Gasca v. County of Sacramento

Filing 28

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 10/14/2016 GRANTING 25 Defendants' Motion motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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----oo0oo----

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MARTIN GASCA, an individual,
Plaintiff,

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CIV. NO. 2:15-1109 WBS CKD
ORDER RE: MOTION TO ENFORCE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

v.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a
municipal corporation;
OFFICER NATHAN BURNETTE; and
DOES 2 through 25;
Defendants.

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----oo0oo---Plaintiff brought an action in the California Superior

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Court against the County of Sacramento for alleged police

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brutality in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law.

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(See Notice of Removal Ex. A, Compl. at 1 (Docket No. 1).)

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county removed the action to this court.

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After removal, plaintiff filed an amended complaint identifying

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The

(Notice of Removal.)

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Officer Nathan Burnette as a second defendant.

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Compl.)

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(First Am.

On May 25, 2016, defendants emailed plaintiff stating

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that they would be “willing to offer $10,000” to settle the case.

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(Decl. of Kelley Kern (“Kern Decl.”) Ex. A at 1 (Docket No. 25-

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2).)

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accepting the terms of the proposed settlement.”

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parties filed a Notice of Settlement five days later.

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Notice of Settlement (Docket No. 17); Kern Decl. Ex. B at 3.)

The next day, plaintiff responded that he “is agreeable to
(Id.)

The

(See

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The parties then performed due diligence on the terms of the

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agreement.1

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Ex. D at 1-2.)

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settlement agreement to plaintiff’s counsel for review.

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E at 1.)

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have forwarded to my client for signature.”

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(See Kern Decl. Ex. B at 1; id. Ex. C at 1-2; id.
On August 8, defendants forwarded a draft of the
(Id. Ex.

Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “This looks fine.

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(Id.)

Thereafter and at some point prior to September 12,

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plaintiff informed defendants that he would not be signing the

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settlement agreement.

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21).)

(Joint Status Report at 2 (Docket No.

Defendants now “move the court for an order enforcing the

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The agreement required that: (1) plaintiff “is not
Medicare eligible”; (2) plaintiff “does not owe the County
Department of Revenue Recovery or Child Support Departments any
money”; (3) “County Risk Management [for Sacramento County] . . .
approve the payment”; and (4) plaintiff produce letters from the
hospitals he attended stating how much each would each receive
out of the settlement. (Kern Decl. Ex. A at 1.) The parties
satisfied each of these conditions. (See id. Ex. B at 1
(confirming plaintiff is not Medicare eligible and has no liens
with Sacramento County); id. Ex. C at 1 (stating that first
hospital agrees to accept pro rata share); id. Ex. D at 1-2
(attaching letter from second hospital); id. E (attaching
settlement agreement for plaintiff’s signature after requesting
approval from County Risk).)
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settlement agreement reached between Plaintiff and Defendants on

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May 26.”2

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230(c), plaintiff’s counsel filed a statement of non-opposition

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in response to defendants’ motion.3

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(“Non-Opp’n”) (Docket No. 26).)

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(Defs.’ Mot. (Docket No. 25).)

Pursuant to Local Rule

(Statement of Non-Opp’n

It is “well established that the trial court has power

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to summarily enforce on motion a settlement agreement entered

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into by the litigants while the litigation is pending before it.”

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In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir.

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1994) (quoting Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir.

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1969)); see also Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir.

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1987) (holding the same).

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[the parties] reached an enforceable agreement settling the

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federal and state law claims alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint.”

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Wilcox v. Arpaio, 753 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing

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Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, Or., 7 F.3d 152, 156 (9th Cir.

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1993)).

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“[S]tate contract law governs whether

Under California law, “[t]he essential elements of a

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contract are: parties capable of contracting; the parties'

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consent; a lawful object; and sufficient cause or consideration.”

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Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1230 (1st

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Dist. 2004) (citing California Civil Code section 1550).

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“An

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There is no indication that the August 8 draft differed
in any material respect from the parties’ May 26 agreement. (See
Kern Decl. Ex. D (plaintiff’s counsel responded “[t]his looks
fine” after reviewing the August 8 draft).)
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Plaintiff’s counsel states that he “has been unable to
communicate with or locate plaintiff to discuss [the present
motion] despite numerous and diverse attempts.” (Statement of
Non-Opp’n at 1 (Docket No. 26).)
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essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties,

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or mutual assent.

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offer communicated to the offeree and an acceptance communicated

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to the offeror.”

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sections 1550 and 1565).

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determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test

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being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a

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reasonable person to believe.”

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60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 (2d Dist. 1998) (quoting Meyer v.

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Mutual assent usually is manifested by an

Id. at 1229 (citing California Civil Code
“The existence of mutual consent is

Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick,

Benko, 55 Cal. App. 3d 937, 942-43 (2d Dist. 1976)).

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If a valid agreement exists under state law, it must

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additionally meet two federal requirements.

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complete agreement.”

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Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Maynard v. City of

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San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994) and Callie, 829 F.2d

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at 890).

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terms of the settlement or authorized their respective counsel to

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settle the dispute.”

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Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 1977)).

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“First, it must be a

Marks-Foreman v. Reporter Pub. Co., 12 F.

“Second, both parties must have either agreed to the

Id. (citing Harrop v. Western Airlines,

Here, all of the elements of an enforceable settlement

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agreement are present.

Plaintiff and defendants engaged in a

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settlement negotiation over email which concluded with plaintiff

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stating that he “is agreeable to accepting the terms of

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[defendants’] proposed settlement.”

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2.)

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Notice of Settlement five days after they reached the agreement.

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(See Notice of Settlement; Kern Decl. Ex. B at 3.)

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offered and received consideration, (see Kern Decl. Ex. A at 1),

(See Kern Decl. Ex. A at 1-

The parties confirmed that they had settled by filing a

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Each party

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and the agreement was complete, (id. at 2 (noting that the

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agreement “resolve[d] this matter”)).

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counsel for plaintiff had the explicit authority from his client

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to enter into the settlement that was reached in this matter.”

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(Non-Opp’n at 1.)

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“[A]t all relevant times,

That the parties did not end up executing a formal

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settlement agreement does not alter the validity of their

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original agreement over email.

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Cassidy, 191 Cal. App. 4th 39, 48–49 (2d Dist. 2010) (“When

See Blix St. Records, Inc. v.

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parties intend that an agreement be binding, the fact that a more

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formal agreement must be prepared and executed does not alter the

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validity of the agreement.” (citing Mitchell v. Exhibition Foods,

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Inc., 184 Cal. App. 3d 1033, 1048 (1st Dist. 1986)).

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Accordingly, the court will enforce the parties’
settlement agreement reached on May 26.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

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enforce the settlement agreement reached on May 26, 2016 be, and

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the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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Dated:

October 14, 2016

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