Eagle Systems And Services, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge 725
Filing
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ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 3/31/17. The Court GRANTS Union's Motion for Attorney Fees 27 and AWARDS $17,584.50. (Mena-Sanchez, L)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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EAGLE SYSTEMS AND SERVICES,
INC.,
No.
2:16-cv-02077 JAM-EFB
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE
725,
ORDER GRANTING INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
DISTRICT LODGE 725’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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Defendant.
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The fight between Eagle and Union continues.
Plaintiff
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Eagle Systems and Services, Inc. (“Eagle”) punched first when it
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allegedly violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).
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Defendant International Association of Machinists, District Lodge
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725 (“Union”) hit back by prevailing in arbitration.
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unshaken, filed a complaint in this Court to vacate that award.
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ECF No. 1.
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counter moved to confirm the award.
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declared Union the winner by a TKO and awarded attorneys’ fees.
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Order, ECF No. 25.
Eagle,
Feeling sucker punched, Union moved to dismiss and
ECF No. 7.
This Court
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, see
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Mot., ECF No. 27; Opp’n, ECF No. 28; Reply, ECF No. 29, the Court
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now sets the amount of the attorneys’ fees awarded to Union at
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$17,584.50. 1
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I.
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OPINION
Because this Court’s previous Order details the underlying
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dispute that generated this litigation, the Court will not
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repeat the facts.
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although Eagle “did not challenge the Court’s [bad faith]
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ruling,” see Opp’n at 1, Eagle still disputes whether its
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conduct constituted an unjustified refusal to abide by an
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arbitration award.
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Order at 18-20 (explaining Eagle sought to frustrate the award
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by unjustifiably refusing to abide by the arbitrator’s
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decision).
See generally Order.
Equally important,
This Court already concluded it did.
See
Eagle does not get a second bite at the apple.
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A.
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When evaluating requests for attorneys’ fees, the court
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always begins by calculating the lodestar amount, which involves
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multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a
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reasonable hourly rate.
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433 (1983).
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calculation any “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary”
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hours expended.
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Lodestar Method
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
A court should exclude from this initial
See id. at 434.
But the inquiry does not end there.
There remain other
factors that may compel a court to “adjust the fee upward or
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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for February 21, 2017.
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downward.”
See id.
These include:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
the difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.
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1975), abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v.
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Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
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often subsumed within the lodestar amount, so courts must ensure
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they account for any potential overlap.
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of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1989).
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finally, this district’s Local Rule 293(c)(13) adds one more
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factor:
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under the circumstances.”
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These Kerr factors, however, are
See Cunningham v. Cty.
And,
“[S]uch other matters as the Court may deem appropriate
The party seeking fees should provide documentary evidence
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showing “the number of hours spent, and how it determined the
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hourly rate(s) requested.”
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1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008).
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specific rebuttal evidence “challenging the accuracy and
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reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by”
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the moving party.
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1995).
McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d
Then the opposing party must submit
Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir.
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B.
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Union requests $32,968.75 in attorneys’ fees, arguing that
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Analysis
these were reasonably and necessarily incurred, especially given
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labor arbitration’s compensation and deterrence goals.
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generally Mot.
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lodestar adjustment.
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the Court disagrees.
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1.
See
Union contends that the Court need not make a
See id. at 8.
As further explained below,
Hourly Rates
To determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates
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requested, a court looks to the prevailing market rates in the
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relevant community for “similar work performed by attorneys of
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comparable skill, experience, and reputation.”
Blum v. Stenson,
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465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796
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F.2d 1205, 1210—11 (9th Cir. 1986).
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generally the forum in which the district court sits—not where
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counsel’s firm resides.
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(9th Cir. 1997).
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satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own
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affidavits—that the requested [hourly] rates are in line with
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those prevailing in the community for similar services by
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lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
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reputation.”
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The relevant community is
Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500
The “burden is on the fee applicant to produce
Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11.
Union states the requested rates “reflect the market rates
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. . . in the Bay Area and Sacramento Valley.”
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Although Eagle does not challenge the hourly rates Union seeks,
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See Opp’n at 2 (disputing only the hours expended), the Court
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finds it unreasonable to, as Union does, treat the Bay Area and
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Sacramento Valley as the same “community.”
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this district treat the two separately.
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Sacramento, No. 09-1025, 2011 WL 3584332, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
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12, 2011); Beecham v. City of West Sacramento, No. 07-1115, 2009
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Mot. at 4.
Indeed, courts in
See Jones v. Cty. of
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WL 3824793, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009).
This distinction matters because the parties litigated the
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case—the case underlying Union’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees—in
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Sacramento where this Court sits.
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Because it would be unreasonable to accept rates based on a
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market different from where the case was litigated, the Court
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rejects any hourly rates based on Bay Area rates.
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2009 WL 3824793 at *4.
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appropriate here.
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a.
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See Barjon, 132 F.3d at 500.
See Beecham,
Only the Sacramento market rate is
Partners
Union asks the Court to accept David Rosenfeld’s $775
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hourly rate.
Mot. at 4-5.
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the firm Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld with “over forty years”
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experience.
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its argument.
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though instructive, is not binding authority in that this was a
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more complex case filed in the District’s Fresno division.
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F.R.D. 431, 452 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
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. . . do not establish the prevailing market rates in the
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Sacramento community.”
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13-1544, 2014 WL 1334006, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014); Jadwin
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v. Cty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1124—29 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
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(holding that Fresno division, not Sacramento division, was
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relevant legal community to be used in selecting appropriate
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hourly rates).
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Sacramento Superior Court, is also unhelpful.
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Auto Care.
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supporting declaration and the Court is unable to ascertain why
Gray Decl. ¶ 8.
Rosenfeld is a named shareholder of
Union cites two cases to support
The first, Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp.,
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“Cases litigated in Fresno
Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply, No.
The second case, although litigated in
See Procter v.
Union did not attach this state court case to its
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the state court approved Rosenfeld’s rate.
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only declaration submitted here does not state that $775 is the
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prevailing rate in Sacramento for a lawyer with Rosenfeld’s
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experience.
And, notably, the
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This makes it difficult for the Court to blindly accept
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Union’s requested rate, especially when a judge in this district
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recently determined $530 a reasonable rate for partners with 40
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years of experience.
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of Husbandry v. California State Grange, No. 14-676, 2016 WL
See Nat’l Grange of the Order of Patrons
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4765061, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016).
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not met its burden, and because Rosenfeld’s rate partially
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derives from Bay Area rates, see Gray Decl. ¶ 14, the Court will
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compensate Rosenfeld at a $530 hourly rate.
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Because Union has
Union also requests a $650 hourly rate for Matthew Gauger,
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another shareholder-partner.
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firm’s Sacramento office and has 27 years of experience
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representing labor unions.
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Gray Decl. ¶ 9.
Gauger heads the
Id.
Once again, Union’s cited authority does not support this
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requested rate.
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not accept the rates approved in Barbosa or Procter.
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again, Gauger’s requested $650 rate also stems, in part, from
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Bay Area market rates.
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For the reasons explained above, the Court will
And,
Gray Decl. ¶ 14.
Judges in this district have regularly approved hourly
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rates of $400 or more for partners or experienced attorneys.
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See, e.g., National Grange, 2016 WL 4765061 at *3 (accepting
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unopposed $450 requested rate for party with 35 years of
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experience); Estrada v. iYogi, Inc., No. 13-1989, 2016 WL
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310279, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) (approving $400
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requested rate for partners with as much as 19 years of
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experience); Trulsson v. Cty. of San Joaquin Dist. Attorneys’
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Office, No. 11-2986, 2014 WL 5472787, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28,
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2014) (accepting $450 hourly rate for experienced attorney).
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Once again, Union has not met its burden:
It has not
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offered sufficient evidence showing that $650 is the prevailing
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rate in Sacramento for a lawyer with Gauger’s experience.
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Because judges in this district accept rates between $400 and
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$450 for partners with 20 to 35 years of experience, and Gauger
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has 27 years of experience, this Court finds a $425 hourly rate
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reasonable.
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In sum, the Court will compensate Rosenfeld at a $530
hourly rate and Gauger at a $425 hourly rate.
b.
Second-Year Associates
Union asks the Court to accept second-year associate
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Caitlin Gray’s $295 hourly rate.
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cited by Union supports this.
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v. Blue Cross of California, No. 12-1071, 2012 WL 3638506, at
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*9, 11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (using Los Angeles and San
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Francisco market rates, not Sacramento rates, to find $300
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hourly rate appropriate for second-year associate); Barbosa, 297
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F.R.D. at 452 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (applying $280 hourly rate based
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on Fresno market).
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See Gray Decl. ¶ 10.
No case
See Lodi Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, Inc.
In fact, judges in this district have found $150-$170 an
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appropriate hourly billing rate for second-year associates.
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See, e.g., Cosby v. Autozone, Inc., No. 08-505, 2016 WL 1626997,
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at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) ($150 for new attorney
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practicing a little over one year); Orr v. California Highway
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Patrol, No. 14-585, 2015 WL 9305021, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22,
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2015) (market rate for second and third year associates between
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$150 and $170 per hour).
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The Court will therefore compensate Gray at a $170 hourly
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rate.
She has been practicing law since only 2015, and Union
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has not met its burden establishing Gray should receive a rate
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only $5 less than those awarded for fifth-year associates also
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practicing labor and employment law.
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at *8 (finding $300 rate reasonable for fifth-year associate).
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c.
See Cosby, 2016 WL 1626997
Paralegals
There is some disagreement among judges in this district
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about reasonable Sacramento market rates for work performed by
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paralegals.
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2015 WL 9305021, at *4; Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Albright,
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No. 11-2260, 2013 WL 4094403, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013);
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Friedman v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n, No. 2-101, 2010 WL 2880148,
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at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (citations omitted).
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have found $150 reasonable.
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0508, 2014 WL 1286001, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014);
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Endurance Am. Specialty Co. v. Lance-Kashian & Co., No. 10-1284,
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2011 WL 5417103, at *31 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011); Beecham, 2009
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WL 3824793 at *4.
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$170/hour is the Sacramento market rate for the second-year
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associate involved in this case, the Court will compensate
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paralegals at a $75 hourly rate—a rate judges in this district
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used recently.
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2.
Some have found $75 reasonable.
See, e.g., Orr,
Yet others
Hall v. City of Fairfield, No. 10-
Despite this disagreement, having concluded
See, e.g., Orr, 2015 WL 9305021 at *4.
Hours Expended
Union contends spending 93.15 hours on this litigation was
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reasonable.
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objections.
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See Gray Decl., Exh. C.
a.
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Eagle raises several
L-3’s Motion to Intervene
Eagle argues time spent preparing and responding to L-3’s
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motion to intervene is excessive and unreasonable because L-3 is
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an entity separate and distinct from Eagle—an entity neither
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party to this litigation nor signatory to the CBA.
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In response, Union blames Eagle for having to address L-3’s
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motion, explaining Union had to respond “because Eagle . . .
Opp’n at 2.
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initiated and pursued this action in the first place.”
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2.
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The Court agrees with Eagle.
Reply at
Although neither party cites
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a case supporting its position, some cases are instructive.
The
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Ninth Circuit has recognized that “courts in this circuit [have
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held] individuals whose motions to intervene have been denied
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are not ‘parties’ . . . .”
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Angeles, No. 02-57097, 2003 WL 22872520, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 3,
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2003).
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granted L-3’s motion.
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consider L-3’s Motion to Intervene as moot).
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Union’s opposition to L-3’s motion, Union never requested
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attorneys’ fees.
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2675237, at *4 (D. Ariz July 6, 2012) (granting attorneys’ fees
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for opposing another’s motion to intervene, in part, because
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opposing party asked for fees in opposition brief).
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the Court finds it unreasonable to award fees for time spent
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opposing a motion by an entity not party to this litigation.
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///
United States v. City of Los
Here, L-3 was not a party because this Court never
See Min. Order, ECF No. 26 (declining to
Additionally, in
See Donahoe v. Arpaio, No. 10-2756, 2012 WL
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Simply put,
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b.
Matthew Gauger
Eagle contends Union is not entitled to fees for Matthew
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Gauger’s time because Union did not need two shareholder-
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partners to litigate this case and Gauger’s tasks “were menial
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at best.”
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work was reasonable because his time was minimal (1 hour) and he
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was uniquely positioned to handle the tasks.
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(explaining he spent 15 minutes handling service of process and
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45 minutes preparing Union’s fee motion because he had relevant
Opp’n at 3.
In response, Union maintains Gauger’s
Reply at 2
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information about prevailing rates for lawyers in Sacramento).
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Again, neither party cites supporting authority.
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The Court agrees with Eagle.
Union inadequately addresses
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why it is reasonable to have a shareholder-partner assist with
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issues concerning service of process and market-rates.
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Court is unpersuaded that only Gauger could have handled these
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issues, especially with Rosenfeld aboard.
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even as leader of the Sacramento office, Gauger could have
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directed another where to find material about Sacramento market
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rates, rather than spend 45 minutes “preparing information about
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attorney’s fees awards . . . .”
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to bill partner-level fees to complete these menial tasks.
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Court will not include Gauger’s time in its lodestar
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calculation.
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c.
The
At the very least,
Reply at 2.
It is unreasonable
The
Duplicative Time
Eagle argues Union includes duplicative time.
Two
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paralegals and associate Gray reviewed the applicable rules and
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researched case law to determine due dates triggered by Eagle’s
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Complaint.
Opp’n at 2.
Union maintains this was not
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unreasonably duplicative:
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determined due dates, Rosenfeld noticed a potential timing
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issue, so associate Gray researched the issue and then paralegal
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Castillo double-checked the due dates.
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After paralegal Nathan initially
Reply at 2-3.
The Court finds some of this time duplicative.
Researching
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procedural rules differs from merely identifying due dates, so
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Gray’s time was reasonably expended.
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Castillo “double checked” the due dates first determined by
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paralegal Nathan, their time is duplicative.
But, because paralegal
Had the firm
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researched the timeliness issue before asking a paralegal to
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prematurely determine due dates, another paralegal would not have
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had to “double check” those dates.
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time paralegal Nathan spent identifying due dates.
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d.
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The Court will discount the
Union’s Motion to Dismiss
Next Eagle contends Union should not receive fees for
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excessive time spent on drafting Union’s Motion to Dismiss.
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Opp’n at 4.
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3-4.
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Union maintains this time was reasonable.
The Court agrees with Union.
Reply at
First, in its Complaint, Eagle
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raised several arguments explaining why this Court should vacate
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the arbitration award—and each required considerable analysis.
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Second, to say it is excessive for Union to spend 41 hours
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drafting a motion to dismiss because it took Eagle only 25 hours
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to draft an opposition to Union’s attorneys’ fees motion misses
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the point:
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4.
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took considerable time to sufficiently respond.
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the time spent drafting Union’s Motion to Dismiss reasonable.
Eagle is comparing apples to oranges.
See Opp’n at
Given Eagle’s numerous arguments, it is no surprise Union
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The Court finds
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3.
Lodestar Amount
There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is
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the reasonable fee.
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps
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Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1990).
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“does not seek a multiplier,” it asks the Court to consider “the
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need for deterrence.”
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293(c)(13)).
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whether to award fees in the first place.
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The Court therefore awards the following in attorneys’ fees:
Although Union
See Mot. at 8 (citing E.D. Cal. L.R.
But the Court has already done so when it evaluated
See Order at 18-20.
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David Rosenfeld
8.9
x
$530
=
$ 4,717.00
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Caitlin Gray
75.25
x
$170
=
$12,792.50
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Teresa Alou
0.25
x
$ 75
=
$
18.75
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Judy Castillo
0.75
x
$ 75
=
$
56.25
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$17,584.50
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II.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Union’s
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and awards 17,584.50.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 31, 2017
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