Vang et al v. Lopey, et al.,

Filing 67

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 4/27/17 ORDERING that the County's 59 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The first, third, and fourth claims are dismissed with prejudice. The second claim is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall file their Third Amended Complaint within 20 days of this Order. The County shall file its responsive pleading 20 days thereafter. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JESSE VANG, et al,

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2:16-cv-2172-JAM-CMK

Plaintiffs,

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No.

v.
SHERIFF JON LOPEY, et al,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
SISKIYOU COUNTY’S MOTION TO
DISMISS

Defendants.

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Defendant Siskiyou County (“the County”) moves to dismiss

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ECF No. 59. 1

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Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).

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Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

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forth below, the Court GRANTS the County’s motion to dismiss. 2

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ECF No. 61.

For the reasons set

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The County submitted a Request for Judicial Notice along with
its Motion to Dismiss, asking the Court to take judicial notice
of thirteen documents on this case’s docket. ECF No. 59-2. The
Court does not need to take judicial notice of documents on its
own docket.
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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for April 4, 2017.
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I.

FACTS

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The Court takes the facts alleged by Plaintiffs—several

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Hmong individuals who own property in the County—as true for

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purposes of this motion.

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After an increase in the County’s Hmong population, the

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County “launched an attack” against Plaintiffs.

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Board of Supervisors passed two ordinances placing restrictions

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on growing medical marijuana.

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discriminatorily enforced these ordinances against Asian

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individuals.

SAC ¶ 6.

SAC ¶ 5.

The

The County

SAC ¶ 11.

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In early 2016, Plaintiffs “began registering to vote in

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Siskiyou County, using the County-assigned parcel numbers of

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their legally owned property as their residential address.”

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¶ 18.

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for possible voter fraud.

SAC

The County Clerk flagged these voter registration forms
SAC ¶ 19.

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On two days in June 2016, County officers visited

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Plaintiffs’ properties, and at least one officer carried an

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assault rifle with him.

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five plaintiffs out of voting in the June or November 2016

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elections.

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SAC ¶ 32.

These visits scared at least

SAC ¶¶ 54, 70, 82, 88, 108.

The restrictions on marijuana cultivation passed as Measures

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T and U in the June election.

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nuisance violations have been issued overwhelmingly to Asian

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property owners as opposed to white property owners.”

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SAC ¶ 36.

Since then, “notices of

Id.

In September 2016, the County “executed a series of search

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warrants” on at least some Plaintiffs’ properties.

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The searching officers “handcuffed and held at gunpoint”

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individuals who were present during the searches and “ransacked”
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SAC ¶ 42.

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the properties of those who were not present.

SAC ¶ 43.

Plaintiffs bring four claims against the County in their

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SAC: (1) unreasonable search and seizure, (2) violation of the

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Fourteenth Amendment, (3) municipal liability on a failure-to-

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train theory, and (4) employer liability.

SAC at 29-35.

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The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ fourth claim for “employer

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liability” against the County with prejudice in its January 13,

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2017 Order (“1/13/17 Order”).

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the Court strikes the fourth claim from the SAC.

1/13/17 Order at 7.

Accordingly,

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II.
A.

OPINION

First Cause of Action: § 1983 Unlawful Search and
Seizure Claim

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A local government cannot be held liable pursuant to § 1983

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under a theory of “respondeat superior.”

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F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1999).

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liable only when action pursuant to official municipal policy

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causes a constitutional violation.

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policy” requirement “distinguishe[s] acts of the municipality

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from acts of employees of the municipality,” and thereby limits

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liability to actions for which the municipality is actually

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responsible.

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Christie v. Iopa, 176

Instead, municipalities are

Id. at 1235.

The “official

Id. (emphasis in original).

Plaintiffs do not identify a specific unconstitutional

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municipal policy or custom which caused this alleged

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constitutional violation in their first § 1983 claim. Plaintiffs

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“kitchen-sink” approach to alleging a custom or policy on which

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to base this claim is insufficient.

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not constitute specifically identified County policies as
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Conclusory allegations do

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required.
The Court has already dismissed this claim as brought against

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the County once with leave to amend.

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Court finds that any further attempt by Plaintiffs to properly

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plead plead this claim would be futile.

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dismisses Plaintiffs’ first § 1983 claim against the County with

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prejudice.
B.
Second Cause of Action: § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment
Claim

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1/13/17 Order at 7.

The

The Court therefore

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Plaintiffs attempt to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim
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against the County.

SAC at 31.

Plaintiffs allege the County

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had a “practice or custom of targeting Asian residents”
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beginning in 2015.

SAC ¶ 132.

Plaintiffs allege this targeting

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has denied Plaintiffs the “right to the quiet enjoyment and use
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of property.”

SAC ¶ 133.

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Plaintiffs do not clarify in their SAC under which
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Fourteenth Amendment clause they purport to bring their second
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cause of action.

The SAC alleges that the County was

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“deliberately indifferent” to the health and safety of
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Plaintiffs, which suggests a due process claim.

SAC ¶ 130.

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Plaintiffs’ opposition brief, however, argues the County “began
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enforcing the local ordinance disproportionately against Asian
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American property owners,” which suggests an equal protection
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claim.

Opp’n at 12.

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The allegations in the SAC regarding Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
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Amendment claim do not sufficiently put the County on notice of
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what type of claim it must defend against.

See Nicolescu v.

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Faith & Freedom Coal., 21 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 8
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requires sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on

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notice of the claims against them.”)

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dismisses the second claim brought against the County.

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Plaintiffs could potentially assert an equal protection claim

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based on the alleged facts, the Court grants Plaintiffs one last

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opportunity to amend its Fourteenth Amendment claim against the

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County.
C.

The Court therefore
Because

Third Cause of Action: § 1983 Municipal Liability

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Plaintiffs make the same allegations of municipal liability
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in their SAC as they did in their original complaint.

In both,

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Plaintiffs allege the County’s training policies “were not
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adequate to train its sheriff’s deputies and police officers to
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handle voter fraud investigations and building safety code
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enforcement.”

Compl. ¶ 115, SAC ¶ 135.

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In the Court’s 1/13/17 Order, it outlined the elements of a
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failure-to-train claim.

1/13/17 Order at 8.

Yet Plaintiffs

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still failed to “identify any specific training that was
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deficient, or how the policy amounted to deliberate
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indifference” in their SAC.

See id. at 7-8 (citing Molina v.

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City of Visalia, 2014 WL 1117005, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14,
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2014)).

Because the Court has already given Plaintiffs the

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opportunity to amend this claim, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’
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third cause of action with prejudice.
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III.

ORDER

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the
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County’s motion to dismiss.

The first, third, and fourth claims

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are dismissed with prejudice.

The second claim is dismissed with

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leave to amend.

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Complaint within twenty days of this Order.

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file its responsive pleading twenty days thereafter.

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Plaintiffs shall file their Third Amended

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 27, 2017

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The County shall