Washington v. California Department of Corrections

Filing 10

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 9/22/16 ORDERING that plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Dillon, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WILLIAM NATHANIEL WASHINGTON,

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No. 2:15-cv-2302-MCE-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,

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Defendant.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

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that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
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1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

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with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

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claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
In plaintiff’s complaint, he claims his Eighth Amendment right to receive

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adequate medical care is being violated due to the deliberate indifference of the defendants. He

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alleges x-rays have confirmed he has a fractured bone. He names as defendants the California

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Department of Corrections (CDCR), Solano State Prison (CSP-Solano), E. Arnold as Warden of

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CSP-Solano, and Chief Medical Examiner M. Kuersten. Specifically, plaintiff alleges CDCR is

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the employer of the defendants violating his rights. He fails to specify how CSP-Solano is

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violating is rights, other than stating the prison is responsible for employing the doctors.

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Similarly, he alleges Warden Arnold is the overseer of the prison. Finally, he alleges Dr.

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Kuersten is denying him adequate medical care regardless of the recommendations from two

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physicians. Plaintiff states that an x-ray confirms a fracture, but medical personnel are refusing

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treatment. More specifically, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Kuersten stated in his denial that plaintiff

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was required to see a physical therapist instead of treating the bone fracture. He claims the delay

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in treatment is causing him pain and possibly more extensive treatment.

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II. DISCUSSION

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A. General Provisions

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As to plaintiff’s complaint in general, § 1983 imposes liability upon any person

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who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a federally protected right. 42 U.S.C. §

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1983 (1982). “To make out a cause of action under section 1983, plaintiffs must plead that (1)
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the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the

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Constitution or federal statutes.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.1986).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link

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between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t

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of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person

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‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he

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does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

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which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

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Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth

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specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional

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deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

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employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

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respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

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violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The

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Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on

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knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government

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officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct

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and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

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Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation

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of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be

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liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.

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Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

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When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

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defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

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Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

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1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel

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in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

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official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948.

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The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought

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against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.

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Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition

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extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t

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of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

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Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state

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agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

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(1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993) (en banc).

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In this case, plaintiff names CDC, CSP-Solano, and Warden Arnold. As set forth

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above, § 1983 imposes liability only upon a person. Neither a state nor state agencies and

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subdivisions are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State

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Police, 497, U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989); Hale v. State of Ariz., 993 F.2d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1993).

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In addition, the Eleventh Amendment protects the state agencies. Accordingly, this action cannot

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be maintained against either the CDC or CSP-Solano.

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Similarly, the claims set forth in plaintiff’s complaint fail to state a claim against

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Warden Arnold. The only allegations against Warden Arnold are based on his position as a

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supervisor of the prison as a whole. There are no allegations that Warden Arnold is directly

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involved in plaintiff’s treatment or denial of treatment. Rather, plaintiff attempts to state a claim

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against Warden Arnold for his role as overseer of the prison, which is insufficient to state a
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claim.

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B. Eighth Amendment

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

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when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

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such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at

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105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental

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health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.

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See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

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demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Kuersten is not clear. Plaintiff

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claims Dr. Kuersten stated in his denial that he must complete physical therapy. Plaintiff does

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not agree with that decision. It is unclear to the court whether Dr. Kuersten has actually denied

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plaintiff treatment, or whether he reviewed another doctor’s decision as to the proper treatment

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through the inmate grievance process. In addition, it is unclear whether whether the treatment

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plaintiff is requesting is necessary or simply a difference in opinion between him and Dr.

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Kuersten.

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If Dr. Kuersten is simply reviewing another doctor’s decision through the inmate

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grievance system, plaintiff would not be able to state a claim against the reviewing doctor. See

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Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th
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Cir. 2003) . Similarly, if it is simply a difference of opinion between plaintiff and the doctor, that

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would not be sufficient to state a claim. While it may be possible for plaintiff to state an Eighth

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Amendment claim against Dr. Kuersten, his complaint as written fails to make sufficient

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connections between necessary medical treatment and the actions of Dr. Kuersten. While Rule 8

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contemplates brevity, it also requires that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly.

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As the defects in this claim are also curable, plaintiff will be granted leave to amend this claim.

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However, he is reminded that he must allege sufficient facts to state a claim, and specify who is

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violating his Eighth Amendment rights and how.
III. CONCLUSION

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Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

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cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the

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entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original

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complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following

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dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged

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in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order

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to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint

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must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by

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amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now

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has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the

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claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and

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the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which

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continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and

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recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders

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and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims.

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Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

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with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

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Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

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service of this order.

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DATED: September 22, 2016
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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