Vang et al v. Lopey, et al.,
Filing
82
ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 12/7/2017 DENYING 79 Motion for Attorney Fees. (Zignago, K.)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JESSE VANG, et al.,
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No.
2:16-cv-2172-JAM-CMK
Plaintiffs,
v.
SHERIFF JON LOPEY, et al.,
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT SISKIYOU
COUNTY’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES
Defendants.
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In September 2016, Plaintiffs sued Defendant Siskiyou County
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(“the County”) and other government agencies and officials,
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alleging a myriad of civil rights violations.
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pp. 24–30.
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preliminary injunction, ECF No. 33, and eventually dismissed all
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their claims after granting Plaintiffs leave to amend.
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Orders, ECF Nos. 51, 67, 68, 77.
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Compl., ECF No. 1,
The Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a
See
In the last order of dismissal, the Court denied the
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County’s request to impose sanctions, finding that dismissal with
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prejudice was a sufficient sanction.
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Order, ECF No. 77, pp. 9–
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10.
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fees twice, most recently based on the County’s noncompliance
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with Local Rule 293(b).
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The Court also denied the County’s request for attorney’s
Id. at 10; Order, ECF No. 51, p. 15.
Undeterred, the County has filed another motion seeking fees
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and sanctions, which the Court now addresses.
Mot. Fees, ECF No.
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79.
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both Plaintiffs and their counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28
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U.S.C. § 1927.
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to the motion. Nevertheless, the Court is required to determine
In this motion, the County seeks $97,757.50 in fees from
Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs did not file an opposition
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the motion on its merits, or lack thereof. For the reasons set
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forth below, the Court DENIES the County’s Motion for Attorney
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Fees. 1
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I.
DISCUSSION
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A.
Attorneys’ Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
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In a § 1983 action, a district court has discretion to allow
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the prevailing party an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.
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U.S.C. § 1988(b).
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§ 1988 is different for prevailing defendants in a civil rights
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action than for prevailing plaintiffs.”
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Inc. v. Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 141 (9th Cir. 1997).
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defendants may recover fees only when “the plaintiff’s action was
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frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not
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brought in subjective bad faith.”
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Equal Employ’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
“Authorization for attorneys’ fees under
Legal Servs. of N. Cal.,
Prevailing
Christianburg Garment Co. v.
“An
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This motion was determined suitable for decision without oral
argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for
December 5, 2017.
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action becomes frivolous when the result appears obvious or the
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arguments are wholly without merit.”
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Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2007).
Galen v. Cty. of Los
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“The strict nature of the Christiansburg standard is
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premised on the need to avoid undercutting Congress’ policy of
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promoting vigorous prosecution of civil rights violations under
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. . . § 1983.”
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617, 619 (9th Cir. 1987).
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courts to avoid post hoc reasoning because “[e]ven when the law
Miller v. Los Angeles Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
The Supreme Court instructs district
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or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a
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party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.”
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Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421–22.
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defendant prevails does not automatically support an award of
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fees.”
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Cir. 1994).
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“[T]he mere fact that a
Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9th
Here, the Court does not find that the County has satisfied
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the strict standard governing fee awards to prevailing defendants
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in civil rights cases.
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Plaintiffs’ alleged facts could have potentially asserted an
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equal protection claim.
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numerous opportunities to amend, however, Plaintiffs failed to
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adequately plead their claims.
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Court did not base this finding on the Plaintiffs’ action being
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“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” and found no
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need to impose sanctions on Plaintiffs’ counsel in light of the
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dismissal with prejudice.
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U.S. at 421.
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to award attorney’s fees under § 1988.
As noted in the Court’s April 2017 order,
Order, ECF No. 67, pp. 4–5.
Despite
Order, ECF No. 77, p. 9.
The
Id. at 10; see also Christianburg, 434
Thus, the Court declines to exercise its discretion
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B.
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]n attorney who unreasonably and
Costs, Expenses, and Fees Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
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vexatiously ‘multiplies the proceedings’ may be required to pay
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the excess fees and costs caused by his [or her] conduct.”
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Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp., 606 F.3d
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1216, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2010).
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available when an attorney acts either recklessly or in bad
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faith.
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submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it is not
Id. at 1219.
Section 1927 sanctions are
“For sanctions to apply, if a filing is
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frivolous, it must be intended to harass.”
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Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996).
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nonfrivolous filings, without more, may not be sanctioned.”
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The Court may not apply § 1927 to an initial pleading, id. at
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435, or impose § 1927 sanctions against an attorney’s clients.
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See Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th
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Cir. 2015).
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In re Keegan Mgmt.
“[R]eckless
Id.
The County asks the Court to impose an excessive fees award
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against Plaintiffs and their counsel, jointly and severally.
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Mot. Fees at 14.
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the Court to impose fees on an attorney’s clients.
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799 F.3d at 1293.
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followed the case’s initial filing, the Court finds that the
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County failed to carry its burden of showing Plaintiffs’ counsel
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acted in bad faith or recklessly submitted frivolous pleadings.
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While Plaintiffs’ counsel did not excel at following the Local
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Rules and Court orders, counsel’s conduct fails short of bad
As referenced above, § 1927 does not authorize
See Kaass,
After a thorough review of the pleadings that
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faith. 2
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evidence that Plaintiffs’ counsel multiplied the proceedings with
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intent to harass Defendants.
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Similarly, the County has not provided sufficient
Accordingly, the Court therefore declines to award costs,
expenses, and fees under § 1927. 3
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II.
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the
County’s motion.
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ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 7, 2017
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Although the County takes issue with Plaintiffs’ supporters
attending a hearing, the First Amendment protects the public’s
right to access most judicial proceedings. See Courthouse News
Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Had the Court elected to award the County attorneys’ fees, the
records submitted in support of this motion would not support
such an award. See Spinelli Dec., ECF No. 79-2, pp. 4–5. First,
the sum provided by the County’s counsel for total fees is
mathematically incorrect based on the hours and rates listed.
Second, there is no distinction in the billing as to how much
time was expended on each claim. Finally, the tasks are “blockbilled,” with some tasks combining multiple attorneys, various
unnamed dates, and hundreds of hours of tasks. See id. (“Ms.
Williams, Ms. Winter, and I further spent 199.2 hours and
$36,651.00 on further defense of this matter . . . include[ing]
strategy meetings, and teleconferences with each other and our
clients, document review and analysis, discussions . . . .”).
See e.g., Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 623
(9th Cir. 1993) (stating that mere summaries of hours worked are
inadequate).
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