Ahmed v. Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., et al.
Filing
39
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 2/6/2018 GRANTING 34 Plaintiff's Motion for preliminary certification of a conditional settlement class and preliminary approval of the class action settlement; Defendant and the claims administrator shall notify class members of the settlement in the manner specified in the settlement agreement; the parties agree that Atticus Administration, LLC will serve as the settlement administrator; the court also approves declared fee s and costs of administering the settlement of up to $16,000; All discovery and pretrial proceedings and deadlines are stayed and suspended until further notice from the court, except for such actions as are necessary to implement the settlement agreement and this Order; the final Approval Hearing is set for 5/14/2018 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 5 (WBS) before Senior Judge William B. Shubb; to determine whether the settlement agreement should be finally approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; the court will also consider plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and service payment; Plaintiff shall file a motion for attorneys' fees no later than 35 calendar days after the mailing of the class notice. (Reader, L)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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HENNA AHMED, an individual,
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15
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2:16-1747 WBS KJN
Plaintiff,
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Civ. No.
v.
BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES,
INC.; GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES, LLC and DOES 1-100,
inclusive,
17
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT
APPROVAL
Defendants.
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Plaintiff Henna Ahmed brought this putative class-
19
20
action lawsuit against defendants Beverly Health and
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Rehabilitation Services, Inc. (“Beverly Health”), GGNSC
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Administrative Services, LLC (“GGNSC Services”), and Does 1-100,
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alleging that defendants violated the California Labor Code.
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Presently before the court is plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for
25
preliminary approval of the class action settlement and
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provisional certification of the class.
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I.
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(Docket No. 34.)
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff applied for a job as a Certified Nursing
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1
Assistant with Golden Living, located at 144 F St., Galt CA
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95632, on November 3, 2015.
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1, 2, 8 (Docket No. 13).)
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employee handbook and signed a number of documents which
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identified her as an employee of Golden Living.
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Plaintiff’s wage statements from November 2015 to May 2016 listed
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the name and address of her employer as “GGNSC Administrative
8
Services, LLC” and “144 F Street, Galt, CA 95632.”
9
18, Exs. 9, 11.)
(First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 8, Exs.
Plaintiff was issued a badge and an
(Id. ¶¶ 11-13.)
(Id. ¶¶ 16,
However, plaintiff’s IRS Form W-2 listed the
10
name and address of her employer as “Beverley Health and
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Rehabilitati[sic]” and “1000 FIANA WAY, FORT SMITH, AR 72919.”
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(Id. ¶ 17, Ex. 10.)
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to furnish wage statements accurately showing the “name and
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address of the legal entity that is the employer” as required by
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Labor Code § 226(a)(8).
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Thus, plaintiff alleges defendants failed
(FAC ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants uniformly paid
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plaintiff, and defendants’ other current and former California
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employees, more than seven calendar days following the close of
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the payroll period, in violation of Labor Code § 204.
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Ex. 11.)
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2016 to March 30, 2016, plaintiff and defendants’ other current
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and former California employees were not paid until April 7,
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2016--eight days after the close of the pay period.
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Ex. 27.)
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2016 to July 6, 2016, plaintiff and defendants’ other current and
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former California employees were not paid until July 14, 2016--
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also eight days after the close of the pay period.
28
Ex. 28.)
(FAC ¶ 28,
For example, for the pay period that ran from March 17,
(FAC ¶ 28,
Similarly, for the pay period that ran from June 23,
2
(FAC ¶ 28,
1
If plaintiff was in fact paid for the work she
2
performed during each pay period within seven days of the end of
3
each pay period, then plaintiff alleges defendants failed to
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accurately state the inclusive dates of the pay periods on the
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wage statements, required by Labor Code § 226(a)(6).
6
In addition, plaintiff alleges defendants failed to maintain
7
copies of the wage statements issued to her and defendants’ other
8
California employees, both current and former, for at least three
9
years, thereby violating Labor Code § 226(a).
10
(FAC ¶ 29.)
(FAC ¶ 33.)
On June 3, 2016, class counsel sent written notice to
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the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“Labor
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Agency”) and defendants regarding alleged violations of Labor
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Code section 226(a)(8)--that the wage statements maintained for
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Beverly Health employees inaccurately showed the name and address
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of their employer as “GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC” and
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“144 F Street, Galt, CA 95632.”
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).)
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effective June 16, 2016, to ensure that all future wage
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statements had Beverly Health’s name and address clearly listed
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on top of each wage statement.
(Pl.’s Mem. at 2 (Docket No 34-1
In response, defendants adjusted their payroll system
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(Id.)
On September 1, 2016, class counsel sent written notice
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to the Labor Agency and defendants regarding alleged violations
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of Labor Code sections 204 and 226(a)(6)--that defendants failed
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to timely pay employees or to accurately set forth the inclusive
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dates of the pay period for which their employees were being
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paid.
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remedy these violations.
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(Id.)
Almost immediately, defendants undertook efforts to
(Id.)
On November 10, 2016, plaintiff filed a First Amended
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Complaint alleging the following: (1) failure to furnish accurate
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itemized wage statements in violation of California Labor Code §
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226(a)(8); (2) failure to maintain copies of accurate itemized
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wage statements in violation of California Labor Code § 226(a),
5
and (3) failure to timely pay wages in violation of California
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Labor Code § 204.
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claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the
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California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).
9
(See FAC.)
Plaintiff also asserts individual
(Id.)
Based on the alleged violations of California Labor
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Code §§ 226(a)(8), 226(a)(6), and 204, plaintiff seeks to certify
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a class of “[a]ll current and former California employees of
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Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc. who were issued
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one or more wage statements from July 25, 2015, through September
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1, 2016.”
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¶ 7 (Docket No. 34-2); Pl.’s Mem at 2.)
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this case for over a year before finalizing a settlement
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agreement on December 11, 2017. (Pl.’s Mem. at 3.)
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now seek preliminary approval of the parties’ stipulated class-
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wide settlement, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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23(e).
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II.
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(Decl. of Robert Wasserman Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement
The parties litigated
Plaintiffs
Discussion
Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or
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defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the
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court’s approval.”
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involves a two-step process in which the Court first determines
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whether a proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary
27
approval and then, after notice is given to class members,
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whether final approval is warranted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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“Approval under 23(e)
Nat’l Rural Telecomms.
1
Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
2
(citing Manual for Complex Litig., Third, § 30.41 (1995)).
3
This Order is the first step in that process and
4
analyzes only whether the proposed class action settlement
5
deserves preliminary approval.
6
Co., 266 F.R.D. 468, 473 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Shubb, J.)
7
Preliminary approval authorizes the parties to give notice to
8
putative class members of the settlement agreement and lays the
9
groundwork for a future fairness hearing, at which the court will
See Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec.
10
hear objections to (1) the treatment of this litigation as a
11
class action and (2) the terms of the settlement.
12
v. Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir.
13
1989) (stating that a district court’s obligation when
14
considering dismissal or compromise of a class action includes
15
holding a hearing to “inquire into the terms and circumstances of
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any dismissal or compromise to ensure that it is not collusive or
17
prejudicial.”).
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whether the parties should be allowed to settle the class action
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on their proposed terms after that hearing.
20
See id.; Diaz
The court will reach a final determination as to
The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy
21
favoring settlement of class actions.
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of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).
23
where, as here, “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior
24
to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed
25
compromise to ratify both [1] the propriety of the certification
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and [2] the fairness of the settlement.”
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327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003).
28
Class Plaintiffs v. City
Nevertheless,
Staton v. Boeing Co.,
The first part of this inquiry requires the court to
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“pay ‘undiluted, even heightened, attention’ to class
2
certification requirements” because, unlike in a fully litigated
3
class action suit, the court “will lack the opportunity . . . to
4
adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.”
5
Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see
6
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).
7
The parties cannot “agree to certify a class that clearly leaves
8
any one requirement unfulfilled,” and consequently the court
9
cannot blindly rely on the fact that the parties have stipulated
10
that a class exists for purposes of settlement.
11
U.S. at 621-22 (stating that courts cannot fail to apply the
12
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)).
13
See Windsor, 521
The second part of this inquiry obliges the court to
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“carefully consider ‘whether a proposed settlement is
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fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable,’ recognizing that
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‘[i]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the
17
individual component parts, that must be examined for overall
18
fairness . . . .’”
19
F.3d at 1026); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (outlining class
20
action settlement procedures).
21
22
A.
Staton, 327 F.3d at 952 (quoting Hanlon, 150
Class Certification
A class action will be certified only if it meets the
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four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and additionally fits
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within one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).
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P. 23(a)-(b).
26
determining whether the moving party has satisfied each Rule 23
27
requirement, the court must conduct a rigorous inquiry before
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certifying a class.
Fed. R. Civ.
Although a district court has discretion in
See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701
6
1
(1979); Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
2
1.
3
Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
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Rule 23(a)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
These requirements are commonly referred
to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.
a.
Numerosity
Under the first requirement, “[a] proposed class of at
least forty members presumptively satisfies the numerosity
requirement.”
Avilez v. Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., 286 F.R.D. 450,
456 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also, Collins v. Cargill Meat Solutions
Corp., 274 F.R.D. 294, 300 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Wanger, J.) (“Courts
have routinely found the numerosity requirement satisfied when
the class comprises 40 or more members.”).
Here, plaintiff
estimates that the settlement class will contain “approximately
1,500 Class Members.”
(Pl.’s Mem. at 4.)
This satisfies Rule
23’s numerosity requirement.
b.
Commonality
Commonality requires that the class members’ claims
“depend upon a common contention” that is “capable of classwide
resolution--which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.”
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011).
7
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
“[A]ll questions of fact
1
and law need not be common to satisfy the rule,” and the
2
“existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual
3
predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts
4
coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.”
5
150 F.3d at 1019.
6
Hanlon,
Here, the settlement class is comprised of “[a]ll
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current and former California employees of Beverly Health and
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Rehabilitation Services, Inc. who were issued one or more wage
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statements from July 25, 2015, through September 1, 2016.”
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(Decl. of Robert Wasserman Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement ¶ 7.)
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These claims all flow from the same facts and legal claims that
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allege that defendants failed to furnish and maintain wage
13
statements that comply with the California Labor Code.
14
Accordingly, the settlement class meets Rule 23’s commonality
15
requirement.
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c.
Typicality
Typicality requires that the named plaintiff have
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claims “reasonably coextensive with those of absent class
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members,” but does not require their claims to be “substantially
20
identical.”
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“is whether other members have the same or similar injury,
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whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the
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named plaintiff[], and whether other class members have been
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injured by the same course of conduct.”
25
Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
26
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.
The test for typicality
Hanon v. Dataproducts
Again, plaintiff avers that defendants furnished and
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maintained wage statements for plaintiff and all other class
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members and that these statements failed to comply with the
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1
California Labor Code.
2
allegedly been injured by the same system-wide policies and
3
practices, received wage statements with the same deficiencies,
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and seek the same penalties.
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23’s typicality requirement.
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d.
7
Thus, plaintiff and class members have
Accordingly, plaintiff has met Rule
Adequacy of Representation
Rule 23(a)(4) requires a showing that the proposed
8
class representatives “will fairly and adequately protect the
9
interests of the class.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
In deciding
10
whether plaintiff has met that requirement, the court must answer
11
two questions: “(1) do the named plaintiff[] and [his] counsel
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have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2)
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will the named plaintiff[] and [his] counsel prosecute the action
14
vigorously on behalf of the class?”
15
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.
With respect to the first question, plaintiff is a
16
member of the class and her interests appear to be aligned with
17
those of the class.
18
would be beneficial to each class member, and there appears to be
19
no conflicts between plaintiff as class representative and the
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class members.
21
reward $4,500 to plaintiff, or 1% of the Gross Settlement Amount
22
in consideration for her service as class representative (Decl.
23
of Robert Wasserman ¶ 23), federal courts have generally held
24
that such awards do not create conflicts of interest as to defeat
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class settlements.
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27
28
1
Thus, any beneficial recovery for plaintiff
While the settlement provides for an incentive
1
See Staton, 327 F.3d at 977–78 (holding that
“Incentive awards are payments to class representatives
for their service to the class in bringing the lawsuit.”
Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2013).
9
1
“reasonable incentive payments” do not create conflicts of
2
interest as to defeat class settlements); Hopson v. Hanesbrands
3
Inc., Civ. No. 08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
4
Apr. 3, 2009) (“In general, courts have found that $5,000
5
incentive payments are reasonable.”); Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252
6
F.R.D. 652, 669 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (holding the same).
7
have held the same with respect to class counsel’s plans to apply
8
for a 33% attorneys’ fee.
9
2:14-25851 WBS AC, 2016 WL 3538354, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 28,
The courts
See Garnett v. ADT, LLC, Civ. No.
10
2016) (counsel’s application for 33% fee does not defeat class
11
certification).
12
In contrast, each member of the proposed class will
13
recover approximately $175 under the terms of the settlement
14
agreement.
15
the plaintiff is somewhat disproportionate to the recovery of
16
other class members.
17
L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 463 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.) (finding
18
$7,500 incentive award unreasonable when average class member
19
would receive $65.79 and reducing the award to $2,500).
20
disproportionality does not automatically render plaintiff an
21
inadequate class representative, but it gives the court pause,
22
particularly given the lack of evidence before the court
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demonstrating the quality of plaintiff’s representative service.2
(Pl.’s Mem. at 4.)
An incentive award of $4,500 to
See, e.g., Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores,
This
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2
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26
27
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In his declaration, plaintiff’s counsel states
“Plaintiff . . . has demonstrated her ability to advocate for the
interests of the putative class by initiating this litigation,
bringing about the June 2016 and September 2016 revisions to
defendants’ wage statements, and helping facilitate the
Settlement for which approval is now sought. (Decl. of Robert
Wasserman ¶ 23.) Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel states plaintiff
10
1
However, the incentive award is not dispositive of
2
plaintiff’s adequacy, and its justification can be further
3
explored at the final Fairness Hearing.
4
at 662-63, 669 (certifying plaintiff as an adequate class
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representative “pending the introduction at the final fairness
6
hearing of evidence in support of counsel’s findings”).
7
Accordingly, the court preliminarily finds that the proposed
8
incentive award does not render plaintiff an inadequate
9
representative of the class.
See Alberto, 252 F.R.D.
On or before the date of the
10
Fairness Hearing, however, the parties shall present or be
11
prepared to present evidence of the named plaintiff’s efforts
12
taken as class representative, such as her hours of service or an
13
itemized list of his activities, to justify the discrepancy
14
between her award and those of the unnamed plaintiffs.3
15
“Although there are no fixed standards by which [the
16
second question of Hanlon] can be assayed, considerations include
17
competency of counsel and . . . an assessment of the rationale
18
for not pursuing further litigation.”
19
Here, plaintiff has provided evidence that class counsel has
20
substantial experience in prosecuting class actions, including
21
employment actions and wage-and-hour matters.
22
Wasserman ¶¶ 25-28.)
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021.
(Decl. of Robert
Class counsel decided to forgo further
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24
25
26
27
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has participated in discovery and traveled to attend a full-day
of mediation. (Id. ¶ 24.)
3
The settlement also includes an individual settlement
payment to plaintiff. Separate and apart from the class claims,
plaintiff agreed to settle her individual and retaliation claims
against defendant. Plaintiff requests, and the court
preliminarily approves, a payment of $15,000 in settlement of her
individual claims. (Decl. of Robert Wasserman Ex. 2 § G.)
11
1
litigation after engaging in “extensive formal and informal
2
investigation and discovery,” “months of [] negotiation,” and
3
assessment of the risks of further litigation including
4
“anticipate[d] challenges to both class certification and the
5
merits of the Action” and costs.
6
the court finds that plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel are
7
adequate representatives of the class, and therefore plaintiff
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has satisfied all of the requirements set forth in Rule 23(a).
9
10
2.
(Id. ¶¶ 2-8, 12.)
Accordingly,
Rule 23(b)
An action that meets all the prerequisites of Rule
11
23(a) may be certified as a class action only if it also
12
satisfies the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of
13
Rule 23(b).
Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th
14
Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
15
which provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1)
16
“the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class
17
members predominate over questions affecting only individual
18
members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other
19
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
20
controversy.”
21
22
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
a. Predominance
“Because Rule 23(a)(3) already considers commonality,
23
the focus of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry is on the
24
balance between individual and common issues.”
25
F.R.D. at 476 (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022); see also
26
Windsor, 521 U.S. at 623 (“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry
27
tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
28
warrant adjudication by representation.”).
12
Murillo, 266
1
As previously discussed, the claims of class members in
2
this case appear to raise similar, if not identical questions of
3
fact and law.
4
nucleus of facts and potential legal remedies dominates this
5
litigation.”
6
“predominance” requirement has been satisfied.
7
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022.
Accordingly, the
b. Superiority
8
9
Thus, the class claims demonstrate “[a] common
Rule 23(b)(3) also requires “that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
10
adjudicating the controversy.”
11
sets forth four non-exhaustive factors in determining
12
“superiority”: (a) class members’ interests in individually
13
controlling the litigation; (b) the extent and nature of any
14
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by class
15
members; (c) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in
16
the particular forum; and (d) likely difficulties in managing a
17
class action.
18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
It
Id.
Here, each class member stands to receive approximately
19
$175, depending upon the number of wage statements each
20
participating class member actually received during the class
21
period.
22
likely low given that all of the members stand to recover
23
relatively little compared to the costs of individual litigation.
24
Additionally, the court is unaware of any reason why this forum
25
would be undesirable, and neither party alleges that managing
26
this class action would present undue difficulties.
27
28
Thus, class members’ interest in litigating this case is
Furthermore, separate litigation “would be expensive
and time-consuming and would create the danger of conflicting
13
1
decisions as to persons similarly situated.”
2
Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.
3
1978).
4
to a class action, plaintiffs have satisfied the “superiority”
5
requirement.
6
244 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “if a
7
comparative evaluation of other procedures reveals no other
8
realistic possibilities, this superiority portion of Rule
9
23(b)(3) has been satisfied.”).
See Lerwill v.
Accordingly, because there is no reasonable alternative
See Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.,
10
3.
Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements
11
If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it
12
“must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable
13
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
14
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”
15
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
16
content of a proposed notice.
17
651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
18
417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)).
19
“reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff
20
class,” actual notice is not required.
21
1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
22
Fed.
Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and
See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D.
Although that notice must be
Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d
The parties agree that Atticus Administration, LLC
23
(“Atticus”) will serve as the claims administrator.
(Decl. of
24
Robert Wasserman ¶ 18.)
25
soliciting bids from Rust Consulting, Inc., CPT Group, Inc.,
26
Simpluris, Inc., and Atticus.
The parties settled on Atticus after
(Id.)
27
Here, the parties agree that within fourteen calendar
28
days after preliminary approval, defendant will provide Atticus
14
1
in an accessible electronic format the name, last known address,
2
and social security number of each class member.
3
Agreement § 48).
4
verifications as necessary prior to the first meeting.
5
Within fourteen calendar days after receipt of the class list by
6
defendant, Atticus shall send the class members, by first-class
7
mail, at their last known mailing address or other address
8
located by Atticus, the approved class notice.
9
(Settlement
Atticus will perform address updates and
(Id.)
(Id. § 49).
The parties have also supplied a proposed “Notice of
10
Pendency of Class Action, Preliminary Approval of Settlement, and
11
Hearing for Final Approval.”
12
The notice identifies the parties, explains the nature of the
13
proceedings, defines the class, provides the terms of the
14
settlement, and explains the procedure for objecting or opting
15
out of the class.
16
the content of the notice satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
17
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen.
18
Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory
19
if it ‘generally describes the terms of the settlement in
20
sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to
21
investigate and to come forward and be heard.’” (quoting Mendoza
22
v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir.
23
1980))).
24
25
B.
(Decl. of Robert Wasserman Ex. 2.)
(Decl. of Robert Wasserman Ex. B.)
Therefore,
See Fed.
Preliminary Settlement Approval
After determining that the proposed class satisfies the
26
requirements of Rule 23, the court must determine whether the
27
terms of the parties’ settlement appear fair, adequate, and
28
reasonable.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at
15
1
1026.
2
factors,” including:
3
4
5
6
7
This process requires the court to “balance a number of
the strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation; the risk of maintaining class action
status throughout the trial; the amount offered in
settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of
counsel; the presence of a governmental participant;
and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement.
8
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
Many of these factors cannot be
9
considered until the final Fairness Hearing, so the court need
10
only conduct a preliminary review at this time to resolve any
11
“glaring deficiencies” in the settlement agreement before
12
authorizing notice to class members.
13
No. 2:08-567 WBS DAD, 2014 WL 3057506, at *12 (E.D. Cal. July 7,
14
2014) (citing Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 478).
Ontiveros v. Zamora, Civ.
15
1.
Terms of the Settlement Agreement
16
The key terms of the Settlement Agreement can be
17
summarized as follows:
18
(1)
Settlement Class: All current and former
19
California employees of Beverly Health and
20
Rehabilitation Services, Inc. who were issued one
21
or more wage statements from July 25, 2015,
22
through September 1, 2016. (Settlement Agreement
23
§ 7.)
24
(2)
Notice: Atticus, the claims administrator, shall
25
mail the class notice to the class members within
26
14 calendar days after receiving the Class List
27
from defendants.
28
to Atticus in an accessible electronic format by
The class list will be provided
16
1
defendant and will contain the following
2
information from each class member: name, last
3
known mailing address, and social security number.
4
The notice shall be mailed by Atticus, by first-
5
class mail, to class members at their last known
6
mailing address.
7
updates and verifications as necessary prior to
8
the first mailing.
9
Atticus will perform additional follow-up and will
10
re-mail the class notice to an updated address (if
11
any) within five calendar days of receipt of the
12
returned mail.
13
of the class list, or as otherwise directed by the
14
court, Atticus shall launch its information only
15
website.
16
contained in the class notice and the Order of
17
preliminary approval, the motion for final
18
approval, the motion for attorney’s fees, costs,
19
and service payment, and the Order of final
20
approval when each is filed with the court.
21
§§ 48-49.)
22
23
(3)
Atticus will perform address
If the mail is returned,
Within fourteen days after receipt
The website will contain the information
(Id.
Calculation of Individual Settlement Payments:
a. Step 1: The Gross Settlement Fund will be
24
deposited into the Qualified Settlement Fund.
25
b. Step 1: From the Gross Settlement Amount, the
26
27
28
following will be deducted:
i. The court-approved fees and costs of the
claims administrator;
17
1
ii. The court-approved payment to the Labor
2
Agency;
3
iii. The court-approved incentive payment to
4
the class representative; and
5
iv. The court-approved fees and costs of class
6
members.
7
c. Step 3:
Each participating class member’s
8
share of the Net Settlement Amount--the
9
remaining amount after all deductions--will
10
then be calculated as a percentage, the
11
numerator of which is the number of wage
12
statements he or she received between July 25,
13
2015 and September 1, 2016 (allocated points
14
for each wage statement), the denominator of
15
which is the total number of points allocated
16
for all Participating class members.
17
Participating class members who were also
18
parties to the Veurink Class Action Settlement
19
will not be allocated points for the wage
20
statements they received between July 25, 2015
21
and February 12, 2016.
22
wage statements issued and number of wage
23
statements issued to each participating class
24
member shall be determined using defendants’
25
records.
26
(4)
Opt-Out Procedure:
The total number of
To opt-out of the settlement,
27
a class member must, within forty-five calendar
28
days from the date of mailing of the class notice,
18
1
submit their desire to opt-out in writing to
2
Atticus indicating his or her full name, current
3
home (or mailing address), and the last four
4
digits of his or her social security number as
5
well as written affirmation of the desire to opt-
6
out containing the following or substantially
7
similar language:
8
“I elect to opt-out of the Ahmed v. Beverly
9
Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., et
10
al. class action settlement.
11
that by doing so, I will not be able to
12
participate in the settlement and will not
13
receive a share of the settlement proceeds.”
14
15
I understand
(Id. § 40.)
(5)
Objections to Settlement: Any class member who
16
wishes to object to the proposed settlement at the
17
final Approval Hearing must, within forty-five
18
calendar days from the date of mailing of the
19
class notice, submit their objection in writing to
20
Atticus.
21
clearly identify the case name and number, include
22
the class member’s full name, address, telephone
23
number, and the last four digits of his or her
24
social security number, concisely state the
25
grounds for their objection, whether they would
26
like to appear at the final Approval Hearing, and
27
be filed in writing with Atticus.
28
who have filed a timely and proper objection may,
All objections and support papers must:
19
Class members
1
but are not required to, appear and present
2
argument at the final Approval Hearing in person
3
or through counsel.
4
the final Approval Hearing to object to the terms
5
of the settlement unless he or she has filed a
6
timely objection that complies with the procedures
7
herein.
8
individual objecting to the settlement must file a
9
notice of appearance with the court and serve
No class member may appear at
Any attorney who will represent an
10
counsel for all parties no later than forty-five
11
calendar days after the class notice if first
12
mailed.
13
(6)
(Id.)
Settlement Amount: Defendant will pay $450,000 to
14
settle this case (referred to as the “Gross
15
Settlement Amount”).
16
includes payments to participating class members,
17
the fees and costs of the claims administrator,
18
the service payment to plaintiff, and class
19
counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as a
20
payment to the State of California.
21
Agreement §§ 34-36; Notice § 4.)
22
(7)
The Gross Settlement Amount
(Settlement
Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Plaintiff’s Incentive
23
Award: Defendant has agreed to pay class counsel
24
one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, or
25
$150,000, and reimbursement of litigation costs up
26
to $12,500.
27
to the court for a service payment to plaintiff in
28
an amount not to exceed $4,500, or one percent of
(Notice § 4.)
20
Plaintiff will apply
1
the Gross Settlement Amount, in consideration for
2
her service as a participating class member.
3
service payment is in addition to whatever
4
plaintiff is entitled to as a participating class
5
member.
6
(8)
This
(Settlement Agreement § 38.)
Settlement Distribution: After being reduced by
7
the fees and costs of the claims administrator,
8
the service payment to plaintiff, and class
9
counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as a
10
payment to the State of California, the remaining
11
settlement fund will be distributed by the claims
12
administrator to each participating class member
13
in the form of a check.
14
compensation from the settlement fund that remains
15
after the expiration of 180 days will be
16
transmitted by the claims administrator to the
17
State of California Unclaimed Property Fund, to be
18
held there in the name of and for the benefit of
19
such class members under California’s escheatment
20
laws.
21
(9)
Any uncashed settlement
(Settlement Agreement §§ 42, 44.)
Release: Class members who participate in the
22
settlement agree to “release Defendants and the
23
Releases [] from any and all claims based upon
24
Defendants’ alleged failure to furnish and/or
25
maintain accurate wage statements under Labor Code
26
section 226(a), or the California Labor Code
27
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code
28
section 2698 et. seq., based on any violation of
21
1
Labor Code section 226(a), whether known or
2
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, that existed or
3
came into existence between July 25, 2015 and
4
September 1, 2016.
5
also agree to release defendants and releases from
6
any and all claims based upon defendants’ alleged
7
failure to (i) furnish and/or maintain accurate
8
wage statements under Labor Code sections 226(a),
9
and (ii) to pay wages within seven days of the
10
close of each pay period in violation of Labor
11
Code section 204, between July 25, 2015 and
12
September 1, 2016.
13
to release defendants and releases from all
14
claims, demands, rights, liabilities and cause of
15
action of every nature and description whatsoever,
16
known or unknown, asserted or that could have been
17
asserted, for any violation of state and federal
18
law, arising out of, relating to, or in connection
19
with any act or omission by or on the part of
20
defendants and releases committed or omitted prior
21
to the execution of the settlement agreement
22
including a waiver of California Civil Code
23
section 1542.
24
additional $15,000 as consideration for the above,
25
and for which she will execute a separate
26
individual settlement agreement.
(Id. §§ 50-51.)
Class Members
In addition, plaintiff agrees
Plaintiff will receive an
(Id. § 52.)
27
2. Preliminary Determination of Adequacy
28
At the preliminary stage, “the court need only
22
1
‘determine whether the proposed settlement is within the range of
2
possible approval.’”
3
Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982)).
4
This generally requires consideration of “whether the proposed
5
settlement discloses grounds to doubt its fairness or other
6
obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of
7
class representatives or segments of the class, or excessive
8
compensation of attorneys.”
9
Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 04-438 WBS GGH, 2006 WL 1652598, at *11-12
Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479 (quoting
Id. (quoting West v. Circle K
10
(E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006)).
Courts often begin by examining the
11
process that led to the settlement’s terms to ensure that those
12
terms are “the result of vigorous, arms-length bargaining” and
13
then turn to the substantive terms of the agreement.
14
West, 2006 WL 1652598, at *11-12; In re Tableware Antitrust
15
Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
16
(“[P]reliminary approval of a settlement has both a procedural
17
and a substantive component.”).
See, e.g.,
18
a. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement
19
Here, plaintiff’s counsel states that the settlement
20
agreement is the result of formal and informal settlement
21
negotiations, including the voluntary exchange of extensive
22
information and documents related to claims in this case.
23
P. & A at 3.)
24
was informed by the time and expense that both sides would incur
25
in the course of further litigation, given the anticipation of a
26
vigorous and lengthy challenge to both class certification and
27
the merits of the action.
28
these considerations, the court sees no reason to second-guess
(Pl.’s
Counsel further states that the decision to settle
(Pl.’s P. & A. at 15.)
23
In light of
1
counsel’s determination that settlement is in the best interest
2
of the class.
3
942 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that a settlement reached after
4
informed negotiations “is entitled to a degree of deference as
5
the private consensual decision of the parties” (citing Hanlon,
6
150 F.3d at 1027)).
7
b. Amount Recovered and Distribution
8
9
See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939,
In determining whether a settlement agreement is
substantively fair to the class, the court must balance the value
10
of expected recovery against the value of the settlement offer.
11
See Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
12
consideration of the uncertainty class members would face if the
13
case were litigated to trial.
14
*14.
15
This inquiry may involve
See Ontiveros, 2014 WL 3057506, at
Here, class members may claim penalties under section
16
226(e) of approximately $100 per wage statement.
17
at 14.)
18
occur after years of costly litigation.
19
defendants’ records, it is estimated that the average individual
20
settlement payment for each participating class member will be
21
approximately $175.
22
there is not a significant difference between the settlement
23
amount and the possible recovery under section 226(e).
24
the value of recovery is significant in light of the “significant
25
amount of uncertainty” class members would face if the case were
26
litigated to trial.
27
28
(Pl.’s P. & A.
However, recovery is far from guaranteed and could only
(Id.)
Based upon
(Decl. of Robert Wasserman ¶ 15.)
Here,
Moreover,
Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 480.
Turning to the distribution of this amount, Atticus, is
an experienced claims administrator.
24
(Declaration of Robert
1
Wasserman ¶ 18.)
2
fees are $15,882.
3
awarded by other judges of this district in similar cases.
4
e.g., Adoma, 913 F.Supp.2d at 985 (approving a $19,000 fee for
5
Simpluris, a claims administrator, to manage 1,725-member class);
6
Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 484 (E.D.
7
Cal. 2010) (Wanger, J.) (approving a $25,000 fee for a settlement
8
administrator that managed 177 class members).
9
counsel’s claims estimate of actual litigation costs of up to
Class counsel indicates that Atticus’s expected
(Id.)
These fees are consistent with those
See,
Likewise, class
10
$12,500 do not appear unreasonable at this stage in the
11
litigation.
12
Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 646 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (awarding $111,002.22
13
in costs where defendant agreed to create a settlement fund of at
14
least $7 million); Loretz v. Regal Stone, Ltd., 756 F. Supp. 2d
15
1203, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (awarding a total of over $70,000 in
16
costs to two law firms acting as class counsel).
17
(Pl.’s P. & A. at 20); See, e.g., Hartless v. Clorox
The parties also allocate $4,500, or 1% of the Gross
18
Settlement Amount, to the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”)
19
claims.
20
aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent
21
to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency for enforcement of
22
labor laws, . . . and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.”
23
Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.
24
PAGA claims, 75% or $3,375 will be paid to the Labor Agency, and
25
25% or $1,125 will be returned to the Net Settlement Amount.
26
(Settlement Agreement § 45.)
27
approved by other courts in class actions with PAGA components.
28
See Munoz v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., Civ. No. 07-970 MHP, 2009
Pursuant to PAGA, “civil penalties recovered by
Here, of the $4,5000 allocated to the
This amount is in the range
25
1
WL 1626376, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2009) (approving $60,000 or
2
2% of the total settlement be sent to the California Labor Agency
3
pursuant to PAGA); Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc., Civ. No. 08-844
4
EDL, 2009 WL 928133, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (approving
5
PAGA settlement of $1,500 or .03%); Schiller v. David’s Bridal,
6
Inc., Civ. No. 1:10-616-AWI, 2012 WL 2117001, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
7
June 11, 2012) (Oberto, J.) (approving $7,500 to California Labor
8
Agency for payment of civil penalties where Maximum Settlement
9
Amount totaled $518,245).
10
Accordingly, the court finds such
amount is reasonable and sufficient under the circumstances.
11
The court therefore concludes that the substance of the
12
settlement is fair to class members and thereby “falls within the
13
range of possible approval.”
14
3. Attorneys’ Fees
15
Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
If a negotiated class action settlement includes an
16
award of attorneys’ fees, that fee award must be evaluated in the
17
overall context of the settlement.
18
312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Monterrubio, 291 F.R.D. at
19
455.
20
the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the
21
parties have already agreed to an amount.”
22
Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011).
Knisley v. Network Assocs.,
The court “ha[s] an independent obligation to ensure that
23
In re Bluetooth
Here, class counsel seeks fees under the common fund
24
doctrine.
“Under the ‘common fund’ doctrine, ‘a litigant or a
25
lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons
26
other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable
27
attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.”
28
969 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).
26
Staton, 327 F.3d at
1
The Ninth Circuit has approved two methods of assigning
2
attorneys’ fees in common fund cases: the “percentage of the
3
fund” method and the “lodestar” method.
4
Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In re Wash.
5
Pub. Power Supply Sys. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1295–96 (9th Cir.
6
1994)).
7
counsel a percentage of the common fund recovered for the class.
8
Id.
9
fund cases, where “the benefit to the class is easily
Vizcaino v. Microsoft
Under the percentage method, the court may award class
The percentage method is particularly appropriate in common
10
quantified.”
11
approved a “benchmark” percentage of twenty-five percent, and
12
courts may adjust this figure upwards or downwards if the record
13
shows “‘special circumstances’ justifying a departure.”
14
(quoting Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904
15
F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)).
16
Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942.
The Ninth Circuit has
Id.
The settlement agreement provides that class counsel
17
will apply to the court for a fee in an amount not to exceed
18
$150,000, or one-third, of the Gross Settlement Account.
19
(Settlement Agreement § 39.)
20
Gross Settlement Account.
21
settlement agreement is not contingent upon court approval of the
22
full amount of the requested attorneys’ fees and that a court
23
order granting a lesser fee will not invalidate the settlement
24
agreement. (Id.)
25
fees in class actions for as much as one-third to forty percent
26
of the common fund in similar actions.
27
Specialists, Civ. No. 06-5778 JCS, 2011 WL 1230826, at *29 (N.D.
28
Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (finding attorneys’ fees amounting to just
The fees are to be paid from the
(Id.)
The parties agree that the
Courts have approved payments of attorneys’
27
Wren v. RGIS Inventory
1
under 42% of the settlement amount appropriate and reasonable);
2
Bond v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., Civ. No. 1:09-1662 OWW MJS, 2011
3
WL 2648879, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) (“[T]he exact
4
percentage [of attorneys’ fees] varies depending on the facts of
5
the case, and in most common fund cases, the award exceeds [the
6
25%] benchmark.”); Castillo v. ADT, LLC, Civ. No. 2:15-383 WBS
7
DB, 2017 WL 363108, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) (finding
8
attorneys’ fees amounting to 33% reasonable).
9
Accordingly, the court will preliminarily approve the
10
fee award on the understanding that plaintiff’s counsel must
11
demonstrate, on or before the date of the final Fairness Hearing,
12
that the proposed award is reasonable in light of the court’s
13
concerns.
14
court will be forced to reduce fees to a reasonable amount or to
15
deny final approval of this settlement.
16
at 1047; Alberto, 252 F.R.D. at 667–68.
17
In the event that counsel is unable to do so, the
See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for
18
preliminary certification of a conditional settlement class and
19
preliminary approval of the class action settlement (Docket No.
20
34) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
21
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
22
(1)
Defendant and the claims administrator shall
23
notify class members of the settlement in the manner specified in
24
the settlement agreement (Docket 34-2 Ex. 1);
25
(2) Class members who wish to opt-out of the settlement
26
must submit such opt-out in writing to the clams administrator in
27
accordance with the procedures set forth in the settlement
28
agreement and class notice, postmarked no later than forty-five
28
1
2
calendar days after the mailing of the class notice;
(3) Any class member who wishes to object to the
3
settlement must submit such objection in writing to the claims
4
administrator in accordance with the procedures set forth in the
5
settlement agreement and class notice, postmarked no later than
6
forty-five calendar days after the mailing of the class notice;
7
(4) Class members who have not complied with the
8
procedures set forth in the settlement agreement and class notice
9
shall not be permitted to speak at the final Approval Hearing;
10
(5) Subject to further consideration by the court at
11
the time of the final Approval Hearing, the proposed service
12
payment of $4,500, or 1% of the gross settlement amount, for
13
plaintiff Henna Ahmed, in consideration of her services as class
14
representative, is preliminarily approved;
15
(6)
Subject to further consideration by the court at
16
the time of the final Approval Hearing, the class counsel’s
17
request of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $150,000 service or
18
one-third of the gross settlement amount, and declared costs of
19
up to $12,500, are preliminary approved;
20
(7) Subject to further consideration by the court at
21
the time of the final Approval Hearing, the court preliminarily
22
approves, pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(l)(2),
23
the parties’ allocation of $4,500 to settlement of claims under
24
the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004;
25
(8) the following class be provisionally certified for
26
the purpose of the settlement: all current and former California
27
employees of Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc. who
28
were issued one or more wage statements from July 25, 2015,
29
1
2
through September 1, 2016;
(9) Plaintiff Henna Ahmed is conditionally certified as
3
the class representative to implement the parties' settlement in
4
accordance with the settlement agreement.
5
Hurley P.C., by and through Lead Counsel Robert J. Wasserman,
6
William J. Gorham, Nicholas J. Scardigli, and Vladimir J. Kozina,
7
is her, is conditionally appointed as class counsel. Plaintiffs
8
and Mayall Hurley P.C. must fairly and adequately protect the
9
class’s interests;
10
The law firm of Mayall
(10) The parties agree that Atticus Administration, LLC
11
will serve as the settlement administrator.
12
approves declared fees and costs of administering the settlement
13
of up to $16,000;
14
The court also
(11) If the settlement agreement terminates for any
15
reason, the following will occur: (a) class certification will be
16
automatically vacated; (b) plaintiff will stop functioning as
17
class representative; and (c) this action will revert to its
18
previous status in all respects as it existed immediately before
19
the parties executed the settlement agreement;
20
(12) All discovery and pretrial proceedings and
21
deadlines are stayed and suspended until further notice from the
22
court, except for such actions as are necessary to implement the
23
settlement agreement and this Order;
24
(13) The final Approval Hearing is set for May 14, 2018
25
at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom No. 5, to determine whether the
26
settlement agreement should be finally approved as fair,
27
reasonable, and adequate.
28
plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and service
The court will also consider
30
1
payment;
2
(14) The court approves the establishment of a
3
Qualified Settlement Fund pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 to
4
receive, hold, and distribute the gross settlement amount in
5
accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement and this
6
Order, and that the qualified settlement agreement and the claims
7
administrator will be subject to the continuing jurisdiction of
8
this court;
9
(15) Based on the date this Order is signed and the
10
date of the final Approval Hearing, the following are the certain
11
associated dates in this settlement:
12
(a) Defendant shall provide the contact
13
information of the class members (“class list”) to
14
the claims administrator within 14 calendar days
15
of the entry of this Order;
16
(b) The claims administrator shall launch its
17
information only website within 14 calendar days
18
after receiving the class list;
19
(c) The last day for class members to file a
20
claim, request exclusion, or object to the
21
settlement is 45 calendar days after the mailing
22
of the notice;
23
(16) Plaintiff shall file a motion for attorneys’ fees
24
no later than 35 calendar days after the mailing of the class
25
notice.
26
Dated:
February 6, 2018
27
28
31
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