Howard Jones Investments, LLC v. City of Sacramento et al

Filing 43

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 4/21/16 ORDERING the Court STAYS this action as to the third through sixth causes of action. All claims asserted by Plaintiff Howard Jones are stayed pending resolution of the state proceeding. As t o the tenants, the Court DISMISSES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the first and second causes of action against Defendant City of Sacramento and DENIES the motion to dismiss those two claims against Defendant Armstrong. The Tenant Plaintiffs' amended comp laint, if any, must be filed within (20) days of the date of this order. Plaintiffs' motion to for leave to file an amended complaint 37 is denied as moot. The hearing on 5/3/16 is vacated. Plaintiffs' opposition 39 failed to compl y with this Court's order re page limits. The Court therefore sanctions Plaintiffs' counsel, Moenig Law, in the amount of $150. That amount shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) days of the date of this order. (Becknal, R)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 HOWARD JONES INVESTMENTS, LLC; LOWELLA OLDHAM; ADA LEEPER; DOLLY LEEPER; ERICKA WARD; and ALONZO MEDLEY, 11 Plaintiffs, 12 v. No. 2:15-cv-954-JAM-KJN ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 13 14 15 CITY OF SACRAMENTO; CITY OF SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT; MATT ARMSTONG; MICHAEL BENNER; SAM SOMERS JR.; and DOES 1-20, 16 Defendants. 17 The City of Sacramento assessed a fine against Plaintiff 18 19 Howard Jones Investments, LLC (“Plaintiff Howard Jones”) for 20 failing to abate a public nuisance at its rental property. 21 Because Howard Jones brought this action simultaneously with the 22 continuing administrative proceeding, the Court abstains by 23 staying those causes of action related to the nuisance penalty 24 and its adjudication. 25 causes of action for failure to state a claim. 1 The Court dismisses in part the remaining 26 27 28 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for April 5, 2016. 1 1 I. 2 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Howard Jones rented its apartments at 1933 Los 3 Robles Blvd. to (former) tenants Lowella Oldham, Ada Leeper, 4 Dolly Leeper, Ericka Ward, and Alonzo Medley (collectively, 5 “Tenant Plaintiffs”). 6 Sacramento police officers allegedly targeted Plaintiffs’ 7 property. 8 the apartments without a warrant, handcuffing and pointing guns 9 at the occupants, and conducting searches. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 7-13. They would frequently “raid[]” the building, entering FAC ¶¶ 20-21. In 10 June 2014, Sergeant Matt Armstrong (“Defendant Armstrong”) sent a 11 letter to Plaintiff Howard Jones advising that there were 12 “activities” at the property that “constitute[d] a public 13 nuisance,” including noise violations and “[t]he occurrence of 14 criminal activity.” 15 Notice (“Plaintiff’s RJN”) Exh. A at 1. 16 months, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Armstrong pressured 17 Howard Jones to evict the tenants as a means of abating the 18 nuisance. 19 the tenants to vacate the property,” but Defendant Armstrong 20 nonetheless “issued an Administrative Penalty” for failing to 21 abate the nuisance. 22 appeal followed. 23 Plaintiff brought a complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court 24 seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. 25 Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (“Defendant’s RJN”) Exh. 26 A. 27 28 FAC ¶ 23; Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial FAC ¶¶ 24-30. Over the next few Howard Jones reached “agreements with FAC ¶ 31. FAC ¶¶ 37-40. An administrative hearing and When the appeal was denied, See Meanwhile, Plaintiff Howard Jones simultaneously brought this action in federal court against the City of Sacramento, the 2 1 Sacramento Police Department, and Sacramento Police Officers Matt 2 Armstrong, Michael Benner, and Sam Somers Jr. (collectively, 3 “Defendants”) (Docs. ##1, 2). 4 damages as well as a writ of mandamus. 5 The complaint originally sought The Court granted Defendants’ first motion to dismiss the 6 complaint with leave to amend (Doc. #23). A First Amended 7 Complaint (“FAC”) was filed, which added the Tenant Plaintiffs 8 for the first time and sought only damages (Doc. #27). 9 alleges violations of the tenants’ Fourth Amendment Rights, and The FAC 10 that the fine and forced evictions comprised unconstitutional 11 takings, deprivations of due process, and tortious interference 12 with Plaintiffs’ lease contracts. 13 the FAC (Doc. #36). Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. #39). 14 15 II. OPINION 16 A. Judicial Notice 17 Both parties have filed requests for judicial notice (Docs. 18 ##36-2, 39-2). Defendants seek judicial notice of Howard Jones’s 19 Superior Court complaint, and Plaintiffs request notice of the 20 “Public Hearing Case File Outline.” 21 questions the authenticity of the documents provided. 22 therefore takes judicial notice of these documents, which are in 23 the public record and not subject to reasonable dispute. 24 Evid. 201; see Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa 25 Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Lee v. City of 26 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 662, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 /// 28 /// 3 Neither party objects to or The Court Fed. R. 1 B. 2 3 Analysis 1. Younger Abstention Defendants argue that the Court should abstain pursuant to 4 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 5 Plaintiffs’ opposition brief provided no argument on this 6 subject, and even Defendants offered only a few sentences and 7 minimal citations. 8 Younger is applicable. 9 Mot. at 12; Reply at 1. Nonetheless, the Court has determined that “[A]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is 10 the exception, not the rule.” 11 134 S. Ct. 584, 594 (2013) (citation and quotation marks 12 omitted). 13 circumstances: (1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil 14 enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecution,” 15 and (3) civil proceedings “involving certain orders uniquely in 16 the furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform judicial 17 functions.” 18 For civil enforcement proceedings, the Court should only abstain 19 if three further “threshold elements” are met: 20 proceedings must “(1) [be] ongoing . . . ([2]) implicate an 21 important state interest, and ([3]) allow litigants to raise 22 federal challenges.” 23 Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 24 Where these elements are met, abstention is warranted if “the 25 federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the 26 state proceedings and [no] exception to Younger applies.” 27 These exceptions are “(1) [that] the state proceeding was 28 motivated by bad faith, (2) [that] the challenged statute is Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, Younger abstention applies in three narrow Id. at 591-92 (citations and alteration omitted). The state ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. 4 Id. 1 flagrantly unconstitutional, or (3) [] exceptional circumstances 2 are present.” 3 704477, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007) (citations omitted). 4 Here, the City of Sacramento and Sacramento Police Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Suthers, 2007 WL 5 Department brought a nuisance proceeding against Plaintiff Howard 6 Jones because of alleged “criminal activity.” 7 This state proceeding is not itself criminal and does not affect 8 California’s “judicial functions.” 9 initiated by the government is sufficiently “akin to [a] criminal FAC ¶¶ 31-38. But such a nuisance action 10 prosecution” to invoke Younger principles. 11 Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (“[A]n offense to the State's 12 interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as 13 great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding.”); 14 Woodfeathers, Inc. v. Washington Cty., Or., 180 F.3d 1017, 1021 15 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Civil actions brought by a government entity to 16 enforce nuisance laws have been held to justify Younger 17 abstention.”). 18 Huffman v. Pursue, Turning to the other threshold requirements, all three are 19 met here. First, the proceeding is on-going, because after the 20 administrative hearing and appeal, Howard Jones filed a writ for 21 state-court judicial review. 22 at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) (“[T]he Court adopts the majority 23 approach of treating judicial review of state administrative 24 proceedings as a unitary process that is not to be interrupted by 25 federal court intervention.”); see San Jose Silicon Valley 26 Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 27 546 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (establishing this rule in 28 dicta). Mir v. Kirchmeyer, 2014 WL 2436285, Second, nuisance proceedings “implicate[] important 5 1 state interests justifying abstention.” 2 Partners v. City of Corona, 2015 WL 4163346, at *6-*7 (C.D. Cal. 3 July 9, 2015) (citing World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. 4 City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“[B]ecause 5 the state court proceeding is a civil enforcement action seeking 6 to abate a public nuisance, it implicates important state 7 interests for purposes of Younger abstention.”). 8 have the ability to raise federal constitutional claims in the 9 state proceeding. 10 11 Cal. Outdoor Equity And Plaintiffs See Defendants’ RJN Exh. A at 10 (alleging violations of due process rights). As to the final two inquiries, Plaintiffs’ operative 12 complaint seeks only damages, but such relief would have the 13 “practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings.” 14 damages “would [] cast aspersion on the competence of the[] state 15 courts to adjudicate [P]laintiff[s’] federal claims.” 16 Domestic Sales, 2007 WL 704477, at *12; see Gilbertson v. 17 Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004). 18 have not argued that an exception to Younger applies here, and 19 indeed there is no basis for the Court to conclude that there was 20 bad faith, “flagrant[] unconstitutional[ity],” or other 21 exceptional circumstances. 22 Younger abstention is appropriate and that no exception applies. 23 Defendants contend that dismissal is the proper application Reply at 1. Awarding Gen. Steel Finally, Plaintiffs The Court therefore finds that 24 of Younger. But “when damages are at issue a 25 district court should exercise Younger abstention by staying the 26 federal action rather than dismissing it.” 27 Inv'rs v. City of Capitola, 2005 WL 1774247, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 28 July 26, 2005) (citing Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 984). 6 Los Altos El Granada 1 The Court accordingly stays the third through sixth causes 2 of action, which relate to the ongoing state proceedings about 3 the nuisance penalty. 4 reach the parties’ other arguments as to the merits of these 5 causes of action. 6 Given this conclusion, the Court does not However, there remain two causes of action that are 7 independent of the state proceedings: the first and second causes 8 of action allege that Sacramento police officers entered and 9 searched the tenants’ apartments in violation of the Fourth 10 Amendment. 11 proceedings, so the Court will not stay the case with regard to 12 those causes of action. 13 (noting that abstention is not warranted where “the underlying 14 federal claims [are] ‘wholly unrelated’ to the issues in the 15 pending state proceeding”). 16 merits of the motion to dismiss as to the first and second claims 17 below. 18 Such allegations are unrelated to the nuisance 2. See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 980 n.14 The Court therefore addresses the First and Second Causes of Action 19 Plaintiffs bring two causes of actions for “unlawful entry” 20 and “unlawful search[es]” of Tenant Plaintiffs’ apartments under 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. 22 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (“The Fourth Amendment 23 generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, 24 whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.”). 25 Plaintiffs assert these claims against two defendants: Defendant 26 Armstrong and the City of Sacramento. 27 28 a. See Illinois v. Claims Against Defendant Armstrong Defendants argue that the claims against Defendant Armstrong 7 1 cannot stand because they are “[v]ague and conclusory.” 2 5. 3 police officers, including Defendant Armstrong himself, entered 4 and searched the apartments without a warrant, consent, or reason 5 to suspect wrongdoing. 6 allegations as true, they sufficiently allege a Fourth Amendment 7 violation. 8 938 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying motion to dismiss where the 9 complaint stated that the defendants “‘smashed in [the Mot. at The Court disagrees, because the FAC states that Sacramento FAC ¶¶ 20-21, 75-76, 81. Taking these See Williams v. Cty. of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925, 10 plaintiff's] door and forced it open’ without a warrant, probable 11 cause, exigent circumstances or consent”). 12 The Court also rejects Defendants’ argument that “Armstrong 13 was not personally involved in warrantless entries or searches of 14 tenants’ residents [sic]” and that “‘searches conducted as part 15 of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an 16 administrative purpose . . . may be permissible . . . though not 17 supported by a showing of probable cause.’” 18 at 2 (citation omitted). 19 disputes that the Court cannot resolve on a motion to dismiss. 20 The allegations in the first and second claims against Defendant 21 Armstrong are sufficient for this stage of the proceedings and 22 will not be dismissed. 23 b. 24 Mot. at 5-6; Reply Such analyses are fraught with factual Claims Against Defendant City of Sacramento Defendants move to dismiss the claims against City of 25 Sacramento because Plaintiffs did not allege a policy, custom, or 26 practice to support municipality liability under Monell v. Dep't 27 of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 28 4. Mot. at Plaintiffs’ opposition discusses an alleged policy to effect 8 1 mass evictions, see, e.g., Opp. at 15, but does not mention any 2 policy related to unlawful entry and search of apartments. 3 Indeed, the FAC contains no allegations of that nature. 4 first and second causes of action are therefore dismissed without 5 prejudice as to Defendant City of Sacramento. The 6 7 8 9 III. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the Court STAYS this action as to the third through sixth causes of action. All claims 10 asserted by Plaintiff Howard Jones are therefore stayed pending 11 resolution of the state proceeding. 12 DISMISSES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the first and second causes of 13 action against Defendant City of Sacramento and DENIES the motion 14 to dismiss those two claims against Defendant Armstrong. 15 Tenant Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, if any, must be filed 16 within twenty (20) days of the date of this order. 17 responsive pleading is due within twenty (20) days thereafter. 18 As to the tenants, the Court The Defendants’ Based on these rulings, Plaintiffs’ motion to for leave to 19 file an amended complaint (Doc. #37) is denied as moot. 20 Howard Jones’s claims are now stayed and the Tenant Plaintiffs 21 have been given the opportunity to amend their remaining claims. 22 The hearing on May 3, 2016 is vacated. 23 That is, As a final matter, Plaintiffs’ opposition (Doc. #39) failed 24 to comply with this Court’s order regarding page limits. See 25 Order re Filing Requirements (Doc. #5) (limiting briefs to 26 fifteen pages and advising that “[a] violation of this Order will 27 result in monetary sanctions being imposed against counsel in the 28 amount of $50.00 per page”). The Court therefore sanctions 9 1 Plaintiffs’ counsel, Moenig Law, in the amount of $150. 2 amount shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) 3 days of the date of this order. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 21, 2016 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 That

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