Womack v. Perry

Filing 24

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes on 09/27/17 DISMISSING plaintiffs second amended complaint. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third amended complaint. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the courts form for filing a civil rights action.(Plummer, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RODNEY JEROME WOMACK,

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No. 2:15-cv-1858 JAM DB

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

WARDEN PERRY,
Defendant.

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Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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On November 10, 2015, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint and granted him thirty

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days leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) On December 4, 2015, plaintiff filed an

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amended complaint. (ECF No. 13.) However, on January 11, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to

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amend his complaint to name an additional defendant to this action. (ECF No. 14.) Then, on

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January 20, 2016, plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint to include a request for monetary

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damages as part of his prayer for relief. (ECF No. 15.) The court thereafter dismissed the

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amended complaint and granted plaintiff thirty days leave to file a second amended complaint

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that is complete in and of itself without reference to any prior pleading. (ECF No. 16.)

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After being granted several extensions of time (ECF Nos. 17; 18; 20; 21), plaintiff
submitted a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 22.)
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PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

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In his second amended complaint, plaintiff identifies the following defendants: J.

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Mclachlan, the prison chaplain; R. St. Andra, the Assistant Warden; S. Beck, the warden; and

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Beck, a commanding correctional officer. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant

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Mclachlan has been denying inmates in C-Yard Muslim services on a bi-weekly basis because of

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a disagreement he has with an inmate in C-Yard. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary

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damages.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims

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that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

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Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

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Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more

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than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

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allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550
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U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

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allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

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738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

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doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

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their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

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holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

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Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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DISCUSSION
I.

Defendants Beck, Perry, and St. Andra

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The original complaint in this action only identified defendant Perry. (ECF No. 1.)

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During the initial screening, the court warned that any amended complaint “must allege in

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specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.”

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(ECF No. 9 at 4.) In the second amended complaint, plaintiff’s only allegations concerning
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defendants Beck, Perry, and St. Andra are that they each held a supervisory role and were

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purportedly on notice of defendant Mclachlan’s failure to hold Muslim services in C-Yard. (ECF

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No. 22 at 5-6.) These conclusory allegations of involvement in discrimination are insufficient to

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state a potentially cognizable claim.

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There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

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connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362; May

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v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Vague and conclusory

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allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at

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268. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

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notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and

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succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff

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must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

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support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), his second amended complaint must be dismissed concerning

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defendants Beck, Perry, and St. Andra.

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As noted above, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

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actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

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defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

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constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle, 607 F.2d at 862. Vague and

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conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

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are not sufficient. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Because plaintiff’s only allegations concerning

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defendants Beck, Perry, and St. Andra are that they each held a supervisory role and were

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purportedly on notice of the failure to hold Muslim services in C-Yard (ECF No. 22 at 5-6), this

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is insufficient to state a potentially cognizable claim.

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Accordingly, the court dismisses all claims against defendants Beck, Perry, and St. Andra

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for failure to state a potentially cognizable claim.

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II.

Defendant Mclachlan
Plaintiff alleges two claims against defendant Mclachlan: (1) “Religious retaliation” for

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cancelling Muslin services in C-Yard because of a disagreement with an inmate in that yard; and

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(2) “Religious discrimination” against Muslims in the C-Yard for cancelling Muslim services in

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C-Yard because of a disagreement with an inmate in that yard. (ECF No. 22 at 4-5.)

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Both of these claims, as phrased, are not cognizable claims under section 1983. As the

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court previously noted in dismissing the original complaint, plaintiff needs to clarify what

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constitutional or federal statutory right he believes defendants violated. (ECF No. 9 at 4.) Insofar

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as plaintiff wishes to proceed on a claim under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, he is

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advised that “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their

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conviction and confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). However, a

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prisoner’s First Amendment rights are “necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may

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be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.”

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McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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In particular, a prisoner’s constitutional right to free exercise of religion must be balanced

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against the state’s right to limit First Amendment freedoms in order to attain valid penological

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objectives such as rehabilitation of prisoners, deterrence of crime, and preservation of

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institutional security. See O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417

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U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). These competing interests are balanced by applying a “reasonableness

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test.” McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197. “Regulations that impinge on an inmate’s constitutional rights

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will be upheld if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Henderson v.

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Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).

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Insofar as plaintiff wishes to proceed on a claim under the Religious Land Use and

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Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), he is advised that the government is prohibited from

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imposing “a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

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institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. §

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2000cc-1(a). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that an institution’s actions

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have placed a substantial burden on plaintiff’s free exercise of religion. To state a cognizable
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claim under RLUIPA, plaintiff must specify how the defendant denied him access to religious

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services. In this regard, plaintiff must link any RLUIPA claim to the defendant’s specific

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conduct.

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Plaintiff is cautioned that monetary damages are not available under RLUIPA against state

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officials sued in their individual capacities. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir.

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2015) (“RLUIPA does not authorize suits for damages against state officials in their individual

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capacities because individual state officials are not recipients of federal funding and nothing in

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the statute suggests any congressional intent to hold them individually liable.”). RLUIPA only

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authorizes suits against a person in his or her official or governmental capacity. See Wood v.

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Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1139 n.4 (9th

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Cir. 2015) (defendants have Eleventh Amendment immunity from official capacity damages

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claims under RLUIPA); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 599 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(same).
Plaintiff’s statement of claim does not sufficiently notify defendant Mclachlan or the court

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as to the basis on which plaintiff’s claim is proceeding. Accordingly, the court dismisses the

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claim with leave to amend.

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III.

Leave to Amend

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Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

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notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and

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succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff

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must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

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support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), his second amended complaint must be dismissed. The court

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will, however, grant plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint.

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If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must allege facts demonstrating how

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the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal constitutional or statutory

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rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The amended complaint must allege in

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specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.
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There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

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connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362;

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May, 633 F.2d at 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Vague and conclusory

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allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at

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268. Furthermore, plaintiff must specify the legal grounds on which he is pursuing his claim,

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making sure that it is cognizable.

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Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make

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plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th

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Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a third amended complaint, the original pleading and the second

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amended complaint no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in any amended

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complaint plaintiff elects to file, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of

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each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 22) is dismissed;

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2.

Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third

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amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket

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number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Third Amended Complaint”; failure to file an

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amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

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be dismissed without prejudice; and

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3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil

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rights action.

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Dated: September 27, 2017

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