Stoops v. Shelton

Filing 8

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 2/24/2016 DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend; plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days.(Yin, K)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RANDY STOOPS,

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No. 2:15-CV-2439-WBS-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

JAMES SHELTON,
Defendant.
/
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,
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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

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if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

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which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

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allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

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the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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Plaintiff names James Shelton, a correctional officer, as the only defendant to this
action. Plaintiff claims that defendant “failed to provide me protection. . .” and that defendant
violated his “civil rights to personal protection and safety. . . .”

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

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when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so

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serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities;

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and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the

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purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth

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Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps

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to protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th

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Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met:

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(1) objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of

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serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer,

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511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge

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element. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not

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liable, however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer,

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511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison

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officials know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more

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than a mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison

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officials actually knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to

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respond to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

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Here, plaintiff does not allege any facts showing a safety risk, let alone a

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substantial safety risk. Specifically, plaintiff does not state what conditions posed a risk to his

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safety or necessitated protection. Additionally, plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that

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defendant knew of a safety risk. Plaintiff’s bare allegation that defendant failed to act – without

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more – does not state a claim.

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Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

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action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

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informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

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Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

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amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

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complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
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plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

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plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

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with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

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2.

Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

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service of this order.

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DATED: February 24, 2016
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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