Stoops v. Beasley et al.

Filing 24

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 2/22/2018 RECOMMENDING that 22 Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. Referred to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. Objections due within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations.(Fabillaran, J)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RANDY STOOPS,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:15-CV-2581-MCE-CMK-P

vs.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JOSEPH M. BEASLEY, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc.

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22) based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

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I. BACKGROUND

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A.

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Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff, who is deaf, claims that he was denied effective visitation with his

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family for an eight-month period during which the prison did not have telephones in the visiting

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area suitable for the deaf.

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B.

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The Parties’ Evidence
In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants assert that the

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following facts are undisputed:

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1.

On December 29, 2014, plaintiff submitted a “Reasonable
Accommodation Request,” CDCR 1824, log no. DVI-15-00032,
requesting contact visits with his family so he could read their lips and
hear them through an amplified telephone.

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On March 17, 2015, plaintiff submitted a second CDCR 1824 request, log
no. DVI-15-00718, appealing a February 18, 2015, prison decision
denying plaintiff’s request for “extended stay privileges.” The request was
denied and plaintiff was informed that he could appeal by filing an inmate
grievance, CDCR 602.

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On March 24, 2015, plaintiff submitted another CDCR 1824 request, log
no. DVI-15-00830, again requesting contact visits with his family, as well
as “extended stay privileges.” On the same day, plaintiff submitted a
fourth reasonable accommodation request, log no. DVI-15-00831, also
requesting contact visits and “extended stay privileges.” The requests
were denied as duplicative of plaintiff’s March 17, 2015, request which, at
the time, was still pending.

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On April 13, 2015, plaintiff submitted a fifth CDCR 1824 request, log no.
DVI-15-00987, requesting the same relief.

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On June 1, 2015, plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance, CDCR 602, log
no. DVI-15-01697. In his grievance, plaintiff alleged the denial of
effective communication with his family. The grievance was rejected.

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As of September 27, 2016, plaintiff had appealed six inmate grievances to
the third and final level of review, and none of them related to the issues
raised in plaintiff’s complaint.

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Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts is supported by the declarations of V. Brunetti, the

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Appeals Coordinator at DVI, and M. Voong, the Chief of the Office of Appeals for the CDCR.

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Other than his declaration in opposition to defendants’ motion (see Doc. 23),

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plaintiff has not presented any evidence.

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II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary

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adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

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the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The

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standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

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56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One

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of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.

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See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the

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moving party
. . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.
Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1).

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

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opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

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establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

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allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

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form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

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dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The

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opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

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affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

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242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

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(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
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could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

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1436 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more

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than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the

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record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,

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there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is

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sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the

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parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

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In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

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any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

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before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

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Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

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produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

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Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

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1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for

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the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury

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could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof

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is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

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III. DISCUSSION
Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative

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remedies prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory

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regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling

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Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of

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the complaint, compliance with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative remedies
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while the lawsuit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). The

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Supreme Court addressed the exhaustion requirement in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and

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held: (1) prisoners are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint

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because lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the

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defendants; (2) an individual named as a defendant does not necessarily need to be named in the

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grievance process for exhaustion to be considered adequate because the applicable procedural

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rules that a prisoner must follow are defined by the particular grievance process, not by the

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PLRA; and (3) the PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint if only some, but not

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all, claims are unexhausted.

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The Supreme Court also held in Woodford v. Ngo that, in order to exhaust

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administrative remedies, the prisoner must comply with all of the prison system’s procedural

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rules so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits. 548 U.S. 81, 89-96 (2006). Thus,

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exhaustion requires compliance with “deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id. at 90.

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Partial compliance is not enough. See id. Substantively, the prisoner must submit a grievance

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which affords prison officials a full and fair opportunity to address the prisoner’s claims. See id.

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at 90, 93. The Supreme Court noted that one of the results of proper exhaustion is to reduce the

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quantity of prisoner suits “because some prisoners are successful in the administrative process,

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and others are persuaded by the proceedings not to file an action in federal court.” Id. at 94.

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A prison inmate in California satisfies the administrative exhaustion requirement

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by following the procedures set forth in §§ 3084.1-3084.8 of Title 15 of the California Code of

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Regulations. In California, inmates “may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or

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omission by the department or its staff that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material

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adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a).

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The inmate must submit their appeal on the proper form, and is required to identify the staff

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member(s) involved as well as describing their involvement in the issue. See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

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15, § 3084.2(a). These regulations require the prisoner to proceed through three levels of appeal.
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See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(b), 3084.2, 3084.7. A decision at the third formal level,

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which is also referred to as the director’s level, is not appealable and concludes a prisoner’s

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departmental administrative remedy. See id. Departmental appeals coordinators may reject a

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prisoner’s administrative appeal for a number of reasons, including untimeliness, filing excessive

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appeals, use of improper language, failure to attach supporting documents, and failure to follow

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proper procedures. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.6(b). If an appeal is rejected, the inmate

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is to be provided clear instructions how to cure the defects therein. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

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§§ 3084.5(b), 3084.6(a). Group appeals are permitted on the proper form with each inmate

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clearly identified, and signed by each member of the group. See Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, §

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3084.2(h).
In certain circumstances, the regulations make it impossible for the inmate to

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pursue a grievance through the entire grievance process. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 939

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n. 11 (9th Cir. 2005). Where a claim contained in an inmate’s grievance is characterized by

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prison officials as a “staff complaint” and processed through a separate confidential process,

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prison officials lose any authority to act on the subject of the grievance. See id. at 937 (citing

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Booth, 532 U.S. at 736 n. 4). Thus, the claim is exhausted when it is characterized as a “staff

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complaint.” See id. at 940. If there are separate claims in the same grievance for which further

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administrative review could provide relief, prison regulations require that the prisoner be notified

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that such claims must be appealed separately. See id. at 939. The court may presume that the

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absence of such a notice indicates that the grievance did not present any claims which could be

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appealed separate from the confidential “staff complaint” process. See id.

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In this case, the court finds that defendants have met their initial burden of

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presenting facts showing plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies related to the

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claims raised in his complaint. Specifically, according to defendants’ evidence, plaintiff never

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completed the exhaustion process related to his claims by appealing through the third and final

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level of review. In his opposition, plaintiff fails to present any evidence which would create a
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genuine issue of material fact on the issue of exhaustion. In particular, plaintiff does not present

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any evidence tending to show that he did in fact file a third-level appeal relating to his instant

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claims, nor has plaintiff alleged that the grievance process was thwarted in any way.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 22) be granted.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.

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See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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DATED: February 22, 2018
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CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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