Blight v. Manteca et al

Filing 152

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 11/27/2017 DENYING 146 Defendants' Bill of Costs. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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----oo0oo----

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JOANNE BLIGHT,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: BILL OF
COSTS

CITY OF MANTECA, et al.,

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CIV. NO. 2:15-02513 WBS AC

Defendants.

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Plaintiff alleged defendants unreasonably searched her

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home and seized her in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth

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Amendment rights. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).)1

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On October 19, 2017,

In the initial Complaint, plaintiff alleged the
following causes of action against all individually named
defendants: (1) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(2) violation of federal and state constitutional and statutory
rights under California Civil Code § 52.1; (3) false arrest; (4)
false imprisonment; (5) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (6) negligence; and (7) invasion of privacy. (Compl. at
1.) Against the City of Manteca, plaintiff alleged a failure to
supervise and adequately train officers and detectives under 42
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the court granted defendants’ City of Manteca, Armando Garcia,

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Ian Osborn, Paul Carmona, and Chris S. Mraz (collectively

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“defendants”) Motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s federal

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claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and declined to exercise

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jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.

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Re: M. for Summ. J. (Docket No. 144).)

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was entered, defendants submitted a Bill of Costs totaling

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$6,800.05 for the costs of 14 deposition transcripts.

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No. 146).

(Mem. and Order

After summary judgment

(Docket

After defendants submitted a Bill of Costs, defendants

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filed a Notice of Appeal.2

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to awarding any costs for the depositions arguing that defendants

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have not yet been conferred “prevailing party status”, and even

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if they have, the court should exercise its discretion to

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disallow costs.

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(Docket No. 149.)

Plaintiff objects

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 (Docket No. 147).)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule

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292 govern the taxation of costs to losing parties, which are

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generally subject to limits set under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

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U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs); Fed. R. Civ. P.

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54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court

See 28

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U.S.C. § 1983.
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(Id.)

Even though a Notice of Appeal was filed, this court
may still decide whether or not defendants are entitled to their
costs under Rule 54(d)(1) See U.S. ex rel. McLean v. County of
Santa Clara, Civ. No. 05-01962 HRL, 2012 WL 4717793, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (“[A]wards of fees and costs are considered
collateral issues over which the district court normally retains
jurisdiction even after an appeal divests the court of
jurisdiction over the merits.” ) (citing Leslie v. Group ICA, 198
F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999)); Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins.
Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The district court
retained the power to award attorneys’ fees after the notice of
appeal from the decision on the merits had been filed.”).
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order provides otherwise, costs--other than attorney’s fees--

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should be allowed to the prevailing party.”); E.D. Cal. Local R.

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292(f); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437,

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441 (1987) (limiting taxable costs to those enumerated in §

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1920).

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I.

Prevailing Party

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To be a prevailing party, a party must “receive[] a

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judgment on the merits, or obtain[] a court-ordered consent

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decree.”

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t

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of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 606 (2001) (internal

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citations omitted).

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has been a material alteration of the legal relationship of the

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parties.”

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Cir. 2003) (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603)(internal

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quotations omitted).

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litigant need not prevail on every issue” in the case.

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v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 1997) (interpreting

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discretion of court to award attorney’s fees)(citation omitted).

“[T]here is a prevailing party where there

Miles v. State of California, 320 F.3d 986, 989 (9th

To be considered the prevailing party, “a
Hashimoto

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Defendants prevailed on the federal law claims, because

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the court granted summary judgment to defendants on the merits of

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those claims.

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1995) (stating defendants success defeating plaintiff’s federal

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constitutional claims on summary judgment was a judgment on the

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merits under Rule 54(d)).3

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were not a prevailing party on the state law claims, because the

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court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to

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See Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 356 (11th Cir.

The court notes that the defendants

Plaintiff does not dispute the defendants are prevailing
parties as to the federal claims.
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28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3).

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Early Develop., 541 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating “a

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defendant is not a prevailing party with regard to claims

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dismissed without prejudice”).

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change the court’s analysis.

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See Oscar v. Alaska Dep’t of Educ. and

However, this fact does not

While the federal and state law claims rely on the same

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set of facts, the court’s decision to decline to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims does not

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change the fact that defendants are the prevailing party in this

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action and are therefore entitled to their costs.

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Trona Ry. Co., Civ. No. 08-01766 VAPOPX, 2009 WL 10673182, at *2

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(C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (stating “Court’s use of its discretion

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not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

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remaining state-law claim does not affect Defendant’s status as

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the prevailing party.”)(citation omitted); Corridean v. Restore

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Fin. Servs. Network, LLC, Civ. No. 06-524-HU, 2007 WL 1989622, at

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*3 (D. Or. July 6, 2007) (“[A]lthough defendants are not

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prevailing parties on the [state] claims, and although the state

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and federal claims rest on identical facts . . . the dismissal of

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the state claims based on this Court’s declining to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction . . . does not change the fact that

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defendants are the prevailing party in this federal claim and

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thus, are entitled to an award of costs . . . .”) (citations

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omitted).

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II.

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See Stevens v.

Discretion to Award Costs
While Rule 54(d) creates “a presumption for awarding

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costs to prevailing parties,”

Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,

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335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted),
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Rule

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54(d)(1) “vests in the district court discretion to refuse to

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award costs.”

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California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing National

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Info. Servs., Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir.

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1995)).

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instructed that:

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Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of

In exercising that discretion, the Ninth Circuit has

Appropriate reasons for denying costs include (1) the
substantial public importance of the case, (2) the closeness
and difficulty of the issues in the case, (3) the chilling
effect on future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff’s
limited financial resources, and (5) the economic disparity
between the parties. This is not an exhaustive list of good
reasons for declining to award costs, but rather a starting
point for analysis.

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Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1247–48

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(9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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exercising its discretion, a district court must state the

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reasons for denying costs to the prevailing party.

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Subscription Television, Inc. v. S. Cal. Theatre Owners Ass’n,

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576 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1978).

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In

See

The Ninth Circuit has instructed that “[d]istrict

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courts should consider the financial resources of the plaintiff

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and the amount of costs in civil rights cases.”

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of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).

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plaintiffs do not have to be currently indigent, “the proper

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inquiry is whether an award of costs might make them so.”

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v. NIBCO, 701 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1143 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Wanger,

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J.) (citing Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1079-80).

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approved denying costs for the reason that the losing party has

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limited financial resources.

Stanley v. Univ.
While the

Rivera

The Ninth Circuit has

Ass'n of Mexican-Am. Educators, 231

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F.3d at 592.

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at Davis, Civ. No. 03-2591 FCD EFB, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171

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(E.D. Cal. July 15, 2008) (Damrell, J.) (denying costs to

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University where student plaintiffs demonstrated they had limited

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financial resources and could barely cover their monthly

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expenses); Nat’l Org. for Women v. Bank of Cal., Nat’l Ass’n, 680

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F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating district court did not

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abuse its discretion by denying the bank costs by considering the

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plaintiff’s limited budget); Knox v. City of Fresno, 208 F. Supp.

See Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal.

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3d 1114, 1117 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016) (Grosjean, J.) (denying

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costs and noting that while plaintiffs “did not proceed in forma

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pauperis and are not completely indigent, Plaintiffs have

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submitted declarations attesting to their limited financial

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resources.”).

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Here, plaintiff’s argument that she has limited

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financial means is both compelling and supported by evidence.

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See Tubbs v. Sacramento County Jail, 258 F.R.D. 657, 661 (E.D.

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Cal. Aug. 21, 2009) (Karlton, J.) (denying costs where

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plaintiff’s argument that he is indigent was compelling and

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supported by evidence.)

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woman who lives with her husband in a mobile home, and is unable

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to work due to a tumor behind her eye.

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husband supports the family with his retirement pension and his

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full-time driving job.

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in her declaration that it is difficult to stretch their finances

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on a monthly basis and itemizes her estimated monthly expenses.

Plaintiff is a seventy-seven year old

(Decl. at 13)

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 8.)

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Her

Plaintiff represents

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(Decl. of Joanne Blight 7-11).4

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about her finances, the court agrees that plaintiff’s limited

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financial resources weigh against awarded costs in this action.

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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has expressed concern

Given plaintiff’s representation

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that the “imposition of such high costs on losing civil rights

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plaintiffs of modest means may chill civil rights litigation in

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this area.”

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award costs against low-wage workers, finding that awarding costs

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would be a significant disincentive to bring meritful suits.

Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1080.

Courts have hesitated to

See

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Rivera, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (finding that for a low wage-

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worker the threat of a $3,600 cost bill was a significant

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disincentive to bring suit and risked a chilling effect); Escriba

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v. Foster Poultry Farms, No. 1:09-CV-1878, 2012 WL 174847, at *6

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(E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) (O’Neill, J.), aff'd sub nom. Escriba

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v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(finding the threat of a $13,958.16 cost bill, to a low-wage

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worker, was a strong disincentive to bring a meritful suit).

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Here, the court believes the imposition of costs against the

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plaintiff may have a chilling effect on others with limited

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financial means alleging unreasonable searches and seizures.

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Therefore, the court finds this factor weighs against awarding

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costs to defendants.

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The court may also consider the economic disparity
between the parties.

See Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1248.

The court

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Plaintiff further represents that she cannot afford to
replace her front door that was damaged by the police or the roof
on her mobile home, which needs to be replaced. (Decl. of Joanne
Blight ¶ ¶¶ 11, 12.)
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agrees that there is a stark economic disparity between the

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parties that weighs in favor of denying costs.

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Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting the

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comparison between plaintiff’s limited resources-–having no money

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in his prison account, no income, no assets, and owing

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restitution--with the resources of the State of California.);

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Mansourian,566 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (noting a significant economic

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disparity between student plaintiffs with limited resources to a

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University with a substantial budget); Knox, 208 F. Supp. 3d at

See Draper v.

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1117 (noting economic disparity between plaintiffs who submitted

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declarations attesting to their limited financial resources and

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the City of Fresno).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ Bill of Costs

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(Docket No. 146) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.5

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Dated:

November 27, 2017

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Because the court denies costs based on equity
considerations, the court does not discuss whether the
depositions taken were reasonably necessary.
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