Woods v. Krause et al
Filing
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ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 8/26/2016 DISMISSING plaintiff's amended complaint with leave to amend; plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days. (Yin, K)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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TAJHIKEEM WOODS,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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No. 2:15-cv-1474-JAM-CMK-P
KRAUSE, et al.,
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ORDER
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 17).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,
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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied
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if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon
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which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must
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allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support
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the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
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and conclusory.
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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff brings this action against the mental health personnel at High Desert
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State Prison (HDSP). He claims defendant Bowers was deliberately indifferent to his mental
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health needs as he falsely documented his condition in relation to 602 inmate grievances plaintiff
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filed, which were denied. Similarly, he claims defendants Murray and Lewis violated his
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Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights in denying his inmate grievance without further
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evaluation, effectively denying him adequate mental health treatment. Defendants Krause and
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Mace then interviewed plaintiff, and refused to send plaintiff to the mental health crisis bed after
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he informed them that he was suicidal, denying his inmate grievance. Plaintiff also told
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defendant Isaac of his suicidal thoughts, but defendant Isaac simply sent him back to his cell
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without intervention, and lied on the 602 inmate grievance disposition. Finally, plaintiff claims
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that the California Department of Corrections and the State of California are aware of the
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situation, and have failed to supervise its subordinates.
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In support of his claims, plaintiff has attached to the complaint his 602 inmate
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grievances and the defendants’ responses thereto, as well as some medical records. From these
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exhibits, it appears that all of the named defendants were involved in the review of plaintiff’s
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inmate grievances. What is not clear, is whether any of the defendants are actually plaintiff’s
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treating clinicians, but it does not appear as if they were.
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II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects. First and foremost,
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plaintiff’s main claim relates to the 602 inmate grievance process. However, prisoners have no
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stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v.
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Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th
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Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance
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process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, it is impossible for due
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process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly process grievances. Numerous
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district courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion. See Smith v. Calderon, 1999 WL
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1051947 (N.D. Cal 1999) (finding that failure to properly process grievances did not violate any
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constitutional right); Cage v. Cambra, 1996 WL 506863 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that prison
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officials’ failure to properly process and address grievances does not support constitutional
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claim); James v. U.S. Marshal’s Service, 1995 WL 29580 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing
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complaint without leave to amend because failure to process a grievance did not implicate a
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protected liberty interest); Murray v. Marshall, 1994 WL 245967 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding
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that prisoner’s claim that grievance process failed to function properly failed to state a claim
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under § 1983). Prisoners do retain a First Amendment right to petition the government through
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the prison grievance process. See Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Therefore, interference with the grievance process may, in certain circumstances, implicate the
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First Amendment.
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Here, there is no indication that plaintiff’s grievance process has been interfered
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with. Rather, he is unhappy with the result of the inmate grievances he filed, and the lack of
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attention and treatment obtained therefrom. To the extent he is claiming a due process violation
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in relation to the inmate grievances he has filed, he cannot state a claim. As several of the
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defendants named are only named for their role in the inmate grievance process, those claims and
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defendants must be dismissed without leave to amend.
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Plaintiff’s other claim is for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights relating to
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the lack of mental health treatment he is receiving. The treatment a prisoner receives in prison
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and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
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Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509
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U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . .
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embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”
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Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh
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and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison
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officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and
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personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official
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violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the
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official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal
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civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted
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unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
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Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable
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mind.” See id.
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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at
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105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental
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health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily
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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.
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See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also
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demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give
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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,
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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
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It is unclear to the undersigned who plaintiff is alleging actually denied him the
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mental health treatment he indicates he needs, as opposed to those simply reviewing another’s
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decision. Plaintiff claims Bowers interviewed him during the 602 review, but it is unclear if
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Bowers is his treating clinician and has any control over his treatment. Defendants Murray and
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Lewis, as the second and third level inmate grievance reviewers, were simply reviewing what
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decisions had been made, and do not appear to actually be involved in the decisions as to
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plaintiff’s treatment or lack thereof. Similarly, it appears defendants Krause, Mace and Isaac
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were all involved in the inmate grievance reviews, but it is unclear if they were also treating
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clinicians. Accordingly, it appears plaintiff may be able to state a claim for denial of necessary
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mental health treatment, but it is unclear who the responsible clinician is in denying him such
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treatment.
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
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connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations.
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See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
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(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the
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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or
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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and
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conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations
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are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the
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plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged
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constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Reviewing another person’s decision or action is insufficient involvement to state
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a claim against a defendant. Rather, the named defendant has to be personally involved in the
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alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not sufficiently link the
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named defendants with their personal involvement in the denial of his mental health care.
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Finally, plaintiff names both the State of California and the California Department
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of Corrections as defendants to this action. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts
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from hearing suits brought against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other
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states. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).
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This prohibition extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies.
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See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880
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F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction
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of prisoners is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh,
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438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993)
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(en banc).
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The Eleventh Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials
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acting in their official capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995);
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Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment
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does not, however, bar suits against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id.
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Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not
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bar suits for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official
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capacities. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh
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Amendment also does not bar suits against cities and counties. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
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Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978).
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As the Eleventh Amendment bars actions against both the State of California and
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the California Department of Corrections, both of these defendants must be dismissed from this
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action without leave to amend.
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III. CONCLUSION
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Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be
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cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the
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entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original
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complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following
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dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged
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in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order
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to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint
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must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by
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amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now
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has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the
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claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and
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the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which
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continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and
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recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders
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and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims.
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Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
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with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
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Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date
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of service of this order.
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DATED: August 26, 2016
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CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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