Caritas Acquisitions I v. Cox

Filing 4

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 1/6/2016. to Solano County Superior Court. Defendant's 2 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is GRANTED and Court hereby REMANDS this action back to Superior Court of California, County of Solano. A copy of Remand Order sent to Solano County Superior Court. (Marciel, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CARITAS ACQUISITIONS I, LLC dba
CASA GRANDED MOBILE HOME
PARK,

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Plaintiff,

No. 2:15-cv-2668 TLN KJN PS

ORDER REMANDING CASE

v.
CLIFFORD COX aka WESLEY C. COX

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Defendant.

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This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Clifford Cox’s (“Cox”) Notice of

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Removal. (ECF No. 1.) Cox is a defendant in a state court matter and erroneously identifies

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himself as the plaintiff for purposes of his removal. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

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hereby remands the action to the Superior Court of California, County of Solano, due to lack of

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subject-matter jurisdiction.

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I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On or about March 1, 2004, Cox and Plaintiff Casa Grande Mobile Home Park (“Park”)

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entered into a yearly lease agreement for the homesite known as space 74 Del Luz Court.

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(Compl., Ex. 1, ECF No. 1.) On August 12, 2015, Park filed a complaint in state court alleging

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unlawful detainer and past rents in an amount of $2765.20 and asserting a claim for attorney’s

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fees as well as utility fees totaling $1337.99. (ECF No. 1.) Park served Cox a three-day written
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notice to vacate the Property and deliver up possession of the Property, in accordance with Cal.

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Civ. Pro. Code § 1162. (ECF No. 1.) In response, Cox removed this matter to federal court on

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December 24, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) In addition, Cox moves for in forma pauperis status because

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he asserts that he is unable to pay the filing fees. (ECF No. 2.)

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II.

STANDARD OF LAW

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28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the

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district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is

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proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been

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filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

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Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the

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defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980

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F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time

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determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the

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improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer

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v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544

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U.S. 974 (2005).

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The “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

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complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

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presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386.

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Removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim raising a

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federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556

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U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009).

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III.

ANALYSIS

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Cox states in his removal that jurisdiction is proper under: 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) or (b); 28

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U.S.C. § 1367; and California Civil Code § 1954.31. Cox does not give any reasons as to why

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jurisdiction is proper under these statutes. After reviewing the briefing, the Court concludes that

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Cox cannot present a viable argument to support federal jurisdiction.

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Section 1441(a) allows for removal where a complaint presents a federal question, while
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section 1441(b) allows for removal where diversity jurisdiction is met under section 1332. Here,

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there is not a federal cause of action that would supply this court with original jurisdiction. See

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Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386 (“federal [question] jurisdiction exists only when a federal question

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is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint”). Park does not bring any

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claims within its complaint that involve a federal question. In fact, all of Park’s claims are based

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on California state contract law. Furthermore, Cox cannot satisfy the requirements for diversity

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jurisdiction under section 1332.
Section 1332 states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil

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actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest

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and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States.” Cox does not assert that the parties

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are citizens of different states or that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

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The burden of proving the amount in controversy depends on what the plaintiff has

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pleaded. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007). When

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the complaint alleges damages less than the jurisdictional requirement, the party seeking removal

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must prove the amount in controversy with legal certainty. Id.; Rynearson v. Motricity, Inc., 601

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F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2009). Cox fails to allege a reason to support the propriety

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of removal on this basis. The complaint alleges damages calculated at $18.18 per day for the time

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period that Defendants fail to vacate the premises, and asserts that the damages at this time are

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somewhere in the neighborhood of $4,103.19 plus attorney’s fees. Thus, Cox has failed to

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establish his burden of showing that jurisdiction before this Court is proper. Therefore, it is

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appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal jurisdiction. See United Investors

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Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the district court ha[s] a

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duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the

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parties raised the issue or not.”).

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby remands the action to the Superior Court of

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California, County of Solano. Additionally, the Court has reviewed Cox’s motion for in forma

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pauperis status (ECF No. 2) and finds that Cox meets the requisite standard. As such, Cox’s

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motion for in forma pauperis status is granted.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2016

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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