Battiste v. Smith et al

Filing 8

ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes on 9/28/2017 ORDERING Clerk of Court to randomly assign a district judge to this action and RECOMMENDING this action be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a cognizable claim. Assigned and referred to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. Objections due within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations. (Henshaw, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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No. 2:16-cv-2331 DB

EDWARD ANTONIO BATTISTE,
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Plaintiff,
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ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

v.
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ALBERT SMITH, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se with an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

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1983, alleging that he is being denied various rights during ongoing criminal proceedings against

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him in Colusa County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for

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screening.
While the complaint is filed pursuant to Section 1983, the actual claims made sound in

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habeas corpus, as plaintiff moves for this court to intervene in ongoing legal proceedings that he

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claims are violating his rights. As this case does not and cannot state a cognizable claim for relief

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in the Section 1983 context, the court orders that a district judge be assigned to this case and that

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this matter be dismissed without leave to amend.

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I.

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Screening
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. §
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1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims

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that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A.

Legal Standard

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

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Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

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Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

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In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

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court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and construe

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the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

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236 (1974). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers.

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See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a

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claim, a pro se complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or

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“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

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action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

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678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial

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plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

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for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered

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to be part of the complaint for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal

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Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).

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B.

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Plaintiff generally alleges that the public defender, the district attorney, and the judge in

Discussion

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his criminal proceedings in Colusa County Superior Court are conspiring against him and

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violating his due process rights. (ECF No. 1.)

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Plaintiff’s claims are not appropriate under Section 1983, as it appears he is challenging

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the criminal proceedings that led to him being incarcerated. At the time that the complaint was

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filed, plaintiff had yet to be convicted and was being held in county custody pending trial. (ECF

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No. 1.) “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

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imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or a

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speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”

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Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). If plaintiff seeks to make a collateral attack on

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his trial and imprisonment, the action should be filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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However, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for pursuing state

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judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus

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should not be entertained unless the petitioner has first exhausted his state remedies. Baldwin v.

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Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989). Concerns of

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comity dictate that the State must first be afforded a full and fair opportunity to pass upon and

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correct the alleged violation of its prisoners’ federal rights. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

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365 (1995). The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition

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for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

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According to the complaint, plaintiff has not been tried or convicted of any crimes at this

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stage, so, therefore, any petition for a writ of habeas corpus would be premature. A petitioner

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satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair

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opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor,

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404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1986). In order for

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this court to address a petitioner’s habeas claims, he must first be convicted and sentenced by the

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state trial court. Thereafter, the petitioner must pursue his claims in the state courts of appeal

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until the claims have been exhausted before the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, if this
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court were to interpret the complaint as a petition for habeas corpus, it would be premature and

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require dismissal until such time as when plaintiff exhausted his state court remedies.
In its present form, plaintiff’s claims sound in habeas law and do not present cognizable

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claims for relief pursuant to Section 1983. For these reasons, the complaint must be dismissed

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without prejudice. The court will not grant leave to amend the complaint because amendment

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would be futile, as it appears no set of facts can rectify that this case is, in its essence, a habeas

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matter.

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II.

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Conclusion
In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Clerk of Court randomly

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assign a district judge to this action, and IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be

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dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a cognizable claim.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections

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with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

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to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.

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Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Dated: September 28, 2017

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