Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 3/15/18, ORDERING that Plaintiff's 17 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Commissioner's 18 cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. This matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor. CASE CLOSED (Kastilahn, A)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

JAMAAL ANTHONY JOHNSON,

12

Plaintiff,

13
14
15

No. 2:16-cv-2134-EFB

v.

ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

16
17

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

18
19

(“Commissioner”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and

20

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The

21

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. ECF Nos. 17 & 18. For the reasons

22

discussed below, plaintiff’s motion is granted and the Commissioner’s motion is denied and this

23

matter is remanded for further proceedings.
I.

24

Background
On April 14, 2011, plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging that he had been

25
26

disabled since January 1, 2008. Administrative Record (“AR”) 280-92. Plaintiff’s application

27

was denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Commissioner. Id. at 163-68, 170-74.

28

/////
1

1

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and hearings in this

2

case were held on August 21, 2012, October 16, 2014, and February 18, 2015. Id. at 30-111.

3

Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at each of the three hearings. Id. Vocational experts

4

testified at the August 21, 2012 and February 18, 2015 hearings. Id. at 62-68, 101-07.

5

The ALJ issued a decision on April 8, 2015 and found that, based on the DIB application,

6

plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act.1 Id. at 24. The ALJ also

7

found that, based on the SSI application, plaintiff was not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of

8

the Act. Id. He made the following specific findings:

9

/////

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1

Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the
Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid
to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions,
disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to
“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) &
1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The
following summarizes the sequential evaluation:
Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful
activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed
to step two.
Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment?
If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is
appropriate.
Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination
of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically
determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.
Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past
work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step
five.
Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional
capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not
disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

26

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

27

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation
process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential
evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.
2

28

1
2
3
4

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through
June 30, 2012.
***
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2008, the
alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

5
6
7

***
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: adjustment disorder, depression[,]
and anxiety (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

8
***
9
10
11

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and
416.926).

12
***
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has
the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but
with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant is able to perform detailed,
complex tasks and simple repetitive tasks; maintain regular attendance; perform work
activities on a consistent basis; able to perform noncompetitive work but should avoid
high stress level work and avoid jobs that have quotas so it is not fast paced and fairly
noncompetitive type work.
***
6. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
***
7. The claimant was born in 1980 and was 27 years old, which is defined as a younger
individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
***
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English
(20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).

25
26
27

***
9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past
relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).

28
3

1

***

2

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

3
4

***

5
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from
January 1, 2008, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

6
7

Id. at 13-24.

8
9

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on July 29, 2016, leaving the
ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. Id. at 1-3.

10

II.

11

Legal Standards of Review
The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings

12

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were

13

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000);

14

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel,

15

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).

16

The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are

17

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is

18

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th

19

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

20

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v.

21

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

22

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

23

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.

24

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

25

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.”

26

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).

27

/////

28

/////
4

1

III.

Analysis

2

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) assigning little weight to the opinions of treating

3

psychiatrist Dr. Alan Koike; and (2) the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert did

4

not account for Dr. Lacy’s finding that plaintiff would have an impaired ability to maintain

5

regular attendance. The court finds, for the reasons stated below, that the ALJ failed to offer

6

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for giving little weight to Dr.

7

Koike’s opinions. This matter will be remanded for further proceedings. Having reached this

8

conclusion, the court declines to take up plaintiff’s second argument.

9

A.

10

Relevant Legal Standards

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by

11

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.

12

1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a

13

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80

14

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical

15

opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory

16

opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an

17

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

18

convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or

19

examining medical professional may be rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are

20

supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally

21

is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion

22

(e.g., supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict.

23

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

24

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical

25

findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the

26

examining physician are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir.

27

2007).

28

/////
5

1

B.

Background

2

The ALJ, after reviewing the relevant medical records, determined that plaintiff was seen

3

by Dr. Koike on three separate dates –July 18, 2014, September 9, 2014, and January 6, 2015 - at

4

Adult Psychiatric Support Services (“APSS”). AR at 18. The court has independently reviewed

5

the record and confirmed this finding.2 Id. at 817-20. On January 7, 2015, Dr. Koike authored a

6

letter in which he stated that:

7

[Plaintiff] has been under my care at the APSS Clinic. He has been
a client at the clinic since 7/12/15.3 He was last seen on 1/6/15. He
suffers from major depressive disorder, PTSD and ADHD. His
treatment includes Trazodone 50mg ½-2 tabs qhs prn insomnia,
Celexa to 40mg qd, and Hydroxyzine 25mg TID PRN anxiety. His
symptoms include a depressed mood, anxiety, paranoia,
hypervigilance, insomnia, nightmares, lack of focus, poor
concentration, anger and irritability. In my opinion, he is unable to
work in any capacity. He is unable to concentrate and keep focus
for extended periods of time. He [is] unable to handle the stress or
(sic) a normal work environment. He is unable to be around coworkers, supervisors or the general public. I believe his disability is
permanent.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Id. at 815 (emphasis added). The ALJ referenced the letter and noted that “[a] statement that an

15

individual is unable to work is not a medical opinion as defined in the regulations, but rather,

16

constitutes an opinion regarding disability, which is an issue reserved to the Commissioner . . . .”

17

Id. at 18. The ALJ went on to find that, although Dr. Koike was an acceptable medical source

18

pursuant to the regulations, his opinions were entitled to little weight. Id. at 18-19. In reaching

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

2

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misstates the number of times plaintiff was treated at APSS
Clinic. ECF No. 17 at 12. It is true that records indicate that plaintiff was seen a total of nine
times at APSS between July 12, 2013 and January 6, 2015. AR at 817-828. The records also
show, however, that Dr. Koike was the provider at only three of the nine visits. Id. at 817-820.
Plaintiff was seen by different providers – Denali Tice, Zenaida Pablo, Helena Hart, Peter
Knudsen, and Guohua Xia - at his others visits. Id. at 820-828. It appears that at least some of
these other providers were medical residents (id. at 822) and, as such, it may be that they were
providing care under the direct supervision of Dr. Koike or some other attending physician. No
such direction is apparent from the records, however, and the court declines to infer information
that is not explicitly presented.
3

26
27
28

This reference to plaintiff’s first contact with the clinic as July 12, 2015 is an obvious
typographical error given that the letter is dated January 7, 2015. The provided records date
plaintiff’s first visit to APSS at July 5, 2013. AR at 827. The write up of that assessment was not
submitted until July 12, 2013, however. Id. It appears that this was the date Dr. Koike was
attempting to reference.
6

1

this determination, the ALJ noted the discrepancy between Dr. Koike’s treatment records - which

2

showed that plaintiff was “alright,” took his medications regularly, and his mental status

3

examinations were within normal limits – and the opinion that plaintiff was disabled and unable

4

to work. Id. at 18. The ALJ also determined that Dr. Koike’s opinions on the “nature and

5

severity of [plaintiff’s impairment] were based on plaintiff’s subjective complaints rather than on

6

objective findings.” Id. at 18-19. Finally, the ALJ characterized Dr. Koike’s examinations of

7

plaintiff as “limited.” Id. at 18.

8
9

By contrast, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of consultative psychologist D.
Lacy. Id. at 17-18. Dr. Lacy conducted a psychological evaluation of plaintiff on December 2,

10

2011. Id. at 624. Dr. Lacy observed that plaintiff had “psychomotor agitation and blunted

11

affect.” Id. at 627. She also noted (and the ALJ emphasized in his decision) plaintiff’s self-

12

reported symptoms that his depression increased after he learned that he had cancer, and his

13

mental health symptoms were worsening and included feelings of hopelessness and irritability

14

with people.4 Id. at 625. Dr. Lacy ultimately concluded that plaintiff: (1) could perform detailed

15

and complex tasks; (2) could perform simple and repetitive tasks; (3) had a mildly impaired

16

ability to perform work activities on a consistent basis; (4) could perform work activities without

17

special or additional supervision; (5) had a moderately impaired ability to accept instructions

18

from supervisors, relate/interact with coworkers and the public, and deal with the usual stresses

19

encountered in competitive work; and (6) had a mildly impaired ability to maintain regular

20

attendance. Id. at 630. The ALJ referenced these findings in his decision and stated that he was

21

giving Dr. Lacy’s opinion great weight because: (1) it was based on her direct examination,

22

findings, and observations; and (2) supported the ALJ’s RFC finding.5 Id. at 17-18.

23
24

4

Dr. Lacy’s report indicates that the feelings of hopelessness stemmed, at least in part,
from being weaned off of the medications Strattera and Zoloft before he left the prison system.
AR at 625.

25
5

26
27
28

That finding, also reproduced supra, was:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: the claimant is able to perform
7

1

C.

2

Analysis
1.

3

Discrepancy Between Opinion and Treatment Notes

The court finds that the ALJ failed to offer specific and legitimate reasons for discounting

4

the opinions of Dr. Koike. The ALJ highlighted a purported discrepancy between Koike’s

5

opinion that plaintiff was disabled and treatment records showing that plaintiff “was alright, took

6

his medications regularly, and his mental status examinations were within normal limits . . . .” Id.

7

at 18. Although such a discrepancy can be sufficient, even under the higher “clear and

8

convincing” standard to discount a physician’s opinion, see, e.g., Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d

9

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005), examination of the relevant records reveals that the ALJ’s

10

characterization of their contents was incomplete in this case.

11

First, Dr. Koike never opined or concluded that plaintiff was “alright.” A January 6, 2015

12

progress note authored by Koike began with “[t]he pt [patient] reports that he is alright.” Id. at

13

817. Immediately thereafter, however, plaintiff reported that: (1) he doesn’t like talking to people

14

or going out; (2) he thinks people are looking at him and judging him; (3) he has nightmares and

15

occasional flashbacks about his stepfather;6 (4) he is hypervigilant and has an increase[d] startle

16

response; (5) the past month was “rough” and he felt more depressed; (6) he feels angry at times

17

and is unsure why; (7) he is unable to concentrate and can’t focus on activities like watching

18

television or doing things with his son; and (8) that his appetite is low and he feels anxious “a lot

19

of the time.” Id. Taken in the full context of the progress note, plaintiff’s initial statement that he

20

was “alright” appears less like an assessment of his mental state of being and more like a greeting

21

/////

22

/////

23

detailed, complex tasks and simple repetitive tasks; maintain
regular attendance; perform work activities on a consistent basis;
able to perform noncompetitive work but should avoid high stress
level work and avoid jobs that have quotas so it is not fast paced
and fairly noncompetitive type work.

24
25
26
27
28

AR at 16.
6

In a previous progress note, Dr. Koike took down plaintiff’s report that he had been
physically abused by his stepfather. AR at 819.
8

1

formality. It certainly was not Dr. Koike’s medical assessment of plaintiff’s condition. Indeed,

2

Koike went on to assess that plaintiff “appears to have PTSD and MDD.”7 Id.

3

Second, the fact that plaintiff took his medications regularly is not a persuasive reason for

4

discounting Dr. Koike’s opinions regarding plaintiff’s disability. At the same January 2015 visit

5

referenced in the foregoing paragraph, Koike did note that plaintiff “takes meds fairly regularly.”

6

Id. In the next sentence, however, Koike noted that the response to those medications was

7

“partial and inadequate.” Id. Logically, the fact that a patient frequently takes medications only

8

cuts against a finding of disability if that intake appears to ameliorate his symptoms in some

9

meaningful way. Here, the amelioration was specifically reported to be inadequate.

10

Third, it is impossible to read Dr. Koike’s treatment notes and conclude that plaintiff’s

11

mental state fell within any reasonable definition of “normal limits.”8 As noted above, Dr. Koike

12

concluded that plaintiff was afflicted with PTSD and MDD. Id. He also concluded that plaintiff

13

had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and noted that plaintiff presented with an anxious

14

mood and affect. Id.

15

Thus, this rationale for discounting Dr. Koike’s opinions fails to meet the specific and

16

legitimate standard. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where the

17

purported existence of an inconsistency is squarely contradicted by the record, it may not serve as

18

the basis for the rejection of an examining physician's conclusions.”); see also Holohan v.

19

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[The treating physician’s] statements must be

20

read in context of the overall diagnostic picture he draws. That a person who suffers from severe

21

/////

22
23

7

PTSD refers to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and MDD would appear to refer to Major
Depressive Disorder.

24
8

25
26
27
28

It is true that some of plaintiff’s examinations were within normal limits. For instance,
Dr. Koike himself noted that plaintiff was a low risk for imminent self-harm or suicide, that he
was cooperative, and his thought process was linear. AR at 817. The ALJ’s opinion made no
attempt to parse these treatment notes in his analysis of why Koike’s opinion should be
discounted, however. Rather, he simply and summarily stated that “[plaintiff’s] mental status
examinations were within normal limits.” Id. at 18. This gives the impression that plaintiff had a
clean, or mostly clean, bill of mental health – an assessment that Koike clearly did not reach.
9

1

panic attacks, anxiety, and depression makes some improvement does not mean that the person’s

2

impairments no longer seriously affect her ability to function in a workplace.”).

3
4

2.

Subjective Complaints and Limited Examinations

The ALJ also characterized Dr. Koike’s examinations of plaintiff as “limited.” Id. at 18.

5

It is unclear what this term means in this context. To the extent the ALJ suggests that the number

6

of visits between Dr. Koike and plaintiff (three in this case) was limited and Koike’s opinion

7

should be discounted on that basis, the record does not support such a conclusion. It is true that

8

an ALJ may consider the length of a treatment relationship in determining what weight to afford a

9

physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). That being said, the Ninth Circuit has held

10

that there is no floor for the number of visits necessary to create a treatment relationship. See

11

Ghokassian v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994). And, in this case, plaintiff had a

12

number of previous visits to the APSS Clinic where Koike practiced. Counting his three visits

13

with Koike’s, plaintiff was seen a total of nine times at the clinic by various providers, dating

14

back to July 2013. AR at 817-28. And the diagnoses of these providers largely tracked Koike’s.

15

Id. at 821 (symptoms of anxiety that border on paranoia); id. at 825 (finding patient had MDD).

16

Nor is there a basis in the record to conclude that Dr. Koike’s examinations were limited

17

or deficient insofar as they relied “solely on [plaintiff’s] subjective complaints.” Id. at 18. This

18

characterization fundamentally misapprehends Dr. Koike’s treating role. In a recent decision the

19

Ninth Circuit explained that:

20
21
22
23

Psychiatric evaluations may appear subjective, especially
compared to evaluation in other medical fields. Diagnoses will
always depend in part on the patient's self-report, as well as on the
clinician's observations of the patient. But such is the nature of
psychiatry. . . . Thus, the rule allowing an ALJ to reject opinions
based on self-reports does not apply in the same manner to opinions
regarding mental illness.

24

Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017). Koike’s treatment notes make clear that

25

he relied in part on his own clinical observations. At each of the three treatment visits, Koike

26

noted that plaintiff’s mood and affect were anxious. AR at 817-19. Although these treatment

27

notes are not detailed, they are ultimately sufficient to establish that Koike’s opinions were not

28

based solely on plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms. See Downey v. Astrue, No. CV 11-02378-SP,
10

1

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134596, *17-18 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (finding a treating physician’s

2

notes were not detailed, but nevertheless sufficient where they “identifie[d] plaintiff’s subjective

3

complaints, note[d] [the treating physicians’s] objective findings, and provide[d] a diagnosis at

4

each examination.”). And other providers at the APSS Clinic who made more detailed notes

5

regarding their observations agreed with Koike’s observations regarding plaintiff’s anxious

6

demeanor. See, e.g., AR at 821 (“Plaintiff is anxious but pleasant and cooperative with interview,

7

avoids direct eye contact . . . [s]peech is rapid rate and rambling though not pressured . . . [m]ood

8

is anxious . . . .”).

9

3.

10

Weight Credited to Dr. Lacy’s Opinion

In closing, the court briefly notes that it is difficult to square the ALJ’s decision to accord

11

great weight to Dr. Lacy’s opinion with his decision to discount Dr. Koike’s.9 As noted above,

12

the ALJ commented that Koike only treated plaintiff “for a total of three visits.” Id. at 18. Yet

13

Lacy only saw plaintiff on a single occasion. Id. at 624. Still more confounding is the fact that

14

Lacy’s examination occurred in December 2011 - years before the 2014 and early 2015

15

treatments with Koike and years before the relevant ALJ decision. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has

16

held, “[a] treating physician’s most recent medical reports are highly probative.” Osenbrock v.

17

Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 532 (9th Cir.

18

1985) (where a claimant has a worsening condition, medical evaluations prepared several months

19

before hearing are not sufficient evidence to rebut more recent conclusions by a treating doctor).

20

For the reasons discussed infra, the court will remand for further proceedings. If the

21

ALJ’s next decision also accords great weight to Lacy’s decision, it should explicitly account for

22

the foregoing in its analysis.

23

/////

24

/////

25
9

26
27
28

Plaintiff does not raise a separate argument concerning the weight given to Dr. Lacy’s
opinion. He does, however, take issue with the ALJ’s reliance on Lacy’s findings to the extent
that such reliance led him to discount Dr. Koike’s opinion. ECF No. 17 at 13 (“[T]he ALJ’s
analysis that Lacy’s opinion is based on objective findings and observations and that Koike’s
opinion is based on plaintiff’s subjective complaints is ridiculous.”).
11

1

4.

2

Remand for Additional Administrative Proceedings

Having found, for the reasons articulated above, that the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr.

3

Koike’s opinion was not supported by specific and legitimate reasons, the court must decide

4

whether to remand for additional administrative proceedings or for the award of benefits. “The

5

decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to award benefits is within

6

the discretion of the court.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). A court

7

should remand for further administrative proceedings, however, unless it concludes that such

8

proceedings would not serve a useful purpose. Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir.

9

2016). The court cannot say that additional proceedings would have no utility in the present case.

10

The contradiction in medical opinions between Drs. Koike and Lacy weighs in favor of additional

11

proceedings. Additionally, the generation of additional medical evidence in the intervening years

12

may prove enlightening. See Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir.

13

2014) (additional proceedings have utility where “there is a need to resolve conflicts and

14

ambiguities, . . . or the presentation of further evidence . . . may well prove enlightening in light

15

of the passage of time.”) (internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).

16

IV.

Conclusion

17

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

18

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED;

19

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is DENIED;

20

3. This matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings; and

21

4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the plaintiff’s favor and close the case.

22

DATED: March 15, 2018.

23
24
25
26
27
28
12