Murphy, et al. v. JP Morgan Chase, et al.

Filing 15

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 4/8/15 ORDERING that plaintiffs' 10 motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is DENIED without prejudice. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TONYA MURPHY and SAMUEL
SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

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ORDER
v.

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No. 2:15-cv-00725-KJM-GGH

JP MORGAN CHASE; VANZETTI
PROPERTY; NATIONAL DEFAULT
SERVICING LP,
Defendants.

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On April 6, 2015, plaintiffs Tonya Murphy1 and Samuel Smith, appearing without

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counsel, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 10. Their motion also requests a

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temporary restraining order (TRO). See id. at 1, 8. The analysis applicable to TROs and

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preliminary injunctions is “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush &

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Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the plaintiffs’ motion does not meet the

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applicable standard, it is denied without prejudice.
First, the Local Rules of the Eastern District of California impose certain

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requirements on litigants who seek TROs:
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Elsewhere plaintiffs refer to Ms. Murphy as Tonya Smith-Murphy. Compare, e.g., First Am.
Compl. 1, ECF No. 9 with Mot. Prelim. Inj. 1, ECF No. 10.
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No hearing on a temporary restraining order will normally be set
unless the following documents are provided to the Court and,
unless impossible under the circumstances, to the affected parties or
their counsel:

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(1) a complaint;
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(2) a motion for temporary restraining order;
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(3) a brief on all relevant legal issues presented by the motion;
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(4) an affidavit in support of the existence of an irreparable injury;
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(5) an affidavit detailing the notice or efforts to effect notice to the
affected parties or counsel or showing good cause why notice
should not be given, . . . ;

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(6) a proposed temporary restraining order with a provision for a
bond . . . ;
(7) a proposed order with blanks for fixing the time and date for
hearing a motion for preliminary injunction, the date for the filing
of responsive papers, the amount of the bond, if any, and the date
and hour of issuance . . . ; and

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(8) in all instances in which a temporary restraining order is
requested ex parte, the proposed order shall further notify the
affected party of the right to apply to the Court for modification or
dissolution on two (2) days’ notice or such shorter notice as the
Court may allow.

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E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(c). The plaintiffs’ motion omits several of these documents.

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Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as those represented by a lawyer. See E.D. Cal. L.R.

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183(a). Nevertheless, by long tradition, federal courts may afford unrepresented litigants leniency

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in their filings. Cf., e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Fajeriak v.

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McGinnis, 493 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1974); Forte v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 11-00318, 2014 WL

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4745923, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014). The court therefore considers the merits of plaintiffs’

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motion, but cautions that any future motions must comply with the Local Rules.

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A temporary restraining order may be issued upon a showing “that immediate and

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irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard

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in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of such an order is to preserve the

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status quo and to prevent irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no

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longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). In
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determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, a court applies the factors that guide

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the evaluation of a request for preliminary injunctive relief, see Stuhlbarg, 240 F.3d at 839 n.7:

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whether the moving party (1) “is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “likely to suffer irreparable

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harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [its] favor,” and (4)

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“an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

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(2008).

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Here, the plaintiffs argue the defendants’ liability stems from the wrongful

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foreclosure sale of real property located at 929 Bess Place in Stockton, California. See Mot. 2–3,

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5–6. They have attached documents to show a trustee’s sale is complete and the purchasers

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intend to take possession of the property. Id. Exs. 3, 5. They allege the defendants have

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“attempt[ed] to take property that is not legal[ly] theirs,” and they seek to halt other lawsuits. Id.

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at 8.

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The court admits its difficulty understanding the plaintiffs’ legal arguments. The

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plaintiffs’ motion and supporting documents do not clearly describe their claims or show their

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likely success. The motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is

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DENIED without prejudice. This order resolves ECF No. 10.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 8, 2015.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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