Howard Jones Investments, LLC v. City of Sacramento et al
Filing
43
ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 4/21/16 ORDERING the Court STAYS this action as to the third through sixth causes of action. All claims asserted by Plaintiff Howard Jones are stayed pending resolution of the state proceeding. As t o the tenants, the Court DISMISSES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the first and second causes of action against Defendant City of Sacramento and DENIES the motion to dismiss those two claims against Defendant Armstrong. The Tenant Plaintiffs' amended comp laint, if any, must be filed within (20) days of the date of this order. Plaintiffs' motion to for leave to file an amended complaint 37 is denied as moot. The hearing on 5/3/16 is vacated. Plaintiffs' opposition 39 failed to compl y with this Court's order re page limits. The Court therefore sanctions Plaintiffs' counsel, Moenig Law, in the amount of $150. That amount shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court within ten (10) days of the date of this order. (Becknal, R)
1
2
3
4
5
6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9
10
HOWARD JONES INVESTMENTS, LLC;
LOWELLA OLDHAM; ADA LEEPER;
DOLLY LEEPER; ERICKA WARD; and
ALONZO MEDLEY,
11
Plaintiffs,
12
v.
No.
2:15-cv-954-JAM-KJN
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
13
14
15
CITY OF SACRAMENTO; CITY OF
SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT;
MATT ARMSTONG; MICHAEL BENNER;
SAM SOMERS JR.; and DOES 1-20,
16
Defendants.
17
The City of Sacramento assessed a fine against Plaintiff
18
19
Howard Jones Investments, LLC (“Plaintiff Howard Jones”) for
20
failing to abate a public nuisance at its rental property.
21
Because Howard Jones brought this action simultaneously with the
22
continuing administrative proceeding, the Court abstains by
23
staying those causes of action related to the nuisance penalty
24
and its adjudication.
25
causes of action for failure to state a claim. 1
The Court dismisses in part the remaining
26
27
28
1
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for April 5, 2016.
1
1
I.
2
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Howard Jones rented its apartments at 1933 Los
3
Robles Blvd. to (former) tenants Lowella Oldham, Ada Leeper,
4
Dolly Leeper, Ericka Ward, and Alonzo Medley (collectively,
5
“Tenant Plaintiffs”).
6
Sacramento police officers allegedly targeted Plaintiffs’
7
property.
8
the apartments without a warrant, handcuffing and pointing guns
9
at the occupants, and conducting searches.
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 7-13.
They would frequently “raid[]” the building, entering
FAC ¶¶ 20-21.
In
10
June 2014, Sergeant Matt Armstrong (“Defendant Armstrong”) sent a
11
letter to Plaintiff Howard Jones advising that there were
12
“activities” at the property that “constitute[d] a public
13
nuisance,” including noise violations and “[t]he occurrence of
14
criminal activity.”
15
Notice (“Plaintiff’s RJN”) Exh. A at 1.
16
months, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Armstrong pressured
17
Howard Jones to evict the tenants as a means of abating the
18
nuisance.
19
the tenants to vacate the property,” but Defendant Armstrong
20
nonetheless “issued an Administrative Penalty” for failing to
21
abate the nuisance.
22
appeal followed.
23
Plaintiff brought a complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court
24
seeking judicial review of the administrative decision.
25
Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (“Defendant’s RJN”) Exh.
26
A.
27
28
FAC ¶ 23; Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial
FAC ¶¶ 24-30.
Over the next few
Howard Jones reached “agreements with
FAC ¶ 31.
FAC ¶¶ 37-40.
An administrative hearing and
When the appeal was denied,
See
Meanwhile, Plaintiff Howard Jones simultaneously brought
this action in federal court against the City of Sacramento, the
2
1
Sacramento Police Department, and Sacramento Police Officers Matt
2
Armstrong, Michael Benner, and Sam Somers Jr. (collectively,
3
“Defendants”) (Docs. ##1, 2).
4
damages as well as a writ of mandamus.
5
The complaint originally sought
The Court granted Defendants’ first motion to dismiss the
6
complaint with leave to amend (Doc. #23).
A First Amended
7
Complaint (“FAC”) was filed, which added the Tenant Plaintiffs
8
for the first time and sought only damages (Doc. #27).
9
alleges violations of the tenants’ Fourth Amendment Rights, and
The FAC
10
that the fine and forced evictions comprised unconstitutional
11
takings, deprivations of due process, and tortious interference
12
with Plaintiffs’ lease contracts.
13
the FAC (Doc. #36).
Defendants now move to dismiss
Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. #39).
14
15
II.
OPINION
16
A.
Judicial Notice
17
Both parties have filed requests for judicial notice (Docs.
18
##36-2, 39-2).
Defendants seek judicial notice of Howard Jones’s
19
Superior Court complaint, and Plaintiffs request notice of the
20
“Public Hearing Case File Outline.”
21
questions the authenticity of the documents provided.
22
therefore takes judicial notice of these documents, which are in
23
the public record and not subject to reasonable dispute.
24
Evid. 201; see Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa
25
Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Lee v. City of
26
Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 662, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
27
///
28
///
3
Neither party objects to or
The Court
Fed. R.
1
B.
2
3
Analysis
1.
Younger Abstention
Defendants argue that the Court should abstain pursuant to
4
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
5
Plaintiffs’ opposition brief provided no argument on this
6
subject, and even Defendants offered only a few sentences and
7
minimal citations.
8
Younger is applicable.
9
Mot. at 12; Reply at 1.
Nonetheless, the Court has determined that
“[A]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
10
the exception, not the rule.”
11
134 S. Ct. 584, 594 (2013) (citation and quotation marks
12
omitted).
13
circumstances: (1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil
14
enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecution,”
15
and (3) civil proceedings “involving certain orders uniquely in
16
the furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform judicial
17
functions.”
18
For civil enforcement proceedings, the Court should only abstain
19
if three further “threshold elements” are met:
20
proceedings must “(1) [be] ongoing . . . ([2]) implicate an
21
important state interest, and ([3]) allow litigants to raise
22
federal challenges.”
23
Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
24
Where these elements are met, abstention is warranted if “the
25
federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the
26
state proceedings and [no] exception to Younger applies.”
27
These exceptions are “(1) [that] the state proceeding was
28
motivated by bad faith, (2) [that] the challenged statute is
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,
Younger abstention applies in three narrow
Id. at 591-92 (citations and alteration omitted).
The state
ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp.
4
Id.
1
flagrantly unconstitutional, or (3) [] exceptional circumstances
2
are present.”
3
704477, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007) (citations omitted).
4
Here, the City of Sacramento and Sacramento Police
Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Suthers, 2007 WL
5
Department brought a nuisance proceeding against Plaintiff Howard
6
Jones because of alleged “criminal activity.”
7
This state proceeding is not itself criminal and does not affect
8
California’s “judicial functions.”
9
initiated by the government is sufficiently “akin to [a] criminal
FAC ¶¶ 31-38.
But such a nuisance action
10
prosecution” to invoke Younger principles.
11
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (“[A]n offense to the State's
12
interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as
13
great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding.”);
14
Woodfeathers, Inc. v. Washington Cty., Or., 180 F.3d 1017, 1021
15
(9th Cir. 1999) (“Civil actions brought by a government entity to
16
enforce nuisance laws have been held to justify Younger
17
abstention.”).
18
Huffman v. Pursue,
Turning to the other threshold requirements, all three are
19
met here.
First, the proceeding is on-going, because after the
20
administrative hearing and appeal, Howard Jones filed a writ for
21
state-court judicial review.
22
at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) (“[T]he Court adopts the majority
23
approach of treating judicial review of state administrative
24
proceedings as a unitary process that is not to be interrupted by
25
federal court intervention.”); see San Jose Silicon Valley
26
Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose,
27
546 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (establishing this rule in
28
dicta).
Mir v. Kirchmeyer, 2014 WL 2436285,
Second, nuisance proceedings “implicate[] important
5
1
state interests justifying abstention.”
2
Partners v. City of Corona, 2015 WL 4163346, at *6-*7 (C.D. Cal.
3
July 9, 2015) (citing World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v.
4
City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“[B]ecause
5
the state court proceeding is a civil enforcement action seeking
6
to abate a public nuisance, it implicates important state
7
interests for purposes of Younger abstention.”).
8
have the ability to raise federal constitutional claims in the
9
state proceeding.
10
11
Cal. Outdoor Equity
And Plaintiffs
See Defendants’ RJN Exh. A at 10 (alleging
violations of due process rights).
As to the final two inquiries, Plaintiffs’ operative
12
complaint seeks only damages, but such relief would have the
13
“practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings.”
14
damages “would [] cast aspersion on the competence of the[] state
15
courts to adjudicate [P]laintiff[s’] federal claims.”
16
Domestic Sales, 2007 WL 704477, at *12; see Gilbertson v.
17
Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004).
18
have not argued that an exception to Younger applies here, and
19
indeed there is no basis for the Court to conclude that there was
20
bad faith, “flagrant[] unconstitutional[ity],” or other
21
exceptional circumstances.
22
Younger abstention is appropriate and that no exception applies.
23
Defendants contend that dismissal is the proper application
Reply at 1.
Awarding
Gen. Steel
Finally, Plaintiffs
The Court therefore finds that
24
of Younger.
But “when damages are at issue a
25
district court should exercise Younger abstention by staying the
26
federal action rather than dismissing it.”
27
Inv'rs v. City of Capitola, 2005 WL 1774247, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
28
July 26, 2005) (citing Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 984).
6
Los Altos El Granada
1
The Court accordingly stays the third through sixth causes
2
of action, which relate to the ongoing state proceedings about
3
the nuisance penalty.
4
reach the parties’ other arguments as to the merits of these
5
causes of action.
6
Given this conclusion, the Court does not
However, there remain two causes of action that are
7
independent of the state proceedings: the first and second causes
8
of action allege that Sacramento police officers entered and
9
searched the tenants’ apartments in violation of the Fourth
10
Amendment.
11
proceedings, so the Court will not stay the case with regard to
12
those causes of action.
13
(noting that abstention is not warranted where “the underlying
14
federal claims [are] ‘wholly unrelated’ to the issues in the
15
pending state proceeding”).
16
merits of the motion to dismiss as to the first and second claims
17
below.
18
Such allegations are unrelated to the nuisance
2.
See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 980 n.14
The Court therefore addresses the
First and Second Causes of Action
19
Plaintiffs bring two causes of actions for “unlawful entry”
20
and “unlawful search[es]” of Tenant Plaintiffs’ apartments under
21
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment.
22
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (“The Fourth Amendment
23
generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home,
24
whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.”).
25
Plaintiffs assert these claims against two defendants: Defendant
26
Armstrong and the City of Sacramento.
27
28
a.
See Illinois v.
Claims Against Defendant Armstrong
Defendants argue that the claims against Defendant Armstrong
7
1
cannot stand because they are “[v]ague and conclusory.”
2
5.
3
police officers, including Defendant Armstrong himself, entered
4
and searched the apartments without a warrant, consent, or reason
5
to suspect wrongdoing.
6
allegations as true, they sufficiently allege a Fourth Amendment
7
violation.
8
938 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying motion to dismiss where the
9
complaint stated that the defendants “‘smashed in [the
Mot. at
The Court disagrees, because the FAC states that Sacramento
FAC ¶¶ 20-21, 75-76, 81.
Taking these
See Williams v. Cty. of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925,
10
plaintiff's] door and forced it open’ without a warrant, probable
11
cause, exigent circumstances or consent”).
12
The Court also rejects Defendants’ argument that “Armstrong
13
was not personally involved in warrantless entries or searches of
14
tenants’ residents [sic]” and that “‘searches conducted as part
15
of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
16
administrative purpose . . . may be permissible . . . though not
17
supported by a showing of probable cause.’”
18
at 2 (citation omitted).
19
disputes that the Court cannot resolve on a motion to dismiss.
20
The allegations in the first and second claims against Defendant
21
Armstrong are sufficient for this stage of the proceedings and
22
will not be dismissed.
23
b.
24
Mot. at 5-6; Reply
Such analyses are fraught with factual
Claims Against Defendant City of Sacramento
Defendants move to dismiss the claims against City of
25
Sacramento because Plaintiffs did not allege a policy, custom, or
26
practice to support municipality liability under Monell v. Dep't
27
of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
28
4.
Mot. at
Plaintiffs’ opposition discusses an alleged policy to effect
8
1
mass evictions, see, e.g., Opp. at 15, but does not mention any
2
policy related to unlawful entry and search of apartments.
3
Indeed, the FAC contains no allegations of that nature.
4
first and second causes of action are therefore dismissed without
5
prejudice as to Defendant City of Sacramento.
The
6
7
8
9
III.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court STAYS this action
as to the third through sixth causes of action.
All claims
10
asserted by Plaintiff Howard Jones are therefore stayed pending
11
resolution of the state proceeding.
12
DISMISSES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND the first and second causes of
13
action against Defendant City of Sacramento and DENIES the motion
14
to dismiss those two claims against Defendant Armstrong.
15
Tenant Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, if any, must be filed
16
within twenty (20) days of the date of this order.
17
responsive pleading is due within twenty (20) days thereafter.
18
As to the tenants, the Court
The
Defendants’
Based on these rulings, Plaintiffs’ motion to for leave to
19
file an amended complaint (Doc. #37) is denied as moot.
20
Howard Jones’s claims are now stayed and the Tenant Plaintiffs
21
have been given the opportunity to amend their remaining claims.
22
The hearing on May 3, 2016 is vacated.
23
That is,
As a final matter, Plaintiffs’ opposition (Doc. #39) failed
24
to comply with this Court’s order regarding page limits.
See
25
Order re Filing Requirements (Doc. #5) (limiting briefs to
26
fifteen pages and advising that “[a] violation of this Order will
27
result in monetary sanctions being imposed against counsel in the
28
amount of $50.00 per page”).
The Court therefore sanctions
9
1
Plaintiffs’ counsel, Moenig Law, in the amount of $150.
2
amount shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court within ten (10)
3
days of the date of this order.
4
5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 21, 2016
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10
That
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?