Fagan v. County of Sacramento

Filing 13

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 1/6/2016 GRANTING defendant's 5 Motion to Dismiss 1 Complaint. Plaintiff is GRANTED 14 days from date on Order filed to file First Amended Complaint addressing referenced deficiencies. (Marciel, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JORDAN FAGAN,

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No. 2:15-cv-01755-GEB-KJN

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; and
DOES 1–20,

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Defendants.

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Defendant

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County

of

Sacramento

(“County”)

seeks

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dismissal of Plaintiff Jordan Fagan’s Complaint, under Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), “for failure to state

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a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Notice of Mot. and

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Mot. to Dismiss Compl. 1:22–23, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff’s Complaint

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alleges

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County and Doe defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 11–29, ECF No. 1.)

a

single

I.

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claim,

The

following

under

42

U.S.C.

§ 1983,

against

the

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
factual

allegations

in

the

concern the motion:
On July 24, 2014, while being detained at
Sacrament[o]
County
Jail,
Plaintiff
was
handcuffed and being transferred from one
room to another by two Sheriff Deputies. A
third Sheriff’s deputy then came and swept
Plaintiff[’]s
feet
from
underneath
him.
Plaintiff hit the ground face first causing
him to break three of his front teeth, along
with a large laceration underneath his bottom
1

Complaint

1

lip. As a result, Plaintiff received eleven
stitches to the close up the laceration
underneath his bottom lip and is undergoing
multiple dental treatments to fix his three
broken teeth.

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(Compl.

¶ 9)

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Department immediately following the incident and after being

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informed

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complaint was the proper procedure. Plaintiff received a letter

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from

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sustaining his complaint.” (Compl. ¶ 10.)

by

the

“Plaintiff

a

filed

Sherriff’s

Sherriff’s

“To

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survive

complaint

Department

Department,

II.

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a

a

with

employee

dated

the

that

Sheriff’s

filing

December 2,

a

2014,

LEGAL STANDARD
motion

to

dismiss,

a

complaint

must

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contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Caviness v.

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Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.

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2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim

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has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

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that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

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(2007)).

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claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires

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the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common

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sense.” Id. at 679. Further, “the court need not accept as true

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conclusory

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unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Sciences Secs. Litig., 536

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F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

§ 1983

whether

allegations,

Specifically,

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“Determining

municipal

nor

“[t]o

liability

a

complaint

make

unwarranted

survive
claim],
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states

a
‘a

motion
bare

a

plausible

deductions

to

or

dismiss

allegation

[a

that

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government

2

government

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plaintiffs’

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that . . . plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that

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it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to

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the expense of discovery and continued litigation.’” Shelley v.

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Cty. of San Joaquin, 954 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1009 (E.D. Cal. 2013)

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(quoting AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631,

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637 (9th Cir. 2012)).

officials’
policy

conduct

or

complaint

custom’
must

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III.

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The

County

to

some

unidentified

insufficient;
‘factual

instead,

allegations

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s

superior liability for municipalities under Section 1983” and

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“the

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existence of a County policy or custom that was deliberately

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indifferent to [P]laintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Mem. P. &

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A. ISO Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) 2:6–7, 2:26, 3:16–17, ECF

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No. 5-1.)

factual

is

no

be

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no

“[t]here

should

dismissed,

alleges

alia,

Complaint

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[C]omplaint

inter

is

include

argues

arguing,

conformed

material

respondeat

showing

the

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Plaintiff agrees the County’s “legal analysis appears

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to have merit” and “[a]t present, Plaintiff cannot articulate

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additional facts to support the culpability of the moving party.”

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(Pl.’s

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No. 7.)

However,

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“motion

to

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reasonable time to conduct discovery.” (Opp’n 4:2–4.)

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P.&A.

ISO

Opp’n

Plaintiff

dismiss

The

to

should

Supreme

Court

Mot.

(“Opp’n”)

argues,
be

denied

held

in

inter

1:23,

3:12–14,

alia,

the

until

Monell

Plaintiff

v.

ECF

County’s
has

Department

had

of

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Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that

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“[m]unicipalities are considered ‘persons’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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and thus may be liable for a constitutional deprivation.” Waggy

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v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). However, “it is only when

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execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury

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that

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(alteration removed) (citation omitted). “[A] municipality cannot

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be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, that

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is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Anderson v. Warner,

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451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

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the

municipality

as

an

entity

is

responsible.”

Id.

omitted).

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Therefore,
he

possessed

“[Plaintiff]

deprived; (2) that the [County] had a policy; (3) that the policy

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amounts

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constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force

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behind

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(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

constitutional

indifference

violation.”

of

to

Id.

which

he

(1)

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deliberate

right

allege]

that

the

constitutional

[plausibly

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to

a

must

was

[Plaintiff’s]

(emphasis

added)

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Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint: “The Defendants to

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this claim at all times relevant hereto were acting pursuant to

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municipal/county custom, policy, decision, ordinance, regulation,

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widespread habit, usage, or practice in their actions pertaining

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to [Plaintiff].” (Compl. ¶ 27.)

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Plaintiff’s allegations “simply recite the elements of

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a [Monell] cause of action, . . . [and do not] contain sufficient

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allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable

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the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Hernandez, 666

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F.3d at 637.

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///
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IV.

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Since

Plaintiff

CONCLUSION

has

not

alleged

a

plausible

claim

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against the County, the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

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Complaint against it is granted. Plaintiff is granted fourteen

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(14) days from the date on which this order is filed to file a

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First Amended Complaint addressing the referenced deficiencies.

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Plaintiff is notified that this action may be dismissed with

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prejudice

under

Federal

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Plaintiff

fails

to

file

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Dated:

of

an

Civil

amended

prescribed time period.

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Rule

January 6, 2016

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5

Procedure

complaint

41(b)
within

if
the