Eagle Systems And Services, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge 725

Filing 31

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 3/31/17. The Court GRANTS Union's Motion for Attorney Fees 27 and AWARDS $17,584.50. (Mena-Sanchez, L)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 EAGLE SYSTEMS AND SERVICES, INC., No. 2:16-cv-02077 JAM-EFB 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 16 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE 725, ORDER GRANTING INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE 725’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 17 Defendant. 18 19 The fight between Eagle and Union continues. Plaintiff 20 Eagle Systems and Services, Inc. (“Eagle”) punched first when it 21 allegedly violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). 22 Defendant International Association of Machinists, District Lodge 23 725 (“Union”) hit back by prevailing in arbitration. 24 unshaken, filed a complaint in this Court to vacate that award. 25 ECF No. 1. 26 counter moved to confirm the award. 27 declared Union the winner by a TKO and awarded attorneys’ fees. 28 Order, ECF No. 25. Eagle, Feeling sucker punched, Union moved to dismiss and ECF No. 7. This Court Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, see 1 1 Mot., ECF No. 27; Opp’n, ECF No. 28; Reply, ECF No. 29, the Court 2 now sets the amount of the attorneys’ fees awarded to Union at 3 $17,584.50. 1 4 5 I. 6 OPINION Because this Court’s previous Order details the underlying 7 dispute that generated this litigation, the Court will not 8 repeat the facts. 9 although Eagle “did not challenge the Court’s [bad faith] 10 ruling,” see Opp’n at 1, Eagle still disputes whether its 11 conduct constituted an unjustified refusal to abide by an 12 arbitration award. 13 Order at 18-20 (explaining Eagle sought to frustrate the award 14 by unjustifiably refusing to abide by the arbitrator’s 15 decision). See generally Order. Equally important, This Court already concluded it did. See Eagle does not get a second bite at the apple. 16 A. 17 When evaluating requests for attorneys’ fees, the court 18 always begins by calculating the lodestar amount, which involves 19 multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a 20 reasonable hourly rate. 21 433 (1983). 22 calculation any “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” 23 hours expended. 24 25 Lodestar Method See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, A court should exclude from this initial See id. at 434. But the inquiry does not end there. There remain other factors that may compel a court to “adjust the fee upward or 26 27 28 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for February 21, 2017. 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 downward.” See id. These include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and the difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 10 1975), abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. 11 Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). 12 often subsumed within the lodestar amount, so courts must ensure 13 they account for any potential overlap. 14 of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1989). 15 finally, this district’s Local Rule 293(c)(13) adds one more 16 factor: 17 under the circumstances.” 18 These Kerr factors, however, are See Cunningham v. Cty. And, “[S]uch other matters as the Court may deem appropriate The party seeking fees should provide documentary evidence 19 showing “the number of hours spent, and how it determined the 20 hourly rate(s) requested.” 21 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 specific rebuttal evidence “challenging the accuracy and 23 reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by” 24 the moving party. 25 1995). McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d Then the opposing party must submit Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 26 B. 27 Union requests $32,968.75 in attorneys’ fees, arguing that 28 Analysis these were reasonably and necessarily incurred, especially given 3 1 labor arbitration’s compensation and deterrence goals. 2 generally Mot. 3 lodestar adjustment. 4 the Court disagrees. 5 6 1. See Union contends that the Court need not make a See id. at 8. As further explained below, Hourly Rates To determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates 7 requested, a court looks to the prevailing market rates in the 8 relevant community for “similar work performed by attorneys of 9 comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 10 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 11 F.2d 1205, 1210—11 (9th Cir. 1986). 12 generally the forum in which the district court sits—not where 13 counsel’s firm resides. 14 (9th Cir. 1997). 15 satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own 16 affidavits—that the requested [hourly] rates are in line with 17 those prevailing in the community for similar services by 18 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 19 reputation.” 20 The relevant community is Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 The “burden is on the fee applicant to produce Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. Union states the requested rates “reflect the market rates 21 . . . in the Bay Area and Sacramento Valley.” 22 Although Eagle does not challenge the hourly rates Union seeks, 23 See Opp’n at 2 (disputing only the hours expended), the Court 24 finds it unreasonable to, as Union does, treat the Bay Area and 25 Sacramento Valley as the same “community.” 26 this district treat the two separately. 27 Sacramento, No. 09-1025, 2011 WL 3584332, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28 12, 2011); Beecham v. City of West Sacramento, No. 07-1115, 2009 4 Mot. at 4. Indeed, courts in See Jones v. Cty. of 1 2 WL 3824793, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009). This distinction matters because the parties litigated the 3 case—the case underlying Union’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees—in 4 Sacramento where this Court sits. 5 Because it would be unreasonable to accept rates based on a 6 market different from where the case was litigated, the Court 7 rejects any hourly rates based on Bay Area rates. 8 2009 WL 3824793 at *4. 9 appropriate here. 10 a. 11 See Barjon, 132 F.3d at 500. See Beecham, Only the Sacramento market rate is Partners Union asks the Court to accept David Rosenfeld’s $775 12 hourly rate. Mot. at 4-5. 13 the firm Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld with “over forty years” 14 experience. 15 its argument. 16 though instructive, is not binding authority in that this was a 17 more complex case filed in the District’s Fresno division. 18 F.R.D. 431, 452 (E.D. Cal. 2013). 19 . . . do not establish the prevailing market rates in the 20 Sacramento community.” 21 13-1544, 2014 WL 1334006, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014); Jadwin 22 v. Cty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1124—29 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 23 (holding that Fresno division, not Sacramento division, was 24 relevant legal community to be used in selecting appropriate 25 hourly rates). 26 Sacramento Superior Court, is also unhelpful. 27 Auto Care. 28 supporting declaration and the Court is unable to ascertain why Gray Decl. ¶ 8. Rosenfeld is a named shareholder of Union cites two cases to support The first, Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 297 “Cases litigated in Fresno Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply, No. The second case, although litigated in See Procter v. Union did not attach this state court case to its 5 1 the state court approved Rosenfeld’s rate. 2 only declaration submitted here does not state that $775 is the 3 prevailing rate in Sacramento for a lawyer with Rosenfeld’s 4 experience. And, notably, the 5 This makes it difficult for the Court to blindly accept 6 Union’s requested rate, especially when a judge in this district 7 recently determined $530 a reasonable rate for partners with 40 8 years of experience. 9 of Husbandry v. California State Grange, No. 14-676, 2016 WL See Nat’l Grange of the Order of Patrons 10 4765061, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016). 11 not met its burden, and because Rosenfeld’s rate partially 12 derives from Bay Area rates, see Gray Decl. ¶ 14, the Court will 13 compensate Rosenfeld at a $530 hourly rate. 14 Because Union has Union also requests a $650 hourly rate for Matthew Gauger, 15 another shareholder-partner. 16 firm’s Sacramento office and has 27 years of experience 17 representing labor unions. 18 Gray Decl. ¶ 9. Gauger heads the Id. Once again, Union’s cited authority does not support this 19 requested rate. 20 not accept the rates approved in Barbosa or Procter. 21 again, Gauger’s requested $650 rate also stems, in part, from 22 Bay Area market rates. 23 For the reasons explained above, the Court will And, Gray Decl. ¶ 14. Judges in this district have regularly approved hourly 24 rates of $400 or more for partners or experienced attorneys. 25 See, e.g., National Grange, 2016 WL 4765061 at *3 (accepting 26 unopposed $450 requested rate for party with 35 years of 27 experience); Estrada v. iYogi, Inc., No. 13-1989, 2016 WL 28 310279, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) (approving $400 6 1 requested rate for partners with as much as 19 years of 2 experience); Trulsson v. Cty. of San Joaquin Dist. Attorneys’ 3 Office, No. 11-2986, 2014 WL 5472787, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 4 2014) (accepting $450 hourly rate for experienced attorney). 5 Once again, Union has not met its burden: It has not 6 offered sufficient evidence showing that $650 is the prevailing 7 rate in Sacramento for a lawyer with Gauger’s experience. 8 Because judges in this district accept rates between $400 and 9 $450 for partners with 20 to 35 years of experience, and Gauger 10 has 27 years of experience, this Court finds a $425 hourly rate 11 reasonable. 12 13 14 15 In sum, the Court will compensate Rosenfeld at a $530 hourly rate and Gauger at a $425 hourly rate. b. Second-Year Associates Union asks the Court to accept second-year associate 16 Caitlin Gray’s $295 hourly rate. 17 cited by Union supports this. 18 v. Blue Cross of California, No. 12-1071, 2012 WL 3638506, at 19 *9, 11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (using Los Angeles and San 20 Francisco market rates, not Sacramento rates, to find $300 21 hourly rate appropriate for second-year associate); Barbosa, 297 22 F.R.D. at 452 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (applying $280 hourly rate based 23 on Fresno market). 24 See Gray Decl. ¶ 10. No case See Lodi Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. In fact, judges in this district have found $150-$170 an 25 appropriate hourly billing rate for second-year associates. 26 See, e.g., Cosby v. Autozone, Inc., No. 08-505, 2016 WL 1626997, 27 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) ($150 for new attorney 28 practicing a little over one year); Orr v. California Highway 7 1 Patrol, No. 14-585, 2015 WL 9305021, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2 2015) (market rate for second and third year associates between 3 $150 and $170 per hour). 4 The Court will therefore compensate Gray at a $170 hourly 5 rate. She has been practicing law since only 2015, and Union 6 has not met its burden establishing Gray should receive a rate 7 only $5 less than those awarded for fifth-year associates also 8 practicing labor and employment law. 9 at *8 (finding $300 rate reasonable for fifth-year associate). 10 11 c. See Cosby, 2016 WL 1626997 Paralegals There is some disagreement among judges in this district 12 about reasonable Sacramento market rates for work performed by 13 paralegals. 14 2015 WL 9305021, at *4; Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Albright, 15 No. 11-2260, 2013 WL 4094403, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013); 16 Friedman v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n, No. 2-101, 2010 WL 2880148, 17 at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (citations omitted). 18 have found $150 reasonable. 19 0508, 2014 WL 1286001, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014); 20 Endurance Am. Specialty Co. v. Lance-Kashian & Co., No. 10-1284, 21 2011 WL 5417103, at *31 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011); Beecham, 2009 22 WL 3824793 at *4. 23 $170/hour is the Sacramento market rate for the second-year 24 associate involved in this case, the Court will compensate 25 paralegals at a $75 hourly rate—a rate judges in this district 26 used recently. 27 28 2. Some have found $75 reasonable. See, e.g., Orr, Yet others Hall v. City of Fairfield, No. 10- Despite this disagreement, having concluded See, e.g., Orr, 2015 WL 9305021 at *4. Hours Expended Union contends spending 93.15 hours on this litigation was 8 1 reasonable. 2 objections. 3 See Gray Decl., Exh. C. a. 4 Eagle raises several L-3’s Motion to Intervene Eagle argues time spent preparing and responding to L-3’s 5 motion to intervene is excessive and unreasonable because L-3 is 6 an entity separate and distinct from Eagle—an entity neither 7 party to this litigation nor signatory to the CBA. 8 In response, Union blames Eagle for having to address L-3’s 9 motion, explaining Union had to respond “because Eagle . . . Opp’n at 2. 10 initiated and pursued this action in the first place.” 11 2. 12 The Court agrees with Eagle. Reply at Although neither party cites 13 a case supporting its position, some cases are instructive. The 14 Ninth Circuit has recognized that “courts in this circuit [have 15 held] individuals whose motions to intervene have been denied 16 are not ‘parties’ . . . .” 17 Angeles, No. 02-57097, 2003 WL 22872520, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 18 2003). 19 granted L-3’s motion. 20 consider L-3’s Motion to Intervene as moot). 21 Union’s opposition to L-3’s motion, Union never requested 22 attorneys’ fees. 23 2675237, at *4 (D. Ariz July 6, 2012) (granting attorneys’ fees 24 for opposing another’s motion to intervene, in part, because 25 opposing party asked for fees in opposition brief). 26 the Court finds it unreasonable to award fees for time spent 27 opposing a motion by an entity not party to this litigation. 28 /// United States v. City of Los Here, L-3 was not a party because this Court never See Min. Order, ECF No. 26 (declining to Additionally, in See Donahoe v. Arpaio, No. 10-2756, 2012 WL 9 Simply put, 1 2 b. Matthew Gauger Eagle contends Union is not entitled to fees for Matthew 3 Gauger’s time because Union did not need two shareholder- 4 partners to litigate this case and Gauger’s tasks “were menial 5 at best.” 6 work was reasonable because his time was minimal (1 hour) and he 7 was uniquely positioned to handle the tasks. 8 (explaining he spent 15 minutes handling service of process and 9 45 minutes preparing Union’s fee motion because he had relevant Opp’n at 3. In response, Union maintains Gauger’s Reply at 2 10 information about prevailing rates for lawyers in Sacramento). 11 Again, neither party cites supporting authority. 12 The Court agrees with Eagle. Union inadequately addresses 13 why it is reasonable to have a shareholder-partner assist with 14 issues concerning service of process and market-rates. 15 Court is unpersuaded that only Gauger could have handled these 16 issues, especially with Rosenfeld aboard. 17 even as leader of the Sacramento office, Gauger could have 18 directed another where to find material about Sacramento market 19 rates, rather than spend 45 minutes “preparing information about 20 attorney’s fees awards . . . .” 21 to bill partner-level fees to complete these menial tasks. 22 Court will not include Gauger’s time in its lodestar 23 calculation. 24 25 c. The At the very least, Reply at 2. It is unreasonable The Duplicative Time Eagle argues Union includes duplicative time. Two 26 paralegals and associate Gray reviewed the applicable rules and 27 researched case law to determine due dates triggered by Eagle’s 28 Complaint. Opp’n at 2. Union maintains this was not 10 1 unreasonably duplicative: 2 determined due dates, Rosenfeld noticed a potential timing 3 issue, so associate Gray researched the issue and then paralegal 4 Castillo double-checked the due dates. 5 After paralegal Nathan initially Reply at 2-3. The Court finds some of this time duplicative. Researching 6 procedural rules differs from merely identifying due dates, so 7 Gray’s time was reasonably expended. 8 Castillo “double checked” the due dates first determined by 9 paralegal Nathan, their time is duplicative. But, because paralegal Had the firm 10 researched the timeliness issue before asking a paralegal to 11 prematurely determine due dates, another paralegal would not have 12 had to “double check” those dates. 13 time paralegal Nathan spent identifying due dates. 14 d. 15 The Court will discount the Union’s Motion to Dismiss Next Eagle contends Union should not receive fees for 16 excessive time spent on drafting Union’s Motion to Dismiss. 17 Opp’n at 4. 18 3-4. 19 Union maintains this time was reasonable. The Court agrees with Union. Reply at First, in its Complaint, Eagle 20 raised several arguments explaining why this Court should vacate 21 the arbitration award—and each required considerable analysis. 22 Second, to say it is excessive for Union to spend 41 hours 23 drafting a motion to dismiss because it took Eagle only 25 hours 24 to draft an opposition to Union’s attorneys’ fees motion misses 25 the point: 26 4. 27 took considerable time to sufficiently respond. 28 the time spent drafting Union’s Motion to Dismiss reasonable. Eagle is comparing apples to oranges. See Opp’n at Given Eagle’s numerous arguments, it is no surprise Union 11 The Court finds 1 2 3. Lodestar Amount There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is 3 the reasonable fee. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps 4 Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1990). 5 “does not seek a multiplier,” it asks the Court to consider “the 6 need for deterrence.” 7 293(c)(13)). 8 whether to award fees in the first place. 9 The Court therefore awards the following in attorneys’ fees: Although Union See Mot. at 8 (citing E.D. Cal. L.R. But the Court has already done so when it evaluated See Order at 18-20. 10 11 David Rosenfeld 8.9 x $530 = $ 4,717.00 12 Caitlin Gray 75.25 x $170 = $12,792.50 13 Teresa Alou 0.25 x $ 75 = $ 18.75 14 Judy Castillo 0.75 x $ 75 = $ 56.25 15 $17,584.50 16 17 18 19 20 21 II. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Union’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and awards 17,584.50. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March 31, 2017 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

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