Minnick v. City of Vacaville et al.

Filing 39

ORDER signed by District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 9/29/2017 GRANTING-IN-PART and DENYING-IN-PART 25 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint consistent with this order within 14 days. (Donati, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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A. J. MINNICK,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:16-cv-00397-KJM-CKD

v.

ORDER

CITY OF VACAVILLE; and REINELDA
LOPEZ,
Defendants.

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This matter comes before the court on the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by defendant City of Vacaville (the “City”), which argues res judicata

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preclusive effect of a prior settlement agreement. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF

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No. 25. For the following reasons, the City’s motion to dismiss as to claims one, two and three is

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DENIED and as to claim four is GRANTED with leave to amend.

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I.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is a “qualified person with a disability” and a “physically disabled

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person” as defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), the Rehabilitation

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Act of 1973, and the California Disabled Persons Act (the “CDPA”). Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1.

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Specifically, plaintiff is a quadriplegic who requires a wheelchair for mobility in traveling to and

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from work, as well as around the community. Id. ¶¶ 6, 17. In the City of Vacaville, plaintiff
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often encounters accessibility barriers that make it difficult for him to travel safely using his

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wheelchair. Id. ¶¶ 17–19. On March 12, 2015, plaintiff was forced to ride his wheelchair in the

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street to avoid excessive and dangerous cross slopes on the sidewalk, placing him at risk of

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tipping over. Id. ¶ 20. While plaintiff rode in the area of the street shoulder, defendant Reinelda

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Lopez (“Lopez”) opened the driver-side door of her parked car into the traffic lane in which

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plaintiff was riding. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Plaintiff did not have time to respond and hit the inside of

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Lopez’s car door. Id ¶ 20. As a result of the impact, plaintiff suffered injuries and property

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damage. Id. ¶¶ 22–25.

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II.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit in this court on February 24, 2016, alleging four

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causes of action. Plaintiff brought the first three claims against only the City and brought the

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fourth claim against both defendants, the City and Lopez, as follows: (1) violation of Title II of

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the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131; (2) violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

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§ 794; (3) violation of the CDPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 54; and (4) negligence. The City filed a

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motion to dismiss on October 21, 2016, contending the first three causes of action are precluded

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under the doctrine of res judicata due to a judicially approved 2006 class action settlement

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agreement whereby the City agreed to address its non-ADA compliant streets and sidewalks over

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a thirty year period. The City moves to dismiss the claim of negligence as insufficiently pled.

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See Def.’s Mot. 9:17–10:16. Plaintiff opposes the City’s motion to dismiss, Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s

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Mot. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 26, and the City has replied, Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 27. The

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hearing on this motion took place on January 27, 2017, at which attorneys Mark Potter appeared

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for plaintiff and Eugene Elliot appeared for the City.

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III.

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JUDICIAL NOTICE
As an initial matter, the City asks the court to take judicial notice of the following

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documents from a prior lawsuit in this court, Nystrom v. City of Vacaville, Case No. 2:04-cv-

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00330-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal.), in support of its motion to dismiss:

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1. July 24, 2006 Executed Settlement Agreement in Nystrom v. City of Vacaville,
supra;
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2. July 24, 2006 Declaration of Melissa W. Kasnitz in support of the Joint Motion

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for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and

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Certification of Settlement Class in Nystrom v. City of Vacaville, supra; and

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3. November 20, 2006 Order Granting Final Approval to Class Action Settlement

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in Nystrom v. City of Vacaville, supra.
Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice 1:27–2:7, ECF No. 25-1.

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The court “may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute

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because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

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reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Specifically, the court “may take judicial

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notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state

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courts.” Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). The

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three documents listed above represent undisputed matters of public record on file with this

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federal court, Nystrom v. City of Vacaville, Case No. 2:04-cv-00330-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal.), ECF

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Nos. 28-1, 30, and 41; therefore, their existence is judicially noticed.

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The City also requests judicial notice of a document referenced by the City as

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“July 24, 2006 Order Granting Final Approval to Class Action Settlement in Nystrom v. City of

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Vacaville, Dkt. No. 41.” Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice 2:4–5. However, because this document is

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not included with the City’s judicial notice attachments and there is no document by this name or

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docket number filed in Nystrom v. City of Vacaville, supra, it is unclear what the City means by

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this request, and thus, the City’s request for judicial notice of this document is denied.

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IV.

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STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed

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in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

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337–338 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what

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the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule
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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s

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obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

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conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.

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(alterations in original) (citation omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal

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conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

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the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

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Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must

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contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally

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cognizable right of action”)).

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Furthermore, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that

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no amendment can cure the defect.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.

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1995) (per curiam); see also Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir.

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1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an

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exercise in futility . . . .”)).

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V.

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DISCUSSION
A.

Res Judicata
The City argues plaintiff’s first three claims are barred by the doctrine of res

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judicata, because plaintiff is a member of a class that settled with the City on similar claims in

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2006. Two related doctrines—claim preclusion and issue preclusion—are grouped under the term

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“res judicata.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). The City invokes claim preclusion,

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which forecloses “successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the

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claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” Id. (citation omitted). In other words, “[c]laim

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preclusion . . . bars any subsequent suit on claims that were raised or could have been raised in a

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prior action.” Cell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Lash Group, Inc., 586 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009).

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When the prior action is a class action, the party seeking preclusive effect must

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show that precluding the subsequent action would not violate due process because the class

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members received adequate notice and representation in the prior action. Frank v. United
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Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir. 2000). For a federal class action certified under Rule

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23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as here, the court treats preclusive effect differently

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depending on which subsection of Rule 23 the class action is certified under. The subsections

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relevant here are (b)(2), where the class seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, and (b)(3), where

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the class seeks monetary damages. The class notice determines whether a subsection (b)(2)

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“injunction” class action precludes subsequent damages claims: “Rule 23 . . . requires a higher

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standard of notice for . . . (b)(3) [damages] class action, under which individual notice must be

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provided to ‘all members who can be identified through reasonable effort’ [and because] all

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potential members in a . . . (b)(3) [damages] class must be allowed to opt out of the class.”

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Frank, 216 F.3d at 851 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974)). Notice

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in an earlier “injunction” suit is not sufficient to preclude monetary claims in later suits. Id. As a

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result, “a class action suit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief does not bar subsequent

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individual damage claims by class members, even if based on the same events.” Hiser v.

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Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996); see also In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust

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Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2012 WL 273883, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) (“[A] Rule 23(b)(2)

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judgment, with its one-size-fits-all approach and its limited procedural protections, will not

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preclude later claims for individualized relief.”).

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Here, the City entered into a judicially approved settlement agreement in 2006,

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which addressed inaccessible conditions in the City’s pedestrian rights-of-way. Settlement

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Agreement, Nystrom v. City of Vacaville, Case No. 2:04-cv-00330-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal.) (the

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“Nystrom Agreement”) at 1:5–13, ECF No. 28-1. The Nystrom Agreement defined “Class” or

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“Class Members” as “all persons with Mobility . . . Disabilities who seek full and equal access

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pertaining to curb cuts and sidewalks in the City of Vacaville’s Pedestrian Rights of Way.” Id. at

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3:2–5. The Nystrom Agreement was a Rule 23(b)(2) “injunction” class action: “[T]his settlement

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resolves only class claims for declaratory and injunctive relief . . . and . . . does not provide for

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damages for any individual Class Member[] nor does it release any claims an individual Class

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Member may have for damages.” Id. at 8:8–12.

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In the current suit, plaintiff Minnick, a Class Member within the definition of the

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Nystrom Agreement, now seeks damages based on injuries received due to the sidewalk

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conditions addressed in Nystrom. Even though the current suit is based on the same nucleus of

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facts, that of a disabled person encountering inaccessible pedestrian rights-of-way in the City and

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that gave rise to the Nystrom Agreement, the prior class action sought only declaratory and

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injunctive relief for Class Members, and thus does not bar subsequent individual damage claims

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of a Class Member. Therefore, plaintiff Minnick is not barred by res judicata from seeking

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monetary damages against the City for alleged violations of the ADA, of the Rehabilitation Act or

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of the California Disabled Persons Act.

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B.

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Negligence
Plaintiff concedes his negligence claim is insufficiently pled, and seeks to file a

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first amended complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n 8:1–8, 8:17–20. The City does not oppose plaintiff’s

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request. Def.’s Reply 3:12–15. Therefore, plaintiff’s negligence claim is dismissed with leave to

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amend.

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VI.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, defendant City of Vacaville’s motion to dismiss as to

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claims one, two and three is DENIED and as to claim four is GRANTED with leave to amend.

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Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint consistent with this order within fourteen (14) days.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 29, 2017.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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