Deal v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 3/31/2017 DENYING 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 16 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. CASE CLOSED. (Michel, G.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

PATRICIA ANN DEAL,

12

Plaintiff,

13
14

No. 2:15-CV-2697-CMK

vs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

15
Defendant.
16
/
17
18

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under

19

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

20

Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding

21

judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending

22

before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 12) and defendant’s cross-

23

motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16).

24

///

25

///

26

///
1

1
2

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on November 8, 1995. In the

3

application, plaintiff claims that disability began on October 1, 1990. Following a hearing on

4

March 4, 1997, plaintiff was determined to be disabled since November 8, 1995. In April 2005,

5

plaintiff was determined to no longer be disabled and benefits were discontinued in May 2005.

6

Plaintiff again applied for benefits on February 19, 2010, alleging that disability

7

began on May 12, 2008. Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied. Following denial of

8

reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on December 30,

9

2011, and continued to allow plaintiff to obtain representation. Plaintiff appeared at a hearing on

10

March 19, 2012, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) K. Kwon and the record was held

11

open thereafter for new evidence. In a March 30, 2012, decision, the ALJ concluded that

12

plaintiff was able to engage in a full range of unskilled work at all exertional levels with

13

limitations in social functioning.

14

Plaintiff sought review and the Appeals Council remanded for further

15

proceedings. Another hearing was held before the same ALJ on December 10, 2013. In a March

16

13, 2014, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled based on the following

17

relevant findings:

18

1.

The claimant has the following severe impairment(s) since May 12, 2008:
an affective disorder and an anxiety disorder;

2.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations;

3.

The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: she can
perform the full range of work at all exertional levels with the following
non-exertional limitations: she can engage in simple, routine, unskilled
tasks with a specific vocational preparation (SVP) code of ‘2' with no
work with the public and no tandem team work with co-workers; and

4.

Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, residual
functional capacity, and vocational expert testimony, there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
2

1

After the Appeals Council declined review on November 3, 2015, this appeal followed.

2
3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

4

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is:

5

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

6

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

7

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

8

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

9

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

10

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

11

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

12

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

13

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

14

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

15

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

16

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987).

17

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

18

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

19

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

20

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

21

Cir. 1988).

22

///

23

///

24

///

25

///

26

///
3

1

III. DISCUSSION

2

In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ failed to

3

properly evaluate the opinions of Drs. Gottschalk, Mandelbaum, and Samuelson; and (2) the ALJ

4

failed to properly assess her credibility.

5
6

A.

Evaluation of Medical Opinions
The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

7

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

8

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

9

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

10

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

11

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

12

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

13

(9th Cir. 1990).

14

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

15

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

16

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an

17

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

18

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

19

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

20

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

21

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

22

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

23

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

24

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

25

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

26

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and
4

1

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

2

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

3

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

4

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

5

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

6

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

7

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751.

8

1.

9

As to Dr. Gottschalk, the ALJ stated:

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Dr. Gottschalk

A State agency psychological consultant [Dr. Gottschalk] determined in
June 2010 that an affective disorder and an anxiety-related disorder caused
moderate limitations in maintaining social functioning, concentration,
persistence, or pace (Exhibits B5F, B6F, and B7F). The consultant opined
that the claimant was able to do at least one to two-step tasks not requiring
significant, close, or coordinated interaction with others (Exhibit B6F at
3). In August 2010, another State agency psychological consultant
affirmed the initial determination (Exhibit B8F). The consultants’
assessment is well explained, supported by the record as a whole, and
consistent with the record as a whole. Their assessment is given
significant weight.
According to plaintiff:

18

. . .The ALJ did note the opinions of Dr. Gottschalk that Deal could
carry out one and two-step instructions. (Citation omitted). The ALJ did
not give a reason for rejecting that discrete opinion. . . .

19

Plaintiff misstates Dr. Gottschalk’s opinion. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the

20

doctor did not opine that plaintiff is limited to, at most, one and two-step instructions. A review

21

of the record establishes that Dr. Gottschalk opined, as the ALJ correctly noted, that plaintiff can

22

perform, at a minimum, one and two-step tasks. This is indicated by the doctor’s use of the

23

phrase “at least,” and is consistent with the doctor’s assessment that plaintiff is not significantly

24

limited in the ability to understand, remember, and carry out “very short and simple instructions.”

25

The ALJ adequately accounted for Dr. Gottschalk’s opinion in the finding that plaintiff is capable

26

of simple, routine, unskilled tasks.
5

1

2.

2

As to Dr. Mandelbaum, the ALJ stated:

3

Psychiatrist Daniel Mandelbaum, M.D., consultatively evaluated the
claimant in March 2010 (Exhibit B3F). The claimant informed Dr.
Mandelbaum that she quit her job in 2007 because she was being harassed
and abused, but would not elaborate about this when asked (further
citations Exhibit B3F omitted). She reported that she was currently not
taking any medications and had not for about a year, and she was not in
counseling. Dr. Mandelbaum diagnosed the claimant with major
depressive disorder, rule out bipolar disorder, panic disorder with
agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, rule out dissociative disorder,
and personality disorder with certain borderline features. He opined that
the claimant would have significant difficulties on the job in terms of
getting along with her employer or fellow employees and working under
pressure. He assessed moderate to marked impairment with the abilities
and aptitude necessary to do most jobs. Reduced weight is given to this
examining source’s assessment because it is inconsistent with and not
supported by the record as a whole. Here, again, we have a doctor relying
quite heavily, if not solely, on the subjective report of symptoms and
limitations provided by the claimant, and he seemed to accept uncritically
as true most, if not all, of what the claimant reported given the lack of
support and detail from the substantial medical evidence for the degree of
limitations endorsed by the CE. It is entirely unclear why she would have
up to a marked impairment with the abilities and aptitude to do most jobs
in 2010 when she was working at a semi-skilled job two years prior to the
evaluation and successfully taking a college math course the following
year after his evaluation. There is no intervening incident or explanation
to account for such a dramatic reduction in her general abilities and
aptitudes at that particular time.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Dr. Mandelbaum

17

The court does not agree with plaintiff that the ALJ erred with respect to evaluation of Dr.

18

Mandelbaum’s opinion. As indicated above, the ALJ may reject any medical opinion which is

19

supported by minimal clinical findings. Such is the case with Dr. Mandelbaum’s opinion. A

20

review of the doctor’s report reflects that the opinions stated therein are largely based on

21

plaintiff’s subjective reports. The doctor’s five-page report contains only one paragraph

22

referencing any objective clinical testing or findings, as follows:

23

On cognitive testing, she knew the date, the President of the United States,
and several past presidents. She could subtract serial 3s from 20, without
error. She could spell the word “world” frontwards and backwards. She
could remember 3 out of 3 objects after 5 minutes. . . .

24
25
26

///
6

1

These findings are patently inconsistent with Dr. Mandelbaum’s extreme opinion that plaintiff

2

lacks the aptitude or ability to perform most jobs. Dr. Mandelbaum seems to acknowledge that

3

his opinion is based on subjective rather than objective factors by stating that plaintiff’s ability to

4

work would be limited by her anxiety, depression, and dissociation symptoms and not clinical

5

findings. In fact, Dr. Mandelbaum references no specific clinical findings to support any of his

6

conclusions, nor could he given that the only clinical findings on objective testing were

7

unremarkable.

8

3.

9

As to Dr. Samuelson, the ALJ stated:

10

Dr. Samuelson

Melody Samuelson, Psy.D., consultatively evaluated the claimant in
December 2013 at the request of the claimant’s attorney (Exhibit B16F).
Dr. Samuelson’s source of information was the claimant, psychiatric
treatment records from November 2012, and Dr. Mandelbaum’s report
(further citations to Exhibit B16F omitted). During the exam, the claimant
revealed to Dr. Samuelson a history of early childhood sexual, physical,
and emotional abuse, panic attacks, and experiencing fear to leave her
house. She endorsed symptoms of post-traumatic stress, psychotic
features in the form of auditory hallucinations, and dissociative
experiences. The claimant denied taking any psychotropic medications.
She reported difficulty completing complex household tasks, such as
bending, lifting, and standing for any period as a result of her chronic pain.
Dr. Samuelson’s diagnostic impressions were recurrent major depressive
disorder, chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder with
agoraphobia, dissociative disorder, and a pain disorder. She opined that
the claimant was a mentally unstable individual who would not be
appropriate for a work setting. Dr. Samuelson also noted that she was not
being treated currently and was not on any medications. Dr. Samuelson
opined that the claimant was severely impaired in the aptitudes and
abilities necessary to do any type of work activity, but was capable of
handing funds. Dr. Samuelson’s opinion is given little weight. Were one
to read over the treating social worker, Ms. Wantland’s treatment notes,
there would be a vast chasm of dissimilarity between the individual
described by Dr. Samuelson and the individual presented in Ms.
Wantland’s notes. The “paragraph B” examples above do not support Dr.
Samuelson’s extreme opinion. In addition, as observed by the Appeals
Council, the record does not reflect hospitalization or regular, let alone,
ongoing treatment or even medications for mental conditions – or for
chronic pain – during the period at issue.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

///

26

///
7

1

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s comment that progress notes do not support Dr. Samuelson’s

2

opinion could not be further from the truth.” Plaintiff then cites the following pages from the

3

record: 474, 502, 555, 556, 569, 581, 677, and 679.

4

Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. Rather than showing that the ALJ’s

5

assessment of Dr. Samuelson’s opinion “could not be further from the truth,” the cited portions

6

of the record support the ALJ’s conclusion. Specifically, the portions of the record cited by

7

plaintiff reflect treatment notes documenting a reported history of childhood sexual abuse. While

8

some of the cited treatment notes also document a depressed mood, none of the cited treatment

9

notes describes any objective clinical findings.

10

B.

Credibility Assessment

11

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

12

court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

13

provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit

14

credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

15

F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

16

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

17

and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

18

evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

19

credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d

20

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007),

21

and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)).

22

///

23

///

24

///

25

///

26

///
8

1

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

2

Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

3

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

4

341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

5

The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the
[symptom] itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce
objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the
medically determinable impairment and the symptom. By requiring that
the medical impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce” pain or
another symptom, the Cotton test requires only that the causal relationship
be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon.

6
7
8
9

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in
Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)).

10
11

The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged,

12

including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell,

13

947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the

14

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

15

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

16

prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

17

physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

18

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the

19

claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning

20

drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the

21

claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given

22

impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See

23

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)).

24

///

25

///

26

///
9

1

Regarding reliance on a claimant’s daily activities to find testimony of disabling

2

pain not credible, the Social Security Act does not require that disability claimants be utterly

3

incapacitated. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has

4

repeatedly held that the

5

does not . . .[necessarily] detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” See Orn v.

6

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vertigan v. Heller, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th

7

Cir. 2001)); see also Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that a

8

claim of pain-induced disability is not necessarily gainsaid by a capacity to engage in periodic

9

restricted travel); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the

“. . . mere fact that a plaintiff has carried out certain daily activities . . .

10

claimant was entitled to benefits based on constant leg and back pain despite the claimant’s

11

ability to cook meals and wash dishes); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (observing that “many home

12

activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the

13

workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication”). Daily

14

activities must be such that they show that the claimant is “. . .able to spend a substantial part of

15

his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable

16

to a work setting.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. The ALJ must make specific findings in this regard

17

before relying on daily activities to find a claimant’s pain testimony not credible. See Burch v.

18

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).

19

The ALJ first summarized the evidence of limitations in plaintiff’s activities:

20

The claimant has the following degree of limitation in the broad areas of
functioning set out in the disability regulations. . .:no restriction in
activities of daily living; mild to moderate difficulty in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; and no episodes of decompensation of
extended duration. For example, she cleans her house, shops, and cooks
for herself (Exhibits B4E at 3, B6E at 1 and 3, B2F at 2, and B3F at 3).
The claimant initially denied that she needed help with personal care,
hygiene, or upkeep of a home (Exhibit B1D at 2). She lived alone
(Exhibits B1D at 2, B4E at 1, B6E at 1, and B9F at 3). The claimant
works in the yard, she reported dating, and talked about her pregnant
daughter moving in with her (Exhibit B9F at 26). She testified that she
could drive a car. She cares for her grandchildren from time to time
(Exhibit B4E at 2). Except for not getting dressed on some days, she has

21
22
23
24
25
26

10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

no problems with personal care (Exhibits B4E at 2, B5E at 1, and B6E at
2). The claimant informed an examining source that when she mixed with
the public, she experiences extreme anxiety and became dysfunctional
(Exhibit B2F at 1). The claimant shops in stores, has a few friends she
occasionally sees, and occasionally attends church (Exhibit B3F at 3). She
reported a boyfriend in June 2011 that ended their relationship (Exhibit
B9F at 34). She started an exercise class in January 2011 (Exhibit B9F at
14). The claimant reported she was dropping out of her classes because
she felt crowded and blocked in when in class; but she would try to
complete her computer class (Exhibit B9F at 26). The claimant took
walks, danced, was very active in church, and went to church for fun
(Exhibits B9F at 16, B10F at 6). She testified that she attended church
every week, her friends come visit her, and she talks to people on the
phone (see also, Exhibit B4E at 5). She can leave home alone and shop in
stores (Exhibits B4E at 4, and B6E at 4). An examining source reported
good concentration and memory but difficulty relating her history that
concerned emotional issues (Exhibit B3F at 4). She enrolled in college
classes in February 2011 (Exhibit B9F at 16). She testified that she took a
math class at the community college in 2011 and earned a B. She said she
reads the Bible. She denied the need for reminders to take care of personal
needs, grooming, or to take medications (Exhibit 4E at 3). She was
assessed having significant financial stressors but no problems accessing
community resources (Exhibit B14F at 8). She went to Sacramento in
January 2013 to perform community service in order to pay off a motor
vehicle ticket; her son-in-law paid the ticket for her and she repaid him by
working around the place (Exhibit B15F at 24). The claimant attended an
uncle’s funeral in Sacramento (Exhibit B15F at 31).
The ALJ then summarized plaintiff’s testimony as follows:
At the March 2012 hearing, the claimant testified that she lived with her
son, a daughter-in-law, and three grandchildren; they all moved in to her
home quite recently. She said she last worked in 2007 and that job ended
when she had a nervous breakdown. She stated that she preferred to stay
at home. The claimant stated that she only took ibuprofen and last took
psychotropic medications in February 2012 – now more than two years
ago.
In December 2013, the claimant testified that she lived with her daughter,
her boyfriend, and two young children. She said that she has a hard time
answering questions when she is stressed. She stated that after the hearing
in March 2012, she remained in bed for eight days. She said that she
stopped working because she had a mental breakdown on the job. She
testified that she helped around the house when she had the energy, she did
not take care of her grandchildren, and her daughter did most of the
cooking. She said that she could bathe and dress herself. She states that
she experiences the most pain in her back, and also experienced pain in her
shoulders, hips, feet, and ankles. The claimant denied that she could lift
forty pounds and admitted that she could lift twenty-four pounds – but not
repeatedly or even five times a day (Exhibit B13E).

26
11

1

In concluding that plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects

2

of her symptoms were not credible, the ALJ provided a detailed analysis of the objective

3

findings, medical opinions, and third-party statements. Finally, the ALJ stated:

4

11

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by
the generally unremarkable objective evidence of record, limited treatment
and findings; meanwhile, the claimant’s level of activity and claimant’s
declination of further work up or treatment generally fails to support
greater restrictions than those found herein. Moreover, the claimant’s
work history indicates even before her alleged onset date a history of
minimal earnings that raises the question whether her continued
unemployment is due to medical reasons (see Exhibits B2D-B5D, B7DB8D). Careful consideration was also made to the claimant’s subjective
allegations, often vague and self-diagnosed, as well as the several third
party reports (Exhibits 6E, 19E, 21E, 22E, and 30E); however sincere
these reports may be, the lack of objective support and limited course of
treatment while remaining fairly active limit their probative value and are
otherwise reflected in the residual functional capacity to the extent they are
reasonably supported.

12

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for

5
6
7
8
9
10

13

rejecting her testimony as not credible. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the “ALJ offered vague

14

reasons for finding Ms. Deal not credible.” The court does not agree. While plaintiff supplies a

15

detailed summary of the law relating to credibility assessments in social security cases, she

16

makes no attempt to explain how the ALJ in this case failed to correctly apply the law. The court

17

finds that the ALJ’s credibility assessment is supported by clear and convincing reasons. In

18

particular, plaintiff’s daily activities reflect functional capabilities which are transferrable to the

19

wok setting, such as the ability to successfully complete a college-level math course.

20

///

21

///

22

///

23

///

24

///

25

///

26

///
12

1
2

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

3

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

4

ORDERED that:

5

1.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 12) is denied;

6

2.

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16) is granted; and

7

3.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

8

DATED: March 31, 2017

9
10

______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
13