Carroll v. State of California et al

Filing 21

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 12/9/2016 ORDERING Plaintiff's amended complaint is DISMISSED with 30 days to file a second amended complaint; failure to file a second amended complaint within that time will result in a recommendation of dismissal of this action; Plaintiff's 19 motion for injunctive relief and motion for appointment of counsel are DENIED. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TREMAYNE DEON CARROLL,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2: 16-cv-1759 TLN KJN P

v.

ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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I. Introduction

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Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant

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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 31, 2016, the undersigned dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with

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leave to amend. (ECF No. 12.) Pending before the court is the amended complaint filed

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November 14, 2016. (ECF No. 18.) For the reasons stated herein, the amended complaint is

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dismissed with leave to amend.

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Named as defendants are California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

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(“CDCR”) Classification, CDCR Director and CDCR Chief of Inmate Appeals. Plaintiff alleges

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that defendants classified him with an “R” suffix even though plaintiff has never been convicted

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of a sex crime.1 Plaintiff alleges that defendants labeled him with “a lewd and lascivious act

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An “R” suffix is an inmate custody designation assigned to inmates with a history of sex
offenses as outlined in California Penal Code § 290, and “R” suffix inmates are housed in
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against minor child” when he has never been accused or convicted of such an offense. Plaintiff

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alleges that as a result of the “R” suffix, he has limited access to programs and education.

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Plaintiff also alleges that physical injury has been inflicted on him by staff and inmates as a result

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of the “R” suffix. Finally, plaintiff alleges that he has been denied resentencing due to “related

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incidents.”

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II. Failure to Name Proper Defendants

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Plaintiff alleges that defendants CDCR Classification, CDCR Director and CDCR Chief

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of Inmate Appeals imposed the R suffix. It is unclear to the undersigned whether “CDCR

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Classification” is an agency or an individual. Plaintiff shall clarify this matter in a second

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amended complaint.
According to Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3377.1(b)(3)(A), a classification committee

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determines whether to impose an “R” suffix. The named defendants did not impose the “R”

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suffix because they clearly were not members of a classification committee. For this reason, the

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amended complaint is dismissed. If plaintiff files a second amended complaint, he shall name as

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defendants those prison officials on the classification committee who imposed the “R” suffix.

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If plaintiff names CDCR Classification, CDCR Director and CDCR Chief of Inmate

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Appeals as defendants in the second amended complaint, he must specifically describe their

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involvement in the imposition of the “R” suffix.

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III. Failure to State Potentially Colorable Claims for Relief

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The undersigned construes the complaint to allege a due process claim and an Eighth
Amendment claim.

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Eighth Amendment

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To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

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conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain ...” Rhodes v. Chapman,

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452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison

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officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal

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accordance with placement score. Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3377.1(b).
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safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682

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F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe

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conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate

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indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.

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1998).

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The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

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the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious....” Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison

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official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511

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U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying

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humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm

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and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837–45. Prison

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officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by

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presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844–45.

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Mere negligence on the part of prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the

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official's conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.

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Prisoners have no constitutional right to work or to education. See Baumann v. Arizona

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Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1985) (no constitutional right to work); Rhodes

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v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (no constitutional right to education). Therefore, the

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denial of access to educational activities as a result of the “R” suffix classification does not state

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an Eighth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff also alleges that he has limited access to “programs” as a result of the “R” suffix

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classification. Because plaintiff does not describe these programs, the undersigned cannot

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determine whether plaintiff’s limited access to these programs states a potentially colorable

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Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed with leave to amend. If plaintiff

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files a second amended complaint, he shall clarify the “programs” to which he allegedly has

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limited access.

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Plaintiff generally alleges that he suffered physical injury at the hands of prison staff and

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inmates as a result of the “R” suffix classification. However, plaintiff does not describe these

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incidents of physical injury and how he knows that they were caused by the “R” suffix

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classification. Without this information, the undersigned cannot determine whether plaintiff has

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stated a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Eighth

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Amendment claim based on physical injury is dismissed with leave to amend because it is vague

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and conclusory.

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Due Process

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In general, prison inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in freedom from alleged

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classification errors where such errors do not cause the inmates to be subjected to “atypical and

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significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

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U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The same principle applies to claimed due process violations arising from

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alleged falsification of prison documents. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(discussing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n.11) Further, in Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir.

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1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he classification of

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an inmate as a sex offender is precisely the type of ‘atypical and significant hardship on the

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inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’ that the Supreme Court held created a

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protected liberty interest.” Id. at 829 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482). The Neal court held that

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“the stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label coupled with the

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subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program whose successful completion

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is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of deprivations of liberty that require

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procedural protections.” Id. at 830.

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As stated above, to state a potentially colorable due process claim based on the allegedly

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improper “R” suffix classification, plaintiff must allege that the classification error caused him to

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be subjected to “atypical and significant hardship…in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

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life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Plaintiff alleges that he has “limited access” to programs and

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education as a result of the “R” suffix classification. Plaintiff’s limited access to education

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programs does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship. See id. The undersigned
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cannot determine whether plaintiff’s limited access to other “programs” constitutes an atypical

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and significant hardship because plaintiff does not describe these programs. Accordingly, this

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claim is dismissed as vague and conclusory.

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As discussed above, plaintiff alleges that he has suffered physical harm as a result of the

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“R” suffix classification. Physical harm constitutes an atypical and significant hardship.

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However, plaintiff does not describe the harm or the incidents where he was harmed, or why he

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believes the harm was caused by his “R” suffix classification. Without this information, the

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undersigned cannot determine whether the physical harm constitutes an atypical and significant

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hardship, and whether the “R” suffix classification caused the physical harm. Accordingly, this

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claim is dismissed with leave to amend.
Plaintiff also alleges that he has been denied resentencing due to “related incidents.” The

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undersigned does not understand this claim. Plaintiff must clarify this claim in a second amended

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complaint.

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IV. Motion for Injunctive Relief, Appointment of Counsel

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On November 17, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel and motion for
preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 19.) For the following reasons, these motions are denied.

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In the motion for injunctive relief, plaintiff requests immediate release from prison

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pursuant to Proposition 36. Plaintiff appears to be referring to California Penal Code § 1170.126

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which “created a postconviction release proceeding whereby a prisoner who is serving an

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indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the three strikes law for a crime that is not a

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serious or violent felony and who is not disqualified, may have his or her sentence recalled and be

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sentenced as a second strike offender unless the court determines that resentencing would pose an

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unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal. App. 4th 161, 168

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(2013).

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Plaintiff’s request for release and relief pursuant to Proposition 36 and California Penal

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Code § 1170.126 should be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254. In a civil rights action, the court is not authorized to order release from prison as a

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remedy based on alleged sentencing errors. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief is
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denied.

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On November 16, 2016, the court denied plaintiff’s first motion for appointment of

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counsel. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons stated in that order, plaintiff’s pending motion for

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appointment of counsel is denied.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with thirty days to file a second amended

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complaint; failure to file a second amended complaint within that time will result in a

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recommendation of dismissal of this action;

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2. Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief and motion for appointment of counsel (ECF

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No. 19) are denied.

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Dated: December 9, 2016

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