Ahmed v. Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., et al.
Filing
49
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 4/24/18. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motions for final certification, final approval of class action settlement, attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award (Docket Nos. 44 , 45 ) are, GRANTED. CASE CLOSED (Becknal, R)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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HENNA AHMED, an individual,
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Civ. No.
2:16-1747 WBS KJN
Plaintiff,
v.
BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES,
INC.; GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES, LLC; and DOES 1100, inclusive,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT AND MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND
CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE
PAYMENT
Defendants.
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Plaintiff Henna Ahmed brought this putative class-
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action lawsuit against defendants Beverly Health and
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Rehabilitation Services, Inc. (“Beverly Health”), GGNSC
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Administrative Services, LLC (“GGNSC Services”), and Does 1-100,
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alleging that defendants violated the California Labor Code.
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Presently before the court are plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for
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final approval of the class action settlement (Docket No. 44) and
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unopposed Motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and class
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representative service payment.
(Docket No. 45.)
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I.
Discussion1
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Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or
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defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the
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court’s approval.”
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involves a two-step process in which the Court first determines
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whether a proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary
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approval and then, after notice is given to class members,
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whether final approval is warranted.”
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Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
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(citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Third), § 30.41 (1995)).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
“Approval under 23(e)
Nat’l Rural Telecomms.
The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy
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favoring settlement of class actions.
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of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).
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where, as here, “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior
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to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed
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compromise to ratify both [1] the propriety of the certification
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and [2] the fairness of the settlement.”
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327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Class Plaintiffs v. City
Nevertheless,
Staton v. Boeing Co.,
The first part of the inquiry requires the court to
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“pay ‘undiluted, even heightened, attention’ to class
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certification requirements” because, unlike in a fully litigated
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class action suit, the court “will lack the opportunity . . . to
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adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.”
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Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see also
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To avoid repetition, the court will refrain from
reciting the factual and procedural background, which remains the
same as in its February 7, 2018 Order granting plaintiff’s
unopposed Motion for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement and provisional certification of the class.
(Feb. 7,
2018 Order (Docket No. 39).)
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Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).
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In the second stage, the court holds a fairness hearing
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where the court entertains any class member’s objections to (1)
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the treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) the
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terms of the settlement.
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Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989) (hearing prior to
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final approval of a dismissal or compromise of class claims
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required to “inquire into the terms and circumstances of any
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dismissal or compromise to ensure it is not collusive or
See Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac.
is
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prejudicial”).
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final determination as to whether the court should allow the
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parties to settle the class action pursuant to the agreed-upon
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terms.
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A.
Following such a hearing, the court must reach a
See DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 525.
Class Certification
A class action will be certified only if it meets the
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four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and additionally fits
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within one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).
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P. 23(a)-(b).
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determining whether the moving party has satisfied each Rule 23
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requirement, the court must conduct a rigorous inquiry before
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certifying a class.
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(1979); Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
Fed. R. Civ.
Although a district court has discretion in
See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701
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1.
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Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will
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Rule 23(a)
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fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
These requirements are commonly referred
to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.
In the court’s Order granting preliminary
approval of the settlement, the court found that the putative
class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements.
Because the court
is not aware of any facts that would alter its initial Rule 23(a)
analysis, the court finds that the class definition proposed by
plaintiff meets the requirements of Rule 23(a).
2.
Rule 23(b)
An action that meets all the prerequisites of Rule
23(a) may be certified as a class action only if it also
satisfies the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of
Rule 23(b).
Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th
Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
which provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1)
“the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over questions affecting only individual
members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
In its Order granting preliminary approval of the
settlement, the court found that both prerequisites of Rule
23(b)(3) were satisfied.
The court is unaware of any changes
that would affect this conclusion, and the parties indicated that
they were aware of no such developments.
Because the settlement
class satisfies both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the court will
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grant final class certification of this action.
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3.
Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements
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If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it
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“must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable
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under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
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members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”
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R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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content of a proposed notice.
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651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
Fed.
Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and
See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D.
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417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)).
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“reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff
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class,” actual notice is not required.
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1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
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Although that notice must be
Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d
Here, the parties agreed that Atticus Administration,
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LLC (“Atticus”) would serve as the claims administrator.
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(Wasserman Decl. ¶ 23 (Docket No. 44-2).)
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and provided Atticus with the class members’ names, last known
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addresses, and the number of wage statements received.
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Decl. ¶ 9 (Docket No. 44-4).)
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potential class members.
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by the parties were processed and updated utilizing the National
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Change of Address Database maintained by the U.S. Postal Service.
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(Id. ¶ 10.)
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each class member via certified mail.
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date, Atticus launched a toll-free line that class members could
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call for information and also launched a settlement website which
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contains, among other things, a viewable, printable, and
(Id.)
Defendant identified
(Longley
The parties identified 1,447
The mailing addresses identified
On March 1, 2018, the class notice was mailed to
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(Id. ¶ 11.)
On the same
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downloadable copy of the full notice.2
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represents that just 49 class notices remain undeliverable, for a
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successful mail rate of 97%. (Longley Decl. ¶ 11.)
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only one class member elected to exclude herself from the
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settlement, and no class members objected to the settlement.
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(Id. ¶¶ 15, 16; Longley Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6 (Docket No. 46).)3
(Id. ¶ 14.)
Atticus
In addition,
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The notice identifies the parties, explains the nature
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of the proceedings, defines the class, provides the terms of the
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settlement, and explains the procedure for objecting or opting
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out of the class.
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explains how class members’ individual settlement awards will be
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calculated and the amount that class members can expect to
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receive.
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satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
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also Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575
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(9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally
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describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to
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alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come
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(Longley Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. C.)
(Id. Ex. C.)
The notice also
Therefore, the content of the notice
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see
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However, the initial notice contained two typographical
errors, specifically: (1) the class period was incorrectly stated
on the first page as extending from July 25, 2016--instead of
July 25, 2015--through September 1, 2016; and (2) an incorrect
website address. On March 13, 2018, a supplemental notice,
approved by the court, was mailed to the class members that
notified them of typographical errors in the class notice. (Id.
¶ 13.) In addition, the parties agreed to operate two websites,
the website address included in the initial notice and the
corrected notice, so that interested class members could obtain
the information from either website. (March 8, 2018 Order ¶ 4
(Docket No. 43).)
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On April 19, 2018, the parties filed a supplemental
declaration to inform the court that only one class member optedout and that Atticus did not receive any objections.
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forward and be heard.’” (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No.
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1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980))).
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B.
Rule 23(e): Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness of
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Proposed Settlement
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Having determined that class treatment is warranted,
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the court must now address whether the terms of the parties’
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settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable.
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this analysis, the court must balance several factors, including:
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the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement;
the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the
proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the
reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement.
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In conducting
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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
But see In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.
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Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The factors in
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a court’s fairness assessment will naturally vary from case to
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case.”).
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1.
Strength of Plaintiff’s Case
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An important consideration is the strength of
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plaintiff’s case on the merits compared to the settlement amount
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offered.
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required to reach an ultimate conclusion of the merits, “for it
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is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of
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wastefulness and expensive litigation that induce consensual
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settlements.”
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& County of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).
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DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 526.
The court, however, is not
Officers for Justice v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City
The settlement terms compare favorably to the
uncertainties with respect to liability in this case.
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If the
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case had not settled, defendant would have opposed any class
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certification request and would have continued to assert legal
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and factual grounds to defend itself.
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(“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 19 (Docket No. 44-1).)
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the risk that civil penalties sought under the Private Attorneys
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General Act (“PAGA”) would be reduced, possibly significantly, if
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the court determined that imposition of full penalties would be
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unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, or confiscatory.
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Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2)).)
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(Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A.
Plaintiff also faced
(Id. (citing
In comparing the strength of plaintiff’s case with the
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proposed settlement, the court finds that the proposed settlement
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is a fair resolution of the issues in this case.
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2.
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Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of
Further Litigation
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As explained above, further litigation could greatly
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delay resolution of this case and increase expenses.
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settlement, the parties would likely have had to litigate class
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certification and summary judgment, both of which would require
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additional discovery, time, and expense.
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addition, defendants may have appealed any favorable judgment.
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(Id.)
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Absent
(Pl.’s Mem. at 20.)
In
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of settlement.
3.
Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout
Trial
If the case proceeded to trial, plaintiff would have
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faced several risks regarding the maintenance of class status
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throughout trial, including establishing that the alleged
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violations were knowing and intentional and that class members
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suffered injury as a result of the inaccurate wage statements.
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(Pl.’s Mem. at 20.)
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vigorous and lengthy challenge to class certification and the
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merits of the action.
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also weighs in favor of settlement.
In addition, plaintiff anticipated a
(Id. at 19.)
Accordingly, this factor
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4.
Amount Offered in Settlement
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In assessing the amount offered in settlement, “[i]t is
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the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual
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component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.”
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Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 628.
“It is well-settled law
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that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the
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potential recovery will not per se render the settlement
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inadequate or unfair.”
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consideration of the uncertainty class members would face if the
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case were litigated to trial.
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F.R.D. 356, 370-71 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
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Id.
This inquiry may involve
See Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303
The gross settlement amount in this case is $450,000.
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(Wasserman Decl. ¶ 12.)
The parties have agreed to distribute
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the amount as follows: (1) class counsel will receive a fee of
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$150,000, equal to one third of the gross settlement amount,
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(Pl.’s Mem. at 24); (2) plaintiff will receive an incentive
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reward of $4,500, (id.); (3) $4,500 will go to pay any civil
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penalties that could be awarded and of that amount $3,375 will be
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paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency in
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satisfaction of defendants’ alleged penalties under the Labor
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Code Private Attorney General’s Act (id. at 8); (4) $12,500 will
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go towards litigation costs (Settlement Agreement at 4 (Docket
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4402); (5) $16,000 will be paid to Atticus Administration (id.);
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and (6) the remaining amount, $263,625, will be distributed to
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the settlement class based on the number of wage statements
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issued to each class member, (see id. at 3.)
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separate and apart from the claims made on a class and
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representative basis, plaintiff asserted individual claims for
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alleged violations of the FEHA, and plaintiff has agreed to
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settle those claims in exchange for $15,000.
Additionally,
(Pl.’s Mem. at 9.)
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Each of the 1,446 participating class members will
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receive an average individual settlement payment of $182.31.
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(Pl.’s Mem. at 21.)
In addition, as a result of the efforts of
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class counsel, defendants have twice reviewed and amended their
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policies and procedures associated with the furnishing and
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maintenance of wage statements so as to ensure compliance with
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Labor Code sections 226(a)(6), 226(a)(8) and 204.
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Decl. ¶ 11 (Docket No. 44-2); Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. for
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Attorneys’ Fees (“Pl.’s Mem. II”) at 1 (Docket No. 45-1).)
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(Wasserman
In light of the risks and expense of further litigation
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in this matter, the court finds the settlement amount to be fair
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and adequate.
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5.
Extent of Discovery and State of Proceedings
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A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the
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proceedings indicates that the parties carefully investigated the
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claims before reaching a resolution.
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No. 07-1895 WBS DAD, 2008 WL 4891201, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
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2008).
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conducted a significant amount of discovery, took depositions,
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reviewed hundreds of pages of documents, and participated in
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mediation.
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the claims through extensive formal and informal discovery weigh
Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., Civ.
Before a settlement was reached, the parties in this case
(Pl.’s Mem. at 21-22.)
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The parties’ investigation of
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in favor of settlement.
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6.
Experience and Views of Counsel
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“When approving class action settlements, the court
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must give considerable weight to class counsel’s opinions due to
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counsel’s familiarity with the litigation and its previous
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experience with class action lawsuits.”
7
Elec. Co., Civ. No. 2:08-1974 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 2889728, at *8
8
(E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010).
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that class counsel has substantial experience in prosecuting
Murillo v. Pac. Gas &
Here, plaintiff has provided evidence
10
class actions, including employment actions and wage-and-hour
11
matters.
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plaintiff’s counsel believe the proposed settlement is fair,
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reasonable, and adequate to the class under the circumstances, as
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it reflects a reasoned compromise which not only takes into
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consideration the inherent risks in wage and hour class
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litigation, but the various issues in this case which had the
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potential to substantially reduce or completely eliminate
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recovery by class members.
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supports approval of the settlement agreement.
(Wasserman Decl. ¶¶ 34-37.)
Based on their experience,
(Pl.’s Mem. at 23.)
This factor
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7.
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No governmental entity participated in this matter;
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Presence of Government Participant
this factor, therefore, is irrelevant to the court’s analysis.
8.
Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed
Settlement
Notice of the settlement was sent to 1,447
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participating class members and only one has elected to opt-out
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of the settlement agreement, and not a single class member has
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filed an objection to its terms.
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(Pl.’s Mem. at 23.)
“It is
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established that the absence of a large number of objections to a
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proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that
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the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to
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the class members.”
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this factor weighs in favor of the court’s approval of the
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settlement.
DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 529.
Accordingly,
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9.
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Having considered the foregoing factors, the court
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Conclusion
finds that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable
pursuant to Rule 23(e).
C.
See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
Attorneys’ Fees
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, “[i]n a
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certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s
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fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the
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parties’ agreement.”
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includes an award of attorney’s fees, that fee award must be
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evaluated in the overall context of the settlement.
18
Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Monterrubio
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v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
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(England, J.).
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ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable,
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even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.”
23
Headset, 654 F.3d at 941.
24
If a negotiated class action settlement
Knisley v.
The court “ha[s] an independent obligation to
Bluetooth
“Under the ‘common fund’ doctrine, ‘a litigant or a
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lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons
26
other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable
27
attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.’”
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969 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).
12
Staton, 327 F.3d at
1
In common fund cases, the district court has discretion to
2
determine the amount of attorney’s fees to be drawn from the fund
3
by employing either the percentage method or the lodestar method.
4
Id.
5
the other method.
The court may also use one method as a “cross-check[ ]” upon
6
See Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 944.
“Despite this discretion, use of the percentage method
7
in common fund cases appears to be dominant.”
In re Omnivision
8
Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing
9
cases).
“Because the benefit to the class is easily quantified
10
in common-fund settlements, [the Ninth Circuit has] allowed
11
courts to award attorneys a percentage of the common fund in lieu
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of the often more time-consuming task of calculating the
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lodestar.”
14
ease of calculation and the frequent use of the percentage-of-
15
recovery method in common fund cases, the court thus adopts this
16
method.
17
Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 942.
Because of the
Under the percentage-of-recovery method, the court may
18
award class counsel a percentage of the total settlement fund.
19
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002).
20
Here, class counsel requests $150,000 in attorneys’ fees.
21
(“Pl.’s Mem. II at 1.)
22
The attorney’s fees requested by counsel constitute 33% of the
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gross settlement amount.
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counsel are below the lodestar figure of $189,018.25, which
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counsel calculated based on 282.25 hours expended in this case
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times rates of $717 for a partner, $440 for an associate, and
Defendant does not oppose the request.
The attorneys’ fees requested by
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13
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$195 for a paralegal.4
2
No. 45-2).)
3
number of hours worked.
4
(Wasserman Decl. II ¶ 30, Ex. 2 (Docket
Counsel submitted detailed invoices justifying the
(Id.)
While the attorneys’ fees requested is above the 25%
5
“benchmark” set by the Ninth Circuit for “common fund”
6
settlements, see Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers,
7
904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), courts in this circuit have
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approved fees that exceeded that “benchmark” in many cases, see
9
Bond v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1662 OWW MJS, 2011 WL
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2648879, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) (“[T]he exact percentage
11
[of attorneys’ fees] varies depending on the facts of the case,
12
and in most common fund cases, the award exceeds [the 25%]
13
benchmark.”).
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settlement value” is considered “acceptable.”
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“a review of California cases . . . reveals that courts usually
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award attorneys’ fees in the 30-40% range in wage and hour class
17
actions that result in recovery of a common fun[d] under $10
18
million.”
19
2991486, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010).
20
that the requested fees in this case are below the lodestar
21
figure further supports granting approval.
22
F.3d at 1050 (“[T]he lode star ... provides a check on the
23
reasonableness of the percentage award.”).
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A fees award amounting to “33 1/3 % of the total
Id.
Furthermore,
Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc., Civ. No. 07-1182, 2010 WL
In addition, the fact
See Vizcaino, 290
In light of the fees usually awarded in these types of
Counsel also states that he anticipates his firm will
incur several thousand dollars of additional attorney’s fees in
representing the Class through final judgment in this matter.
(Id. ¶ 31.) The amount of fees was calculated up to April 2,
2018. However, no supplemental declaration was filed regarding
additional fees incurred.
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cases, the risks counsel incurred by taking this case on a
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contingency basis, the time and effort spent litigating this
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case, and the reasonable result they obtained for class members,
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the court finds the requested fees to be reasonable.
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Accordingly, the court will approve counsel’s requested fees.
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D.
Expenses
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“There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a
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common fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to
9
reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.”
10
In re Heritage Bond Litig., Civ. No. 02-1475, 2005 WL 1594403, at
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*23 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005).
12
reimbursement for the out-of-pocket expenses they incurred during
13
this litigation in the amount of no more than $12,500.
14
Mem. II at 14.)
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in actual out-of-pocket expenses.
16
a list of itemized costs including filing fees, copying, postage,
17
computerized legal research charges, and the cost of the
18
mediator.
19
reasonable litigation expenses, and it therefore will grant class
20
counsel’s request for compensation of in the amount of
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$12,186.47.
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E.
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Here, plaintiff requests
(Pl.’s
To date, class counsel have incurred $12,186.47
(Id.)
(Wasserman Decl. II Ex. 2.)
Class counsel submitted
The court finds these are
Incentive Payment to Plaintiff
“Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action
24
cases.”
Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th
25
Cir. 2009).
26
representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up
27
for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the
28
action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as
“[They] are intended to compensate class
15
1
a private attorney general.”
2
reasonableness of incentive payments, the court should consider
3
“the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of
4
the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from
5
those actions” and “the amount of time and effort the plaintiff
6
expended in pursuing the litigation.”
7
(citation omitted).
8
plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the proportion of the
9
payments relative to the settlement amount, and the size of each
In assessing the
Staton, 327 F.3d at 977
The court must balance “the number of named
10
payment.”
11
$5,000 is presumptively reasonable.
12
Inc., Civ. No. 1:13-01211 LJO BAM, 2015 WL 6697929, at *11 (E.D.
13
Cal. Nov. 3, 2015).
14
Id.
Id. at 958-59.
In the Ninth Circuit, an incentive award of
Davis v. Brown Shoe Co.,
Here, the class representative seeks an incentive
15
payment of $4,500.
16
award, plaintiff represents that she took on substantial risk in
17
bringing this class action and exposed herself to notoriety and
18
damage to her professional reputation.
19
states that she spent a significant amount of time assisting
20
class counsel in the development of this case, including
21
responding to discovery, participating in mediation, assisting in
22
the preparation and evaluation of the case, and evaluating and
23
approving the proposed settlement on behalf of the class.
24
at 16.)
25
bringing this action, the court finds her requested incentive
26
award to be reasonable, and will approve the award.
27
II.
28
(Pl.’s Mem. II at 15.)
In justifying the
(Id.)
Plaintiff also
(Id.
In light of plaintiff’s efforts and risks incurred in
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court grants final
16
1
certification of the settlement class and approves the settlement
2
set forth in the settlement agreement as fair, reasonable, and
3
adequate.
4
participating class members who did not exclude themselves.
5
The settlement agreement shall be binding upon all
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motions for
6
final certification, final approval of class action settlement,
7
attorneys’ fees, costs, and incentive award (Docket Nos. 44, 45)
8
be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED.
9
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
10
(1) solely for the purpose of this settlement, and
11
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby
12
certifies the following class: all current and former California
13
employees of Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc. who
14
were issued one or more wage statements from July 25, 2015,
15
through September 1, 2016.
Specifically, the court finds that:
16
(a) the settlement class members are so numerous
17
that joinder of all settlement class members would
18
be impracticable;
19
(b) there are questions of law and fact common to
20
the settlement class which predominate over any
21
individual questions;
22
(c) claims of the named plaintiff are typical of
23
the claims of the settlement class;
24
(d) the named plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel
25
have fairly and adequately represented and
26
protected the interests of the settlement class;
27
and
28
(e) a class action is superior to other available
17
1
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
2
the controversy.
3
(2) the court appoints the named plaintiff Henna Ahmed
4
as class representative and finds that she meets the requirements
5
of Rule 23;
6
(3) the court appoints Robert J. Wasserman, William J.
7
Gorham III, Nicholas J. Scardigli, and Vladimir J. Kozina of the
8
firm of Mayall Hurley P.C. as class counsel and finds that they
9
meet the requirements of Rule 23;
10
(4) the settlement agreement’s plan for class notice is
11
the best notice practicable under the circumstances and satisfies
12
the requirements of due process and Rule 23.
13
approved and adopted. The notice to the class complies with Rule
14
23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e) and is approved and adopted;
15
The plan is
(5) the court finds that the parties and their counsel
16
took appropriate efforts to locate and inform all class members
17
of the settlement.
18
to the settlement, the court finds that no additional notice to
19
the class is necessary;
20
Given that no class member filed an objection
(6) as of the date of the entry of this Order,
21
plaintiff and all class members who have not timely opted out of
22
this settlement herby do and shall be deemed to have fully,
23
finally, and forever released, settled, compromised,
24
relinquished, and discharged defendants of and from any and all
25
settled claims, pursuant to the release provisions stated in the
26
parties’ settlement agreement;
27
28
(7) plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to fees in the
amount of $150,000, and litigation costs in the amount of
18
1
$12,186.47;
2
3
(8) Atticus Administration is entitled to
administration costs in the amount of $16,000;
4
(9) $3,375 from the gross settlement amount shall be
5
paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency in
6
satisfaction of defendants’ alleged penalties under the Labor
7
Code Private Attorneys General Act;
8
9
10
(10) the remaining settlement funds shall be paid to
participating class members in accordance with the terms of the
settlement agreement; and
11
(11); this action is dismissed with prejudice.
However
12
without affecting the finality of this Order, the court shall
13
retain continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation,
14
implementation, and enforcement of the settlement agreement with
15
respect to all parties to this action and their counsel of
16
record.
17
The clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly.
18
19
Dated:
April 24, 2018
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25
26
27
28
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