Shahid v. Beard

Filing 4

ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 05/28/15 ORDERING the clerk of court shall randomly assign a district judge to this action. U.S. District Judge William B. Shubb randomly assigned to this action. Also, RECOMMENDING that this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a cognizable claim. Referred to Judge William B. Shubb. Objections due within 21 days. (Plummer, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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UMAR SHAHID,

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No. 2:15-cv-1075 AC P
Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER and

JEFFREY BEARD,

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant.

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Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

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This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the

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reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed without leave to

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amend for failure to state a cognizable claim.

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Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(a). Nevertheless, because this action must be dismissed on the merits without leave to

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amend, the court declines to impose on plaintiff the in forma pauperis filing fee.

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I. Screening of Complaint

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A. Legal Standards

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
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court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

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Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

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Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.

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2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably

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meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at

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1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations

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sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.

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However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.

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Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal

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quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as

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true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the

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pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

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(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

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B. Plaintiff’s Allegations and Claims

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In his complaint, plaintiff challenges the policy and/or practice of the California

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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to initially accord a higher classification

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score to younger inmates based on the assumption that they pose higher security threats. Plaintiff

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alleges that application of this policy to younger inmates upon admission to CDCR results in their

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initial placement in a more restrictive setting with fewer opportunities for rehabilitation and

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vocational programs, with long-term consequences. Plaintiff, who is now 32 years of age, states

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that he was admitted to CDCR at age 21, and classified according to the challenged system,

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resulting in diminished access to programming options. Plaintiff states, “I am being punished,

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and have been punished for the past eleven years[,] based solely on my age . . . . Someone with

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the same exact sentence, criminal record and disciplinary history as myself would have a lower

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classification score if they were 40 years old and would be placed in a less restrictive housing unit

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[upon admission to CDCR].” ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff asserts that this disparity is “unequal and

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discriminatory,” in violation of his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth

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Amendment. Id. at 3-4. The only defendant named in the complaint is CDCR Secretary Jeffrey

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Beard. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief (elimination of the challenged policy and/or practice), and

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“$10,000 in compensatory damages for lost wages and rehabilitation for the equal protection

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violations over the past eight years.” Id. at 3.

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C. Screening

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The undersigned finds that the complaint fails to state a cognizable civil rights claim and

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cannot be cured by amendment.

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To state a federal due process claim, a prisoner must allege that a federally-protected

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liberty interest was denied without adequate procedures to ensure a fair result. See Sandin v.

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Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974). Here,

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plaintiff does not identify a federally-protected liberty interest. State-created liberty interests

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protected by the federal Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint

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which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

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incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Ordinary incidents of prison life include the
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legitimate penological goal of assessing, from a practical standpoint, the potential security threat

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of every prisoner. Moreover, it is well established that prisoners have no federally-protected

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liberty interest in their classification status. See Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th

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Cir. 1987). For these reasons, the complaint fails to state a federal due process claim, which

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cannot be cured by amendment.

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that persons who are

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similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.

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432, 439 (1985). The Supreme Court has held that state-created discrimination on the basis of

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age need pass only a rational-basis assessment. Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538

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U.S. 721, 735 (2003). Pursuant to this assessment, a state practice premised on age distinctions

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will be upheld “if there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on

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which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the

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governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so

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attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. . . . [A] plausible reason [includes] . .

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. any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the

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classification.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (citations and

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internal quotation marks omitted). Under these standards, even if CDCR routinely accords higher

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classification scores to younger inmates upon commitment, resulting in greater hurdles for these

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inmates to participate in vocational, rehabilitation and other similar programs, such discrimination

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is rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of maximizing inmate and institutional

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security and safety, and is therefore valid. For these reasons, the complaint fails to state a federal

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equal protection claim, and cannot be cured by amendment.

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II. Conclusion

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“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.” Hartmann

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v.CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th

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Cir. 2000) (“Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.”).

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Because plaintiff is unable to allege any facts, based upon the circumstances he challenges, that

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would state a cognizable federal claim, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed

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with prejudice.

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall
randomly assign a district judge to this action.
Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed with prejudice
for failure to state a cognizable claim.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections

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with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

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and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified

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time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

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(9th Cir. 1991).

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DATED: May 28, 2015

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