Ahmed v. Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., et al.

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 4/24/18. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motions for final certification, final approval of class action settlement, attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award (Docket Nos. 44 , 45 ) are, GRANTED. CASE CLOSED (Becknal, R)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HENNA AHMED, an individual, 12 13 14 15 16 17 Civ. No. 2:16-1747 WBS KJN Plaintiff, v. BEVERLY HEALTH AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.; GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC; and DOES 1100, inclusive, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff Henna Ahmed brought this putative class- 20 action lawsuit against defendants Beverly Health and 21 Rehabilitation Services, Inc. (“Beverly Health”), GGNSC 22 Administrative Services, LLC (“GGNSC Services”), and Does 1-100, 23 alleging that defendants violated the California Labor Code. 24 Presently before the court are plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for 25 final approval of the class action settlement (Docket No. 44) and 26 unopposed Motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and class 27 representative service payment. (Docket No. 45.) 28 1 1 I. Discussion1 2 Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or 3 defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the 4 court’s approval.” 5 involves a two-step process in which the Court first determines 6 whether a proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary 7 approval and then, after notice is given to class members, 8 whether final approval is warranted.” 9 Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 10 (citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Third), § 30.41 (1995)). 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “Approval under 23(e) Nat’l Rural Telecomms. The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy 12 favoring settlement of class actions. 13 of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). 14 where, as here, “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior 15 to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed 16 compromise to ratify both [1] the propriety of the certification 17 and [2] the fairness of the settlement.” 18 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). 19 Class Plaintiffs v. City Nevertheless, Staton v. Boeing Co., The first part of the inquiry requires the court to 20 “pay ‘undiluted, even heightened, attention’ to class 21 certification requirements” because, unlike in a fully litigated 22 class action suit, the court “will lack the opportunity . . . to 23 adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.” 24 Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see also 25 26 27 28 1 To avoid repetition, the court will refrain from reciting the factual and procedural background, which remains the same as in its February 7, 2018 Order granting plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement and provisional certification of the class. (Feb. 7, 2018 Order (Docket No. 39).) 2 1 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 2 In the second stage, the court holds a fairness hearing 3 where the court entertains any class member’s objections to (1) 4 the treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) the 5 terms of the settlement. 6 Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989) (hearing prior to 7 final approval of a dismissal or compromise of class claims 8 required to “inquire into the terms and circumstances of any 9 dismissal or compromise to ensure it is not collusive or See Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac. is 10 prejudicial”). 11 final determination as to whether the court should allow the 12 parties to settle the class action pursuant to the agreed-upon 13 terms. 14 15 A. Following such a hearing, the court must reach a See DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 525. Class Certification A class action will be certified only if it meets the 16 four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and additionally fits 17 within one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). 18 P. 23(a)-(b). 19 determining whether the moving party has satisfied each Rule 23 20 requirement, the court must conduct a rigorous inquiry before 21 certifying a class. 22 (1979); Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). Fed. R. Civ. Although a district court has discretion in See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 23 1. 24 Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 25 26 27 28 Rule 23(a) 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These requirements are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. In the court’s Order granting preliminary approval of the settlement, the court found that the putative class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements. Because the court is not aware of any facts that would alter its initial Rule 23(a) analysis, the court finds that the class definition proposed by plaintiff meets the requirements of Rule 23(a). 2. Rule 23(b) An action that meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) may be certified as a class action only if it also satisfies the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1) “the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In its Order granting preliminary approval of the settlement, the court found that both prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied. The court is unaware of any changes that would affect this conclusion, and the parties indicated that they were aware of no such developments. Because the settlement class satisfies both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the court will 28 4 1 grant final class certification of this action. 2 3. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements 3 If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it 4 “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable 5 under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 6 members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” 7 R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 8 content of a proposed notice. 9 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Fed. Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 10 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). 11 “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff 12 class,” actual notice is not required. 13 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 14 Although that notice must be Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d Here, the parties agreed that Atticus Administration, 15 LLC (“Atticus”) would serve as the claims administrator. 16 (Wasserman Decl. ¶ 23 (Docket No. 44-2).) 17 and provided Atticus with the class members’ names, last known 18 addresses, and the number of wage statements received. 19 Decl. ¶ 9 (Docket No. 44-4).) 20 potential class members. 21 by the parties were processed and updated utilizing the National 22 Change of Address Database maintained by the U.S. Postal Service. 23 (Id. ¶ 10.) 24 each class member via certified mail. 25 date, Atticus launched a toll-free line that class members could 26 call for information and also launched a settlement website which 27 contains, among other things, a viewable, printable, and (Id.) Defendant identified (Longley The parties identified 1,447 The mailing addresses identified On March 1, 2018, the class notice was mailed to 28 5 (Id. ¶ 11.) On the same 1 downloadable copy of the full notice.2 2 represents that just 49 class notices remain undeliverable, for a 3 successful mail rate of 97%. (Longley Decl. ¶ 11.) 4 only one class member elected to exclude herself from the 5 settlement, and no class members objected to the settlement. 6 (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16; Longley Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6 (Docket No. 46).)3 (Id. ¶ 14.) Atticus In addition, 7 The notice identifies the parties, explains the nature 8 of the proceedings, defines the class, provides the terms of the 9 settlement, and explains the procedure for objecting or opting 10 out of the class. 11 explains how class members’ individual settlement awards will be 12 calculated and the amount that class members can expect to 13 receive. 14 satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). 15 also Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 16 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally 17 describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to 18 alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (Longley Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. C.) (Id. Ex. C.) The notice also Therefore, the content of the notice See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see 2 However, the initial notice contained two typographical errors, specifically: (1) the class period was incorrectly stated on the first page as extending from July 25, 2016--instead of July 25, 2015--through September 1, 2016; and (2) an incorrect website address. On March 13, 2018, a supplemental notice, approved by the court, was mailed to the class members that notified them of typographical errors in the class notice. (Id. ¶ 13.) In addition, the parties agreed to operate two websites, the website address included in the initial notice and the corrected notice, so that interested class members could obtain the information from either website. (March 8, 2018 Order ¶ 4 (Docket No. 43).) 3 On April 19, 2018, the parties filed a supplemental declaration to inform the court that only one class member optedout and that Atticus did not receive any objections. 6 1 forward and be heard.’” (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 2 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980))). 3 B. Rule 23(e): Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness of 4 Proposed Settlement 5 Having determined that class treatment is warranted, 6 the court must now address whether the terms of the parties’ 7 settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable. 8 this analysis, the court must balance several factors, including: 9 the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. 10 11 12 13 In conducting 14 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. But see In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. 15 Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The factors in 16 a court’s fairness assessment will naturally vary from case to 17 case.”). 18 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case 19 An important consideration is the strength of 20 plaintiff’s case on the merits compared to the settlement amount 21 offered. 22 required to reach an ultimate conclusion of the merits, “for it 23 is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of 24 wastefulness and expensive litigation that induce consensual 25 settlements.” 26 & County of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). 27 28 DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 526. The court, however, is not Officers for Justice v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City The settlement terms compare favorably to the uncertainties with respect to liability in this case. 7 If the 1 case had not settled, defendant would have opposed any class 2 certification request and would have continued to assert legal 3 and factual grounds to defend itself. 4 (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 19 (Docket No. 44-1).) 5 the risk that civil penalties sought under the Private Attorneys 6 General Act (“PAGA”) would be reduced, possibly significantly, if 7 the court determined that imposition of full penalties would be 8 unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, or confiscatory. 9 Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2)).) 10 (Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. Plaintiff also faced (Id. (citing In comparing the strength of plaintiff’s case with the 11 proposed settlement, the court finds that the proposed settlement 12 is a fair resolution of the issues in this case. 13 2. 14 Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation 15 As explained above, further litigation could greatly 16 delay resolution of this case and increase expenses. 17 settlement, the parties would likely have had to litigate class 18 certification and summary judgment, both of which would require 19 additional discovery, time, and expense. 20 addition, defendants may have appealed any favorable judgment. 21 (Id.) 22 23 24 Absent (Pl.’s Mem. at 20.) In Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of settlement. 3. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial If the case proceeded to trial, plaintiff would have 25 faced several risks regarding the maintenance of class status 26 throughout trial, including establishing that the alleged 27 violations were knowing and intentional and that class members 28 suffered injury as a result of the inaccurate wage statements. 8 1 (Pl.’s Mem. at 20.) 2 vigorous and lengthy challenge to class certification and the 3 merits of the action. 4 also weighs in favor of settlement. In addition, plaintiff anticipated a (Id. at 19.) Accordingly, this factor 5 4. Amount Offered in Settlement 6 In assessing the amount offered in settlement, “[i]t is 7 the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual 8 component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” 9 Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 628. “It is well-settled law 10 that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the 11 potential recovery will not per se render the settlement 12 inadequate or unfair.” 13 consideration of the uncertainty class members would face if the 14 case were litigated to trial. 15 F.R.D. 356, 370-71 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 16 Id. This inquiry may involve See Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 The gross settlement amount in this case is $450,000. 17 (Wasserman Decl. ¶ 12.) The parties have agreed to distribute 18 the amount as follows: (1) class counsel will receive a fee of 19 $150,000, equal to one third of the gross settlement amount, 20 (Pl.’s Mem. at 24); (2) plaintiff will receive an incentive 21 reward of $4,500, (id.); (3) $4,500 will go to pay any civil 22 penalties that could be awarded and of that amount $3,375 will be 23 paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency in 24 satisfaction of defendants’ alleged penalties under the Labor 25 Code Private Attorney General’s Act (id. at 8); (4) $12,500 will 26 go towards litigation costs (Settlement Agreement at 4 (Docket 27 4402); (5) $16,000 will be paid to Atticus Administration (id.); 28 and (6) the remaining amount, $263,625, will be distributed to 9 1 the settlement class based on the number of wage statements 2 issued to each class member, (see id. at 3.) 3 separate and apart from the claims made on a class and 4 representative basis, plaintiff asserted individual claims for 5 alleged violations of the FEHA, and plaintiff has agreed to 6 settle those claims in exchange for $15,000. Additionally, (Pl.’s Mem. at 9.) 7 Each of the 1,446 participating class members will 8 receive an average individual settlement payment of $182.31. 9 (Pl.’s Mem. at 21.) In addition, as a result of the efforts of 10 class counsel, defendants have twice reviewed and amended their 11 policies and procedures associated with the furnishing and 12 maintenance of wage statements so as to ensure compliance with 13 Labor Code sections 226(a)(6), 226(a)(8) and 204. 14 Decl. ¶ 11 (Docket No. 44-2); Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. for 15 Attorneys’ Fees (“Pl.’s Mem. II”) at 1 (Docket No. 45-1).) 16 (Wasserman In light of the risks and expense of further litigation 17 in this matter, the court finds the settlement amount to be fair 18 and adequate. 19 5. Extent of Discovery and State of Proceedings 20 A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the 21 proceedings indicates that the parties carefully investigated the 22 claims before reaching a resolution. 23 No. 07-1895 WBS DAD, 2008 WL 4891201, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 24 2008). 25 conducted a significant amount of discovery, took depositions, 26 reviewed hundreds of pages of documents, and participated in 27 mediation. 28 the claims through extensive formal and informal discovery weigh Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., Civ. Before a settlement was reached, the parties in this case (Pl.’s Mem. at 21-22.) 10 The parties’ investigation of 1 in favor of settlement. 2 6. Experience and Views of Counsel 3 “When approving class action settlements, the court 4 must give considerable weight to class counsel’s opinions due to 5 counsel’s familiarity with the litigation and its previous 6 experience with class action lawsuits.” 7 Elec. Co., Civ. No. 2:08-1974 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 2889728, at *8 8 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010). 9 that class counsel has substantial experience in prosecuting Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Here, plaintiff has provided evidence 10 class actions, including employment actions and wage-and-hour 11 matters. 12 plaintiff’s counsel believe the proposed settlement is fair, 13 reasonable, and adequate to the class under the circumstances, as 14 it reflects a reasoned compromise which not only takes into 15 consideration the inherent risks in wage and hour class 16 litigation, but the various issues in this case which had the 17 potential to substantially reduce or completely eliminate 18 recovery by class members. 19 supports approval of the settlement agreement. (Wasserman Decl. ¶¶ 34-37.) Based on their experience, (Pl.’s Mem. at 23.) This factor 20 7. 21 No governmental entity participated in this matter; 22 23 24 25 Presence of Government Participant this factor, therefore, is irrelevant to the court’s analysis. 8. Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed Settlement Notice of the settlement was sent to 1,447 26 participating class members and only one has elected to opt-out 27 of the settlement agreement, and not a single class member has 28 filed an objection to its terms. 11 (Pl.’s Mem. at 23.) “It is 1 established that the absence of a large number of objections to a 2 proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that 3 the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to 4 the class members.” 5 this factor weighs in favor of the court’s approval of the 6 settlement. DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 529. Accordingly, 7 9. 8 Having considered the foregoing factors, the court 9 10 11 Conclusion finds that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable pursuant to Rule 23(e). C. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. Attorneys’ Fees 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, “[i]n a 13 certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s 14 fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the 15 parties’ agreement.” 16 includes an award of attorney’s fees, that fee award must be 17 evaluated in the overall context of the settlement. 18 Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Monterrubio 19 v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 20 (England, J.). 21 ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, 22 even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” 23 Headset, 654 F.3d at 941. 24 If a negotiated class action settlement Knisley v. The court “ha[s] an independent obligation to Bluetooth “Under the ‘common fund’ doctrine, ‘a litigant or a 25 lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons 26 other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable 27 attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.’” 28 969 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)). 12 Staton, 327 F.3d at 1 In common fund cases, the district court has discretion to 2 determine the amount of attorney’s fees to be drawn from the fund 3 by employing either the percentage method or the lodestar method. 4 Id. 5 the other method. The court may also use one method as a “cross-check[ ]” upon 6 See Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 944. “Despite this discretion, use of the percentage method 7 in common fund cases appears to be dominant.” In re Omnivision 8 Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing 9 cases). “Because the benefit to the class is easily quantified 10 in common-fund settlements, [the Ninth Circuit has] allowed 11 courts to award attorneys a percentage of the common fund in lieu 12 of the often more time-consuming task of calculating the 13 lodestar.” 14 ease of calculation and the frequent use of the percentage-of- 15 recovery method in common fund cases, the court thus adopts this 16 method. 17 Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 942. Because of the Under the percentage-of-recovery method, the court may 18 award class counsel a percentage of the total settlement fund. 19 Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 Here, class counsel requests $150,000 in attorneys’ fees. 21 (“Pl.’s Mem. II at 1.) 22 The attorney’s fees requested by counsel constitute 33% of the 23 gross settlement amount. 24 counsel are below the lodestar figure of $189,018.25, which 25 counsel calculated based on 282.25 hours expended in this case 26 times rates of $717 for a partner, $440 for an associate, and Defendant does not oppose the request. The attorneys’ fees requested by 27 28 13 1 $195 for a paralegal.4 2 No. 45-2).) 3 number of hours worked. 4 (Wasserman Decl. II ¶ 30, Ex. 2 (Docket Counsel submitted detailed invoices justifying the (Id.) While the attorneys’ fees requested is above the 25% 5 “benchmark” set by the Ninth Circuit for “common fund” 6 settlements, see Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 7 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), courts in this circuit have 8 approved fees that exceeded that “benchmark” in many cases, see 9 Bond v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1662 OWW MJS, 2011 WL 10 2648879, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) (“[T]he exact percentage 11 [of attorneys’ fees] varies depending on the facts of the case, 12 and in most common fund cases, the award exceeds [the 25%] 13 benchmark.”). 14 settlement value” is considered “acceptable.” 15 “a review of California cases . . . reveals that courts usually 16 award attorneys’ fees in the 30-40% range in wage and hour class 17 actions that result in recovery of a common fun[d] under $10 18 million.” 19 2991486, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010). 20 that the requested fees in this case are below the lodestar 21 figure further supports granting approval. 22 F.3d at 1050 (“[T]he lode star ... provides a check on the 23 reasonableness of the percentage award.”). 24 25 26 27 28 A fees award amounting to “33 1/3 % of the total Id. Furthermore, Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc., Civ. No. 07-1182, 2010 WL In addition, the fact See Vizcaino, 290 In light of the fees usually awarded in these types of Counsel also states that he anticipates his firm will incur several thousand dollars of additional attorney’s fees in representing the Class through final judgment in this matter. (Id. ¶ 31.) The amount of fees was calculated up to April 2, 2018. However, no supplemental declaration was filed regarding additional fees incurred. 14 4 1 cases, the risks counsel incurred by taking this case on a 2 contingency basis, the time and effort spent litigating this 3 case, and the reasonable result they obtained for class members, 4 the court finds the requested fees to be reasonable. 5 Accordingly, the court will approve counsel’s requested fees. 6 D. Expenses 7 “There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a 8 common fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to 9 reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.” 10 In re Heritage Bond Litig., Civ. No. 02-1475, 2005 WL 1594403, at 11 *23 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005). 12 reimbursement for the out-of-pocket expenses they incurred during 13 this litigation in the amount of no more than $12,500. 14 Mem. II at 14.) 15 in actual out-of-pocket expenses. 16 a list of itemized costs including filing fees, copying, postage, 17 computerized legal research charges, and the cost of the 18 mediator. 19 reasonable litigation expenses, and it therefore will grant class 20 counsel’s request for compensation of in the amount of 21 $12,186.47. 22 E. 23 Here, plaintiff requests (Pl.’s To date, class counsel have incurred $12,186.47 (Id.) (Wasserman Decl. II Ex. 2.) Class counsel submitted The court finds these are Incentive Payment to Plaintiff “Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action 24 cases.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th 25 Cir. 2009). 26 representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up 27 for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the 28 action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as “[They] are intended to compensate class 15 1 a private attorney general.” 2 reasonableness of incentive payments, the court should consider 3 “the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of 4 the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from 5 those actions” and “the amount of time and effort the plaintiff 6 expended in pursuing the litigation.” 7 (citation omitted). 8 plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the proportion of the 9 payments relative to the settlement amount, and the size of each In assessing the Staton, 327 F.3d at 977 The court must balance “the number of named 10 payment.” 11 $5,000 is presumptively reasonable. 12 Inc., Civ. No. 1:13-01211 LJO BAM, 2015 WL 6697929, at *11 (E.D. 13 Cal. Nov. 3, 2015). 14 Id. Id. at 958-59. In the Ninth Circuit, an incentive award of Davis v. Brown Shoe Co., Here, the class representative seeks an incentive 15 payment of $4,500. 16 award, plaintiff represents that she took on substantial risk in 17 bringing this class action and exposed herself to notoriety and 18 damage to her professional reputation. 19 states that she spent a significant amount of time assisting 20 class counsel in the development of this case, including 21 responding to discovery, participating in mediation, assisting in 22 the preparation and evaluation of the case, and evaluating and 23 approving the proposed settlement on behalf of the class. 24 at 16.) 25 bringing this action, the court finds her requested incentive 26 award to be reasonable, and will approve the award. 27 II. 28 (Pl.’s Mem. II at 15.) In justifying the (Id.) Plaintiff also (Id. In light of plaintiff’s efforts and risks incurred in Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the court grants final 16 1 certification of the settlement class and approves the settlement 2 set forth in the settlement agreement as fair, reasonable, and 3 adequate. 4 participating class members who did not exclude themselves. 5 The settlement agreement shall be binding upon all IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motions for 6 final certification, final approval of class action settlement, 7 attorneys’ fees, costs, and incentive award (Docket Nos. 44, 45) 8 be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: 10 (1) solely for the purpose of this settlement, and 11 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby 12 certifies the following class: all current and former California 13 employees of Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc. who 14 were issued one or more wage statements from July 25, 2015, 15 through September 1, 2016. Specifically, the court finds that: 16 (a) the settlement class members are so numerous 17 that joinder of all settlement class members would 18 be impracticable; 19 (b) there are questions of law and fact common to 20 the settlement class which predominate over any 21 individual questions; 22 (c) claims of the named plaintiff are typical of 23 the claims of the settlement class; 24 (d) the named plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel 25 have fairly and adequately represented and 26 protected the interests of the settlement class; 27 and 28 (e) a class action is superior to other available 17 1 methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 2 the controversy. 3 (2) the court appoints the named plaintiff Henna Ahmed 4 as class representative and finds that she meets the requirements 5 of Rule 23; 6 (3) the court appoints Robert J. Wasserman, William J. 7 Gorham III, Nicholas J. Scardigli, and Vladimir J. Kozina of the 8 firm of Mayall Hurley P.C. as class counsel and finds that they 9 meet the requirements of Rule 23; 10 (4) the settlement agreement’s plan for class notice is 11 the best notice practicable under the circumstances and satisfies 12 the requirements of due process and Rule 23. 13 approved and adopted. The notice to the class complies with Rule 14 23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e) and is approved and adopted; 15 The plan is (5) the court finds that the parties and their counsel 16 took appropriate efforts to locate and inform all class members 17 of the settlement. 18 to the settlement, the court finds that no additional notice to 19 the class is necessary; 20 Given that no class member filed an objection (6) as of the date of the entry of this Order, 21 plaintiff and all class members who have not timely opted out of 22 this settlement herby do and shall be deemed to have fully, 23 finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, 24 relinquished, and discharged defendants of and from any and all 25 settled claims, pursuant to the release provisions stated in the 26 parties’ settlement agreement; 27 28 (7) plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to fees in the amount of $150,000, and litigation costs in the amount of 18 1 $12,186.47; 2 3 (8) Atticus Administration is entitled to administration costs in the amount of $16,000; 4 (9) $3,375 from the gross settlement amount shall be 5 paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency in 6 satisfaction of defendants’ alleged penalties under the Labor 7 Code Private Attorneys General Act; 8 9 10 (10) the remaining settlement funds shall be paid to participating class members in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement; and 11 (11); this action is dismissed with prejudice. However 12 without affecting the finality of this Order, the court shall 13 retain continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation, 14 implementation, and enforcement of the settlement agreement with 15 respect to all parties to this action and their counsel of 16 record. 17 The clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly. 18 19 Dated: April 24, 2018 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19

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