T.V. et al v. Sacramento City Unified School District

Filing 21

ORDER signed by District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 02/02/16 ORDERING that defendant's 13 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: GRANTED without leave to amend as to plaintiffs' disparate impact claim and GRANTED with leave to amend as to plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in all other respects. Defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement is DENIED. A third amended complaint shall be filed within 14 days. (Benson, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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T.V., et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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No. 2:15-cv-00889-KJM-AC

v.

ORDER

SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

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Plaintiffs bring this action against Sacramento City Unified School District (“the

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District” or “defendant”), alleging the Gifted and Talented Education (“GATE”) program at

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David Lubin Elementary School (“Lubin Elementary”) had the purpose and effect of dividing

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classes along racial lines in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

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§ 2000d. This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for a more

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definite statement. ECF No. 13. Plaintiffs oppose both motions. ECF No. 16. The court

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submitted the matter as provided by Local Rule 230(g). As explained below, the court GRANTS

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IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendant’s motion to dismiss, and DENIES defendant’s

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motion for a more definite statement.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs filed a complaint on April 24, 2015, ECF No. 1, and a first amended

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complaint on June 11, 2015, ECF No. 5. As approved by the court, plaintiffs filed the operative

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second amended complaint on September 4, 2015. ECF No. 12. On September 17, 2015,

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defendant filed the pending motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

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and for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). ECF No. 13

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(“Mot.”). Plaintiffs opposed the motions, ECF No. 16 (“Opp’n”), and defendant replied, ECF

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No. 17 (“Reply”).

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The second amended complaint makes the following allegations. The minor

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plaintiffs are students of Hispanic national origin or mixed Hispanic national origin who attended

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Lubin Elementary during the 2011–2012, 2012–2013 and/or 2013–2014 school years. Second

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Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 17–21, ECF No. 12 (“SAC”). The District receives federal funds for its

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educational program. Id. ¶¶ 2, 31, 53. During the relevant time period, the District maintained

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the GATE Program for the purpose of racially segregating the students into two separate tracks

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based on their national origin. Id. ¶¶ 6, 32.

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A.

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Structure of the GATE Program
At Lubin Elementary, the District split each grade level into two separate

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classrooms, with approximately one half of each grade level in the GATE classroom, the “vast

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majority” of which were white students, and one half of each grade level in the non-GATE

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classroom. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Students selected for the GATE program were provided differential

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instruction designed to emphasize critical and creative thinking, problem solving, and logical

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reasoning. Id. ¶ 7. Students who were not selected were provided a lesser program that was

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treated as inferior by school staff and administration. Id. Under official school policy, the

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students in the non-GATE class were subjected to placement in split classes, which did not allow

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non-GATE students to socialize at recess or at other times with same grade students in the GATE

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class, or attend grade level field trips, such as visiting Sutter’s Fort, with their peers in the GATE

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class. Id. ¶¶ 14, 35, 38. The structure of the District’s GATE program is not authorized by

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California’s GATE regulations and does not reflect a standard structure for GATE programs in

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California schools or elsewhere. Id. ¶¶ 16, 33.

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B.

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Selection Process
The process utilized by the District to identify students eligible for the GATE

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program began with the administration of the Naglieri Non-verbal Assessment Test (“NNAT”) to

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all first grade students. Id. ¶ 8. Students scoring above the seventy-seventh percentile on the

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NNAT were then further considered for eligibility based on a “profile” of gifted characteristics

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completed by parents and teachers, academic data, and “impact factors.” Id. ¶ 8. A second

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method of gaining entrance to the GATE program was based on the Cognitive Abilities Test

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(“CogAT”) in the third grade. Id. ¶ 9. In at least the 2013–2014 school year, there were not

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enough GATE eligible students to fill the GATE classes, so the school selected between two and

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nineteen additional students from the non-GATE program purportedly based on standardized

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testing. Id. ¶ 11.

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Plaintiffs believe the District subjectively applied factors to exclude students of

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Hispanic race/national origin and other non-white students from the GATE program. Id. ¶¶ 8–9,

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36. In addition, the District did not test all students uniformly. Id. For example, there is no

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record of plaintiffs having been given the NNAT and CogAT, and plaintiffs have no memory of

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being tested. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Plaintiff Isabella Maranon was told by the administrators that her

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children would not be tested because the GATE classes would be too hard given that English was

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their second language. Id. ¶¶ 8, 25. However, the Maranon children do not qualify for an English

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as a Second Language (ESL) designation and do not speak Spanish. Id.

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C.

Injury from GATE Program

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The District’s policies and segregation of the students created divisiveness

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between the GATE and non-GATE classes, which led to bullying and negative comments

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regarding the non-GATE class. Id. ¶ 14. The non-GATE class was derogatorily referred to as the

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“ghetto” class or by other similar terms that had a racial or stigmatizing connotation, and the

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school administration did nothing to ameliorate that characterization despite becoming aware of

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it. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 34, 37, 59.
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As a result of this discrimination, the minor plaintiffs suffered “stigmatization, loss

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of social companions and typical social opportunities, scorn, embarrassment, humiliation and lost

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education opportunities.” Id. ¶ 39. The educational performance of the minor plaintiffs also

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suffered as a result of placement in the non-GATE class; for example, T.V.’s STAR test scores

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decreased over 100 points during the time he was in the non-GATE class. Id. ¶ 15. Placement of

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J.S. in the non-GATE class exacerbated his academic weaknesses and materially harmed his

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educational progress. Id. ¶ 21. When A.V. was permitted into the GATE program in her sixth

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grade year, she and other students who moved from the non-GATE to the GATE class were

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singled out by the math teacher and treater more harshly. Id. ¶ 17.

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D.

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Retaliation
District employees intentionally intimidated, coerced, and discriminated against

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the parents of T.V. and I.M. for the purpose of interfering with their right to advocate on behalf of

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their children. Id. ¶ 55. Upon raising concerns verbally and in writing related to the disparate

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treatment of non-white students, plaintiffs Will and Jackie Valerio, the parents of minor T.V.,

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were retaliated against by school administration. Id. ¶ 22. First, the school administration had

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hostile and public reactions toward them at school events. Id. Second, T.V. was excluded from

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the “principal’s perfect attendance party,” an ice cream social, even though he qualified. Id.

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After the party, the principal admitted that T.V. qualified, but then tried to give T.V.’s parents his

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certificate in a meeting instead of giving T.V. his certificate alongside his peers. Id. Third,

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several teachers refused to communicate with the Valerios using typical methods of

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communication, and one teacher refused to meet with them to discuss their son’s progress

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because they had complained about the disparate treatment. Id. Fourth, the District did not

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properly investigate or respond to a complaint filed by the Valerios, providing false reasons for its

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failure. Id.

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On September 26, 2013, when questioned about T.V’s performance, the principal

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stated the system was set up for “white kids” to do better, and perhaps T.V. would have done

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better on the STAR testing if it had a little more “Tupac in it.” Tupac Shakur is a deceased

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rapper. Id. ¶ 23. T.V.’s parents complained to school officials regarding the statement, but the
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complaint did not result in an appropriate investigation. Id. On other occasions, T.V. was singled

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out by the principal for fabricated infractions, including a claim that he intentionally stepped in a

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hole to injure himself. Id. ¶ 24.

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After plaintiffs Jorge and Isabella Maranon, the parents of minor I.M., complained

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about the disparate treatment and the bullying of I.M., the District pulled I.M. out of school for

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five days instead of investigating and addressing the complaints. Id. ¶ 25. Other plaintiffs were

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afraid to complain due to the retaliation inflicted on the Valerios and Maranons. Id. ¶ 26.

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The U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights investigated the District,
but before it issued findings, the District agreed to change its GATE program. Id. ¶ 27.
II.

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MOTION TO DISMISS
A.

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Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to

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dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may

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dismiss “based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged

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under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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1990).

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Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to survive a motion

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to dismiss this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something

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more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and

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conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Id. (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss

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for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

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its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the

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interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the

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action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
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In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint

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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the

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complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the

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defendant bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Yaqub v.

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Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 11-2190, 2011 WL 12646345, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2011)

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(citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

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B.

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Disparate Impact Claim
Plaintiffs concede there is no private cause of action under Title VI for disparate

impact claims. Opp’n at 8; see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 276–77 (2001); Colwell v.

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Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009). The court therefore

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GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VI disparate impact claim without leave

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to amend. See Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave

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need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in

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futility . . . .”).

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C.

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Disparate Treatment Claim
Defendant argues the second amended complaint does not contain sufficient

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factual allegations to establish a disparate treatment claim, and plaintiffs’ disparate treatment

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claim is time barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court addresses each argument

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in turn.

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1.

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Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, “[n]o person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or

Whether Allegations State a Claim

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national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

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discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id. To state

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a claim for a violation of this section, a plaintiff must plead “(1) the entity involved is engaging in

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racial discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance.” Fobbs

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v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other

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grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Defendant argues the second amended complaint does not state a claim for the first

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element, that the school engaged in racial discrimination, because it does not allege plaintiffs

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received qualifying scores on the NNAT or CoGAT tests or were prevented from taking the tests

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because of their national origin or race. See Mot. at 9. Defendant misconstrues the nature and

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extent of plaintiffs’ discrimination claim. The second amended complaint does not simply allege

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the District excluded plaintiffs from the GATE program because of their national origin or race;

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rather, it alleges the District intentionally designed and implemented the entire GATE program

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with the purpose of segregating the school into a GATE class of primarily white students and an

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inferior non-GATE class of primarily non-white students. See SAC ¶¶ 32, 34–38. The District

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allegedly achieved its purpose by intentionally excluding non-white students from the GATE

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program and preventing the GATE and non-GATE classes from socializing together. Id. ¶¶ 8–11,

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35. Such intentional segregation, if proven, would constitute racial discrimination against

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plaintiffs even if they would not have qualified for the GATE program as it was designed, and

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even if the two programs were in fact “equal” in educational value. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of

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Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of

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Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100, 106-08 (9th

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Cir. 1972).

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In addition, the second amended complaint provides sufficient factual allegations

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to support the disparate treatment claim at this stage. The complaint alleges the District designed

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the structure of the GATE program to split the students into almost equal halves, aligned mostly

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by national origin or race, with the purpose of creating a two-tier division of classes based on

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national origin or race. See SAC ¶¶ 10, 32. It alleges the District designed and manipulated the

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selection process to exclude non-white students from the GATE program, such as through the use

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of subjective factors, id. ¶¶ 8–11, 36, and instituted policies to segregate the GATE and non-

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GATE students from learning or socializing together, id. ¶ 14. Specific facts and anecdotes

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further support plaintiffs’ claim of racial discrimination: the non-GATE class was referred to as

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the “ghetto” class, and the school administration did nothing to ameliorate that characterization,

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see id. ¶ 13; Hispanic students were incorrectly labelled as English as Second Language students,
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even though they did not speak Spanish, see id. ¶ 8; and the school principal said one student

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would have done better on standardized testing if the test had a little more “Tupac in it,” id. ¶ 23.

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These allegations, taken together, state a plausible claim of disparate treatment discrimination

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under Title VI.

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2.

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Title VI discrimination claims filed in California are subject to California’s

Statute of Limitations

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two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,

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993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding statute of limitations for claims brought

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under § 2000d is “same state limitations period applicable to claims brought under [42 U.S.C.] §

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1983”); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 1983 claim governed by

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California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions). However, “[t]he

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continuing violations doctrine extends the accrual of a claim if a continuing system of

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discrimination violates an individual’s rights ‘up to a point in time that falls within the applicable

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limitations period.’” Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir.),

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amended, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918,

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924 (9th Cir. 1982)). A plaintiff can establish a “continuing violation” by showing a “systematic

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policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations period—a

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systemic violation.” Id. (citation omitted).

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Similar to its first argument, defendant contends plaintiffs’ disparate treatment

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claim is time-barred because plaintiffs were first excluded from the GATE program more than

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two years before they filed the instant action. See Mot. at 8–9. Again, under plaintiffs’

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segregation theory, the school violated Title VI continuously and systematically while the GATE

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program was operated, through the 2013–2014 school year, rather than only at the time plaintiffs

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were initially rejected from the program. Given that plaintiffs filed this action on April 23, 2015,

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the alleged systemic violation operated in part within the two year statute of limitations period

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under Douglas. Because plaintiffs’ allegations are consistent with a theory of a “continuing

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violation,” defendant has not met its burden of showing plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim

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should be dismissed as time-barred at this stage.
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For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim.
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Hostile Education Environment
The Ninth Circuit has applied the three-part framework set out by the U.S.

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Department of Education to analyze hostile environment claims under Title VI. See Monteiro v.

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Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998). According to the Department

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of Education, a school district violates Title VI when (1) there is a racially hostile environment;

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(2) the district had notice of the problem; and (3) the district “failed to respond adequately to

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redress the racially hostile environment.” Investigative Guidance on Racial Incidents and

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Harassment Against Students, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448-01, 11449 (Mar. 10, 1994). “Under this

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analysis, an alleged harasser need not be an agent or employee of the recipient because this theory

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of liability under Title VI is premised on a recipient’s general duty to provide a nondiscriminatory

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educational environment.” Id. The Department of Education defines a “racially hostile

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environment” as one in which racial harassment is “severe, pervasive or persistent so as to

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interfere with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in or benefit from the services,

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activities or privileges provided by the recipient.” Id.; see Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1033. “Whether

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a hostile educational environment exists is a question of fact, determined with reference to the

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totality of the circumstances, including the victim’s race and age.” Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1033.

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Defendant’s argument that plaintiffs have not alleged the existence a racially

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hostile environment under the first part of the framework is unpersuasive. See Mot. at 13.

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Several allegations described above support plaintiffs’ claim that the school is a racially hostile

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environment: the District used the GATE program and other policies to segregate students based

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on national origin or race, see SAC ¶¶ 10, 14, 32; the non-GATE class was referred to as the

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“ghetto” class, and the school administration did nothing to ameliorate that characterization, see

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id. ¶ 13; Hispanic students were incorrectly labelled as English as Second Language students,

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even though they did not speak Spanish, see id. ¶ 8; and the school principal’s comment about

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testing having a little more “Tupac in it,” id. ¶ 23. These allegations are sufficient to plausibly

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suggest racial harassment at Lubin Elementary sufficiently “severe, pervasive or persistent” so as
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to interfere with the minor plaintiffs’ education. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 11449. Whether the

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environment is in fact racially hostile is a question of fact not appropriate for resolution on a

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motion to dismiss. See Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1033.

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The court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile education
environment claim.
E.

Retaliation

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1.

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Title VI prohibits recipients of federal funds from “intimidat[ing], threaten[ing],

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Whether Allegations State a Claim

coerc[ing], or discriminat[ing] against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right

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or privilege [under Title VI], or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or

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participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this part.” 34 C.F.R.

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§ 100.7. To state a claim for retaliation under Title VI, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) plaintiff

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engaged in a protected activity; (2) plaintiff was subjected to adverse action; and (3) there existed

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a causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity. Jones v. Wash. Metro. Area

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Transit Auth., 205 F.3d 428, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

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Here, the second amended complaint alleges District employees intentionally

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intimidated, coerced, and discriminated against the Valerios and Maranons for the purpose of

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interfering with their right to advocate on behalf of their children. SAC ¶ 55. Specifically, the

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complaint alleges when the parent plaintiffs complained about disparate treatment to the District,

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the District had hostile and public reactions to the Valerios at school events, a teacher refused to

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meet with the Valerios, the principal singled out T.V. for fabricated infractions, the District pulled

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I.M. out of school for five days, and the District refused to properly investigate the complaints of

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the Valerios or Maranons. Id. ¶¶ 22–27.

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For the reasons discussed above, the court first rejects defendant’s argument that

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plaintiffs’ activity was not protected because their belief the District engaged in unlawful

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discrimination was not objectively reasonable. See Mot. at 14. Plaintiffs have stated a plausible

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claim for disparate treatment discrimination. The court also rejects defendant’s argument that the

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alleged actions taken against plaintiffs were not sufficiently severe or materially adverse to state a
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claim. See id. at 15 (citing Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003)). Contrary to

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defendant’s contention, the court finds that the retaliatory actions described above are more than

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“minor annoyances” or “petty slights” and could plausibly chill a reasonable parent from making

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a complaint under Title VI on behalf of her children. See id. Although some of the alleged

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retaliatory actions were directed against the parents’ children, the second amended complaint

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alleges the actions were causally linked to the parents’ protected activity and were carried out for

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the purpose of retaliating against the parents, SAC ¶¶ 22–26. See Jones, 205 F.3d at 433. For

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these reasons, defendant has not met its burden of showing the second amended complaint fails to

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state a claim for retaliation at this stage. See Yaqub, 2011 WL 12646345, at *1.

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The court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim
insofar as it seeks monetary damages.

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2.

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The second amended complaint also prays for a permanent injunction prohibiting

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defendant from retaliating against plaintiffs. SAC at 13. To be awarded a permanent injunction,

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a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies

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available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,

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considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is

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warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Here, the second amended

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complaint as currently pled does not state the irreparable injury plaintiffs have suffered as a result

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of defendant’s retaliation or explain why the monetary damages they seek would not fully

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compensate them for their injury.

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Permanent Injunction

The court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ request for a

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permanent injunction, but with leave to amend.

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III.

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MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more

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definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague

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or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Id. Motions under this rule
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are generally disfavored and rarely granted. Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d

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1035, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A motion for a more

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definite statement may be granted if the defendant “cannot understand the substance of the claim

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asserted,” Griffin v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting

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Castaneda, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1045), or if the defendant cannot “frame a responsive pleading,”

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id. (quoting Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981)).

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Ordinarily, if discovery would reveal the detail sought, the motion should be denied. Beery v.

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Hitachi Home Elecs., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D. Cal. 1993).

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Here, defendant requests a more definite statement with respect to plaintiffs’

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hostile educational environment claim and disparate treatment claim to determine if these claims

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are time barred. As discussed above, the second amended complaint sufficiently states a claim

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under the continuing violation doctrine, and defendant may elicit additional details relating to the

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timing of the alleged events to support its statute of limitations defense through appropriate

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discovery. The second amended complaint is not “so vague or ambiguous” that defendant cannot

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reasonably prepare a response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

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Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement is DENIED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED without

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leave to amend as to plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim and GRANTED with leave to amend as to

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plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED in all

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other respects. Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement is DENIED. A third amended

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complaint shall be filed no later than 14 days after the filing date of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 2, 2016.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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