale to a later
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date, causing Plaintiff to be unable to make a bid at the actual
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sale.
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have tendered payment on December 1, 2014.
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would have attended and made a full credit bit.
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Defendant produces no evidence that Plaintiff could not have done
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so.
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none of the cited cases give the Court any reason to conclude
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that the inquiry turns on the cancelled foreclosure sale rather
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than the actual foreclosure sale.
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favor of summary adjudication are premised on this theory, its
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motion is denied.
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Thus, the relevant question is whether Plaintiff could
Plaintiff alleges he
Compl. at ¶ 20.
Although neither party cites a factually analogous case,
As Defendant’s arguments in
In a final effort, Defendant asks for summary judgment
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because declaratory relief is not appropriate where Plaintiff
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seeks to redress past wrongs.
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argument in its earlier motions on the pleadings.
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13.
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Defendant did not make this
ECF Nos. 6 &
In an action for declaratory relief, the Court must inquire
whether there is a case of actual controversy within its
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jurisdiction.
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(9th Cir. 1994).
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claim operates ‘prospectively,’ not to redress past wrongs.”
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Flores v. EMC Mortg. Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1111 (E.D. Cal.
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2014) (citation omitted).
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Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 143
As Defendant argues, “[a] declaratory relief
The only foreclosure sale case Defendant cites is
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distinguishable from the present circumstances.
In Flores v. EMC
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Mortg. Co., the court dismissed a claim seeking a declaration
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that the defendants were not authorized to foreclose on a
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property after the defendants had already foreclosed on the
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property.
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sought to redress past alleged wrongs, rather than prospective
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wrongdoing, and, additionally, that the claim must fail given the
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court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims on identical issues.
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Id.
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and Plaintiff seeks a declaration that it is null and void.
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Thus, there appears to be a live controversy over the deed’s
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status and the Court is not persuaded that the action is merely
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backward looking.
Id. at 1111–12.
Here, however, the validity of the deed itself is in dispute
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The court reasoned that the complaint
III.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 30, 2017
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