Candler v. Stainer, et al.

Filing 11

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 1/10/17 RECOMMENDING that this action be dismissed. Referred to Judge Troy L. Nunley; Objections to F&R due within 14 days.(Dillon, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KEITH CANDLER,

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No. 2:15-CV-0969-TLN-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MILES STAINER, et al.,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,
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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

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if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

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which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

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allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

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the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Miles Stainer; Clark Kelso; J.

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Macomber; S. Delgado; J. Haque; Swartz; Hewette; the California Department of Corrections

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and Rehabilitation, and California State Prison – Sacramento. Plaintiff states that he has been

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attempting to receive adequate mental health care since entering the prison system. Plaintiff

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alleges that “defendants J. Macomber, Miles Stainer, and C Kelso deliberately refused to provide

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plaintiff with adequate mental health treatment when they knew or should have known that

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plaintiff needed it.” Plaintiff also states that he smokes marijuana and masturbates to relieve his

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mental health symptoms but, rather than providing him mental health treatment, he has “been

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written up” for this behavior. Though plaintiff states that he was sent to a “crisis bed” after

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feeling suicidal, he was not given adequate mental health treatment of follow-up care by

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defendant Delgado, a prison mental health provider. According to plaintiff, defendant Delgado

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informed him that “she was not working here to help plaintiff but to only get paid.”

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Next, plaintiff alleges that he “received medical documents that shows”

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defendants Delgado, Haque, and Swartz “denied plaintiff adequate mental health care.” Plaintiff

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adds that “these defendants also forged and/or doctored plaintiff mental health file in order to

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make it seem like plaintiff was receiving proper mental health care stemming from the 7-26-13

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suicidal incident.”
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Plaintiff’s claims that defendant Hewette was his clinician and “refused to talk

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with plaintiff for more than ten minutes during our meetings.” In particular, plaintiff states that,

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on one occasion, he asked to be placed in a program to help him with his “indecent exposure

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issues,” but that defendant Hewette said that she would not “carry on with that conversation with

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plaintiff.” According to plaintiff, defendant Hewette “also refused my request for a higher level

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of care and would not allow me to attend my IDTT (medical hearing) which I had a right to

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attend.”

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Plaintiff claims that defendants Stainer, Kelso, and Macomber are liable for

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failing to properly train subordinates and ensure that he is being provided necessary mental

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health treatment.

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II. DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects, each discussed below.
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Defendants Stainer, Kelso, and Macomber
Plaintiff claims that defendants Stainer, Kelso, and Macomber are liable for

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failing to properly train and supervise subordinates. Supervisory personnel are generally not

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liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

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(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor

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is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or

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directed the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory

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defendant can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional

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conduct because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under §

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1983 for his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient

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that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a

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constitutional violation may, however, be liable even where such personnel do not overtly
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participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.

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1991) (en banc).

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When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

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defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

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Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

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1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel

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in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

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official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948.

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Because plaintiff has not alleged how the supervisory defendants’ personal

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conduct caused or contributed to a constitutional violation, he fails to state any claims against

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these defendants.

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B.

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Defendants CDCR and CSP-Sacramento
Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and

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California State Prison – Sacramento as defendants. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal

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courts from hearing suits brought against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of

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other states. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.

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1991). This prohibition extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state

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agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v.

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List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and

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correction of prisoners is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama

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v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th

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cir. 1993) (en banc).

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These defendants are immune from suit.

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C.

Defendant Hewette

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Plaintiff’s claims that defendant Hewette, who was his therapist, “refused to talk

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with plaintiff for more than ten minutes during our meetings.” In particular, plaintiff states that,

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on one occasion, he asked to be placed in a program to help him with his “indecent exposure

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issues,” but that defendant Hewette said that she would not “carry on with that conversation with

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plaintiff.” According to plaintiff, defendant Hewette “also refused my request for a higher level

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of care and would not allow me to attend my IDTT (medical hearing) which I had a right to

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attend.”

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

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when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

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such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

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105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

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health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.

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See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

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demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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In this case, plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating how the alleged denial of

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treatment could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

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pain. Moreover, the facts alleged establish that plaintiff was in fact provided therapeutic

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treatment by defendant Hewette. Plaintiff’s difference of opinion as to the proper course of such
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treatment does not establish a constitutional claim.

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D.

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Defendants Delgado, Haque, and Swartz
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Delgado, Haque, and Swartz “denied plaintiff

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adequate mental health care.” Plaintiff adds that “these defendants also forged and/or doctored

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plaintiff mental health file in order to make it seem like plaintiff was receiving proper mental

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health care stemming from the 7-26-13 suicidal incident.”

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A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

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on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

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plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

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1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it

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asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

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defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement

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to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

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Here, by claiming that defendants Delgado, Haque, and Swartz “denied plaintiff

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adequate medical care,” plaintiff has alleged facts which are conclusory and merely consistent

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with liability. Plaintiff’s further allegations that documents were forged or manipulated – which

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are not specific to any of these three defendants – do not reasonably allow for an inference of

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liability.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

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cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

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the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be
dismissed.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.

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See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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DATED: January 10, 2017
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CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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