Fairfield Quail Terrace, LLC v. Easterling

Filing 4

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 9/1/2015 ORDERING that this case is REMANDED to Solano County Superior Court. Defendant's 2 IFP motion is DENIED as MOOT. CASE CLOSED. (Zignago, K.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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FAIRFIELD QUAIL TERRACE, LLC,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:15-cv-01813-KJM-DAD

v.

ORDER

PATRICIA EASTERLING, et al.,

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Defendants.

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On August 27, 2015, defendant, proceeding pro se, removed this unlawful detainer

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action from Solano County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) On the same day, defendant moved to

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proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) As explained below, the court REMANDS the case to

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the Solano County Superior Court and DENIES defendant’s motion as MOOT.
When a case “of which the district courts of the United States have original

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jurisdiction” is initially brought in state court, a defendant may remove it to federal court.

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28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal

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question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1332. A federal district court may remand a case sua sponte where a defendant has not

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established federal jurisdiction. See Enrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.

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1988) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921)). “If at any time

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before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case

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shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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Here, the court finds the case should be remanded to the Solano County Superior

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Court. The form complaint filed in the State Court is for unlawful detainer only. (ECF No. 1.)

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Defendant grounds the removal on the court’s federal question jurisdiction, arguing that “[f]ederal

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question exists because [the] Answer, a pleading depend [sic] on the determination of [her] rights

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and [p]laintiff’s duties under federal law.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) However, plaintiff is the master of

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the complaint and may “avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading solely state-law claims.” Valles v.

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Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005). Hence, defendant’s assertion is best

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characterized as a defense or a potential counterclaim; neither of which can be considered in

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evaluating whether federal question jurisdiction exists. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 50

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(2009) (federal question jurisdiction cannot “rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim”);

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Valles, 410 F.3d at 1075 (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer jurisdiction

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on a federal court, even if the defense is that of federal preemption and is anticipated in the

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plaintiff’s complaint.”); Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,145 F.3d 320, 326–27

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(5th Cir. 1998); Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins Co., 765 F.2d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 1985).

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Accordingly, because plaintiff’s unlawful detainer complaint does not provide a

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basis for federal question jurisdiction, and defendant’s potential defenses or counterclaims cannot

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provide the basis for removal jurisdiction here, this court cannot exercise subject matter

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jurisdiction over plaintiff’s single state-law claim for unlawful detainer. This case is

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REMANDED to Solano County Superior Court. Defendant’s IFP motion is DENIED as MOOT.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 1, 2015.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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