Tran v. Wrye et al

Filing 7

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 04/14/17 ordering plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BINH TRAN,

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No. 2:15-cv-2200-CMK
Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER

M.D. SCOTT W. WRYE, et al.
Defendant.
/
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

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that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
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1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

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with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

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claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
In his complaint plaintiff alleges that he suffered a broken jaw from an assault by

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a cellmate. He was transported and treated at Renown Regional Medical Center where defendant

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Wrye performed surgery to repair the damage. At a follow up visit with Dr. Wrye, plaintiff

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informed Dr. Wrye that he was hearing bone popping and his teeth were not aligned. Dr. Wrye

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removed the wire anyway. At a second follow up visit, plaintiff informed Dr. Wrye that he was

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experiencing pain. A month later, he saw a dentist at the prison for the pain, who recommended

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him to an oral surgeon. The oral surgeon, Dr. Landis, recommended a second surgery, which

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was successfully performed a few months later. He is requesting a transfer to a facility where he

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will receive adequate medical treatment, proper medication for his pain, examination by another

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specialist, physical therapy, monetary damages for his pain and suffering, and protection from

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cruel and unusual punishment.

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II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a few deficiencies. It appears plaintiff is

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attempting to set forth an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on

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medical treatment. However, his allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

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when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

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such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

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105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

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health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

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injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

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1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.

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See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

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demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Here, plaintiff names his first surgeon, Dr. Wrye, as a defendant. However, he

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fails to explain how Dr. Wrye violated his Eighth Amendment rights. It does not appear that Dr.

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Wrye failed to provide plaintiff treatment as plaintiff alleges he performed surgery. Nor is there

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any allegation that Dr. Wrye somehow acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical

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needs. If plaintiff’s claim is that the surgery was unsuccessful, at best that would lead to a

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negligence or medical malpractice action, not an Eighth Amendment violation.

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In addition, plaintiff names both the current and former warden of the facility, as

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well as the chief medical officer. However, there are no factual allegations related to any of these

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other named defendants.

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

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connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations.

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See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

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conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

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are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

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plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

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constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

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As plaintiff makes no allegations as to these three other defendants, the complaint

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is insufficient to state a claim against them. To the extent plaintiff has named these other

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defendants due to their supervisorial position, that is also insufficient.

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Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

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employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

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respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

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violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The

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Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on

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knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government

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officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct

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and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

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Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation

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of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be

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liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.

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Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

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When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

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defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

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Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

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1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel

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in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
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official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

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action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

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informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

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Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

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amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

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complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

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plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

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plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

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with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

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Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

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DATED: April 14, 2017
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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