Clark v. Feinberg et al
Filing
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FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 2/23/2016 RECOMMENDING that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Referred to Judge John A. Mendez; Objections due within 14 days. (Yin, K)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ROBERT CLARK,
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No. 2:15-CV-0613-JAM-CMK-P
Plaintiff,
vs.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
BENNETT FEINBERG, et al.,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,
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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied
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if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon
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which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must
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allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support
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the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
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and conclusory.
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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Feinberg; (2) Lewis; (3) Fong;
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and (4) Sahota. Plaintiff states that he broke his finger in December 2013 but was denied
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medical care. According to plaintiff, he was seen by defendant Feinberg, apparently a prison
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doctor, on May 5, 2014, for “severe pain, throbbing in the index finger area.” Plaintiff informed
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defendant Feinberg that his finger had never been set correctly. Plaintiff claims that defendant
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Sahota reviewed his prison grievance regarding his finger but “denied the medical request for
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help.” Plaintiff also states that defendant Sahota denied surgery. Next, plaintiff claims that
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defendant Fong reviewed his grievances and also denied medical care. Specifically, plaintiff
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claims that “no relief was provided for the constant pain after the interview was conduct[ed] by
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Lawrence C. Fong on 7/3/2014.” Finally, plaintiff claims that he “sought medical relief” from
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defendant Lewis by way of a prison grievance but that defendant Lewis also denied care.
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Attached to plaintiff’s complaint are the defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s
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various grievances. In responses dated May 13, 2014, by defendant Sahota and July 3, 2014, by
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defendant Lewis, plaintiff was informed as follows:
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In the First Level Appeal, received on 4/14/2014, you indicated that you
are requesting to be provided with the medical care that a specialist
recommended. Records show that this was a joint replacement in your
finger. You are requesting an investigation in why you were not provided
medical care for the pain of your fractured finger.
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During your interview with Dr. Feinberg, your medical history was
reviewed. It is noted that orthopedic surgery of the 5th finger was
recommended by an orthopedic surgeon on 1/24/14. The request for
services was denied by the Institutional Utilization Management
Committee (IUMC) on 2/6/14. The IUMC recommended to provide
continuous care and to consider buddy taping to the adjacent finger.
Records show that due to the deformity of your finger, taping caused more
pain than not. Dr. Feinberg resubmitted a Request for surgery on 5/5/14
for a right 5th PIP joint replacement. Your case was discussed in length
by the IUMC. The pros and cons of surgery were discussed. The clinical
finding of the IUMC was to deny the surgery. It was felt that any
recommendation at this stage may not return full function of the finger.
The IUMC recommended accommodations to minimize situations causing
discomfort. Your request for surgery is denied.
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II. DISCUSSION
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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts
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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,
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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only
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when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious
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such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at
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105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental
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health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily
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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.
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See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also
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demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give
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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,
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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is his contention that he should have been
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provided surgery. At best, plaintiff’s allegations indicate a difference of medical opinion and not
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deliberate indifference. To the contrary, plaintiff’s allegations as well as documents attached to
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the complaint clearly show that plaintiff was, in fact, provided medical treatment. Plaintiff’s
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disagreement with the course of that treatment does not give rise to a claim under § 1983.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be
cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of
the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days
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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of
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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.
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See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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DATED: February 23, 2016
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CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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