J.M. et al v. Pleasant Ridge Union School District et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 10/11/2016 re 8 Pleasant Ridge's Motion to Dismiss: IT IS ORDERED that Pleasant Ridge's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' third and Morin-Teal's fourth cause of action as to Pleasant Ridge be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pleasant Ridge's motion to dismiss plaintiffs second and J.M.'s fourth cause of action as to Pleasant Ridge be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file a First Amended Complaint, if it can do so consistent with this Order. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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----oo0oo----

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J.M., a minor by and through
her Guardian ad Litem, Nancy
Morin-Teal, and NANCY MORINTEAL, an individual,

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

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CIV. NO.: 2:16-00897 WBS CKD

v.
PLEASANT RIDGE UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT, ALLIANCE REDWOODS
OUTDOOR RECREATION, COUNTY OF
NEVADA, and DOES 1 to 50,
Defendants.

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----oo0oo---Plaintiffs Nancy Morin-Teal and J.M. filed this action
against defendants Pleasant Ridge School District (“Pleasant
Ridge”), Alliance Redwoods Conference Grounds (“Alliance
Redwoods”), and the County of Nevada (“County”) for a violation
of the Rehabilitation Act and related state law claims arising
out of J.M.’s involvement as a student at Magnolia Intermediate

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School (“Magnolia”).

Pleasant Ridge’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

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J.M. is a disabled minor who attends Magnolia, a
subordinate public entity of Pleasant Ridge.
(Docket No. 2).)

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(Compl. ¶¶ 8, 13

Plaintiffs allege defendants had prior

knowledge of all of J.M.’s disabilities before the events at
issue.

(Id.)

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The matter is now before the court on

Plaintiffs allege Pleasant Ridge required J.M. to
participate in a camp at Alliance Redwoods for school.
16-17.)

(Id. ¶¶

Prior to the trip, J.M.’s mother, Morin-Teal, worked

with defendants to create a written care plan for J.M. during the
trip.

(Id. ¶ 18.)

Morin-Teal allegedly went to J.M.’s class

prior to the trip to demonstrate to the teacher how to operate
J.M.’s medical breathing machine.

(Id.)

Further, plaintiffs

allege J.M.’s physician gave written orders that J.M. could not
be exposed to direct sunlight.

(Id.)

During the trip to Alliance Redwoods, defendants
allegedly forced J.M. to stay in direct sunlight for 9.5 hours,
despite J.M.’s protests.

(Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

Plaintiffs allege

defendants gave J.M. Tylenol, told her to lie down, and did not
provide a nurse.

(Id. ¶ 23.)

J.M. allegedly suffered second

degree burns, heat exhaustion, heat stroke, permanent damage to
her internal organs, emotional distress, and post-traumatic
stress syndrome.

(Id. ¶ 26.)

During normal class hours, J.M.’s accommodation plan

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also allegedly permitted J.M. to leave class when her eyes needed
rest and allowed J.M. to eat lunch in the office so she did not
have to eat in the sun.

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staff usually told J.M. to leave the office at lunch.

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(Id.)

Plaintiffs initiated this action, alleging the
following causes of action: (1) discrimination under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”); (2) negligent
supervision of J.M.; (3) violation of J.M.’s right to attend a
safe school under Article 1, Section 28 of the California
Constitution; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

Pleasant Ridge moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ second,

third, and fourth causes of action.1
II.

Discussion

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In practice, plaintiffs

allege J.M.’s teacher did not allow her to take breaks and the

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(Id. ¶ 29.)

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319, 322 (1972).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
544, 570 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

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Pleasant Ridge originally argued for dismissal of the
first cause of action under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions.
Pleasant Ridge conceded its Rule 12(b)(1) motion in its Reply to
the motion to dismiss and withdrew its Rule 12(b)(6) motion at
oral argument.
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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

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Id.

Under this

standard, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”).
A.

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“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

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Ashcroft v.

Negligent Supervision
In their second cause of action, plaintiffs allege

defendants failed to properly supervise J.M. while under
defendants’ care.

Under the California Tort Claims Act, “[a]

public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
employee or any other person.”

Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.

In

California, “all government tort liability must be based on
statute.”

Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925,

932 (1998).

Pleasant Ridge is a public entity; therefore,

plaintiffs must allege it violated a statute in order to hold
Pleasant Ridge liable for any allegedly tortious conduct.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges Pleasant Ridge is liable
for negligent supervision in violation of California Government

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Code section 815.2.

(Compl. at 10.)

Under section 815.2, “[a]

public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act
or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope
of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this
section, have given rise to a cause of action against that
employee . . . .”

§ 815.2.

Since Pleasant Ridge is a public

entity and section 815.2 establishes the requisite statutory
liability, plaintiffs sufficiently allege a statutory basis for
their negligent supervision claim against Pleasant Ridge.

See

Dailey v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747-50 (1970)
(holding a school liable for negligent supervision under section
815.2).
“[I]n order to prevail in a negligence action,
plaintiffs must show that defendants owed them a legal duty, that
defendants breached that duty, and that the breach proximately
caused their injuries.”

Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs.,

Inc., 32 Cal. 4th 1138, 1145 (2004).

The relationship between

school personnel to “students gives rise to a duty of care.”
Hoff, 19 Cal. 4th at 933.

“California law has long imposed on

school authorities a duty to supervise at all times the conduct
of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules
and regulations necessary to their protection.”

Id. at 934

(quoting Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 807
fn.3 (1984)).
Here, plaintiffs allege Magnolia, as a subordinate
entity of Pleasant Ridge, has a duty to exercise reasonable care
supervising J.M. and Pleasant Ridge owes a special duty of care

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to prevent injury to its students.

Plaintiffs further allege defendants breached this duty when they
forced J.M. to stay in direct sunlight and “refused to allow
[J.M.] to contact her mother.”

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(Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

While defendants

permitted other students to call their parents, plaintiffs allege
defendants did not allow J.M. to call her mother and defendants
instead gave J.M. Tylenol, told J.M. to lie down, and never
provided J.M. with access to a nurse or adequate medical care as
promised to Morin-Teal.

(Id. ¶ 22-24.)

Outside of the school

trip, plaintiffs further allege “Defendants encouraged peers to
physically confront J.M. even though they were aware that such
physical confrontation was exceptionally dangerous to J.M. due to
her disabilities.”

(Id. ¶ 34.)

Together, plaintiffs

sufficiently allege there was a breach of a duty of care.

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(Compl. ¶¶ 8, 35, 50.)

Finally, plaintiffs allege the breach of Pleasant
Ridge’s duty of care caused J.M.’s damages.

“As a result of her

exposure to direct sunlight[,] J.M. suffered . . . severe 2nd
degree burns on her skin, heat exhaustion, heat stroke, permanent
damage to her internal organs including kidney and liver failure,
emotional distress and post-traumatic stress syndrome.”
26.)

(Id. ¶

Plaintiffs further support the harm and causation by

alleging “J.M. [was] in extreme distress and crying hysterically
with no medical aid.”

(Id. ¶ 25.)

Taking all reasonable

inferences in favor of plaintiffs, it is reasonable to infer
Pleasant Ridge was aware of J.M.’s harm when she was crying
hysterically on the trip.
Plaintiffs allege with sufficient particularity that

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Pleasant Ridge owed a duty of care to J.M. and breached this duty
of care.

motion to dismiss the negligent supervision claim.
B.

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defendants “failed to provide a safe, secure, and peaceful
location for school activities,” in violation of J.M.’s right to
attend a safe, secure, and peaceful school.

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(Compl. ¶ 56.)

In

support of this contention, they refer to the California
Constitution, which provides, “All students and staff of public
primary, elementary, junior high, and senior high schools . . .
have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe,
secure and peaceful.”

Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(f)(1).

Courts have held that this provision does not establish
any obligation on the state.

See Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte

Valley Unified Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 2:09-00245 WBS CMK, 2009 WL
2424608, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009).

Plaintiffs conceded

this provision does not create a cause of action.

Accordingly,

the court must dismiss this claim without leave to amend.
C.

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Right to Attend a Safe School
In their third cause of action, plaintiffs allege

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Accordingly, the court will deny Pleasant Ridge’s

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In their fourth cause of action, plaintiffs allege

defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon J.M.
and Morin-Teal.

As previously stated, a public entity is not

liable for injuries arising from the acts or omissions of the
public entity or its employees, unless liability is based on a
statute.

See Myers v. City of Madera, Civ. No. 1:10-01398 AWI

JLT, 2011 WL 773417, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011).

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Plaintiffs, in their fourth cause of action, “re-allege all
allegations previously alleged,” which includes defendants’
violation of section 815.2.

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entity, plaintiffs sufficiently allege a statutory basis for
their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
Pleasant Ridge.
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of
the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the
plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and
(3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by
the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”

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Christensen v. Superior

Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 904 (1991) (citations omitted).

Conduct

is outrageous if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of
that usually tolerated in a civilized community.”

Potter v.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993).
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the
outrageous act was “directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the
presence of the plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.”
Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 903.

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Since section 815.2

establishes the requisite statutory liability for a public

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(Compl. ¶ 58.)

Plaintiffs allege defendants intentionally caused
emotional distress to J.M. when defendants were aware of J.M.’s
health problems and accommodation plan, yet forced her “to stay
in direct sunlight on the beach for 9.5 hours.”
19, 21.)

(Compl. ¶¶ 18-

Defendants allegedly prevented J.M. from contacting her

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mother during the trip.

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These actions, as alleged,

could be found by the trier of fact to be extreme and outrageous.
Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged defendants acted with
reckless disregard for the probability of causing emotional
distress because defendants engaged in these actions despite
J.M.’s pleas to contact her mother, pleas to be removed from the
sunlight, and “extreme distress and [hysterical] crying.”
¶¶ 21-22, 25.)

(Id.

Plaintiffs further allege the “exposure to direct

sunlight” and defendants’ conduct caused J.M. to suffer emotional
distress, paranoia, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic
stress syndrome.

(Compl. ¶¶ 25, 60.)

Based on plaintiffs’

allegations, the trier of fact could reasonably draw inferences
that defendants intentionally caused J.M. emotional distress.

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(Id. ¶ 22.)

Plaintiffs also argue Morin-Teal can recover under
intentional infliction of emotional distress because she “was
present when J.M. suffered the effects of the outrageous conduct
. . . .”

(Pls.’ Opp’n at 13 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiffs

support this argument with the allegation that Morin-Teal was
forced to see her daughter “suffer and witnessed her being denied
adequate medical care for the injuries she sustained by the
conduct of the Defendants.”

(Compl. ¶ 25.)

This is the sole

allegation by plaintiffs about the conduct Morin-Teal witnessed.
This allegation is followed immediately by an allegation that
Morin-Teal heard about J.M.’s medical needs when another
student’s mother contacted Morin-Teal, indicating Morin-Teal
never witnessed the allegedly outrageous conduct.

(See id.)

It is not enough that Morin-Teal witnessed the effects

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of the allegedly outrageous conduct.

outrageous conduct occurred in Morin-Teal’s presence while
Pleasant Ridge was aware of her presence.
Cal. 3d at 903.

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Pleasant Ridge.

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Accordingly, the court must grant Pleasant

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Pleasant Ridge’s motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ third and Morin-Teal’s fourth cause of action
as to Pleasant Ridge be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pleasant Ridge’s motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ second and J.M.’s fourth cause of action as
to Pleasant Ridge be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

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Plaintiffs do not allege with sufficient

Ridge’s motion to dismiss Morin-Teal’s emotional distress claims.

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See Christensen, 54

particularity that Morin-Teal witnessed an outrageous act by

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California law requires the

Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is
signed to file a First Amended Complaint, if it can do so
consistent with this Order.
Dated:

October 11, 2016

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