Beecham et al v. Roseville City School District et al

Filing 228

ORDER signed by District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 10/1/2018 DENYING 184 Plaintiffs' Motion to reinstate claims. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DUANE BEECHAM, KIMBERLY
BEECHAM, S.Y.B., a minor by and
through her co-guardians ad litem DUANE
BEECHAM and KIMBERLY BEECHAM;
OLIVER VERGARA, JENNIFER
VERGARA, E.V., a minor by and through
his co-guardians ad litem OLIVER
VERGARA and JENNIFER VERGARA;
and M.B., a minor by and through his
guardian ad litem MANOJ
THOTTASSERI,

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ORDER

Plaintiffs,

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No. 2:15-cv-01022-KJM-EFB

v.
ROSEVILLE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
THERESA VAN WAGNER, GEORGE
ROOKS, JERROLD JORGENSEN, and
DOES 1-30,
Defendants.

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Plaintiffs move to reinstate claims dismissed on summary judgment. ECF No.

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187. Defendants oppose. ECF No. 196; see also ECF No. 198. Plaintiffs have replied. ECF

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No. 211. Having considered the parties’ briefing, the court DENIED the motion in a minute

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order; the reasons set forth below explain the court’s decision.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD

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Plaintiffs frame their argument as a motion to reinstate claims, claiming that Local

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Rule 230(j) limits the grounds for a motion for reconsideration to new facts or circumstances.

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ECF No. 187 at 2.1 In essence, plaintiffs contend that the court erred in its summary judgment

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order by failing to consider certain of plaintiffs’ arguments regarding vicarious liability under the

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ADA and Rehabilitation Act, as well as the applicability of discretionary immunity to failure to

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warn cases. Id. at 3–5. Local Rule 230(j) does not preclude a motion for reconsideration based

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on clear error. Local Rule 230(j)(3) provides that a moving party must set forth “what new or

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different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon

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such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.” (emphasis added). The court

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construes plaintiffs’ motion as a motion for reconsideration and will evaluate it on those grounds.

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See, e.g., Fletcher v. Blades, No. 1:15-CV-00166-REB, 2017 WL 6944327, at *1 (D. Idaho Oct.

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6, 2017) (construing “Plaintiff’s Objection as a motion to reconsider . . . under the [] the Court’s

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inherit procedural power to reconsider”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Meyer v.

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Hot Springs Imp. Co., 169 F. 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1909) (finding that in “matters of mere practice

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. . . courts may construe their own rules equitably”).

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District courts do “possess[] the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind,

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or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of L.A., Harbor Div.

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v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation

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marks omitted). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual

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circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed

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clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals,

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Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks

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omitted, alteration in original). Clear error occurs where “the reviewing court . . . is left with the

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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer

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ECF citations refer to ECF pagination only, not internal document pagination.
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City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

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(1948)).

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The Ninth Circuit has held it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for

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reconsideration merely because the underlying order is “erroneous,” rather than “clearly

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erroneous.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999). “Mere doubts or

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disagreement about the wisdom of a prior decision . . . will not suffice . . . . To be clearly

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erroneous, a decision must . . . [be] more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead

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wrong.” Campion v. Old Repub. Home Prot. Co., Inc., No. 09-CV-748-JMA (NLS), 2011 WL

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1935967, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2011) (quoting Hopwood v. State of Tex., 236 F.3d 256, 273

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(5th Cir. 2000)); see also Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (movant

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must demonstrate a “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling

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precedent”).

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II.

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DISCUSSION

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Vicarious Liability: Disability Discrimination Under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act

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Plaintiffs assert that the court erroneously dismissed claims 3 and 4 in full by

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overlooking the existence of a vicarious relationship between Roseville City School District

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(“RCSD”) and defendant Van Wagner, instead of just Rooks, as permitted by the ADA and

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Rehabilitation Act. ECF No. 187 at 3. Plaintiffs rely on Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124

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(9th Cir. 2001), as establishing the rule for vicarious liability against a municipality under Title II

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of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

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A.

In opposition, defendants contend that plaintiffs are merely rehashing arguments

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already considered by the court. ECF No. 196 at 5. Even if the court did overlook plaintiffs’

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arguments, defendants argue Duvall is distinguishable on the facts, and cite as more closely

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analogous Garedakis v. Brentwood Union Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2016),

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aff'd, No. 16-16332, 2018 WL 2996661 (9th Cir. June 15, 2018). ECF No. 196 at 5. Plaintiffs do

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not object to the court’s consideration of Garedakis, and contend it does not undermine Duvall’s

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applicability, and the rule of vicarious liability controls. ECF No. 211 at 3–5.
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Plaintiffs have failed to show that the court’s decision reflects clear error. First,

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the issue of vicarious liability was thoroughly briefed, ECF No. 154 at 25; ECF No. 157 at 7–8,

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argued, ECF No. 196 at 5, and considered by the court. The court discussed the Duvall case upon

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which plaintiffs rely in great detail in the summary judgment order’s analysis of disability

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discrimination. ECF No. 161 at 18–19. The court expressly addressed whether the District was

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exposed to vicarious liability based on the actions of Rooks, consistent with plaintiffs’ pleading of

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their claim. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 90, ECF No. 30 at 14. Although the court did not expressly

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address whether the question of a vicarious relationship between Van Wagner and RCSD could

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go to trial, the issue was, by implication, fully considered by the court. Moreover, the degree to

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which Duvall controls here is not so certain. Garedakis, at the very least, suggests that Duvall

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does not support a per se application of vicarious liability. 183 F. Supp. 3d at 1045 (finding

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Duvall inapplicable where teacher lacked authority to take action to prevent threat to students’

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federally protected rights). Rather, courts, as here, consider the strictures of Duvall on an

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individual, or case-by-case, basis.

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When viewed through the lens of reconsideration, there is hardly sufficient

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grounds to show the court erred by not expressly considering and applying Duvall’s vicarious

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liability rule to Van Wagner and RCSD.

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B.

Discretionary Immunity

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Plaintiffs also contend the court erred by failing to address, and, in turn, limit the

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scope of California Government Code § 820.2’s immunity. ECF No. 187 at 4–5. Plaintiffs rely

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on Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782 (1968), as they did in their opposition to summary judgment,

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for the notion that § 820.2’s immunity does not extend to failure to warn cases. Defendants argue

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the court thoroughly addressed the scope of immunity under § 820.2 in its summary judgment

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order, thus the matter has been definitively decided. ECF No. 196 at 6–7.

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Here too plaintiffs fail to adequately clear the hurdle of reconsideration by

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showing the court has committed clear error. Although the court did not cite to Johnson v. State

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in its summary judgment order, it provided ample discussion of discretionary immunity and the
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limitations imposed based on “basic policy” verses “ministerial” decisions as relevant to this case.

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ECF No. 161 at 24–26 (“[T]he decision[s] of Rooks and Jorgensen . . . were all considered

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decisions in which [they] exercised the type of discretion that entitles them to immunity.”).

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Johnson does nothing to disrupt this analytical framework; rather it confirms that immunity may

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be limited in a failure to warn context so long as the “policy” verses “ministerial” decision has

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been fully considered. 69 Cal. 2d at 793–98. The court’s careful consideration of the decisions

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made by Rooks and Jorgensen regarding Van Wagner’s investigation meets this requirement.

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ECF No. 161 at 25–26. Plaintiffs have not shown the court’s analysis amounts to clear error.

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III.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs’ motion to reinstate claims, ECF

No. 187, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 1, 2018.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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