Gnibus v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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ORDER granting 23 Motion for Attorney Fees signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 10/13/17. (Kaminski, H)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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LYNN EILEEN GNIBUS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
No. 2:15-cv-1669 AC
ORDER
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
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(“Commissioner”), denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) benefits
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under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). On March 13, 2017, the court granted
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plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary
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judgment, and remanded the action to the Commissioner with instructions to award benefits.
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ECF No. 19.
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Now pending before the court is plaintiff’s September 1, 2017 motion for an award of
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attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 23. On September 1, 2017, defendant
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filed a response asserting that defendant “has no objection to the fee request.” ECF No. 24. For
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the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.
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I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST
At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee
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agreement. ECF No. 23-1. Pursuant to that agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s
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fees in the amount of $8,300.00, which represents 25% of the $33,238.20 in retroactive disability
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benefits received by plaintiff on remand for 22.3 hours of attorney time expended on this matter.
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ECF Nos. 23 at 3-6.
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Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social
security claimants:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under
this subchapter who was represented before the court by an
attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment
a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent
of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled
by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social
Security may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such
attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due
benefits.
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42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42
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U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing
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party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009)
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(en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under
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§ 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that
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attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’”
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Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht,
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535 U.S. at 805).
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The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must
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ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not
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displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts
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to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent
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boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable
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for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable
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fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee
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arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’”
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Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808).
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In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character
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of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151
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(quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is warranted,
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the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or delayed the
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case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. Finally,
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the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing
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charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at
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808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers “the time and
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labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether the fee
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requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable.
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Here, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for
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plaintiff. See Declaration of Lawrence D. Rohlfing (“Rohlfing Decl.”) (ECF No. 23) ¶ 6. There
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is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard performance by
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counsel. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any dilatory conduct
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resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $8,300.00 fee, which represents 25% of the
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$33,238.20 in past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits
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awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case
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and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent plaintiff on
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such terms. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed significant risk in
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accepting these cases, including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or that there would be
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a long court or administrative delay in resolving the cases”). Finally, counsel has submitted a
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detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF No. 23-3.
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Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by
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counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable.
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II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES
An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted
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under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.
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Here, plaintiff’s attorney was previously awarded $4,085.00 in EAJA fees. See ECF No. 22.
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Counsel therefore must remit that amount to plaintiff.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1. Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 23), is
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GRANTED;
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2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $8,300.00 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the
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Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld
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for the payment of such fees (see ECF No. 23 ¶3; 23-2); and
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3. Counsel for plaintiff is directed to remit to plaintiff the amount of $4,085.00 for EAJA
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fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner.
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DATED: October 13, 2017
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