Dougherty et al v. Bank of America, N.A. et al

Filing 38

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 04/01/2016 GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 28 Motion to Dismiss and GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 30 Motion to Dismiss. Defendant BOA's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to COUNT I, COUNT II, COUNT IV, and COUNT VI; and GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND with respect to COUNT III and COUNT V. Defendant Wells and SPS' Motion to Dismiss is ruled upon as follows: With respect to COUNT I and COUNT II against Wells, the mo tion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. With respect to COUNT I and II against SPS, the motion is DENIED. With respect to COUNTS IV and VI against Wells and SPS, the motion is DENIED. With respect to COUNTS III and V against Wells and SPS, the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. (Jackson, T)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 13 PENNY DOUGHERTY and DENNIS DOUGHERTY, ORDER Plaintiffs, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 No. 2:15-cv-01226-TLN-CKD v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE, ON BEHALF OF THE HOLDERS OF THE HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-12; SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.; DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. 21 22 This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) 23 and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells”), as trustee on behalf of the Holders of the HarborView 24 Mortgage Loan Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-12 and Select Portfolio 25 Servicing, Inc.’s (“SPS”) (together “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended 26 Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 28, 30.) For the reasons 27 set forth below, Defendant BOA’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 28 1 1 PART, and Defendants Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 2 IN PART. 3 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 The claims in this case arise out of Defendants’ alleged breach of their agreements in 5 connection with the modification of Plaintiffs’ residential mortgage loan. The residence is 6 located in Newcastle, CA 95658. (Pls.’ First Am. Compl., “FAC”, ECF No. 26 ¶ 2.) For clarity, the Court cites first to Defendant BOA’s summary of the underlying facts, and 7 8 then states the more detailed allegations from the FAC. Defendant BOA alleges as follows: in 9 November 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a $458,000 home loan from Aegis Wholesale Corporation. 10 The loan was secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) recorded against the property. The DOT listed 11 Commonwealth Land Title as the trustee and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 12 (“MERS”) as nominee and beneficiary. On October 20, 2011, an Assignment of Deed of Trust 13 was recorded, wherein MERS transferred the beneficial interest to BOA, as successor by merger 14 to BAC Home Loans Servicing LP FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP. On May 8, 15 2012 a Deed of Trust related to the “Keep Your Home California Program” (“KYHC”) was 16 recorded against the property in favor of CalHFA Mortgage Assistance Corporation, securing a 17 Note for $16,089.03. On April 9, 2015, a Corporation Assignment Deed of Trust was recorded 18 wherein BOA’s interest in the DOT was assigned to Wells Fargo, as trustee for a securitized trust. 19 On April 14, 2015, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded, wherein Wells Fargo, as trustee for the 20 securitized trust, substituted in Clear Recon Corp. as trustee. Clear Recon Corp. recorded a 21 Notice of Default on April 30, 2015, indicating that Plaintiffs were $33,685.97 in arrears as of 22 April 27, 2015.1 (See Def. BOA’s Mot. Dism., ECF No. 28 at 10.) 23 The following are the material allegations from the FAC: the November 2006 loan for 24 $458,000 was “a jumbo non-conforming adjustable rate negative amortization loan, whereby the 25 1 26 27 28 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of documents associated with the subject property, which are recorded in the Official Records of the Placer County Recorder’s Office. (ECF Nos. 29 & 30.) These documents include the DOT, assignments of the DOT, substitution of the trustee on the DOT, the KYHC Deed of Trust, the Notice of Default, and a Deed of Reconveyance. Plaintiffs do not oppose these requests for judicial notice. The Court will take judicial notice of these documents on the basis that they are matters of public record and are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Gardner v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). 2 1 monthly payment would not cover the interest, and thus the difference would be added to and 2 increase the principal each month.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 14.) 3 Immediately after entering the loan, Plaintiffs began making monthly payments of $1,775 4 to an “entity known as Countrywide. Countrywide was either Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. or 5 Countrywide Financial Corporation. Plaintiffs made monthly loan payments to Countrywide 6 through approximately August, 2009 when they were notified future payments were to be made to 7 an entity known as BAC. Plaintiffs understood the entity to be BAC Home Loans Servicing LP 8 which was a servicer subsidiary of Countrywide.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 15.) At all relevant times, 9 “BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP operated as a subsidiary of [Defendant BOA].” 2 (ECF No. 26 10 ¶ 16.) 11 At some point, Plaintiffs contacted an agent of BOA to request to change their loan to a 12 fixed rate loan. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 18.) The BOA agent explained “there was no program available 13 for a modification of [Plaintiffs] loan terms since they were current in their payments.” (ECF No. 14 26 ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs continued to call BOA to inquire about converting the loan to a fixed rate, but 15 they “were told there was no . . . modification . . . available because they were current and not in 16 default.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 19.) Mrs. Dougherty started a job with the Fieldhaven Feline Rescue 17 earning $500 per month; she performed her job duties from home so she could care for her 18 disabled husband. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 20.) In January 2010, the monthly payment increased to 19 $1,880 for two months and then to $1,850 for three months.3 (ECF No. 26 ¶ 22.) In January 20 2010, Mrs. Dougherty lost her position with Fieldhaven. However, Plaintiffs continued to make 21 monthly payments. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 23.) 22 In July 2010, Plaintiffs did not make their monthly payment. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 24.) 23 Immediately thereafter, Plaintiffs contacted BOA to notify it of the missed payment in order to 24 apply for a modification. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 25.) BOA said “there was still no program available 25 even if [Plaintiffs] missed payments and [they] must resume [their] monthly payments.” (ECF 26 2 27 For convenience, the Court will refer to activity by BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP or BOA solely as activity by Defendant BOA. 3 28 Per the terms of the DOT, Plaintiffs’ monthly mortgage loan payment could begin to change on the first day of January 2008, “and on that day every 12th month thereafter.” (ECF No. 31–1 at 20.) 3 1 No. 26 ¶ 25.) In August 2010, Plaintiffs resumed making a partial monthly payment of $1,700 2 and did not pay the full amount of $1,850, because that was the payment they could afford. (ECF 3 No. 26 ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs made this payment for 14 consecutive months without objection from 4 BOA. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 28.) However, in September 2011, BOA returned Plaintiffs’ $1,700 5 payment for that month and said it would not accept any more payments that were not $1,952.56 6 monthly. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 32.) Consequently, out of fear of default, in October and November 7 2011 Plaintiffs made $1,952.56 monthly payments. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 34.) 8 On November 15, 2011, BOA invited Plaintiffs to attend an event at the Sacramento 9 Convention Center to discuss and apply for a loan modification. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 35.) At the 10 convention, BOA granted Plaintiffs a written modification of their loan terms, which would 11 commence in January 2012 for just over $2,000 per month. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs agreed 12 to enter this modification despite the amount being over $1,700, because the “[BOA] agent told 13 them there was a program known as Keep Your Home California (“KYHC”) that would give 14 [BOA] $100,000 towards a reduction of the principal, which would then result in a lower monthly 15 payment down to about $1,700 per month.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 38.) Plaintiffs signed the BOA 16 modification documents, and thereafter a BOA agent led them “to the KYHC table to fill out the 17 paperwork to obtain the $100,000 Principal Reduction Program.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 39.) “The 18 KYHC representative confirmed to plaintiff that [BOA] was a participant in the program and all 19 they had to do was submit the forms online which [Plaintiffs] did immediately.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 20 40.) A BOA representative told Plaintiffs that their monthly loan payment of $1,700 would begin 21 in approximately January 2012. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 41.) 22 On November 30, 2011, BOA sent a letter to Plaintiffs, notifying them that their loan had 23 been sold to an unknown entity (which Plaintiffs later learned was Defendant Wells) and that SPS 24 would be the new servicer for that entity. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 42.) In December 2011, Plaintiffs 25 contacted SPS and “spoke to [its’] authorized agent Debra Shrowder” to inquire about the status 26 of their loan modification. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 43.) Shrowder “told plaintiff she would look into the 27 status of the $100,000 from KYHC and also asked plaintiff to send her the [BOA] approval 28 papers for the loan modification which plaintiff did send to her. Shrowder also told plaintiff in 4 1 this initial conversation not to make any payments to SPS until they resolve the issue.” (ECF No. 2 26 ¶ 43.) 3 In January 2012, Shrowder told Plaintiffs that SPS had received written confirmation of 4 the modification; however SPS was not going to honor it “because [SPS was] not yet a participant 5 in the KYHC program but [was] applying to become one.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 44.) Shrowder told 6 Plaintiffs “the owner of the loan was a participant in an aspect of the KYHC program known as 7 the loan reinstatement program whereby only the past due payments are covered by KYHC and 8 not yet the KYHC program whereby $100,000 is given to the lender to reduce the principal. 9 (ECF No. 26 ¶ 47.) Shrowder told Plaintiffs they were approved for $16,000 through the KYHC 10 reinstatement program, which “SPS would receive and accept . . . which would make the loan 11 current.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 52.) Additionally, Shrowder instructed them to submit a Home 12 Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) application as a sign of goodwill, pending SPS’ 13 membership in the KYHC principal reduction program. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 48.) Plaintiffs consented 14 to SPS’s applying $16,000 to their past-due amount through the KYHC reinstatement program, 15 and Plaintiffs also submitted a completed HAMP application. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 50, 52.) “For 16 three months thereafter in 2012 plaintiff made numerous calls to SPS to inquire as to the status of 17 the . . . modification agreement, as well as both the KYHC and the HAMP application.” (ECF 18 No. 26 ¶ 51.) “Plaintiffs were told repeatedly everything was still pending and to submit certain 19 financial records that they had already submitted or to send in updated bank statements.” (ECF 20 No. 26 ¶ 51.) 21 Sometime thereafter, Shrowder told Plaintiffs that they were approved for the KYHC loan 22 reinstatement program for $16,000. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 52.) Shrowder told Plaintiffs that despite this 23 approval, beginning April 1, 2012, Plaintiffs had to pay $1,952.56 until either SPS became a 24 member of the KYHC principal reduction program or until SPS approved Plaintiffs’ HAMP 25 application. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 53.) Shrowder told Plaintiffs that she would ask the investor for an 26 “in-house” modification. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 54.) “Shrowder promised [P]laintiffs that if they 27 complied with these demands, which included making $1,952.56 monthly payments and allowing 28 SPS to receive the $16,000 from the KYHC reinstatement program, they would have their loan 5 1 modified down to the $1,700 monthly amount,” independent of their HAMP application or SPS’ 2 entry into the KYHC principal reduction program. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 55.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs 3 made monthly payments of $1,952.56 per month for eight months. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 57.) To make 4 the $1,952.56 monthly payments, they had to cease paying their insurance policies for Long Term 5 Care. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 58.) However, due to frustration that SPS had still not modified their loan, 6 Plaintiffs did not make their monthly payments in December 2012 or January 2013. (ECF No. 26 7 ¶ 59.) 8 9 In or around February 2013, Shrowder asked Plaintiffs what payment they could afford. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 60.) Plaintiffs stated they could afford $1,700 monthly payments, and 10 consequently, Shrowder placed Plaintiffs in a six month plan whereby Plaintiffs would pay 11 $1,700 per month “pending further response to the above described agreements and promises, as 12 well as the in house permanent modification which had been promised.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 61.) 13 Plaintiffs continued to make a $1,700 monthly payment continuously until September 2014. 14 (ECF No. 26 ¶ 62.) 15 In September 2013, Plaintiffs became aware that Wells became a participant in the KYHC 16 principal reduction program. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 64.) Plaintiffs immediately applied for the principal 17 reduction through KYHC. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 65.) In October 2013, KYHC informed Plaintiffs “they 18 were approved pending documentation from SPS.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 66.) SPS delayed in providing 19 KYHC the requisite information necessary to fund the principal reduction, resulting in KYHC 20 denying Plaintiffs the remaining $84,000 balance.4 (ECF No. 26 ¶ 67.) 21 Additionally, since May 2014 SPS has not placed Plaintiffs in a HAMP modification, 22 which apparently would modify their loan to $1,700 per month, and instead SPS “offered to place 23 them into trial payment at the approximate $2,200 per month rate.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 68.) 24 25 In summary, the Court takes the following allegations to be Plaintiffs essential claims against Defendant BOA: (1) In or around 2009, BOA’s statement that Plaintiffs had to be behind 26 4 27 28 The FAC explains: “At the same time plaintiffs were placed into the forebearance in January 2013, Shrowder told them Wells Fargo was still becoming a participant in the KYHC $100,000 principal reduction program and through it plaintiffs would be eligible for an $84,000 reduction since they had already received the $16,000 payment described above.” (FAC ¶ 63.) 6 1 in their monthly payments to qualify for a loan modification was misleading and inaccurate; (2) 2 from August 2010 to September 2011, BOA’s act of accepting Plaintiffs $1,700 monthly 3 payments for 14 months constituted a permanent modification, and BOA’s subsequent act of then 4 ceasing to accept a $1,700 payment constituted a breach of contract; and (3) BOA failed to ensure 5 that Wells and SPS honored the modifications discussed between Plaintiffs and BOA in 6 November, 2011 (FAC ¶¶ 35–42), or to ensure that Plaintiffs would receive funds from the 7 KYHC principal reduction program. 8 Against Defendants Wells and SPS, the essential claims are as follows: (1) SPS failed to 9 honor the modifications discussed between Plaintiffs and BOA in November 2011, or to ensure 10 that Plaintiffs would receive funds from the KYHC principal reduction program; (2) SPS 11 continued to delay in processing Plaintiffs’ various loan modification applications, including the 12 KYHC principal reduction application and HAMP application; (3) SPS failed to submit 13 documents to KYHC, resulting in KYHC denying them a principal reduction; and (4) generally, 14 Defendants Wells and SPS did not provide Plaintiffs a permanent loan modification or facilitate 15 that process. 16 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 17 On April 28, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Placer County. 18 (ECF No. 1 at 2–25.) On June 8, 2015, Wells and SPS filed a Notice of Removal to this Court. 19 (ECF No. 1.) On June 15, 2015, Wells and SPS filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 6.) On 20 July 1, 2015, BOA also filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 14; see Amended Motion to 21 Dismiss, ECF No. 20.) Before the Court ruled on these motions, on July 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed 22 the instant FAC. (ECF No. 26.) On July 15, 2015 BOA filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 23 28.) On July 20, 2015, Wells and SPS filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 30.) On August 13, 24 2015, Plaintiffs filed Oppositions to both motions. (ECF Nos. 33, 34.) On August 20, 2015, both 25 BOA and Wells / SPS filed replies. (ECF Nos. 35, 36.) 26 In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege six causes of action against all Defendants: (1) Intentional 27 Misrepresentation; (2) Negligent Misrepresentation; (3) Breach of Contract; (4) Negligence; (5) 28 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”); and (6) Violations of Business and 7 1 Professions Code § 17200, et seq. 2 III. STANDARD OF LAW 3 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 5 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain 6 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 7 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the 8 defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 9 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice 10 pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 11 disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 12 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 13 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted 14 as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of 15 every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. 16 Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not 17 allege “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing 18 entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 19 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 20 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 21 544, 556 (2007)). 22 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the 23 form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. RingrosHee, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 24 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more 25 than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 26 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 27 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 28 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 8 1 statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 2 facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 3 been alleged[.]” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 4 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 5 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged 6 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 7 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge[] [his or her] claims . 8 . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 9 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 10 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 11 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 12 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 13 In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any 14 exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of 15 Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu 16 Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 17 1998). 18 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 19 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 20 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 21 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 22 see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 23 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 24 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has 26 previously amended its complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 27 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th 28 Cir. 2004)). 9 1 IV. 2 A. BOA’s Motion to Dismiss 3 4 ANALYSIS a. Statute of Limitations BOA contends the following claims are time barred: (1) intentional misrepresentation; 5 (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) negligence. BOA asserts that the statute of limitations 6 for an intentional misrepresentation claim is three years, two years for a negligent 7 misrepresentation claim, and two years for a negligence claim. (ECF Nos. 28 at 4, 11.) Plaintiffs 8 do not dispute that these are the appropriate statutes of limitations; however, they dispute the 9 correct accrual dates for the above three claims. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs filed their original 10 complaint on April 28, 2015. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Consequently, for a claim with a three-year 11 statute of limitations, the accrual date cannot precede April 28, 2012. For a claim with a two-year 12 statute of limitations, the accrual date cannot precede April 28, 2013. 13 1. Intentional Misrepresentation 14 As stated in California’s Code of Civil Procedure § 338, a cause of action for fraud must 15 be brought within three years, although “[t]he cause of action in that case is not deemed to have 16 accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud.” Cal. Civ. 17 Proc. Code § 338(d). This discovery rule “postpones accrual of a cause of action until the 18 plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 19 Cal. 4th 383, 397 (1999). Accordingly, “[a] plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ 20 necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the 21 plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide 22 whether to file suit or sit on her rights.” Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111 (1998). 23 To rely on a claim of delayed discovery, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the basis of the 24 claim could not have been discovered earlier, even in the exercise of reasonable diligence, and 25 identifying how and when plaintiff discovered the fraud. Briosos v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 10– 26 02834 LB, 2011 WL 1740100, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011). See also Fox v. Ethicon Endo- 27 Surgery., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 808 (2005) (“plaintiff claiming application of the discovery rule must 28 plead facts showing “the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence”). 10 1 BOA argues that the accrual occurred in December 2011, because that is when Plaintiffs 2 last had contact with BOA. (ECF Nos. 28 at 4–5.) Thus, BOA states that “the very latest 3 Plaintiffs could have brought an intentional misrepresentation claim against [BOA] is December 4 2014 and the very latest they could have brought a negligent misrepresentation claim was 5 December 2013.” (ECF No. 28 at 5.) Plaintiffs respond that they did not become aware of the 6 fraudulent nature of BOA’s conduct until May 2014. (ECF No. 33 at 3.) Among other 7 agreements with Defendants, it appears Plaintiffs argue that because they relied on an agreement 8 with SPS to honor the prior KYHC principal reduction program and an agreement to modify their 9 loan to $1,700 monthly payments, Plaintiffs did not become aware that they would never receive 10 these modifications until SPS denied them the $84,000 principal reduction in May 2014. (ECF 11 No. 33 at 4.) Therefore, Plaintiffs allege their claims accrued in May 2014. 12 The Court finds the FAC adequately alleges that Plaintiffs exercised “reasonable 13 diligence” through at least April 28, 2012, in attempting to discover whether they would receive 14 various loan modifications and/or a KYHC reduction. Fox, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 797. Specifically 15 regarding the KYHC reduction, Plaintiffs allege they met a BOA representative at a convention in 16 November, 2011, who discussed the KYHC program with Plaintiffs and directed them to fill out 17 the necessary paperwork. A KYHC representative then told Plaintiffs to anticipate a principal 18 reduction, and a BOA representative (it appears Plaintiffs state this also occurred at the 19 convention) told Plaintiffs “their first $1,700 payment would be in or about January, 2012.” 20 (ECF No. 26 ¶ 41.) Subsequently, at the end of November 2011, BOA sent a letter informing 21 Plaintiffs their loan had been sold and SPS would be the new servicer. Plaintiffs allege they had 22 sought and received assurances from SPS until May 2014 that the KYHC principal loan reduction 23 would take effect. As a general matter, the FAC contains allegations that Plaintiffs sought 24 clarification regarding their loan through 2014. (See ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 37–42, 52–68.) 25 Plaintiffs have to show only that the accrual date was April 28, 2012 or later, given that 26 the Complaint was filed three years later on April 28, 2015. It is a tenable position that Plaintiffs 27 would not discover alleged misrepresentations by BOA until after this date, given that their loan 28 had been sold and they were assigned a new servicer shortly after the November 2011 11 1 convention, at which they learned about the KYHC program and any related modifications. 2 Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded facts to withstand dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. 3 Thus, the Court DENIES BOA’s motion to dismiss the intentional misrepresentation cause of 4 action as time barred. 5 2. Negligence 6 Defendants submit, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that the statute of limitations for the 7 instant negligent misrepresentation and general negligence claims is two years. See Ventura 8 County Nat. Bank v. Macker, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1528, 1531 (1996) (holding that in an action 9 against accountants for negligent misrepresentation, the statute of limitations was two years); Cal. 10 Code Civ. P. § 339(1). “Under the general rule, a cause of action accrues when, under the 11 substantive law, the wrongful act is done, or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent 12 liability arises. In other words, it accrues when the cause of action is complete with all of its 13 elements.” Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 383. Thus, with respect to negligence, the statute of 14 limitations does not accrue until the plaintiff sustains an injury because “the mere breach of a . . . 15 duty does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence.” Sahadi v. Scheaffer, 155 Cal. 16 App. 4th 704, 715 (2007). 17 As stated, BOA argues that the date of accrual was December 2011 when Plaintiffs last 18 had contact with BOA, while Plaintiffs argue they did not discover BOA’s alleged negligence 19 until May 2014. For the same reasons stated above, Plaintiffs adequately allege that they did not 20 know of these causes of action until they were officially denied a principal reduction by KYHC in 21 May 2014. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 67.) Plaintiffs allege that they relied upon Wells and SPS adopting the 22 loan modifications they had discussed with BOA in November 2011, once Wells and/or SPS 23 became a participant in the KYHC principal reduction program. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 35–44.) 24 Plaintiffs allege they were informed in September 2013 that Wells became a participant, and that 25 the KYHC program informed Plaintiffs in October 2013 that they were “approved pending 26 documentation from SPS.” (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 64–66.) They allege they received a denial from 27 KYHC in May 2014. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 67.) Overall, the FAC contains enough allegations that 28 Plaintiffs sought clarity regarding loan modifications through May 2014. Based on these 12 1 allegations, because Plaintiffs filed their claim on August 28, 2015, they timely filed within the 2 two year statute of limitations that began in May 2014. 3 4 Therefore, BOA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence causes of action as time barred is DENIED. 5 b. Sufficiency of the Allegations in the FAC 6 1. Intentional Misrepresentation and Negligent Misrepresentation (First and 7 8 Second Causes of Action) “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or 9 mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Therefore, in an action based on 10 state law, while a district court will rely on state law to ascertain the elements of fraud that a party 11 must plead, it will follow Rule 9(b) in requiring that the circumstances of the fraud be pleaded 12 with particularity.” Marolda v. Symantec Corp., 672 F. Supp. 2d 992, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see 13 also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). “[W]hen the claim is 14 ‘grounded in fraud,’ the pleading of that claim as a whole is subject to Rule 9(b)'s particularity 15 requirement.” Marolda, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (citing Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 16 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003)). Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff to allege “the who, what, when, 17 where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent conduct. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th 18 Cir. 1997). A plaintiff must describe the alleged fraud in specific enough terms “to give 19 defendants notice of the particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge.” 20 Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124. 21 Under California law, the elements of intentional misrepresentation are: “(1) 22 misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity 23 (scienter); (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damages.” Vess, 317 24 F.3d at 1105. “The elements of negligent misrepresentation are similar to intentional fraud except 25 for the requirement of scienter; in a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff need not 26 allege the defendant made an intentionally false statement, but simply one as to which he or she 27 28 13 1 lacked any reasonable ground for believing the statement to be true.”5 Charnay v. Cobert, 145 2 Cal. App. 4th 170, 184 (2006); see also id. (citing Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 3 1226, 1239, n. 4 (1995)) (stating that negligent misrepresentation is a species of the tort of deceit 4 and like fraud, requires a misrepresentation, justifiable reliance and damage). 5 i. Misrepresentation 6 Plaintiffs allege that in or around 2009, BOA said it could not modify their loan unless 7 they were in default (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(i)), which Plaintiffs contend is inaccurate and a 8 misrepresentation because “HAMP guidelines had no requirement that a loan be in default in 9 order to be eligible for modification.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(viii).) In addition, Plaintiffs state that 10 while BOA promised to apply the KYHC principal reduction program of $100,000 to Plaintiffs 11 loan and consequently lower their payment to $1,700 a month, BOA never intended to modify 12 their loan, because “[BOA] never provided KYHC with documents required to ensure the funds 13 would be received, or to ensure that the subsequent servicer was aware of the [KYHC principal 14 reduction program].” (ECF No. 33 at 8.) 15 BOA argues that Plaintiffs fail to identify the name of any BOA representative who 16 allegedly made the misrepresentations to Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 28 at 15.) However, Plaintiffs 17 have provided specific allegations concerning BOA’s practices with regard to Plaintiffs loan 18 modification process and specific statements that BOA made about how to obtain a loan 19 modification. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs have also provided the specific date, location, and 20 statements by BOA regarding their loan modification and KYHC principal reduction agreements 21 in November 2011, at the Sacramento convention center. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 35–41.) These 22 allegations contain enough information to identify the circumstances constituting fraud so that 23 BOA can prepare an adequate answer. Walling, 476 F.2d at 397; see Gabali v. OneWest Bank, 24 FSB, No. 5:12–cv–02901 EJD, 2013 WL 1320770, at *3 (N.D. Cal March 29, 2013) (although 25 plaintiff did not provide the specific identity of the individuals who made the misrepresentation, 26 she provided sufficient factual allegations to put defendant on notice of the particular claim); see 27 5 28 In its motion to dismiss, BOA combines its discussion of the intentional/negligent misrepresentation claims. (ECF No. 28 at 13–17.) 14 1 also Jordan v. Paul Financial, LLC, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (while the 2 plaintiff did not provide the precise identities of the employees responsible, the fraud claim still 3 met the particularity standard under Rule 9(b), because the defendants possessed the superior 4 knowledge of who was responsible for the misrepresentation). The Court will also construe said 5 allegations to constitute a claim that, alternatively, BOA lacked a reasonable ground for making 6 the aforementioned assertions regarding a loan modification. Charnay, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 184. 7 Thus, these allegations are sufficient to meet the misrepresentation element for an 8 intentional/negligent misrepresentation claim at the pleading stage. 9 10 ii. Knowledge of Falsity As to the third element, knowledge of falsity, Plaintiffs allege in the FAC that “BOA 11 knew, or should have known, that HAMP guidelines had no requirement that a loan be in default 12 in order to be eligible for modification.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(viii).) Plaintiffs allege they were 13 directed to a KYHC modification by BOA; however, “BOA, and thereafter SPS, acted with the 14 purpose of delaying the modification process and stringing Plaintiffs along for the purpose of 15 increasing ar[r]ears, fees, and costs.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(ix).) Plaintiffs also summarize their 16 position in their opposition as: BOA “never intended to offer Plaintiffs the $1,700 monthly 17 payments that they were promised regardless of whether the KYHC funds were ever received.” 18 (ECF No. 33 at 8.) Thus, in summary, Plaintiffs allege BOA stated they would receive various 19 modifications while knowing that they (BOA) did not intend to put these modifications into 20 effect. As to negligence, the Court will construe the allegations as a whole to state that BOA 21 represented they intended, or had the ability, to enact various modifications, while lacking a basis 22 for making these representations. See Charnay, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 184 (a plaintiff must allege 23 defendant made a statement “which he or she lacked any reasonable ground for believing the 24 statement to be true”). For example, Plaintiffs allege they were directed to a KYHC modification 25 by BOA and that “this $100,000 from KYHC was certain because [BOA] was a participant in the 26 KYHC program.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 38.) However, Plaintiffs allege BOA transferred the 27 ownership/servicing of their loan to Defendants Wells Fargo and SPS shortly after it had so 28 advised Plaintiff, without ensuring Plaintiff would receive those funds. It is undisputed that 15 1 Plaintiffs never received the allegedly promised $100,000 principle reduction. Plaintiffs allege, 2 more generally, that they were in repeated contact with BOA regarding their loan in 2010–2011, 3 and were led to believe some form of permanent modification would take effect. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 4 27–30.) As such, Plaintiffs have pleaded facts to support an allegation that BOA made statements 5 while lacking a reasonable basis for them, in connection with Plaintiffs’ loan. Therefore, 6 Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the “knowledge of falsity” element for intentional and 7 negligent misrepresentation claims. 8 iii. Intent to Defraud 9 Plaintiffs allege BOA intentionally contrived excuses to “avoid having to offer Plaintiffs 10 a permanent modification.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(ix).) “[BOA] acted with the purpose of delaying 11 the modification process and stringing Plaintiffs along for the purpose of increasing arrears, fees, 12 and costs, all of which would be recovered by [] BOA.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(ix).) BOA would then 13 be able to recover these arrears, fees, and costs upon the actual foreclosure of the Subject 14 Property. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(ix).) Thus, in summary, Plaintiffs allege BOA represented it would 15 carry out multiple modifications, but made those representations in order to collect associated 16 expenses. Therefore, Plaintiffs adequately allege the “intent to defraud” element. 17 18 iv. Justifiable Reliance Plaintiffs contend they meet the justifiable reliance element because they reasonably 19 relied on the representations made by BOA with the hope that BOA would grant their November 20 2011, loan modification application and the KYHC principal reduction application. (ECF No. 26 21 ¶¶ 82–85.) Plaintiffs claim their reliance on BOA’s representations was reasonable because BOA 22 was the servicer of the loan and had the ability to grant Plaintiffs loan modification, and BOA 23 held itself out as the entity that could provide the criteria for qualifying for a modification. (ECF 24 No. 26 ¶ 82.) For example, Plaintiffs allege: “The [BOA] agent told plaintiffs this $100,000 from 25 KYHC was certain because [BOA] was a participant in the KYHC program.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 38.) 26 “After signing the BOA modification documents … the [BOA] agent directed plaintiffs to the KYHC 27 table to fill out the paperwork to obtain the $100,000 Principal Reduction Program.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 28 39.) “The KYHC representative told plaintiffs to anticipate funding of the $100,000 to [BOA] within 16 1 about weeks and the [BOA] representative told plaintiffs that their first $1,700 payment would begin 2 in or about January 2012.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs also allege they relied on BOA’s act of 3 accepting their $1,700 monthly payment for 14 months without dispute to be a permanent loan 4 modification. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 84.) 5 As to Plaintiffs relying on BOA accepting their partial payment, BOA argues that this 6 reliance is unjustified, because “[BOA’s] acceptance of the partial payments . . . were all 7 expressly contemplated and permitted under the DOT signed by Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 28 at 16.) 8 The DOT states: “Lender may accept payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan 9 current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or 10 partial payments in the future.” (ECF No. 28 at 16.) This provision of the DOT expressly 11 allowed BOA to accept partial payments and maintain its right to seek fees associated with each 12 partial payment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ reliance on BOA accepting their partial payments for 14 13 months was not justifiable because of the express terms within the DOT. However, as to 14 Plaintiffs remaining reasons for their justifiable reliance, particularly BOA’s statements regarding 15 Plaintiffs loan modification and the KYHC application in November 2011, these reasons are 16 sufficient to meet the justifiable reliance requirement for intentional/negligent misrepresentation. 17 18 v. Resulting Damages Finally, Plaintiffs allege the damages they sustained as a direct and proximate result of 19 BOA’s conduct were “a potential loss of their ownership interest in the subject property, damage 20 to their credit, fees and penalties, and increased interest and arrears that they would not have 21 otherwise incurred.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 89.) Defendants respond that any increase in arrears or 22 interest are a result of Plaintiffs own voluntary decision to make partial payments. (ECF No. 28 23 at 8.) However, Plaintiffs allege that these arrears, fees, and costs would not have been incurred 24 had they not been told to allow the loan to go into default in order to qualify for a loan 25 modification program. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 89.) Additionally Plaintiffs allege, “Plaintiffs spent time 26 and money engaging in the modification process and gave defendants access to personal financial 27 data that they were otherwise not entitled to receive.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 90; see Alimena v. Vericrest 28 Financial, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1213 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (reasoning a plaintiff may recover 17 1 compensation for time and effort expended in reliance on a defendant's misrepresentation). Based 2 on the foregoing facts, Plaintiffs have met the resulting damages element for intentional/negligent 3 misrepresentation at the pleading stage. 4 In sum, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded intentional/negligent misrepresentation at this 5 stage. Consequently, BOA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action is 6 DENIED. 7 8 2. Breach of Contract (Third Cause of Action) A cause of action for breach of contract under California law has the following elements: 9 (1) a contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, 10 and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Concorde Equity II, LLC v. Miller, 732 F. Supp. 2d 11 990, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Certain types of contracts are invalid unless memorialized by a 12 written document signed by the party against whom the contract is being enforced, i.e. the statute 13 of frauds. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624. Mortgages and deeds of trust are subject to the statute of 14 frauds. Secrest v. Sec. Natl Mortg. Loan Trust 2002–2, 167 Cal. App. 4th 544, 552 (2008). “An 15 agreement to modify a contract that is subject to the statute of frauds is also subject to the statute 16 of frauds” and so must be in writing. Id. at 553; Cal. Civ. Code § 1698(a) (“A contract in writing 17 may be modified by a contract in writing”); see also Basham v. Pac. Funding Group, No. 2:10– 18 cv–96 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 2902368 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (dismissing a claim that 19 defendant breached an oral contract to provide plaintiffs with a loan modification because, under 20 the statute of frauds, “absent a writing, there can be no contract, much less a breach of contract”). 21 Based on the factual allegations stated supra, Plaintiffs allege generally that “Defendants 22 breached the said agreements by failing to honor the said promises which would have resulted in 23 [] permanent modification of the plaintiff’s loan terms.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 111.) Two specific 24 agreements highlighted by Plaintiffs are: (1) that BOA had an obligation to Plaintiffs to ensure 25 that Wells and SPS honored the loan modification discussed with BOA in November 2011; and 26 (2) BOA refused to accept Plaintiffs’ $1,700 payment in September 2011, after BOA had 27 accepted the partial payment for 14 consecutive months. (ECF No. 33 at 11; ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.) 28 The Court will address each of these specific agreements. 18 1 2 i. November 2011 Loan Modification BOA contends that Plaintiffs fail to identify any enforceable contract that modified the 3 terms of their Note and DOT. (ECF No. 28 at 9.) Plaintiffs allege that “[BOA] granted [them] a 4 modification of their loan terms” at the convention in November 2011, and “[t]his written 5 modification required monthly payments of just over $2,000 per month,” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 36.) 6 Plaintiffs allege that “[a]fter signing the [BOA] modification documents for the $2,000 per month 7 rate the [BOA] agent directs Plaintiffs to the KYHC table to fill out the paperwork to obtain the 8 $100,000 Principal Reduction Program (PRP). [] The KHYC representative confirmed to 9 Plaintiff that [BOA] was a participant in the program and all they had to do was submit the forms 10 online which plaintiffs did immediately.” (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 39–40.) 11 However, with their Opposition, Plaintiffs have also filed a copy of a Trial Payment Plan 12 (“TPP”) and BOA approval letter as evidence of an agreed-upon modification. (ECF No. 33-1.) 13 The TPP states that BOA approved Plaintiffs for a trial modification on their loan, in the amount 14 of $2,090.41. (ECF No. 33-1 at 2.) The TPP approval letter states: “You will receive a 15 permanent modification of your account if you have a) paid each of the [three] monthly trial 16 period payments . . . on time, and b) signed and returned the final Modification Agreement, which 17 will be sent to you once you have completed your Trial Payments.” (ECF No. 33-1 at 3.) BOA 18 opposes consideration of the TPP, because Plaintiffs’ FAC does not mention any use of a TPP. 19 (ECF No. 36 at 14.) The TPP is not signed by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs do not appear to state they 20 made the three consecutive TPP trial payments. (See ECF No. 33 at 11–12.) 21 It is not clear which written contract(s) from November 2011, Plaintiffs are talking about 22 in the FAC, and in any event Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to incorporate allegations regarding 23 the TPP. Because the FAC as currently pled is not clear as to which contract(s) from November 24 2011 form the basis for their third cause of action, BOA’s motion to dismiss is granted with leave 25 to amend as to these allegations. 26 27 28 ii. BOA Refusing Plaintiffs’ Payment in September 2011 Plaintiffs also allege that BOA’s act of refusing to accept the $1,700 payment in September 2011 constitutes a breach of contract since BOA accepted the $1,700 payment for the 19 1 previous 14 months, despite that it fell short of the monthly amount owed. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.) 2 Plaintiffs contend BOA’s acceptance of the $1,700 payment constituted a permanent modification 3 to the Note and DOT. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 33.) BOA argues that the governing Note and DOT 4 expressly allows BOA to accept partial payments and maintain its right to seek a remedy in the 5 future. (ECF No. 28 at 10.) 6 The terms of the DOT state: 7 Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in the future, but Lender is not obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted . . . Lender’s acceptance of payments . . . in amounts less than the amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 (ECF No. 31-1 at 5.) Therefore, by accepting a partial payment of $1,700, and then refusing a payment 14 months later, BOA acted within its rights under the Note and DOT. Plaintiffs, however, fail to address this in their arguments. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish a claim for breach of contract. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend, since this is the first time this Court has ruled on this issue. For the foregoing reasons, BOA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 3. Negligence (Fourth Cause of Action) The elements of a negligence cause of action are: (1) the existence of a duty to exercise 21 22 23 due care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 465, 500 (2001). Plaintiffs allege that BOA owed them a duty to exercise reasonable 24 care when working with them on modifying their home loan. BOA argues that it did not owe 25 Plaintiffs a duty of care in considering their loan modification and that Plaintiffs failed to allege 26 that BOA proximately injured them. (ECF No. 28 at 14.) 27 i. Duty of Care 28 20 1 The question of whether a duty of care exists is a question of law to be determined on a 2 case-by-case basis. Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62, (2013). 3 In California, the general rule is that “a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower 4 when the institution[]s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its 5 6 conventional role as a mere lender of money.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., 231 7 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096 (1991). Still, “Nymark does not support the sweeping conclusion that a 8 lender never owes a duty of care to a borrower.” Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 9 228 Cal. App. 4th 941, 945 (2014). 10 11 12 13 14 15 To determine whether a duty of care exists, courts balance the Biakanja factors: [1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future harm. See Nymark, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1098 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647 (1958)). 16 In Meixner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., this Court followed the reasoning in Alvarez, and held that 17 under the six factors set forth in Biakanja v. Irving, a lender owes a duty of care to the borrower 18 19 when considering his loan modification. 101 F. Supp. 3d 938, 955 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Alvarez, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 946; Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d at 649–50. 20 21 The first factor, the extent the transaction could affect the plaintiff, is met, because the 22 failure to uphold the alleged loan modification agreement in November 2011 affected the 23 Plaintiffs ability to pay the long term loan. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 79.) The second factor, the 24 foreseeability of harm, is also met because through mishandling the loan application documents 25 and not notifying the subsequent servicer of the status of the loan, BOA could foresee Plaintiffs 26 losing their alleged loan modification and consequently becoming unable to pay the loan in the 27 long term. (ECF No. 33 at 15; see ECF No. 26 ¶ 43.) Relative to the third factor, Plaintiffs’ 28 21 1 injury, as previously mentioned herein, Plaintiffs allege an accrual of penalties, fees, and arrears. 2 (ECF No. 26 ¶ 119.) 3 4 The fourth factor, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, also weighs in favor of finding a duty. BOA’s acts as Plaintiffs allege relative to 5 6 7 the causes of action in claims one and two herein are closely tied to Plaintiffs’ injury, i.e., having incurred increased fees, penalties, arrears, and an inability to modify their loan. Relative to the fifth factor, the moral blame of defendant’s conduct, it is not clear at this 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 point the extent to which moral blame should be applied to BOA’s conduct, so the Court declines to speculate and issues no finding relative to this factor. Finally, the sixth factor, the policy of preventing future harm, weighs in favor of finding a duty of care for the reasons stated in Alvarez, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 950.6 After carefully balancing the six Biakanja factors, the Court finds that BOA owed Plaintiffs a duty of care in considering Plaintiffs’ loan modification application. As to the remaining elements of a negligence claim, Plaintiffs adequately allege that BOA 15 16 breached its duty by failing to consider Plaintiffs loan modification reasonably, and that the 17 breach proximately and directly caused Plaintiffs to accrue penalties, fees, and arrears. (ECF No. 18 19 26 ¶¶ 118–119.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a sufficient negligence claim, and BOA’s Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action is DENIED. 20 4. IIED (Fifth Cause of Action) 21 22 Under California law, the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 23 distress are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, 24 or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering 25 26 27 28 6 The Court notes that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has published a policy guidance concerning transferring servicers of residential mortgage loans and the risks it imposes on borrowers. Mortg. Servicing Transfers Compl. Bull. (CFPB) No. 2014-01, at 3 (August 19, 2014). The guidance states that transferring servicers should design and implement procedures for transferring pending loan modification documents to transferee servicers to avoid risk and interruption to consumers’ pending loan modification. Id. 22 1 severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 2 distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 3 903 (1991). The act of foreclosure, absent other circumstances, is not the kind of extreme 4 conduct that supports an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Quinteros v. 5 6 Aurora Loan Services, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 7 Plaintiffs allege that BOA, through its acts and omissions, “engaged in extreme and 8 outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard of the probability of 9 causing, Plaintiffs emotional distress.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 121.) Specifically, BOA acted with 10 reckless disregard when it “misrepresented that the loan had to be in default in order to be 11 modified,” that Plaintiffs qualified for the KYHC principal reduction, and that their loan would 12 13 14 reduce to $1,700 monthly payments. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 121.) However, these allegations do not go beyond what is “generally accepted in the debt collection and/or foreclosure process, which is 15 inherently stressful for debtors.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 121); Ramirez v. Barclays Capital Mortg., No. 16 CV F–10–1039 LJO SKO, 2010 WL 2605696, at *10–11 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2010); Shoop v. 17 Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. CV F 10–1049, 2010 WL 2605708, at *10 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 18 19 2010); Minichino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 11–01030, 2011 WL 4715153, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011). Therefore, the Court GRANTS BOA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fifth 20 21 22 23 24 Cause of Action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 5. Violations of Business and Professions Code § 17200 et al. (Sixth Cause of Action) The California Business and Professions Code prohibits “unfair competition,” which is 25 defined as any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 26 17200. To state a cause of action based on an “unlawful” business act or practice, a plaintiff must 27 allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law. People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 28 23 1 626, 635 (1979). A claim may be brought “by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has 2 lost money or property as a result of unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 3 4 BOA contends that the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim depends on Plaintiffs’ additional claims in the FAC, and as such, fails because Plaintiffs fail to “allege a single statutory 5 6 violation or any underlying claim upon which their UCL claim can stand.” (ECF No. 28 at 16.) 7 Here, as detailed above, this Court has found Plaintiff successfully pleaded violations of law for 8 intentional and negligent misrepresentation and general negligence. See Mullins v. Wells Fargo 9 Bank, N.A., No. 2:13–cv–0453 JAM KJN PS, 2013 WL 5299181, at *11 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 10 11 12 13 14 (reasoning that a UCL claim survived a motion to dismiss because it was “expressly predicated” on successfully pleading violations of the California Home Owners Bill of Rights.) Thus, Plaintiffs adequately support a claim under the “unlawful” prong of section 17200. Next, BOA argues that Plaintiffs lack standing under section 17204, because they failed to 15 demonstrate that they lost “any amount of money, or any specific property, as a result of [BOA’s] 16 actions.” (ECF No. 28 at 17.) “[D]amage to credit” is a “loss of money or property” within the 17 meaning of the UCL. Rex v. Chase Home Finance LLC, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 18 2012) (citing Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2010)). “Where the 19 alleged harm is economic injury, injury in fact and loss of money are one in the same.” See Troyk 20 21 v. Farmers Group, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1348 (2009) (cited by Kwikset Corp. v. Superior 22 Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 325 (2011)). Plaintiffs allege their injuries include late fees, damage to 23 their credit score, and the loss of participations in KYHC’s principal reduction program, which is 24 the type of loss protected under the UCL. Accordingly, these alleged monetary injuries constitute 25 economic injury. 26 For the stated reasons, BOA’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is 27 DENIED. 28 24 1 2 3 B. Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss a. Statute of Limitations Wells and SPS contend that Plaintiffs’ intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims 4 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (ECF No. 30 at 14.) The parties do not dispute 5 6 what statute of limitations applies to these claims (an intentional misrepresentation claim is 7 subject to a three-year statute of limitations, while a negligent misrepresentation claim is subject 8 to a two-year statute of limitations) however, they do dispute the accrual date of each claim. 9 Wells and SPS argue that the accrual date occurred in December 2011, and therefore 10 11 Plaintiffs’ April 28, 2015, filing date fell after the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 30 at 15.) As set forth supra, Plaintiffs contend that they did not become aware of their claims until May 2014, 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 when KYHC definitively denied Plaintiffs the $84,000 principal reduction after SPS did not provide KYHC with the requisite documents. Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiffs filed their misrepresentation claims timely under the discovery rule. Fox, 35 Cal. 4th at 808. Therefore, the Court DENIES Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First and Second causes of actions as time barred. b. Fair Notice under Rule 8 Wells and SPS argue that the FAC fails to give them proper notice under Rule 8 because 20 21 “the Amended Complaint improperly lumps three defendants together without specifying how 22 each named defendant is liable for each cause of action.” (ECF No. 30 at 4.) Rule 8 requires a 23 plaintiff to “plead a short and plain statement of the elements of his or her claim, identifying the 24 transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and the elements of the prima facie case.” 25 Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000). When a plaintiff sues 26 multiple defendants, the complaint “must allege the basis of his claim against each defendant to 27 satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a short and plain statement of the 28 25 1 claim to put defendants on sufficient notice of the allegations against them.” Gauvin v. 2 Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Here, while Plaintiffs refer to all three 3 defendants collectively under each cause of action, the FAC adequately sets out specific facts 4 against each individual defendant. See Friedman v. Zimmer, No. CV 15–502 GHK, 2015 WL 5 6 6164787 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (lumping defendants together only violates rule 8 when “the pleadings 7 are largely incomprehensible”). Plaintiffs’ six causes of action fairly put Wells and SPS on notice 8 of the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims: Wells and SPS’ involvement in the ultimate denial of the loan 9 modification through the KYHC program. 10 11 12 13 14 The Court notes that Plaintiffs allege that SPS “is liable for the breach of agreement by [BOA] to modify the loan to $1,700 monthly payments because they were assigned and assumed the servicing and ownership of the loan and thus assumed the prior liabilities.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 46.) Wells and SPS argue that Plaintiffs fail to plead successor liability. (ECF No. 30 at 5.) 15 While it is unclear from Plaintiffs’ FAC whether they are pleading successor liability, Plaintiffs 16 do allege that Wells and SPS are liable based on facts separate from those alleged against BOA. 17 The independent allegations Plaintiffs state against Wells and SPS include: (1) Shrowder telling 18 19 Plaintiffs that they did not need to make payments to SPS until they resolved the previous modification efforts with BOA, and Shrowder having “acknowledged receiving the [BOA] 20 21 written confirmation of the modification” (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 43, 47); (2) SPS misleading Plaintiffs 22 into believing it approved them for a modification when SPS did not have the requisite 23 documentation (ECF No. 26 ¶ 73); (3) Shrowder promising Plaintiffs that by accepting the 24 $16,000 payment from KYHC and making monthly payments of $1,952.56, they would have 25 their loan modified down to a $1,700 monthly amount (ECF No. 26 ¶ 73); and (4) SPS delaying 26 in providing the requisite information to KYHC after SPS became a participant in the principal 27 reduction program (ECF No. 26 ¶ 67). While the Court does not find that Plaintiffs allege 28 26 1 liability on the part of Wells or SPS solely through a successor in interest theory, the Court does 2 find that Plaintiff has alleged other facts to support their liability. 3 Accordingly, Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs FAC pursuant to Rule 8 is 4 DENIED. 5 6 c. Sufficiency of the Allegations in the First Amended Complaint 7 8 9 Wells and SPS seek to dismiss all six of Plaintiffs’ causes of action for failure to state a Claim. 1. 10 11 Intentional and Negligent Misrepresentation (First and Second Causes of Action) As an initial matter, Plaintiffs allege that Wells is responsible for all of SPS’ activity 12 because SPS is an agent of “Wells through its relationship with SPS.” (ECF Nos. 34 at 9–10.) 13 Wells and SPS argue that “there are no allegations in the entire FAC regarding any sort of agency 14 relationship between SPS and Wells Fargo Trustee” and that because Plaintiffs did not allege any 15 misrepresentations by Wells, the misrepresentation claims against Wells should be dismissed. 16 (ECF No. 35 at 6.) 17 Under California law, an agent is defined as “one who represents another, called the 18 principal, in dealings with third persons.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2295. A principal-agent relationship 19 exists if an agent holds the power to alter the legal relations between the principal and third 20 persons, if an agent is a fiduciary, or if the principal has a right to control the day-to-day conduct 21 of the agent. Wallis v. Centennial Ins. Co., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 909, 916 (E.D. Cal. 2013). “If, 22 however, the principal has no control over the day-to-day operations and only has [the] right to 23 dictate the end result of the agent's activities, then an ‘independent contractor’ relationship 24 exists.” In re Coupon Clearing Service, 113 F.3d 1091, 1099–00 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs’ 25 conclusory statement that Wells is liable for the actions and inactions of SPS under an agency 26 theory is insufficient to show that Wells and SPS are in an agency relationship. (ECF No. 34 at 27 9–10.) Plaintiffs’ allegation that “Wells and its agent SPS, have concealed the truth as it pertains 28 to Plaintiffs’ loan modification efforts” is also insufficient to establish an agency theory. (ECF 27 1 No. 34 at 9); see Buick v. World Savings Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 765, 774–75 (E.D. Cal. 2008) 2 (general allegations were not sufficient to support the contention that a broker was an agent of the 3 lending institution); but see Griley v. National City Mortg., No. CIV. 2:10–1204, 2011 WL 4 219574, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (claim that a lender and servicer were a principal and agent was 5 valid since plaintiffs alleged the lender hired the servicer). Plaintiffs do not allege that Wells 6 hired SPS, that Wells had any control over the daily activity of SPS, or that SPS had the authority 7 to alter the legal relations between Wells and Plaintiffs. Consequently, the FAC does not contain 8 sufficient factual allegations to support an agency-principle relationship between Wells and SPS, 9 and as such, Wells is not responsible for the alleged misrepresentations by SPS. Therefore, the 10 Court GRANTS Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss relative to Defendant Wells WITH LEAVE 11 TO AMEND, as to the First and Second Causes of Action.7 12 Wells and SPS also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege each element of a fraudulent 13 misrepresentation claim. (ECF Nos. 30 at 7–10.) The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation 14 claim are: (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to induce reliance; (4) 15 justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damages. “The elements of negligent misrepresentation are 16 similar to intentional fraud except for the requirement of scienter; in a claim for negligent 17 misrepresentation, the plaintiff need not allege the defendant made an intentionally false 18 statement, but simply one as to which he or she lacked any reasonable ground for believing the 19 statement to be true.” Charnay, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 184; see also id. (citing Alliance Mortgage 20 Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 1239 n. 4 (stating that negligent misrepresentation is a species of the tort of 21 deceit and like fraud, requires a misrepresentation, justifiable reliance and damage). 22 i. Misrepresentation Plaintiffs allege that upon their loan’s transfer to SPS, Shrowder told Plaintiffs to stop 23 24 making payments until “the prior modification efforts that Plaintiff and [BOA] had been working 25 on were resolved,” which was a misrepresentation that resulted in SPS charging Plaintiffs 26 unnecessary fees, arrears, and costs. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 73(xvi).) Additionally, SPS continually told 27 7 28 In their motion to dismiss, Wells and SPS challenge the sufficiency of allegations against Wells specifically relative to the first and second causes of action, but not the other causes of action. (ECF No. 30 at 16.) 28 1 Plaintiffs that their loan was under review for modification, but “documents which had been 2 submitted had not been received,” although the FAC does not specify which documents. (ECF 3 No. 26 ¶ 73.) Further, “Shrowder promised plaintiffs that if they complied with these demands, 4 which included making $1,952.56 monthly payments and allowing SPS to receive the $16,000 5 from the KYHC reinstatement program, they would have their loan modified down to the $1,700 6 monthly amount.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 55.) Shrowder stated that Plaintiffs had to make monthly 7 payments of $1,952.56, until SPS became a member of the KYHC principal reduction program; 8 however, even after SPS did become a member, it did not submit the requisite documentation to 9 KYHC and Plaintiffs’ loan was never modified down to a $1,700 monthly payment. (ECF No. 26 10 ¶ 67.) Thus, Plaintiffs allege that this ongoing promise to modify constitutes intentional 11 misrepresentation. The Court will also construe said allegations to constitute a claim that SPS 12 lacked a reasonable ground for making the aforementioned assertions regarding a loan 13 modification. Charnay, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 184; see infra, discussion regarding the fourth cause 14 of action (negligence). Thus, these allegations are sufficient to meet the misrepresentation 15 element for an intentional/negligent misrepresentation claim at this pleading stage. 16 17 ii. Knowledge of Falsity Regarding an intentional misrepresentation, Plaintiffs allege: “[SPS] never had any 18 intention of reviewing Plaintiffs’ many applications for loan modification in good faith or of 19 granting them a modification.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 75.) Plaintiffs allege “[SPS] intended that 20 Plaintiffs rely on their said false representations and promises in order to make more money 21 servicing a distressed loan” through fees, arrears, and penalties. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 78.) Plaintiffs 22 allege: “Specifically defendants utilized the loan modification process and the promise of 23 securing a loan modification as a means of putting Plaintiffs further into default while collecting 24 higher and higher servicing fee[s] [while] knowing that simply denying a loan modification from 25 the outset made it more likely that Plaintiffs could cure their default, whereas stringing Plaintiffs 26 along for years would increase the likelihood that the arrearages would accumulate beyond 27 Plaintiffs’ ability to cure it.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 29.) Regarding a negligent misrepresentation (one 28 which SPS lacked any reasonable ground for believing to be true), Plaintiffs allege: “defendants 29 1 were unconcerned with the truth of the statements made regarding Plaintiffs’ qualification for a 2 loan modification and only made them to further its intended goal of never granting Plaintiffs a 3 fair review for a loan modification.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 100.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Shrowder 4 and other representatives from SPS made several statements regarding Plaintiff’s ability to obtain 5 a loan. For example: “Shrowder did tell plaintiff the owner of the loan was a participant in an 6 aspect of the KYHC program known as the loan reinstatement program whereby only the past due 7 payments are covered by KYHC and not yet the KYHC program whereby $100,000 is given to 8 the lender to reduce the principal.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 47.) Regarding a HAMP loan: “For three 9 months [] in 2012 plaintiff made numerous calls to SPS to inquire as to the status of the $1,700 10 modification agreement, as well as both the KYHC and the HAMP application. Plaintiffs were 11 told repeatedly everything was still pending to submit certain financial records that they had 12 already submitted or to send in updatd bank documents.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 51.) “Shrowder further 13 told plaintiff the goal was to make the loan current and then she would go to the investor and ask 14 for an “in house[“] modification because the plaintiffs will have now complied with everything 15 they were told to do.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 54.) “Shrowder promised plaintiffs that if they complied 16 with these demands, which included making $1,952.56 monthly payments and allowing SPS to 17 receive the $16,000 from the KYHC reinstatement program, they would have their loan modified 18 down to the $1,700 monthly amount. This modification would take place independent of the 19 ongoing [HAMP] or entry by SPS into the [KYHC] principal reduction program, either of which 20 would also accomplish the same result.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 55.) 21 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that SPS intentionally 22 strung Plaintiffs along in the process of obtaining a loan in order to collect increased fees, while 23 knowing such efforts were futile, or alternatively represented that Plaintiffs would receive 24 different types of loan modifications without a reasonable basis for believing these 25 representations. It is not disputed that some of the promises allegedly made by SPS (such as a 26 reduction down to $1,700 per month and receipt by Plaintiffs of the full $100,000 KYHC 27 principle reduction amount) were not carried out by SPS. Therefore, Plaintiffs have satisfied the 28 “knowledge of falsity” element. 30 1 iii. Intent to Defraud Plaintiffs allege “[SPS] acted with the purpose of delaying the modification process and 2 3 stringing Plaintiffs along for the purpose of increasing arrears, fees, and costs, all of which would 4 be recovered by SPS upon the actual foreclosure sale of the property which would occur as a 5 result of the failure to provide Plaintiffs the permanent modification.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 72(ix).) 6 Plaintiffs allege that it is more profitable for SPS to keep Plaintiffs in a loan modification process 7 for as long as possible before deciding to foreclose, and consequently SPS never intended to 8 modify Plaintiffs monthly payment to $1,700. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 132.) Therefore, Plaintiffs have 9 satisfied this third element. 10 iv. Justifiable Reliance 11 Plaintiffs allege that their reliance on SPS’ representations was justified, because SPS was 12 in a position to grant a HAMP loan modification (ECF No. 26 ¶ 112), an in house loan 13 modification (ECF No. 26 ¶ 61), and the KYHC principal reduction (ECF No. 26 ¶ 63) and “had 14 expressed its willingness to grant such modification” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 82). Plaintiffs allege “the 15 reliance was specifically justified because Plaintiffs were presumably granted a modification . . . 16 and defendants accepted payments.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 82.) 17 Wells and SPS argue that throughout the modification review, Plaintiffs remained 18 obligated to pay the full monthly payment and under the DOT, SPS was within its rights to accept 19 lesser payments without waiving any rights. (ECF No. 30 at 17.) However, Plaintiffs allege they 20 spent time and money in complying with SPS’ requests so as to obtain a $1,700 modified loan 21 payment. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 90.) Plaintiffs also allege that although Plaintiffs had an obligation to 22 pay monthly payments under the Note and DOT, they believe that because of SPS’ statements to 23 not make a loan payment in January 2012 until SPS resolved the pending loan modification 24 agreement from BOA and to make $1700 payments in February 2013 for six months, Plaintiffs 25 fell into default. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 84.) Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the fifth element of 26 fraudulent misrepresentation. 27 // 28 // 31 1 v. Resulting Damages Plaintiffs allege that because of SPS’ delay in the modification process, “Plaintiffs 2 3 incurred penalties, fees and costs . . . as well as negative credit reporting.” (ECF No. 26 ¶ 85.) 4 Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently met this element under the standard expressed under Rule 5 9(b). 6 7 8 9 Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action, as to Defendant SPS, is DENIED. 2. Breach of Contract (Third Cause of Action) Under California law, to state a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead: (1) 10 existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance of the 11 contract; (3) defendant's breach of the contract; and (4) resulting damages. Armstrong Petrol. 12 Corp. v. Tri Valley Oil & Gas Co., 116 Cal. App. 4th 1375, 1391 n.6 (2004). Mortgages, deeds 13 of trust, and agreements to modify these contracts are subject to the statute of frauds. Clark v. 14 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 15 Specific to this cause of action, Plaintiffs recite several allegations regarding apparently 16 verbal promises made by Shrowder, an agent of SPS. For instance: “SPS, through its 17 representative Shrowder, informed plaintiff that SPS would receive and accept the $16,000 18 claimed past due payments”; “Shrowder further told plaintiffs that the goal was to make the loan 19 current and then SPS would go to the investor and ask for an [‘]in-house’ modification”; 20 “Shrowder promised plaintiffs … they would have their loan modified down to the $1,700 21 monthly amount”. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 112, 113.) Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that these 22 promises were verbal. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 114.) In their Opposition, Plaintiffs also reference for the 23 first time the TPP, which may or may not be relevant to allegations that Wells or SPS breached a 24 contract. As it stands, Plaintiffs do not clarify which contract(s) they are referring to in this cause 25 of action, or show how the statute of frauds does not invalidate their claims regarding the verbal 26 promises Shrowder allegedly made. 27 28 Therefore, Wells’ and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 32 1 3. Negligence (Fourth Cause of Action) 2 To find a claim for negligence, the court must find: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a 3 legal duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach was a proximate or legal cause 4 of the plaintiff's injuries. Gilmer v. Ellington, 159 Cal. App. 4th 190, 195 (2008). The absence of 5 any one of these three elements is fatal to a negligence claim. Id. 6 The Court infers Plaintiffs allege negligence against Wells and SPS for acts including: 7 failing to honor November 2011 loan modification agreed upon with BOA (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 73, 8 96); failing to submit loan modification documents to KYHC in order to secure the remaining 9 $84,000 reduction and simultaneously reduce their monthly payments to $1,700 per month (ECF 10 No. 26 ¶ 67); and generally, continuously acting in such a way so to lead Plaintiffs to believe they 11 would receive some type of permanent modification, but refraining from actually taking the steps 12 to carry out a modification. 13 Wells and SPS contend that they owe no duty of care to Plaintiffs as a lender. (ECF No. 14 30 at 22.) Wells and SPS disagree that lenders/servicers owe a duty of care in handling a loan 15 modification application, and even if so, the six-factor test in Nymark does not support finding 16 such a duty in this case. Were a duty to be established, there was no breach. (ECF No. 30 at 22– 17 26.) Additionally, Wells and SPS argue that Plaintiffs did not suffer damages as a result of any 18 negligence by Wells and SPS. (ECF No. 35 at 12–13.) 19 First, as this Court has found, a loan modification falls outside of a conventional money- 20 lending role, because when a lender/servicer and a borrower are already in an established 21 relationship, as Plaintiffs, SPS, and Wells are in this case, a borrower cannot decide not to choose 22 a different lender or servicer.8 See Meixner, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 954; see also Alvarez, 228 Cal. 23 App. 4th at 948 (finding that a lender/servicer has no general duty to offer a modification, but a 24 special relationship does arise when a lender/servicer agrees to consider a borrower’s loan 25 modification application). Therefore, when SPS allegedly promised Plaintiffs to modify their 26 loan, it took on a duty to handle the modification process with reasonable care. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 27 8 28 Plaintiffs and Wells / SPS were not in an established relationship in that BOA transferred ownership/servicing of the loan to Wells/SPS. However, no party suggests that Plaintiffs could have chosen to prevent that transfer. 33 1 55); Alvarez, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 949. Second, as this Court held in Meixner, a duty of care can 2 apply to a residential loan. Meixner, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 954–55. 3 Finally, the Biakanja factors weigh in favor of finding that Wells and SPS owed Plaintiffs 4 a duty of care when considering their loan modification applications. The Biakanja balancing 5 8 factors are: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future harm. 9 Nymark, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1098. 6 7 10 Wells and SPS’ efforts to assist Plaintiffs modify their loan were intended to affect 11 Plaintiff, because a payment modification to $1,700, or some other modification, may have 12 allowed Plaintiffs to avoid defaulting. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 55, 81.) The harm caused to Plaintiffs as 13 a result of Wells and SPS not recognizing the alleged transferred loan modification in November 14 2011, not producing documents requested by KYHC, or not carrying out alleged promises to 15 modify a loan is reasonably foreseeable. For example, it is a foreseeable conclusion that 16 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Defendants’ promises to modify would cause Plaintiffs not to pursue other 17 options that may have minimized their financial injury, such as declaring bankruptcy or selling 18 the property. (ECF No. 34 at 16.) Plaintiffs’ alleged injury appears to overlap with their injury 19 caused by BOA; Plaintiffs allege Wells and SPS unreasonably handled the pending loan 20 modification in November 2011, unreasonably delayed in future efforts to modify the loan, and 21 consequently caused Plaintiffs to fall into an incurable default. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 84.) There is a 22 close connection between the alleged conduct and the injury suffered. For example, Plaintiffs 23 allege that through SPS’ failure to submit requisite paperwork to KYHC, Plaintiffs were unable to 24 obtain a principal reduction of $84,000. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 67.) Relative to the fifth factor, the moral 25 blame of a defendant’s conduct, it is not clear at this stage the extent to which moral blame should 26 be applied to Wells and SPS’ conduct. Finally, finding that Wells and SPS have a duty to handle 27 Plaintiffs’ loan with care supports the policy of preventing future harm. Jolley, 213 Cal. App. 4th 28 at 903 (“[T]he California Legislature has expressed a strong preference for fostering more 34 1 cooperative relations between lenders and borrowers who are at risk of foreclosure, so that homes 2 will not be lost.”) In considering all of the Biakanja factors, the Court finds that Wells and SPS 3 owed Plaintiffs a duty of care in considering Plaintiffs’ loan modification. 4 5 Regarding a breach of the duty, the foregoing allegations adequately state that Wells and SPS did not handle Plaintiffs’ requests and/or application for a loan modification with care. 6 Wells and SPS also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege damages, because the 7 penalties, costs, and arrears Plaintiffs accumulated were the result of their own inability to make 8 mortgage payments, not their alleged negligence. (ECF No. 35 at 12–13.) However, Plaintiffs 9 allege that SPS’ handling of their loan modification attempts caused them additional arrears and 10 late fees beyond the anticipated time of when they should have received an answer on their loan 11 modification. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 79, 119.) This delay caused Plaintiffs to forego other options, such 12 as selling their home and saving the equity they had accrued throughout their ownership of the 13 property. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 119.) 14 Plaintiffs have adequately set forth allegations to support each element of negligence in 15 the FAC. Therefore, the Court DENIES Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth 16 Cause of Action.9 17 4. IIED (Fifth Cause of Action) 18 Under California law, a creditor's conduct in attempting to collect a debt is outrageous, as 19 required to support a claim for IIED, only if it exceeds all reasonable bounds of decency. Flores 20 v. EMC Mortg. Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1124 (E.D. Cal. 2014). Plaintiffs allege that Wells 21 and SPS’ acts of failing to honor the November 2011 modification with BOA (ECF No. 26 ¶ 44), 22 failing to submit requisite paperwork to KYHC to obtain the principal reduction (ECF No. 26 ¶ 23 67), and the ongoing delay in modifying Plaintiffs’ monthly loan payment after promising to do 24 so were extreme and outrageous. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 121.) The FAC alleges that this conduct caused 25 Plaintiffs emotional distress, because “Defendants were aware that Plaintiff strongly wished to 26 27 28 9 The alleged offense conduct in the FAC is directed at SPS. However, Defendants specifically move for dismissal of Wells relative to the first and second causes of action (intentional and negligent misrepresentation), and not the other causes of action. 35 1 retain the Subject Property, that Mr. Dougherty was disabled and that Mrs. Dougherty was 2 seeking assistance by having an affordable payment that she could sustain long term.” (ECF No. 3 26 ¶ 121.) Though arguably offensive, this conduct is not so offensive as to “exceed all bounds 4 of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Flores, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (quoting 5 Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979)); see also Davenport v. Litton Loan 6 Servicing, LP, 725 F. Supp. 2d 862, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (the lender’s act of foreclosure, alleged 7 certified mail failure, and refusal to modify plaintiff’s loan were not outrageous acts to justify an 8 IIED claim). 9 10 Accordingly, Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 11 12 5. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (Sixth Cause of Action) “To bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must show either an (1) unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent 13 business act or practice, or (2) unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Lippitt v. 14 Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003); Cal. Bus. & Prof. 15 Code § 17200. “[A]n action based on [the UCL] to redress an unlawful business practice 16 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats these violations . . . as unlawful practices, 17 independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies 18 provided thereunder.” Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992). The 19 unlawful prong of a plaintiff's § 17200 claim can be satisfied by either state or federal law. 20 Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 21 As discussed supra, Plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim under the unlawful prong of section 22 17200 based on their misrepresentation and negligence claims. Plaintiffs have alleged damages 23 in the form of increased service charges, fees, and/or penalties and damage to their credit. 24 Therefore, Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is DENIED. 25 V. CONCLUSION 26 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 27 Defendants’ separate Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 28, 30) Plaintiffs’ First Amended 28 Complaint. The Court orders the following: 36 1 1. Defendant BOA’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to COUNT I, COUNT 2 II, COUNT IV, and COUNT VI; and GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND with 3 respect to COUNT III and COUNT V. 4 2. Defendant Wells and SPS’ Motion to Dismiss is ruled upon as follows. With respect 5 to COUNT I and COUNT II against Wells, the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE 6 TO AMEND. With respect to COUNT I and II against SPS, the motion is DENIED. 7 With respect to COUNTS IV and VI against Wells and SPS, the motion is DENIED. 8 With respect to COUNTS III and V against Wells and SPS, the motion is GRANTED 9 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 Dated: April 1, 2016 14 Troy L. Nunley United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 37

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?