McDaniels v. County of San Joaquin
Filing
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MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 3/7/2007 GRANTING 8 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has fourteen days from the date this Order is signed to file a First Amended Complaint, if she can do so consistent with this Order. (Kirksey Smith, K)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SYNETTA MCDANIELS,
individually and as
successor-in-interest to
Decedent CELESTINE ALLEN,
v.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
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CIV. NO. 2:16-2007 WBS DB
COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, a
municipal corporation; and
DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff Synetta McDaniels brought this action against
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defendants County of San Joaquin and Doe employees arising from
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decedent Celestine Allen’s death while incarcerated at San
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Joaquin County jail.
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entire Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(6). (Docket No. 8.)
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Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s
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I.
Factual and Procedural History
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The decedent allegedly was a diagnosed schizophrenic
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and recovering cocaine addict incarcerated at San Joaquin County
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jail.
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were “aware that Decedent required supervision and/or life saving
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medical treatment,” but “failed to treat and/or monitor
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Decedent.”
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cell in August 2015.
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(Compl. ¶ 1 (Docket No. 1).)
(Id. ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff alleges defendants
Decedent allegedly was found dead in her
(Id. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff initiated this action in her individual
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capacity and as decedent’s successor-in-interest.
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the following causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
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violation of decedent’s and plaintiff’s constitutional rights;
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(2) Monell claim under section 1983; (3) wrongful death under
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California Civil Procedure Code §§ 377.60-61; (4) negligence; (5)
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and violation of California Government Code § 845.6.
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II.
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She alleges
(See id.)
Discussion
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
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must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
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reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
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Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
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Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
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319, 322 (1972).
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must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
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plausible on its face.”
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544, 570 (2007).
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‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Scheuer v.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“A claim has facial
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Ashcroft v.
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plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
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standard, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
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strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
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improbable.”
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Id.
Under this
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
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action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While
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legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
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must be supported by factual allegations.”).
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Plaintiff’s first two causes of action are brought
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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alleges defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive
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due process right to familial relationship, companionship, and
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society with the decedent when defendants were deliberately
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indifference to decedent’s medical needs.1
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right to familial association . . . is a fundamental liberty
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interest protected under the substantive due process clause of
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the Fourteenth Amendment.”
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DAD, 2016 WL 6988597, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2016) (citing
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Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012)).
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In the first cause of action, plaintiff
(Compl. ¶ 26.)
“The
Motley v. Smith, Civ. No. 1:15-905
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“guarante[es] more than fair process” and extends to “a
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The Complaint also mentions the First and Fourth
Amendments. However, the Complaint lacks any factual allegation
regarding plaintiff’s free speech or freedom of association
rights and makes no mention of any search, seizure or invasion of
privacy that took place.
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substantive sphere as well, ‘barring certain government actions
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regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
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them.’”
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“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
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against arbitrary action of government,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
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U.S. 539, 558 (1974), and “only the most egregious official
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conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional
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sense,’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Collins v. City of
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Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998).
Official conduct
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rises to this level only if it “shocks the conscience.”
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“Where actual deliberation is practical, then an [individual]’s
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‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the conscience.”
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Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Id.
The Complaint alleges that defendants were deliberately
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indifferent when they “had been aware that Decedent required
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supervision and/or life saving medical treatment” but “failed to
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treat and/or monitor Decedent.”
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further alleges that defendants “subjected Plaintiff to their
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wrongful conduct” and decedent’s death “was the consequence of
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defendants’ reckless indifference for Decedent’s serious medical
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needs and wellbeing [sic].”
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contains no factual allegations regarding any wrongful conduct or
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deliberation by an individual actor, the decedent’s “serious
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medical needs,” the circumstances surrounding why the decedent
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needed “supervision and/or life saving medical treatment,” or
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defendants’ awareness that the decedent was in need of life-
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saving medical treatment.
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conclusions and conclusory statements, which are insufficient to
(Compl. ¶ 15.)
(Id. ¶¶ 16, 27.)
The Complaint
The Complaint
Plaintiff relies solely on legal
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survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
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U.S. at 678-79.
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See Iqbal, 556
In the second cause of action for Monell liability,
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plaintiff alleges that the Doe defendants acted pursuant to
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unconstitutional San Joaquin County customs, policies, and
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practices.
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under section 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or
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custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
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acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts
(Compl. ¶ 31.)
A municipality can only be liable
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the injury.”
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436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978).
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rejected [] conclusory allegations that lack factual content from
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which one could plausibly infer Monell liability.”
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of Fairfield, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (citing
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cases).
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Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y.,
“Since Iqbal, courts have repeatedly
Via v. City
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains only conclusory
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allegations regarding defendant San Joaquin’s customs, policies,
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and procedures.
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policies and customs of (1) failing to properly train concerning
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the handling of “treatable life threatening conditions”; (2)
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denying inmates access to appropriate “care for serious medical
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needs”; (3) failing to properly train concerning the handling of
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“persons with serious medical conditions at the County Jail”; (4)
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“failing to properly investigate . . . incidents of the handling
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[of] person with life threatening medical conditions”; (5)
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ignoring “unconstitutional or unlawful law enforcement activity”;
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(6) allowing law enforcement officers to file incomplete and
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inaccurate reports; (7) tolerating a “’code of silence’ among law
The Complaint alleges defendant San Joaquin had
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enforcement officers”; and (8) tolerating inadequate procedures
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for reviewing complaints of officer misconduct.
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32.)
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factual allegations.
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of the purported practices, policies, or customs caused the
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decedent’s injury.
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1:10-982 AWI SKO, 2010 WL 5314360, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20,
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2010) (“[T]here are simply no details furnished about any
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particular incident that indicate how Plaintiff’s rights were
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(Compl. ¶¶ 31-
Each alleged policy and custom is unsupported by any
Further, plaintiff fails to allege how any
See Telles v. City of Waterford, Civ. No.
violated.”).
Plaintiff concedes that the Complaint “lacks elaborate
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details that support [plaintiff’s] failure to discipline and
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inadequate training claims,” but argues that a relaxed pleading
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standard applies to plaintiff’s Monell claim because of the “pre-
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discovery posture” of the case and allegations on the basis of
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“information and belief” suffice.
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(Docket No. 9).)
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doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
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conclusions.”
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allegations regarding the customs, policies, and procedures of
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defendant San Joaquin, plaintiff’s Monell claim cannot survive.
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Accordingly, the court must dismiss plaintiffs’ first
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(Pl.’s Opp’n 10:14-11:15
However, “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Absent factual
two causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff’s third cause of action for wrongful death
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lacks the requisite factual allegations as well.
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of the cause of action for wrongful death are the tort
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(negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the
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damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs.”
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“The elements
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Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1263 (6th
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Dist. 2006).
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owed the decedent “a legal duty, that defendants breached that
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duty, and that the breach proximately caused [decedent’s]
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injuries.”
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4th 1138, 1145 (2004).
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Negligence requires allegations that defendants
Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 32 Cal.
As previously stated, the Complaint fails to allege any
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specific wrongful conduct by defendants, let alone conduct that
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the court could reasonably infer constitutes negligence.
In the
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Complaint, plaintiff merely alleges that defendants’ “negligent
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actions and/or negligent failure to act, as set forth herein-
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above proximately caused the death of decedent.”
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Plaintiff’s legal conclusion that defendants were negligent is
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insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
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at 678.
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cause of action for wrongful death.
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(Compl. ¶ 38.)
See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
Accordingly, the court must dismiss plaintiff’s third
Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth
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cause of action for negligence.
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suffers from the same deficiencies as the third cause of action
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for wrongful death.
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her opposition.
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will dismiss plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for negligence.
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The fourth cause of action
Further, plaintiff withdrew this claim in
(Pl.’s Opp’n 12:8-11.)
Accordingly, the court
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of
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California Government Code § 845.6 likewise lacks any factual
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specificity.
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if an employee is acting within the scope of his employment and
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“knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of
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immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to
Under section 845.6, a public entity may be liable
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summon such medical care.”
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again relies on legal conclusions that defendants “knew or had
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reason to know that Decedent was in need of immediate and higher
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level medical care, treatment, observation and monitoring” in
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order to support her claim.
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devoid of factual allegations regarding the circumstances
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surrounding the decedent’s alleged need for immediate medical
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care, the actions of any jail employees, and whether an employee
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was acting within the scope of his employment.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6.
(Compl. ¶ 47.)
Plaintiff
The Complaint is
Accordingly, the
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court must dismiss plaintiff’s fifth cause of action under
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California Government Code § 845.6.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s Motion to
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dismiss all causes of action be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
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Plaintiff has fourteen days from the date this Order is
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signed to file a First Amended Complaint, if she can do so
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consistent with this Order.
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Dated:
March 7, 2017
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