Espinoza v. City of Tracy et al

Filing 88

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 7/19/2018 DENYING Defendants' 81 Motion for Attorney's fees. It is further ORDERED that defendants' Requests for Costs be GRANTED; Costs shall be taxed against plaintiff in the sum of $6,670.96. (Fabillaran, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JUAN ESPINOZA,
Plaintiff,

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No. 15-cv-751 WBS KJN

v.
CITY OF TRACY, CHIEF OF POLICE
GARY HAMPTON, R. LEON CHURCHILL,
JR., and DOES 1 through 40,
inclusive,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND BILL OF COSTS

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Defendants.
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Plaintiff Juan Espinoza filed this action against the
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City of Tracy (“the City”) and City Manager R. Leon Churchill
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alleging unconstitutional discharge and retaliation under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983.1

(First Am. Compl. (Docket No. 33).)

Presently

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before the court is defendants’ Motion for Attorney Fees (Docket
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No. 81) and defendants’ Bill of Costs (Docket No. 80).
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The City and Churchill (collectively “defendants”) are
the only remaining defendant
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I.

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Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on April 6, 2015,

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and the court dismissed plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice.

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(Compl. (Docket No. 1); Nov. 15 Order (Docket No. 32).)

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Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the City and Churchill violated

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plaintiff’s “First, Fourth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment[]” rights

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against him,” by “discriminat[ing]” against him, “retaliati[ng]”

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against him, denying him “due process,” and denying him “Equal

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Protection of the law.”

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Plaintiff also added two new claims for conspiring to violate

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plaintiff’s constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

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1985, and for infringing upon plaintiff’s rights to make and

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enforce contracts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

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68.)

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(FAC ¶¶ 49-50, 56-57 (Docket No. 33).)

(FAC ¶¶ 60-

The court denied defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

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plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action, but granted

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defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s causes of action under

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§ 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985.

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defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff’s remaining

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causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Plaintiff did not file an opposition to defendant’s Motion for

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Summary Judgment.

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II.

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On May 22, 2018, the court granted

(Docket No. 77.)

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Defendants now seek $205,650.00 in attorneys’ fees

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against plaintiff for pursuing a frivolous lawsuit.

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for Attorneys’ Fees at 2 (Docket No. 81).)

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(Defs.’ Mot.

Section 1988(b) of Title 42 of the United States Code
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authorizes the court, in its discretion, to award a “reasonable”

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attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in a case brought under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983.

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distinction between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants, courts

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have interpreted the statute to treat a prevailing defendant

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differently from a prevailing plaintiff; fees are not awarded to

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a defendant routinely or simply because the defendant succeeded.

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See Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1060

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(9th Cir. 2006).

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

While § 1988 makes no

A prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action may

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be awarded attorneys’ fees under § 1988 only when the plaintiff’s

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action is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”

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id. (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,

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421 (1978)).

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See

“A case may be deemed frivolous only when the ‘result

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is obvious or the . . . arguments of error are wholly without

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merit.’”

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2003) (quoting McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th

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Cir. 1981)).

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is ‘groundless or without foundation.’”

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Atty. Gen., 561 F.3d 920, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

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Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421)).

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the plaintiff violates this standard at any point during the

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litigation, not just at its inception.”

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Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2007).

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has further recognized that “[a]ttorneys’ fees in civil rights

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cases should only be awarded to a defendant in exceptional

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circumstances.”

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1990).

Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir.

“A losing § 1983 claim is without merit only if it
Gibson v. Office of

“A defendant can recover if

Galen v. Cty. of Los
The Ninth Circuit

Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.

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Here, there is no dispute that defendants are the

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prevailing party on all claims.

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plaintiff’s claims were frivolous from the outset of the

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litigation.2

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in granting summary judgment in arguing that plaintiff’s claims

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were frivolous.

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district courts to “resist the understandable temptation to

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engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a

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plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been

Rather, defendants argue that

Defendants appear to rely on the court’s reasoning

However, the Supreme Court has cautioned

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unreasonable or without foundation.”

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421–22.

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Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at

Furthermore, “in reviewing the pleadings, the Court

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notes that plaintiff asserted several claims that were not

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legally or factually baseless.”

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*3.

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plaintiffs’ work cellphone and that plaintiff was placed on

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administrative leave.

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that he was subjected to an unlawful search and was placed on

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administrative leave in retaliation for exercising a protected

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right.

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allegations may have been insufficient to survive summary

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judgment, the court cannot say that plaintiff’s claims were

See Pierce, 2013 WL 12174404, at

For instance, it is undisputed that defendants searched

Plaintiff could have reasonably believed

Thus, while the facts and evidence to support plaintiff’s

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To the extent that defendants argue that plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim was frivolous because it was vague and
difficult to decipher, the fact that “the pleadings were prolix
or difficult to comprehend does not imply that the claims were
frivolous . . . .” See Pierce v. Santa Maria Joint Union High
Sch. Dist., No. 2:11-cv-9463 SVW FMOX, 2013 WL 12174404, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013).

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wholly without merit.

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when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at

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the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for

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bringing suit.”); see also Thomas v. Cty. of Riverside, No. 10-

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cv-1846 VAP DTBX, 2012 WL 13014613, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5,

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2012) (“[A] few questionable allegations are insufficient to

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merit a finding that an[] entire claim is frivolous.”).

See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422 (“Even

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Defendants also point to plaintiff’s failure to

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present any evidence to support his claims in arguing that

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plaintiff’s claims were frivolous.

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present evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact to

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defeat summary judgment does not mean that plaintiff’s claims

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were frivolous.

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1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (fact that evidence to support theory failed

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to materialize, and summary judgment is granted in favor of the

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defendants, did not render claims groundless, without foundation

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or frivolous, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, plaintiff’s

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claims).

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However, an inability to

See Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188,

While the court is concerned by plaintiff’s failure to

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file an opposition to defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

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provide evidence in support of his case, there is no indication

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that the plaintiff brought his claims in bad faith.

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Defendants also express concern over plaintiff’s delay
in responding to discovery. However, whether this delay required
defendants to incur additional fees has no bearing on whether
plaintiff’s claims were frivolous. See Thomas v. Cty. of
Riverside, No. 10-cv-01846 VAP DTBX, 2012 WL 13014613, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2012) (stating that the considerable cost of
defendants’ efforts “to quench what ultimately proved to be a lot
of smoke with very little, if any, flame” is not a factor the
court uses to determine whether plaintiffs’ claims were
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Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422 (stating that if a plaintiff

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“brought or continued such a claim in bad faith, there will be an

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even stronger basis for charging him with the attorney’s fees

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incurred by the defense.”)

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defendants attorney fees [in civil rights actions], this Court

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grants [plaintiff] the benefit of the doubt and admonishes his

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counsel to screen and evaluate critically those cases which []he

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pursues and continues to pursue.”

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No. 09-cv-0547 LJO SMS, 2011 WL 13842, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4,

“Given the disfavor to award

See Murdock v. Cty. of Fresno,

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2011) (denying attorney’s fees where plaintiff lacked evidence to

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support his discrimination and retaliation claims).

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For the foregoing reason, the court cannot find that

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plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or wholly without

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merit.4

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Attorney’s Fees.

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III. Bill of Costs

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Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s Motion for

After judgment was entered in favor of defendants

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frivolous).

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Defendants appear to ask the court to consider that
plaintiff previously filed a meritless state court lawsuit
against defendants. In that action, it appears that defendants
filed an anti-SLAPP motion to plaintiff’s operative Complaint
against the City of Tracy and other Tracy employees alleging
unlawful employment actions, and plaintiff voluntary dismissed
his lawsuit. (Decl. of Arlin Kachalia (Kachalia Decl.”) ¶ 4.)
The state court then awarded the City $24,299.50 in attorney’s
fees pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute and ordered plaintiff to
pay the City $4,590.13 in costs. However, the state court
judge’s award of attorneys’ fees based on a separate set of facts
in a separate action has no bearing in determining whether to
award attorneys’ fees and costs in the instant action.

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(Docket No. 78), defendants also submitted a Bill of Costs

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totaling $6,670.96.

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plaintiff Juan Espinoza (“Espinoza”) with seven days from the

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date of service to object, and Espinoza did not object.

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(Docket No. 80).

Local Rule 292(c) provided

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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and Local Rule 292 govern the taxation of costs, which are

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generally subject to limits set under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

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U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs); Fed. R. Civ. P.

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54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court

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order provides otherwise, costs--other than attorney’s fees--

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should be allowed to the prevailing party.”); E.D. Cal. Local R.

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292(f); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437,

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441 (1987) (limiting taxable costs to those enumerated in §

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1920).

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Defendants have requested $6,670.96 in costs based on

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services that were actually and necessarily performed.

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reviewing the bills, and in light of the fact that plaintiff has

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not objected, the court finds the requested costs to be

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reasonable.

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After

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ Motion for

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attorney’s fees (Docket No. 81) be, and the same hereby is,

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DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ request for

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Costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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against plaintiff in the sum of $6,670.96.

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Dated:

July 19, 2018

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Costs shall be taxed