Langston v. Gamoly et al

Filing 11

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 11/19/2018 ORDERING Plaintiff may file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Henshaw, R)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WALTER SHANE LANGSTON,

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No. 2:16-CV-2361-JAM-DMC-P

Plaintiff,

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v.

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GAMOLY, et al.,

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ORDER

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges

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defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him despite having

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knowledge that he was in danger. Plaintiff also alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

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rights.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.

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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual

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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their

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pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

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338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation

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marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The

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sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with

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liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks

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omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Gamoly violated his eighth amendment rights to personal

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safety. Specifically, Plaintiff contends on January 1, 2016 (and on prior dates), he informed Dr.

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Gamoly that “due to a rape case, he had enemy and safety concerns and needed protect[ive]

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custody.” Plaintiff alleges that due to Dr. Gamoly’s deliberate indifference and failure to act on

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his concerns, Plaintiff was beaten on February 2, 2016, and February 3, 2016, resulting in damage

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to his face and left eye. Plaintiff states he was treated for his injuries to his head and eye.

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Plaintiff further states that his safety concerns, voiced to Dr. Gamoly, are supported by Sargent

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Corona and CCT Brown of the Department of Corrections. Plaintiff also contends that he was
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subsequently provided “protection on sensitive need yard.” Additionally, Plaintiff states that the

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“defendants” have violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

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II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges Dr. Gamoly failed to protect him despite knowing he was in

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imminent threat of harm. The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under

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which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which

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prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993);

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and

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idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble,

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429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See

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Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide

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prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint

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v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth

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Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission

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must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

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necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly

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for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth

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Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to

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protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.

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1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists if: (1) objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated

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under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison

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officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of

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the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074,

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1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, however, if evidence is presented that they

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lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does

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not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials know for a certainty that the inmate’s
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safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v.

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Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison

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officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk, they

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are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not

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averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

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Despite naming multiple defendants in his complaint, Plaintiff only alleges facts

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related to Dr. Gamoly. Plaintiff seems to allege Dr. Gamoly is a psychologist at the prison.

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Because the complaint alleges Dr. Gamoly is a physician who contracts with the prison to provide

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medical service, Dr. Gamoly is a proper defendant. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 53-54

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(1988). However, because there are no facts related to Defendants Blackford, Roy Dollarhide,

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Nyrene Clark, Mier, or Fox, they are not proper defendants and thus any claim against them must

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be dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to allege additional facts related to any defendant(s) other than

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Dr. Gamoly, he must file an amended complaint realleging the factual allegations against Dr.

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Gamoly and including additional factual allegations against the other defendants.

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In order for Plaintiff to establish the liability of a prison official for failure to

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protect, he must demonstrate that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to serious threats

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to his safety or to his health.

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stage, if Plaintiff can allege sufficient facts that (1) his conditions of incarceration objectively

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presented a substantial risk of serious harm and (2) the prison official(s) knew of and disregarded

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that risk. Id. The complaint here alleges the conditions of Plaintiff’s incarceration presented a

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substantial risk to his safety because he is labeled as a rapist and targeted by other inmates. He

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further alleges that he informed Dr. Gamoly of this fact, requested more protective confinement,

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and was denied it. Based on this information, Plaintiff has plead sufficient fact to proceed past

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the screening stage on his claim against Dr. Gamoly.

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See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837. This is satisfied, at the pleading

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III. CONCLUSION
Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

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1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the

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prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An

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amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claim against

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defendant Gamoly, if no amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court

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will issue findings and recommendations that the remaining defendants be dismissed, as well as

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such further orders as are necessary for service of process as to defendant Gamoly.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended complaint
within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

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Dated: November 19, 2018
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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