Christian v. Furmanite America, Incorporated

Filing 25

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 2/13/2017 DENYING 18 Motion for Class Certification. (Michel, G.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SCOTT CHRISTIAN, an individual, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:15-cv-00946-TLN-DB

ORDER

v.
FURMANITE AMERICA,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant.

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This is a putative class action alleging violations of the California Labor Code and other

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associated California wage-and-hour requirements. The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff

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Scott Christian’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for class certification. (ECF No. 18.) Defendant Furmanite

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America, Incorporated (“Defendant”) opposes the motion. (ECF No. 19.) The Court has

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carefully considered the record and the parties’ briefs. For the reason set forth below, Plaintiff’s

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motion is hereby DENIED.

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I.

BACKGROUND
Defendant is a large industrial company that provides a variety of services in the

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machining, piping, and engineering fields. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 16 at ¶ 5.)

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Plaintiff was a technician for Defendant and worked as an hourly employee. (ECF No. 16 at
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¶¶ 9–10.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not allowed to take a second meal break to which he was

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entitled on days when he worked for more than ten hours. (ECF No. 16 at ¶¶ 13–15.) Plaintiff

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also alleges that all other technicians worked similar hours and were not allowed to take a second

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meal break. (ECF No. 16 at ¶ 16.)

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Plaintiff brought this lawsuit as a putative class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 16 at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff now moves to certify the class. (ECF

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No. 18.)

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II.

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DISCUSSION
A putative class must clear two hurdles prior to certification. First, the class must satisfy

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the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

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representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.

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1998). Second, the class must fit within at least one of the three categories of class action

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enumerated in Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,

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345 (2011). The party seeking certification bears the burden of showing that those requirements

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are met. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).

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Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3). (See ECF No. 18 at 9:26 –10:1.)1 “To

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qualify for certification under [Rule 23(b)(3)], a class must satisfy two conditions in addition to

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the Rule 23(a) prerequisites: common questions must ‘predominate over any questions affecting

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only individual members,’ and class resolution must be ‘superior to other available methods for

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the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). These requirements are commonly known as predominance and superiority,

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and they are independent prongs of Rule 23(b)(3). See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst.,

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Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189–93 (9th Cir. 2001) (treating predominance and superiority separately);

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Dei Rossi v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 2:12-cv-00125-TLN, 2015 WL 1932484, at *11 (E.D. Cal.

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Apr. 28, 2015) (“The second prong of the analysis under Rule 23(b)(3) also requires a finding that

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In the FAC, Plaintiff indicates that he also seeks to prosecute this case as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1).
(ECF No. 16 at ¶ 22.) But Plaintiff does not contend in his motion that this class is suitable for certification under
Rule 23(b)(1), nor does he even cite Rule 23(b)(1). (See ECF No. 18 at 9:26–10:1.) Thus, even assuming Plaintiff
still seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(1), he has not shown that certification under that subsection is warranted.

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‘a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

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controversy.’”)

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Here, Plaintiff has not shown that a class action is superior. The superiority inquiry

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“necessarily involves a comparative evaluation of alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution.”

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. That inquiry is guided by four factors housed in Rule 23(b)(3), which

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the Court “must consider”: (1) the class members’ interests in individually controlling their cases,

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(2) the extent and nature of any preexisting litigation involving class members, (3) the pros and

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cons of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum, and (4) the likely difficulties in

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managing a class action. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1190–92 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D)).

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But Plaintiff has not argued that the superiority requirement is satisfied, nor has he equipped the

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Court to evaluate the four factors of Rule 23(b)(3). He simply argues that certification is proper

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under Rule 23(b)(3) because a common legal issue will predominate. (ECF No. 18 at 11:22–

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12:2.) That is only one half of the relevant standard. See Dei Rossi, 2015 WL 1932484, at *11.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that certification is warranted. Zinser, 253 F.3d at

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1192. The Court need not address whether the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied or whether

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Plaintiff is correct that a common legal issue will predominate.

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III.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not attempted to show that class resolution would be superior to other

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available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this case. Consequently, Plaintiff’s

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motion for class certification (ECF No. 18) is hereby DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 13, 2017

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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