Prado v. Swarthout et al

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 4/10/19 ORDERING that 45 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS are adopted in part and rejected in part. 36 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. (Kaminski, H)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 ALEJANDRO PRADO, 2:15-cv-01866 WBS DB Plaintiff, 13 14 No. v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 15 GARY SWARTHOUT, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 ----oo0oo---- 18 19 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed 20 this action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 21 Americans with Disabilities Act. 22 (“FAC”) (Docket No. 12.)) 23 States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 24 Local Rule 302. (First Amended Complaint The matter was referred to a United 25 Defendants moved for summary judgment (Docket No. 36), 26 and on February 5, 2019, the magistrate judge filed findings and 27 recommendations regarding that motion (“Findings and 28 Recommendations”)(Docket No. 45). 1 In them, the magistrate judge 1 recommended granting defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with 2 respect to plaintiff’s constitutional claims and denying it with 3 respect to plaintiff’s ADA claim. 4 recommendations were served on all parties and contained notice 5 to all parties that any objections to the findings and 6 recommendations were to be filed within twenty-one days. 7 These findings and Defendants and plaintiff separately filed objections to 8 the findings and recommendations (Docket Nos. 50, 51).1 In 9 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this 10 court has conducted a de novo review of defendants’ Motion for 11 Summary Judgment. 12 I. 13 Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff’s allegations arise out of his experiences as 14 an inmate in the custody of the California Department of 15 Corrections. 16 First Amended Complaint, plaintiff was housed in the 17 Administrative-Segregation unit (“Ad-Seg”) of the California 18 State Prison Solanao (“CSP-SOL”). 19 Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) ¶ 1 (Docket No. 36-3); Plaintiff’s 20 Affidavit and Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PSUF”) ¶ 1 (Docket 21 No. 43 at 15-18).) 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 At all times relevant to the allegations of the (Defs.’ Statement of The outside edge of the shower in the CSP-SOL’s Ad-Seg Plaintiff also filed a “Reply to the Defendant’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations; Motion to Appoint An Expert Witness.” (Docket No. 52.) Courts “generally” utilize an expert witness when “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue.” Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358–59 (7th Cir. 1997). The evidence at issue in this case is not so complex that the appointment of an expert is necessary to assist the trier-of-fact. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint an Expert Witness (Docket No. 52) is denied. 1 2 1 unit was bordered by a tile lip which plaintiff claims is 2 “several inches” high and defendants describe as “eleven inches 3 high on the outside of the shower stall, and six inches high on 4 the inside of the shower”. 5 September 3, 2013, plaintiff fell while exiting the Ad-Seg unit’s 6 shower. 7 filed a grievance about the fall; in it, he requested that the 8 showers be made ADA compliant or that he be transferred to 9 another institution. (PSUF ¶¶ 9-10; DSUF ¶ 39.) (DSUF ¶ 37; PSUF ¶ 8.) On On September 5, 2013, plaintiff (DSUF ¶ 42; PSUF ¶ 11.) In response to the 10 grievance, plaintiff was interviewed by Correctional Lt. 11 Blackwell. 12 subsequently determined that plaintiff’s accommodation chrono2 13 did not indicate he required the use of an ADA compliant shower. 14 (DSUF ¶ 44.) 15 (DSUF ¶ 43.) The prison’s associate warden Matteson On October 10, 2013, plaintiff again fell while in the 16 shower. (DSUF ¶ 46; PSUF ¶ 12.) On October 18, 2013, 17 plaintiff’s accommodation chrono was updated; plaintiff was 18 classified as “DPO,”3 indicating that he intermittently used a 19 wheelchair and required relatively low terrain with no 20 obstructions in the path of travel. 21 same day, October 18, 2013, Chief Deputy Warden Arnold signed a 22 second-level response to plaintiff’s grievance. (DSUF ¶¶ 47, 49.) On that (Id. ¶ 48.) The 23 A “chrono” is a form used by physicians treating inmates in the custody of the California Department of Corrections to document any accommodations an inmate requires because of a medical condition. 2 24 25 26 27 28 “DPO” is a code used by California’s Department of Corrections to classify an inmate’s disability. Inmates who are “DPO” are eligible for a disability placement through the Department of Corrections’ Disability Placement Program. 3 3 1 response indicated that because of plaintiff’s new 2 classification, he met the criteria for transfer to another 3 institution that could better accommodate his mobility 4 impairments. 5 2018, defendant provided plaintiff access a shower chair and 6 walker. 9 No later than October 25, (DSUF ¶¶ 51-52.) 7 8 (DSUF ¶ 49; PSUF ¶ 13.)4 On April 30, 2014, plaintiff was transferred to the California Medical Facility at Vacaville (“CMF”). B. 10 (DSUF ¶ 54.) Disputed Facts Plaintiff claims that he fell “several more times after 11 10/10/13, up through the time he transferred to [California 12 Medical Facility] on 04/30/14” (PSUF ¶ 16.) 13 claim with an incident report and medical records related to a 14 fall on April 29, 2014. 15 Defendants state that there is no evidence plaintiff fell after 16 receiving access to the shower chair and walker. 17 J. at 9.)5 He supports this (FAC, Exhibit C at 26/44, 30-33/44.) (Mot. for Summ. 18 Defendant states that once provided with the shower 19 chair and walker, plaintiff could “sit on the chair, lift his 20 legs over the tile ledge, and swing his legs and feet into the 21 shower” and “use [the] walker as a stabilizing device to help him 22 get into the shower.” (DSUF ¶¶ 51-52.) Though plaintiff did not 23 Arnold’s response indicated that pending plaintiff’s transfer, plaintiff would be housed in the prison’s Correctional Treatment Center--which had accessible showers. (DSUF ¶ 49; PSUF ¶ 14.) Despite this, plaintiff remained in the Ad-Seg unit throughout his time at CSP-SOL; he could not be placed in the CTC because of concerns about his vulnerability to violence. (DSUF ¶ 50.) 5 For purposes of adjudicating this motion, the court assumes plaintiff’s assertion that he fell on April 29 2014 is true. 4 4 24 25 26 27 28 1 directly dispute this claim in his opposition to defendants’ 2 Motion for Summary Judgment, his Motion to Appoint an Expert 3 Witness implicitly disputes these claims by alleging that they 4 are “based upon sheer speculation.” 5 Witness at 2.) 6 support for this allegation. 7 II. Plaintiff does not point to any evidentiary Legal Standard 8 9 (Mot. to Appoint an Expert Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 10 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 11 P. 56(a). 12 of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 13 reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 14 favor. 15 (1986). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 16 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 17 burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 18 fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 19 negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 20 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 21 Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving 22 party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element 23 upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 24 inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be 25 viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 26 motion. 27 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 28 III. Discussion Id. Any Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 5 1 A. 2 Plaintiff’s Claims Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court 3 finds the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations are 4 supported by the record and proper analysis with respect to the 5 following issues: (1) plaintiff’s Eight Amendment claims; and (2) 6 plaintiff’s equal protection claim. 7 reasons, the court does not adopt the magistrate judge’s 8 recommendation with respect to the remaining claim. 9 B. However, for the following ADA Claim 10 1. 11 Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified 12 individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, 13 be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 14 the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 15 subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 16 12132. 17 show “(1) he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) 18 he was either excluded from participation in or denied the 19 benefits of a public entity’s services . . . or was otherwise 20 discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such 21 exclusion, denial . . . or discrimination was by reason of his 22 disability.” 23 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Weinreich v. L.A. Cty. Metro. Transp. 24 Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)). 25 Applicable Law 42 U.S.C. § To prevail on a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 The implementing regulations of Title II provide that 26 “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in 27 policies, practice, or procedures when the modifications are 28 necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, 6 1 unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the 2 modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 3 service, program, or activity.” 4 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Determining whether a modification or accommodation is 5 reasonable is a fact-specific, context-specific inquiry. Zukle 6 v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999). 7 A public entity “does not ‘act’ by proffering just any 8 accommodation: it must consider the particular individual’s need 9 when conducting its investigation into what accommodations are 10 reasonable.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 11 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001). 12 In evaluating ADA claims brought by inmates, the court may 13 “consider, with deference to the expert views of the facility 14 administrators, a detention or correctional facility’s legitimate 15 interests . . . when determining whether a given accommodation is 16 reasonable.” 17 (9th Cir. 2008). Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1217 18 2. Analysis 19 The CDCR is a public entity and the showers it provides 20 inmates are a “program or service” within the meaning of the ADA. 21 See Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 22 2012). 23 2013 adjustment to his chrono, plaintiff was a “qualified 24 individual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA. 25 (See Defs.’ Objs. to Findings and Recommendations (“Objections”) 26 at 7 (Docket No. 50).) 27 the October 18, 2013, adjustment to plaintiff’s chrono indicating 28 that he required relatively low terrain with no obstructions in Moreover, it is undisputed that following the October 18, Finally, it is undisputed that following 7 1 the path of travel, the Ad-Seg unit showers--which are bounded on 2 at least one side by a raised tile lip that is several inches 3 high (PSUF ¶¶ 9-10; DSUF ¶ 39)--were not accessible to plaintiff 4 without some form of accommodation. 5 At issue, then, is whether plaintiff was provided with 6 reasonable modifications that allowed him access to a shower 7 during the period between October 18, 2013, and April 30, 2014. 8 The magistrate judge provided two bases for her 9 recommendation that defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be 10 denied with respect to plaintiff’s ADA claim: first, that the 11 record lacked facts showing that defendants conducted a “fact- 12 specific inquiry to determine how to best accommodate plaintiff” 13 (Findings and Recommendations at 18,) and second, that based on 14 the delay in transferring plaintiff to a facility with accessible 15 showers, “a rational trier of fact could infer that the 16 institution was deliberately indifferent” to plaintiff’s lack of 17 access to accessible showers. 18 (Id.) The magistrate judge is correct that once public 19 entities, correctional facilities among them, receive a request 20 for accommodation, they are “required to undertake a fact- 21 specific investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable 22 accommodation.” 23 Merely proffering an accommodation is not enough; the public 24 entity “must consider the particular individual’s need when 25 conducting its investigation into what accommodations are 26 reasonable.” 27 entity’s “fact-specific inquiry,” or lack thereof, courts have 28 looked to whether a given inquiry was sufficiently fact-specific See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139 (9th Cir. 2001). (Id.) In evaluating the adequacy of a public 8 1 to facilitate the identification of a reasonable accommodation. 2 See Mooring v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 2:14-CV-01471 MCE 3 KJN, 2015 WL 6163449, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2015) (holding 4 that a defendant’s “failure to even mention” a fact-specific 5 inquiry into plaintiff’s disability rendered summary judgment for 6 defendant on plaintiff’s ADA claims inappropriate in case where 7 amputee plaintiff was provided with shower chair but was 8 nonetheless forced to hop on one leg from wheelchair to shower); 9 Sengupta v. City of Monrovia, No. CV0900795ABCSJHX, 2010 WL 10 11515299, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2010)(denying summary 11 judgment when officers ignored deaf arrestee’s requests for a 12 sign language interpreter and made no effort to ascertain what 13 accommodations he required). 14 In the instant case, however, the court finds that 15 defendants did engage in a fact-specific inquiry reflecting a 16 contextualized consideration of plaintiff’s mobility limitations 17 and the potential of a shower chair and/or walker to mitigate 18 their effects. 19 observed that “[i]n an effort to assist inmate Prado to traverse 20 [the ledge bordering the Ad-Seg unit shower] he has been provided 21 with the use of a shower chair to sit in and lift his legs over 22 the ledge and/or a walker which he can use as a stabilizing 23 device to assist him in stepping over the ledge. 24 apparatuses are available for his use whenever he showers, and 25 the decision on which apparatus [sic] has been left to inmate 26 Prado as to which is the easiest and most comfortable for him on 27 any given day.” 28 evidences defendants’ attention to plaintiff’s particular Writing on October 25, 2013, Captain Wamble (Docket No. 36-3 at 91/153). 9 Both Wamble’s report 1 limitations and capacities. 2 The accommodation provided to plaintiff was apparently 3 sufficient to accommodate plaintiff’s disability. The record 4 indicates, and plaintiff has not disputed, that plaintiff took 5 routine showers between October 18, 2013 and April 29, 2014. 6 (Docket No. 36-3 at 133/153-152/153). 7 April 29th fall, plaintiff was transferred to CMF. 8 there is no evidence that the shower chair and walker were so 9 poorly suited to plaintiff’s needs that using them to access the The day after his alleged Moreover, 10 shower caused him severe pain or exacerbated his medical 11 problems. 12 Kan. 1999) (denying summary judgment to jailers on ADA claim 13 brought by double amputee who was not timely provided with a 14 shower chair and was therefore only able to access the shower by 15 crawling and sitting on the floor or by standing--with great 16 pain--on his residual legs).6 17 Cf. Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1033 (D. If plaintiff had not been provided with reasonable 18 accommodations before his transfer to CMF, a reasonable inference 19 of deliberate indifference might be drawn, as suggested by the 20 magistrate judge, from the delay in transferring him. 21 because the court concludes that plaintiff was afforded a timely 22 fact-specific inquiry and reasonably accommodated with the shower 23 chair, no such inference may be drawn from the delay in 24 transferring him. However, 25 26 27 28 Even if it is true that plaintiff fell more than once between the time he was provided with the chair and the time he was transferred, it would not alter the conclusion that defendants conducted an appropriate inquiry or that the accommodation of the chair was reasonable. 10 6 1 Accordingly, because plaintiff has not provided 2 evidence to support an essential element upon which he will bear 3 the burden of proof at trial, namely, that he was “excluded from 4 participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s 5 services” as a result of his disability, defendants’ motion for 6 summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim must be granted. 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 8 1. 9 are adopted in part and rejected in part as set forth herein. 10 11 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 36) is GRANTED. 12 13 The findings and recommendations (Docket No. 45), 3. Dated: The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 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