J.M. et al v. Pleasant Ridge Union School District et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 29 Motion to Dismiss signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 1/10/2017: IT IS ORDERED that Alliance Redwoods' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' third, fourth, fifth, and seventh causes of action as to Alliance Redwoods be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED. Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file a Second Amended Complaint, if they can do so consistent with this Order. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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J.M., a minor by and through
her Guardian ad Litem, Nancy
Morin-Teal, and NANCY MORINTEAL, an individual,

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

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CIV. NO.: 2:16-00897 WBS CKD

v.
PLEASANT RIDGE UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT, ALLIANCE REDWOODS
OUTDOOR RECREATION, COUNTY OF
NEVADA, and DOES 1 to 50,
Defendants.

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----oo0oo---Plaintiffs Nancy Morin-Teal and J.M. filed this action

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against defendants Pleasant Ridge School District (“Pleasant

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Ridge”), Alliance Redwoods Conference Grounds (“Alliance

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Redwoods”), and the County of Nevada for a violation of the

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Rehabilitation Act and related state law claims arising out of
J.M.’s involvement as a student at Magnolia Intermediate School
(“Magnolia”).

The matter is now before the court on Alliance
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Redwoods’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

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for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

(Docket

No. 29.)

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I.

Factual and Procedural Background
J.M. is a disabled minor who attends Magnolia, a

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subordinate public entity of Pleasant Ridge.

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(“FAC”) ¶¶ 7, 11 (Docket No. 2).)

(First Am. Compl.

Plaintiffs allege defendants

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had prior knowledge of all of J.M.’s disabilities prior to the

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events at issue.

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(Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiffs allege Pleasant Ridge required J.M. to
participate in a camp at Alliance Redwoods for school.
14-15.)

(Id. ¶¶

Alliance Redwoods is a non-profit organization that

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provides environmental skills.

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J.M.’s mother, Morin-Teal, allegedly worked with defendants to

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create a written care plan for J.M. during the trip.

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Plaintiffs allege J.M.’s physician gave written orders that J.M.

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(Id. ¶ 15.)

could not be exposed to direct sunlight.

Prior to the trip,

(Id. ¶ 16.)

(Id. ¶ 18.)

During the trip to Alliance Redwoods, defendants

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allegedly forced J.M. to stay in direct sunlight for 9.5 hours,
despite J.M.’s protests.

(Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)

Plaintiffs allege

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defendants gave J.M. Tylenol, told her to lie down, and did not

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provide a nurse as promised.

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suffered second degree burns, heat exhaustion, heat stroke,

(Id. ¶¶ 16, 21.)

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J.M. allegedly

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permanent damage to her internal organs, emotional distress, and

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post-traumatic stress syndrome.

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(Id. ¶ 24.)

Plaintiffs initiated this action and on October 11,
2016, the court granted, in part, Pleasant Ridge’s motion to

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dismiss.
No. 19).)

(Oct. 11, 2016 Order (“Oct. 11 Order”) 10:8-13 (Docket
Plaintiffs filed their FAC on October 31, 2016,

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alleging: (1) discrimination under Section 504 against Pleasant

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Ridge; (2) negligent supervision against all defendants; (3)

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intentional infliction of emotional distress against all

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defendants; and (4) discrimination under the Americans with

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Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Alliance Redwoods.
11.)

(FAC at 7-

Alliance Redwoods now moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ FAC for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II.

Discussion
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court

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must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all

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reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

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Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.

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319, 322 (1972).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

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544, 570 (2007).

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‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a

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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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Ashcroft v.

“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

Under this

standard, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

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strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is

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improbable.”

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”).
A.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In their third and fourth causes of action, plaintiffs

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allege defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon

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J.M. and Morin-Teal.

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(FAC at 9.)

The elements of intentional

infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or

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reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme

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emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the

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emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”

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Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 904 (1991)

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(citations omitted).

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improperly refer to defendants generally when alleging both

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Alliance Redwoods argues that plaintiffs

intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action and
plaintiffs do not allege any intentional or reckless conduct by

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Alliance Redwoods specifically.

(Def.’s Mot. 6:8-13.)

A defendant is entitled to know what actions a

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plaintiff alleges it engaged in that supports the plaintiff’s

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claims.

See Sollberger v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. SACV 09-0766

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AG (ANx), 2010 WL 2674456, *4-5 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (“One

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common type of shotgun pleading comes in cases with multiple

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defendants where the plaintiff uses the omnibus term ‘Defendants’
throughout a complaint by grouping defendants together without
identifying what the particular defendants specifically did

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wrong.”).

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prevents the court from drawing the reasonable inference that the

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specific defendant is liable for the claim alleged and justifies

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dismissal of the claim.

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Failure to delineate conduct by a specific defendant

See id. at *5 (“This shotgun pleading

style deprives Defendants of knowing exactly what they are
accused of doing wrong. . . . [T]his defect alone warrants

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dismissal.”); see also Pryzblyski v. Stumpf, No. CV-10-8073-PCTGMS, 2011 WL 31194, *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2011) (“The Complaint is

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drafted in such a way as to deprive any remaining Defendant of

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the knowledge of what claims and factual allegations the

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Complaint asserts against it.”); Turney v. Fifth Third Bank, No.

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09-2533-JWL, 2010 WL 1744670, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 29, 2010)

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(finding general allegations regarding defendants, without

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identifying conduct by specific defendants, did not provide
defendants with sufficient notice of claims against them).

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Plaintiffs fail to allege any misconduct by Alliance
Redwoods specifically in support of their intentional infliction

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of emotional distress claims.

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding

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J.M.’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, her

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exposure to sunlight at Alliance Redwoods, and her inability to

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contact her mother during the trip all refer to “defendants”

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generally and not Alliance Redwoods.

(See FAC ¶¶ 14-20.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Morin-Teal’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim also refer to “defendants”

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generally.

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defendant responsible for each act at issue, [Alliance Redwoods]

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cannot reasonably respond to [plaintiffs’] allegations in a

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precise manner” and plaintiffs’ claim cannot survive.

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(See id. ¶¶ 23, 57.)

“By failing to specify the

Autobidmaster, LLC v. Alpine Auto Gallery, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-1083AC, 2015 WL 2381611, at *15 (D. Or. May 19, 2015).

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Plaintiffs fail to allege intentional or reckless
conduct by Alliance Redwoods as distinct from Pleasant Ridge.

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Thus, the FAC does not allow the court to draw the inference that

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Alliance Redwoods is liable for the alleged misconduct or

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intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

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Accordingly, the court must grant Alliance Redwoods’ motion to

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dismiss plaintiffs’ third and fourth causes of action for

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intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B.

Americans with Disabilities Act

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In their fifth cause of action, plaintiffs allege
Alliance Redwoods violated the ADA when it discriminated against
J.M. on the basis of her disability.

(FAC at 10.)

Congress enacted the ADA “to remedy widespread

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discrimination against disabled individuals.”

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Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001).

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PGA Tour, Inc. v.

Title III of the ADA prohibits

places of public accommodation from discriminating against
disabled individuals by preventing them from “full and equal
enjoyment” of the services provided.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

To

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prevail on a Title III claim, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he

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is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a

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private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public

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accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public

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accommodations by the defendant because of his disability.”
Ariz. ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603

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F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010).

Alliance Redwoods’ motion to

dismiss centers on the third prong--whether plaintiffs allege

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that Alliance Redwoods discriminated against J.M. on account of

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her disability.

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“The third element--whether [a plaintiff is] denied

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public accommodations on the basis of disability--is met if there

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was a violation of applicable accessibility standards.”

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Johnson

v. Wayside Prop. Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 973, 976 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
(alteration in original) (quoting Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 816

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F. Supp. 2d 831, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).

“[T]he barrier need only

interfere with the plaintiff’s ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of the

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facility.”

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12182(a)).

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Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

Plaintiffs allege that Alliance Redwoods denied J.M.
full and equal enjoyment of its facilities because “the staff was
untrained and even fearful about having a student in their camp
with disabilities.

By failing to ensure that their staff

understood J.M.’s disability and the importance of first aid and

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summoning medical assistance, the Defendants left J.M [sic]

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without the supports necessary to participate with her peers

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equally.”

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defendants did not provide a reasonable accommodations--“no

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(FAC ¶ 63.)

Plaintiffs further allege that the

exposure to direct sunlight”--and that the defendants “knew that
J.M. would not be able to meaningfully access the benefits” of

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Alliance Redwoods absent these accommodations.

(Id. ¶¶ 64-65.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory and do not

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mention a single activity or service that Alliance Redwoods

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excluded J.M. from due to her disability.

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defendants left her “without the supports necessary to

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J.M.’s allegation that

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participate with her peers equally” does not depict what specific

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service or activity J.M. could not fully participate in, as

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required under the ADA.

(FAC ¶ 63); see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

Plaintiffs do not allege that Alliance Redwoods violated any

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applicable accessibility standard or that J.M. was, as a result
of a policy or practice of Alliance Redwoods, prevented from full

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and equal enjoyment of Alliance Redwoods’ services.

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v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2004)

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(holding that a written policy preventing a movie theater from

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requiring a patron to move seats discriminated against a disabled

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wheelchair patron); Johnson, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 976.

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Plaintiffs do not allege with sufficient particularity

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See Fortyune

that Alliance Redwoods denied J.M. full and equal enjoyment of

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its services because of J.M.’s disability.

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court must grant Alliance Redwoods’ motion to dismiss J.M.’s

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fifth cause of action for violation of the ADA.

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C.

Accordingly, the

Negligent Supervision
In their seventh cause of action, plaintiffs allege

Alliance Redwoods is liable for negligent supervision of J.M.

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(FAC at 11.)

“[I]n order to prevail in a negligence action,

plaintiffs must show that defendants owed them a legal duty, that

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defendants breached that duty, and that the breach proximately

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caused their injuries.”

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Inc., 32 Cal. 4th 1138, 1145 (2004).

Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs.,

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Alliance Redwoods argues that plaintiffs do not allege
facts indicating Alliance Redwoods had a duty to supervise J.M.
as distinct from the duty owed by Pleasant Ridge.
9:4-9.)

(Def.’s Mot.

In the court’s October 11 Order, the court denied

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Pleasant Ridge’s motion to dismiss the negligent supervision
cause of action because plaintiffs alleged that Pleasant Ridge

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negligently supervised J.M. in violation of California Government

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Code section 815.2 and Pleasant Ridge is a public entity subject

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to that section that also owes a special duty of care to prevent

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injury to its students, and California law has long imposed a

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duty on school officials to supervise children.
4:27-6:1.)

(Oct. 11, Order

In contrast, plaintiffs’ sole allegation regarding

Alliance Redwoods’ duty to supervise J.M. in the FAC is that

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“[d]efendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable

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care supervising J.M.”

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Alliance Redwoods’ duty to supervise, “supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do[es] not suffice.”

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(FAC ¶ 69.)

Such a threadbare recital of

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678.
Plaintiffs do not allege facts with sufficient

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particularity that indicate Alliance Redwoods had a duty to
supervise J.M.

Accordingly, the court must grant Alliance

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Redwoods’ motion to dismiss J.M.’s seventh cause of action for

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negligent supervision.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Alliance Redwoods’ motion

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to dismiss plaintiffs’ third, fourth, fifth, and seventh causes

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of action as to Alliance Redwoods be, and the same hereby are,

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GRANTED.

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Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is

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signed to file a Second Amended Complaint, if they can do so
consistent with this Order.
Dated:

January 10, 2017

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