United Financial Casualty Company v. L. et al

Filing 64

ORDER signed by District Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi on 11/13/17 ORDERING that on the basis of the foregoing, J.M.L.'s MOTION to STAY or in the Alternative Dismiss this Action, filed 11/22/16 23 is HEREBY GRANTED insofar as the case is STAYED pending the resolution of the aforementioned cases pending in the California State Courts. The Motion is DENIED as to J.M.L.'s request to dismiss the case. (Mena-Sanchez, L)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
J.M.L., a minor, by and
)
)
through her guardian ad
litem, Michelle Rogers, et
)
al.
)
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY
COMPANY,

2:16-CV-02098 LEK

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On November 2, 2016, Defendant J.M.L., a minor, by and

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through her Guardian ad Litem, Michelle Rogers (“J.M.L.”), filed

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a Motion to Stay or in the Alternative Dismiss this Action

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(“Motion”).1

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Company (“United Financial”) filed its memorandum in opposition

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on November 21, 2016, and J.M.L. filed her reply on November 29,

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2016.

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issued an entering order reserving ruling on the Motion until all

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of the defendants were served with the First Amended Complaint

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for Declaratory Relief (“First Amended Complaint”), [filed

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2/17/17 (dkt. no. 28),] and had the opportunity to respond to the

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT J.M.L.’S MOTION TO STAY OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE DISMISS THIS ACTION

[Dkt. no. 17.]

[Dkt. nos. 22, 25.]

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Plaintiff United Financial Casualty

On February 23, 2017, this Court

The version of the Motion filed on November 2, 2016 was
not properly redacted. J.M.L. filed a properly redacted version
on November 22, 2016. [Dkt. no. 23.] All references to the
Motion refer to the November 22 version.

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Motion (“2/23/17 EO”).

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United Financial filed a notice stating that it complied with the

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2/23/17 EO.

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supplemental memorandum in support of the Motion (“Supplemental

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Memorandum”).

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suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to

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L.R. 230(g) of the Local Rules of the United States District

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Court for the Eastern District of California (“Local Rules”).

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J.M.L.’s Motion is hereby granted in part and denied in part, for

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[Dkt. no. 31.]

[Dkt. no. 61.]

On August 31, 2017,

On September 6, 2017, J.M.L. filed a

[Dkt. no. 63.]

The Court finds the Motion

the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND

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United Financial filed its original Complaint for

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Declaratory Relief on September 1, 2016.

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instant case is based on diversity.

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¶ 1.]

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the commercial automobile insurance policy it issued to Defendant

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Manjit Singh, doing business as Top Raman Trucking (“Singh”),

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policy number 03036852-0 (“the Policy”).

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Policy also has a DMV 67 MCP endorsement, in compliance with Cal.

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Code Regs. tit. 13, § 220.06(b) (“the Endorsement”).

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¶ 28.]

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Jurisdiction over the

[First Amended Complaint at

United Financial seeks a declaratory judgment regarding

[Id. at ¶ 24.]

The

[Id. at

On March 16, 2015, “Ewell Levy died as a result of a

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crash while he was driving a 2009 Sterling tractor truck towing

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two trailers loaded with dirt and gravel” (“the Incident”).

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[Id.

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at ¶ 29.]

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exception of Singh – have filed an action in a California state

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court related to the Incident (collectively, “the State Court

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Actions”).

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death, bodily injury, or property damage claims against Singh; or

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claims alleging an interest in the Policy or the Endorsement.

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Singh tendered the defense in the State Court Actions to United

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Financial, which is defending him pursuant to a reservation of

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rights to, inter alia, deny coverage under the Policy and the

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All of the defendants in this case – with the

The State Court Actions assert either: wrongful

Endorsement.

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[Id. at ¶¶ 30-31.]

The First Amended Complaint alleges the following

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claims: a claim for a declaratory judgment that United Financial

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has no duty under the Policy to defend Singh in the State Court

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Actions (“Count I”); a claim for a declaratory judgment that

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United Financial has no duty under the Policy to indemnify Singh

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against the claims in the State Court Actions (“Count II”); and a

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claim for a declaratory judgment that United Financial has no

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duty under the Endorsement to pay for any legal liability that

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Singh has for the claims in the State Court Actions

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(“Count III”).

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Financial prays for costs of suit and any other appropriate

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relief.

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In addition to the declaratory relief, United

As of August 26, 2016, four of the initial State Court
Actions were pending in the Superior Court in the County of

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Solano (“Solano Court”) – J.M.L. v. Parvinder Kumar Gir, et al.,

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Case No. FCS-045211 (“J.M.L. v. Gir”); LaToia Levy Johnson, et

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al. v. Parvinder Kumar Gir, et al., Case No. FCS-047005

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(“Johnson”); Wesco Insurance Co. v. J.M.L., et al., Case No. FCS-

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04099 (“Wesco Insurance”); and United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Roby

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Trucking, Inc., et al., Case No. FCS-047177 (“United Fire”).

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[Motion, Decl. of Thomas C. Knowles in Supp. of Motion (“Knowles

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Decl.”), Exh. A (Notice of Order and Order Relating Cases, of

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Reassignment, and Notice of Case Management Conference, filed on

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8/26/16 in the State Court Actions (“Case Management Order”)).]

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As of the date of the Case Management Order, the four Solano

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Court cases were either directly assigned or transferred to Judge

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Michael Mattice and a fifth case – Farmers Insurance Exchange v.

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Roby Trucking, Inc., et al., Case No. MSC-15-01794 (“Farmers

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Insurance”) – was pending in the Superior Court for the County of

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Contra Costa (“Contra Costa Court”), but was expected to be

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transferred to the Solano Court by stipulation.

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Management Order stated that, if Farmers Insurance was

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transferred to the Solano Court, it would be deemed a related

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case to those before Judge Mattice.

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The Case

[Id. at 3-4, 8.]

The parties were later advised of a sixth case filed in

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the Contra Costa Court – Rogelio Ramirez-Munoz, et al. v. Roby

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Truck [sic], RIS Leasing, et al., Case No. C16-00172 (“Ramirez-

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Munoz”).

[Knowles Decl., Exh. B (Joint Case Management Statement

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in the State Court Actions, dated October 3 and 29, 2016) at 5.2]

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J.M.L. v. Gir and Johnson are wrongful death actions, and Munoz-

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Ramirez is a personal injury action.

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and Farmers Insurance are subrogration actions, and Wesco

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Insurance “is an interpleader action which will ultimately become

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a forum in which numerous claimants with varying types of claims

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(wrongful death, personal injury, structure damage, commercial

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loss, etc.) to the limited resources, will be contesting shares

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with one another.”

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[Id. at 10.]

United Fire

[Id.]

As of the date of the Supplemental Memorandum, two

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additional cases had been filed in the Solano Court.3

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two new cases “seek[s] to pierce the corporate veil” and the

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other “seek[s] property damage and business losses for which

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there was insufficient insurance.”

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the Contra Costa Court cases was dismissed and re-filed in the

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Solano Court.

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Judge Mattice.

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had an unopposed motion for transfer to Judge Mattice in the

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Solano Court.

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September 20, 2017.

One of the

[Suppl. Mem. at 2.]

One of

All of the Solano Court cases are pending before
The one case remaining in the Contra Costa Court

The motion was scheduled for hearing on
[Id.]

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It is unclear from the Knowles Declaration and Exhibit B
whether the Joint Case Management Statement was filed in the
State Court Actions.
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J.M.L. does not identify the new cases.
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According to J.M.L., Singh has been named as a

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defendant and/or cross-defendant in six of the eight State Court

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Cases, and, every time a new plaintiff in the State Court Cases

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files a claim against Singh, United Financial brings the

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plaintiff into the instant case as defendant.

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that United Financial’s counsel has been voluntarily

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participating in the State Court Action’s case management

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proceedings before Judge Mattice.

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J.M.L. also notes

[Id. at 2-3.]

J.M.L. argues that the instant case presents state law

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issues that “will be effectively and more efficiently adjudicated

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in state court as part of the” State Court Actions, including

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whether United Financial has a duty to insure and defend Singh

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under the Policy and/or the Endorsement.

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Motion at 7.]

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Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), and

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Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th

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Cir. 1998), weigh in favor of staying or dismissing this case.

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[Mem. in Supp. of

J.M.L. asserts that the factors in Brillhart v.

STANDARD
This district court has set forth the following

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analysis applicable to the determination of whether to stay a

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declaratory judgment action in light of pending state court

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proceedings:

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A motion to stay in a declaratory relief action is
considered in light of the fact that declaratory
relief “is discretionary, for the Declaratory
Judgment Act is ‘deliberately cast in terms of
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permissive, rather than mandatory, authority.”
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d
1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Public Serv.
Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 250,
73 S. Ct. 236, 97 L. Ed. 291 (1952)). “The Act
‘gave the federal courts competence to make a
declaration of rights; it did not impose a duty to
do so.’” Id. (quoting Public Affairs Associates
v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 1112, 82 S. Ct. 580, 7
L. Ed. 2d 604 (1962)).

N.E. Ins. Co. v. Masonmar, Inc., No. 1:13–cv–00364–AWI–SAB, 2013

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WL 2474682, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2013).

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also uses these factors in the analysis of whether to dismiss a

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declaratory judgment action in light of pending state court

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proceedings.

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No. 2:13–cv–00530–MCE–KJN, 2014 WL 295202, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

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Jan. 24, 2014); accord R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co.,

When deciding a motion to stay proceedings in
a Declaratory Judgment Act action due to a pending
proceeding in state court, the Court must consider
the factors set forth in Brillhart v. Excess Ins.
Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 62 S. Ct. 1173, 86
L. Ed. 1620 (1942) and Dizol. The Court
(1) should avoid needless determination of state
law issues, (2) should discourage litigants from
filing declaratory actions as a means of forum
shopping, and (3) should avoid duplicative
litigation. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225. The Court
should also consider (4) whether the declaratory
action will settle all aspects of the controversy,
(5) whether the declaratory action will serve a
useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations
at issue, (6) whether the declaratory action is
being sought merely for the purposes of procedural
fencing or to obtain a ‘res judicata’ advantage,
(7) whether the use of a declaratory action will
result in entanglement between the federal and
state court systems, (8) the convenience of the
parties, and (9) the availability and relative
convenience of other remedies. Id. at 1225 n.5.

This district court

See, e.g., Atain Specialty Ins. Co. v. Hernandez,

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656 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that, in Brillhart,

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“the Supreme Court held that a district court has discretion to

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dismiss a federal declaratory judgment action when ‘the questions

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in controversy . . . can better be settled in’ a pending state

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court proceeding” (alteration in R.R. St.) (quoting Brillhart,

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316 U.S. at 495, 62 S. Ct. 1173)).

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DISCUSSION
I.

Brillhart/Dizol Factors

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This Court begins by examining whether the

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Brillhart/Dizol factors weigh in favor of or against the exercise

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of jurisdiction in this case.

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A.

Avoiding Needless Determinations of State Law Issues

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This district court has stated:

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This factor relates to unsettled issues of state
law, not unsettled issues of fact in the specific
action. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947
F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on
other grounds by Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1224–25. A
stay is warranted where “[t]he precise state law
issues at stake in the present case are the
subject of a parallel proceeding in state court.”
Id.
James River Ins. Co v. RV Tomlinson Const., Inc., No. CIV.

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2:13–00140 WBS AC, 2013 WL 1934354, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2013)

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(alteration in James River).

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The instant case will involve the interpretation of the

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Motor Carriers of Property Permit Act (“MCPPA”), Cal. Veh. Code,

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§ 34600 et seq.

The MCPPA requires, subject to certain
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exceptions, “[e]very motor carrier of property,” to maintain

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“adequate protection against liability imposed by law upon those

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carriers for the payment of damages in the amount of a combined

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single limit of not less than seven hundred fifty thousand

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dollars ($750,000) on account of bodily injuries to, or death of,

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one or more persons, or damage to or destruction of, property.”

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Cal. Veh. Code § 34631.5(a)(1).

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are state law issues, California insurance law is well

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established, and the unsettled issues in the case are factual,

While the issues in this case

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not legal.

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the stay or dismissal of this action.

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B.

Thus, the first Brillhart/Dizol factor weighs against

Discouraging Forum Shopping

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This district court has stated:

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The Ninth Circuit has said that Brillhart’s
forum shopping factor relates to “the ‘defensive’
or ‘reactive’ nature of a federal declaratory
judgment suit,” and such a suit “would justify a
court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction.”
Robsac, 947 F.2d at 1371 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
. . . .
Nothing in the record before the court
supports a finding that either party’s suit was
improperly reactive or defensive: “Federal
declaratory judgment suits are routinely filed in
anticipation of other litigation. . . . Merely
filing a declaratory judgment action in a federal
court with jurisdiction to hear it, in
anticipation of state court litigation, is not in
itself improper anticipatory litigation or
otherwise abusive ‘forum shopping.’”
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cnty., 343 F.3d
383, 391 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Dizol, 133 F.3d
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Lexington Ins. Co. v. Silva Trucking, Inc., No. 2:14–CV–0015 KJM

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CKD, 2014 WL 1839076, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2014) (some

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alterations in Silva Trucking).

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issues among the issues presented in the State Court Actions,

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United Financial apparently is not a party in any of the State

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Court Actions.

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forum shopping in the instant case.

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Brillhart/Dizol factor weighs against the stay or dismissal of

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this action.

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C.

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at 1225 (“We know of no authority for the
proposition that an insurer is barred from
invoking diversity jurisdiction to bring a
declaratory judgment action against an insured on
an issue of coverage.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); but see Budget
Rent-A-Car v. Crawford, 108 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th
Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by
Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (stating that concerns about
forum shopping “are also present when a federal
plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in anticipation
that a related state court proceeding may be
filed”).
Moreover, “[t]iming is only one consideration
when deciding whether to entertain a declaratory
judgment action, and the Wilton/Brillhart factors
sometimes compel a court to decline to entertain
an earlier-filed action in favor of a later-filed
action.” R.R. Street, 656 F.3d at 976. The fact
that defendants’ state action was filed later
similarly does not, without more, show the suit
was defensive or reactive.

Although the there are insurance

There is no indication that United Financial is
Thus, the second

Duplicative Litigation
A court may dismiss or abstain from a
declaratory action when “[a]ll of the issues
presented by the declaratory judgment action could
be resolved by the state court.” Robsac, 947 F.2d
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at 1372. The federal and state cases do not have
to be completely parallel: “an exact or precise
identity of the issues between the federal and
state action is not required to support dismissal
of a declaratory action.” Navigators Specialty
Ins. Co. v. CHSI of Cal., No. 3:12–cv–1611–GPC–
JMA, 2013 WL 435944, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4,
2013); see also Emps. Reins. Corp. v. Karussos, 65
F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled in part
on other grounds by Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220.
Id. at *9.

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United Financial emphasizes that it “cannot and never

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will be a party to” the State Court Actions.

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16.]

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not presented in the State Court Actions, the third

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Brillhart/Dizol factor does not ask whether the issues in the

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federal and state actions are identical.

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acknowledges that this case will require comparing the terms of

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the Policy and the Endorsement with facts related to the

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Incident.

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are undisputed, but this Court disagrees.

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issues about the Incident will be litigated in both the instant

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case and the State Court Actions, the third Brillhart/Dizol

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factor weighs in favor of staying or dismissing this action.

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[Mem. in Opp. at

While the specific coverage issues in the instant case are

D.

[Id. at 7.]

United Financial

United Financial argues that the facts
Because many factual

Other Factors
The fact that this declaratory judgment action will not

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settle all aspects of the controversy related to the Incident

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weighs in favor of a stay.

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will clarify the legal relations between United Financial and

As to the fifth factor, this case

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Singh, but will have little to no effect on the other relevant

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legal relations related to the Incident.

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neutral, at best.

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State Court Actions, it would not obtain a res judicata

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advantage, or other procedural advantage, in the other actions if

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this case goes forward.

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the State Court Actions are defendants in the instant case, they

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could use the instant case to obtain such advantages against each

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other.

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Thus, this factor is

Because United Financial is not a party in the

However, because the other parties in

The sixth Brillhart/Dizol factor is therefore either

neutral or weighs in favor of dismissal or a stay.
In light of the extent of the State Court Actions and

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the overlapping issues in both this case and the State Court

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Actions, allowing this action to go forward will result in

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entanglement between the federal and state court systems.

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the seventh Brillhart/Dizol factor weighs in favor of the stay or

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dismissal of this action.

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weighs in favor of a stay because of the coordinated litigation

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in the State Court Actions, in which United Financial’s counsel

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has had some voluntarily participation.

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Brillhart/Dizol factor weighs against the stay or dismissal of

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this action.

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State Court Actions, there would not be other remedies available

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to United Financial if this case is dismissed or stayed.

Thus,

The convenience of the parties also

However, the final

Because United Financial is not a party to the

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E.

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Balancing the Brillhart/Dizol Factors
Some of the factors weigh against dismissal or stay,

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the majority of the factors either weigh in favor of dismissal or

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stay or are neutral.

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factors can be given additional weight if appropriate under the

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facts of the case.

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Having carefully considered the Brillhart/Dizol factors – in

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particular, the risk of duplicative litigation and the possible

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use of this case to gain advantages in the State Court Actions,

“Numerosity is not dispositive,” and some

See James River, 2013 WL 1934354, at *4.

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this Court concludes that dismissal or a stay is warranted under

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the circumstances of this case.

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II.

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Whether Dismissal or a Stay is Appropriate
The Declaratory Judgment Act states that “[i]n a case

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of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of

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the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,

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may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

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interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further

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relief is or could be sought.”

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28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

For there to be an actual case or
controversy, there must be a “substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment,”
and the actual controversy between the parties
must relate to a claim upon which relief can be
granted. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549
U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (quotation omitted);
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 429 F. Supp.
2d [1190, 1193] (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Act’s case
or controversy requirement is satisfied when the
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plaintiff has “a real and reasonable apprehension
that he will be subject to liability.” Societe de
Conditionement en Aluminum v. Hunter Eng’g Co.,
Inc., 655 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1981). The fact
that a defendant’s liability may be contingent
does not necessarily mean there is no controversy.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dalton, No. 12-713,
2012 WL 6088313, at *5 [(E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012)].
Furthermore, the Act allows the district court to
litigate a controversy that would “otherwise . . .
only be tried in the future.” Societe de
Conditionnement, 655 F.2d at 943. Declaratory
judgment essentially provides relief for parties
who seek to vindicate interests before they are
jeopardized or challenged, before a right of
action exists or claim accrues. Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Hubbard, 22 F. Supp. 697, 699 (S.D. Cal. 1938);
Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, No.
2:11-CV-00740-MCE, 2011 WL 2496039, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. June 21, 2011).

Houston Cas. Co. v. Metheny, No. 2:14-cv-01377-KJM-CMK, 2016 WL

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615651, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (some alterations in

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Metheny).

In insurance cases, the Supreme Court has
determined that an actual controversy can exist
between an insurer and the allegedly injured third
party even though that third party is not a party
to the insurance contract. Maryland Cas. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273-74
(1941); see also Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.
Mendez, 585 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009). The
Ninth Circuit has confirmed in recent decisions
that a case or controversy exists where the
insurer seeks a declaration regarding its duty to
defend and indemnify its insured in a pending suit
against the insured by a third-party. Am. States
Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 144 (9th Cir.
1994); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Merritt, 974
F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1992). An insurer’s
declaratory relief action regarding its duty to
defend and indemnify is ripe and justiciable even
if the underlying liability action has not
proceeded to judgment. Kearns, 15 F.3d at 144.

Under this analysis, there is federal subject matter

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jurisdiction in the instant case because there is an actual case

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or controversy.

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and a stay is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

Dismissal of the instant case is not necessary,

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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, J.M.L.’s Motion to Stay

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or in the Alternative Dismiss this Action, filed November 22,

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2016, is HEREBY GRANTED insofar as the case is STAYED pending the

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resolution of the aforementioned cases pending in the California

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State Courts.

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The Motion is DENIED as to J.M.L.’s request to

dismiss the case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, November 13, 2017.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY CO. V. J.M.L., ET AL.; CASE NO. 2:16CV-02098 LEK; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT J.M.L.’S MOTION TO STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE DISMISS
THIS ACTION
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