Scharringhausen v. County of Trinity, et al
Filing
16
ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 10/9/15 ORDERING that Defendants' MOTION to DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 8 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of this Order. Defendants' responsive pleading is due within twenty (20) days thereafter. (Mena-Sanchez, L)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
ROBERT MICHAEL
SCHARRINGHAUSEN,
No.
2:15-cv-00965-JAM-CMK
12
Plaintiff,
13
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND
v.
14
15
16
17
18
19
COUNTY OF TRINITY; SGT.
CHRISTOPHER COMPTON; CPL.
OMAR BROWN; CPL. RON HANOVER;
SGT. MIKE RIST (All Officers
serving on the Trinity County
Narcotics Task Force); ERIC
HERYFORD; and DOES 1 through
50,
Defendants.
20
21
In the Complaint (Doc. #1), Plaintiff Robert Michael
22
Scharringhausen (“Plaintiff”) alleges two causes of action
23
against Defendants County of Trinity (“the County”); Trinity
24
County District Attorney, Eric Heryford (“Heryford”); and Trinity
25
County Sheriff’s Deputies Christopher Compton (“Compton”), Omar
26
Brown (“Brown”), Ron Hanover (“Hanover”), and Mike Rist (“Rist”)
27
(collectively “the Deputies”).
28
Deputies (collectively “Defendants”) now move to dismiss (Doc.
The County, Heryford and the
1
1
#8) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 1
2
3
I.
4
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings the first cause of action against all
5
Defendants.
Comp. ¶ 14.
In it, Plaintiff alleges that the
6
Deputies conducted a raid on his property, during which they
7
confiscated documents that included privileged communications
8
between Plaintiff and his attorney.
9
were copied and disseminated to “prosecutorial agencies” without
Id. ¶ 10.
These documents
10
any independent review and at the behest of Heryford.
11
claim alleges a violation of Plaintiff’s attorney-client
12
privilege leading to an unlawful deprivation of “his rights in
13
subsequent criminal defense issues and to his access to the
14
Courts,” and violations of his rights under the Sixth and
15
Fourteenth Amendments.
16
Id.
The
Id. ¶¶ 11-14.
The second cause of action is brought against the Deputies
17
and alleges that they provided knowingly “false and malicious
18
information” regarding Plaintiff’s use of various aliases and his
19
connection to several criminal convictions associated with those
20
aliases.
21
increase Plaintiff’s bail and to prevent him from being released.
22
Id.
23
his liberty.”
24
///
25
///
Comp. ¶ 16.
This information was subsequently used to
He alleges the Deputies’ conduct therefore “deprived him of
Id. ¶ 17.
26
27
28
1
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for September 2, 2015.
2
1
II.
OPINION
2
A.
Judicial Notice
3
Defendants request the Court take notice (Doc. #9) of seven
4
exhibits in support of their motion.
5
Plaintiff argues these documents are not properly noticed at this
6
stage of the litigation.
7
exhibits as impermissible hearsay.
8
9
10
11
Opp. at p. 9.
He also objects to the
The Court declines to take notice of Defendants’ exhibits.
Although the exhibits are public records, they are not necessary
for the Court’s consideration of the current motion.
B.
12
13
In his Opposition,
Discussion
1.
Municipal Liability
Defendants first challenge Plaintiff’s claims against the
14
County.
15
premised on a respondeat superior theory of liability as the
16
Complaint makes no allegations regarding an official policy or
17
custom of the County.
18
MTD at pp. 5-6.
They argue the claim is improperly
In his Opposition, Plaintiff recites case law regarding the
19
imposition of liability on a municipal defendant, but does not
20
directly address Defendants’ arguments or point to any support in
21
the Complaint for a claim based on Monell v. Department of Social
22
Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
23
Opp. at p. 2.
To properly state a Monell claim, allegations in a complaint
24
“may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but
25
must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give
26
fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
27
effectively.”
28
631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d
3
1
1216 (9th Cir. 2011)).
2
theories of municipal liability: (1) when official policies or
3
established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when
4
omissions or failures to act amount to a local government policy
5
of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or (3) when
6
a local government official with final policy-making authority
7
ratifies a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.”
8
Seipert, No. 2:15-CV-00355-KJM, 2015 WL 5173075, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
9
2015) (citing Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232,
10
11
“A Monell claim may be stated under three
Sants v.
1249–50 (9th Cir. 2010)).
The Complaint is devoid of allegations supporting any of
12
these theories of Monell liability.
13
Defendants, the only connection the County had to the underlying
14
conduct was that it employed the Deputies.
15
held liable pursuant to §1983 based upon a respondeat superior
16
theory.
17
to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s claims against the
18
County.
19
Monell liability through the claims against the individual
20
Defendants in their official capacities, they are dismissed on
21
the same grounds.
22
1079, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“Official capacity suits generally
23
represent only another way of pleading an action against the
24
entity that employs the agent.”)
25
As pointed out by
See Sants, 2015 WL 5173075, at *3.
The County cannot be
Defendants’ Motion
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to impose
See Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice and without
26
leave to amend is appropriate “only if it appears beyond doubt
27
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
28
claim which would entitle him to relief.”
4
Navarro v. Block, 250
1
F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation
2
marks omitted).
3
cannot properly plead a Monell claim, any municipal liability
4
claims are dismissed with leave to amend.
5
6
2.
Because the Court is not certain that Plaintiff
First Cause of Action
Plaintiff’s first cause of action is based on the alleged
7
seizure and dissemination of documents protected by the attorney-
8
client privilege.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Comp. ¶¶ 10-14; Opp. at p. 9.
The Ninth Circuit has discussed the constitutional nature of
the attorney-client privilege:
Standing alone, the attorney-client privilege is merely
a rule of evidence; it has not yet been held a
constitutional right. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S.
449, 466 n. 15 (1975); Beckler v. Superior Court, 568
F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1978). In some situations,
however, government interference with the confidential
relationship between a defendant and his counsel may
implicate Sixth Amendment rights. See, e.g.,
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51
L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). Such an intrusion violates the Sixth
Amendment only when it substantially prejudices the
defendant. United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182,
1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980); see United States v. Glover,
596 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
860 (1979).
19
Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985)
20
(emphasis added).
21
Defendants contend there are no allegations in the Complaint
22
that the alleged conduct interfered with Plaintiff’s relationship
23
with his counsel or resulted in “substantial prejudice.”
24
p. 9. Defendants are correct.
25
MTD at
The Complaint fails to properly allege that Plaintiff was
26
substantially prejudiced by the seizure and dissemination of the
27
documents.
28
establish a constitutional violation cognizable under §1983.
The alleged conduct in and of itself does not
5
Nor
1
do Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that his rights were
2
violated establish the necessary element of prejudice.
3
therefore dismisses the first cause of action but does so with
4
leave to amend.
5
6
3.
The Court
Prosecutorial Immunity
Because the only claim brought against Heryford has been
7
dismissed, the Court need not and does not address Defendants’
8
arguments regarding prosecutorial immunity.
9
10
4.
Second Cause of Action
Defendants contend Plaintiff’s second cause of action should
11
be dismissed because it fails to assert a viable claim regarding
12
Plaintiff’s bail and confinement in jail.
13
MTD at p. 10-11.
It is unclear from the face of the Complaint exactly what is
14
the basis for Plaintiff’s second cause of action.
15
adopts the plausible interpretation utilized by Defendants in
16
their Motion that Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for
17
violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive
18
bail, despite the Complaint completely failing to reference the
19
Eighth Amendment.
20
in his Opposition, as he fails to address Defendants’ arguments
21
and includes only one sentence referencing this second cause of
22
action.
23
The Court
Plaintiff does nothing to resolve the mystery
Opp. at p. 9.
The Complaint alleges that the Deputies fabricated previous
24
convictions in order to deny Plaintiff bail.
25
However, in California, judicial officers are vested with the
26
exclusive authority to enhance or reduce bail, not law
27
enforcement.
28
claim against the Deputies, Plaintiff must establish that their
See Cal. Penal Code § 1269c.
6
Comp. ¶¶ 16, 18.
In order to state a
1
conduct caused the constitutional violation.
2
traditional tort law principles of causation, which we apply to §
3
1983 claims, . . . a judicial officer's exercise of independent
4
judgment in the course of his official duties is a superseding
5
cause that breaks the chain of causation linking law enforcement
6
personnel to the officer's decision . . . .”
7
Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 663-64 (9th Cir. 2007).
8
can only be held liable under Plaintiff’s theory “if they
9
prevented the [judicial officer] from exercising his independent
“Pursuant to
Galen v. Cnty. of
The Deputies
10
judgment.”
11
requires two key elements: (1) that law enforcement “deliberately
12
or recklessly misled” the judicial officer; and (2) that the
13
plaintiff’s bail “would not have been unconstitutionally
14
excessive but for the officers' misrepresentations.”
15
Complaint does not include any factual allegations that the bail
16
was in fact constitutionally “excessive” or that it would not
17
have been set at that level but for the Deputies’
18
misrepresentations.
19
allegations that the fabrications were used “to increase
20
Plaintiff’s bail” and therefore his rights were violated.
21
¶¶ 16-18.
22
claim for relief and is dismissed.
23
Id.
The Ninth Circuit has held that such a claim
Id.
The
Rather, it simply makes conclusory and vague
Comp.
Plaintiff’s second cause of action fails to state a
It is not clear to the Court that amendment of this claim
24
would be futile, and therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend.
25
However, as to this claim, and any other claim which the Court is
26
granting leave to amend, Plaintiff is “admonished that failure to
27
cure the defects identified in this Order will be grounds for
28
dismissal without further leave to amend.”
7
See Dick v. Am. Home
1
Mortgage Servicing, Inc., CIV. 2:13-00201 WBS, 2013 WL 5299180,
2
at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
3
4
5
III.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS
6
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
7
First Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days
8
from the date of this Order.
9
due within twenty (20) days thereafter.
10
11
Defendants’ responsive pleading is
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
Plaintiff’s
October 9, 2015
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?