The National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. California State Grange et al.

Filing 154

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 8/4/2017 DENYING 136 Motion for Reconsideration. (Washington, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NATIONAL GRANGE and
CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE,

Civ. No. 2:16-0201 WBS DB

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ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiffs,
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v.
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CALIFORNIA GUILD, formerly
doing business as “California
State Grange,” and ROBERT
MCFARLAND,

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Defendants.

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On May 12, 2017, the court issued an order (“May 12

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order”) denying plaintiffs National Grange and California State

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Grange’s motion to disqualify the Ellis Law Group, counsel for

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defendant Robert McFarland, from this case.

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(Docket No. 135).)

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that order.

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(May 12, 2017 Order

Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of

(Pls.’ Mot. (Docket No. 136).)

Motions for reconsideration seek an “extraordinary
remedy,” one “to be used sparingly in the interests of finality
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and conservation of judicial resources.”

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v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).

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motions “should not be granted, absent highly unusual

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circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly

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discovered evidence, committed clear error, or . . . there is an

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intervening change in the controlling law.”

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Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999).

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moving for reconsideration “may not . . . raise arguments or

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present evidence for the first time when [such arguments or

Kona Enterprises, Inc.
Such

389 Orange St.
The party

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evidence] could reasonably have been raised earlier in the

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litigation.”

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Kona Enterprises, 229 F.3d at 890.

None of plaintiffs’ arguments persuade the court to
change its May 12 order.
First, plaintiffs argue that the court erroneously

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applied the burden-shifting framework for vicarious

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disqualification set forth in Kirk v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.,

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183 Cal. App. 4th 776 (2d Dist. 2010) by failing to “focus on the

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procedures put in place by [the Ellis Law Group]” to screen

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Valenti from working on this case and “requir[ing that

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plaintiffs] demonstrate . . . Valenti has been actively

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participating in [this] case.”

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at 5 (Docket No. 136-1).)

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content of the May 12 order, which discussed the Ellis Law

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Group’s screening procedures on pages ten and eleven, expressly

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cited such procedures in support of its holding on pages thirteen

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and fourteen, and, at no point, “required [that plaintiffs]

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demonstrate that Mr. Valenti has been actively participating in

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[this] case,” as plaintiffs claim.

(Pls.’ Mot., Mem. (“Pls.’ Mem.”)

This argument plainly ignores the

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The court’s application of

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Kirk was not clearly erroneous.

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Second, plaintiffs continue to dispute the efficacy of

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the Ellis Law Group’s ethical wall.

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credibility of two declarations submitted by McFarland at the

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time their disqualification motion was argued, (see id. at 10-11

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(discussing Valenti declaration); Pls.’ Reply at 4-5 (discussing

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Mueller declaration) (Docket No. 146)); offer a new declaration

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from a former Ellis Law Group secretary, Roxy Chipak, who

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testifies that she was not made aware of the screening procedures

They challenge the

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imposed by the Ellis Law Group against Valenti, (see Pls.’ Mem.

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at 9-10);1 and contend that the Ellis Law Group’s screening

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procedures did not satisfy the “primary elements of an ethical

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wall” discussed in Kirk, (see id. at 6-11; Pls.’ Reply at 3-6).

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The Kirk elements cited by plaintiffs are merely factors for

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consideration, not requirements.

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810-11.

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dispositive of the court’s disqualification analysis.

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will not change its ruling based on this argument.

See Kirk, 183 Cal. App. 4th at

Neither of the declarations challenged by plaintiffs was
The court

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Third, plaintiffs argue that a California appellate

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court’s affirmance of disqualification of the Ellis Law Group

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from two related state cases constitutes an intervening change in

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controlling law.

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referenced by plaintiffs are materially distinguishable from this

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case because there, Valenti switched sides during the same cases,

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whereas here, he switched sides after representing the National

(Pls.’ Mem. at 12.)

The two state cases

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Plaintiffs provide no explanation for why the Chipak
declaration could not reasonably have been submitted at the time
their disqualification motion was argued.
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Grange in a related, but different case.

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May 12 order that under California law, vicarious

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disqualification is required where the conflicted attorney

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switches sides during the same case, but is subject to a case-by-

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case analysis where he switches sides after representing an

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opposing party in a related, but different case.

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2017 Order at 6-7.)

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court’s rulings do not apply here.

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This court noted in the

(See May 12,

Accordingly, the California appellate

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ Motion for

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reconsideration of the May 12, 2017 order be, and the same hereby

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is, DENIED.

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Dated:

August 4, 2017

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