Goursau v. Lizarraga

Filing 17

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 08/06/18 RECOMMENDING that petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus 1 be denied. Referred to Judge Morrison C. England Jr. Objections due within 14 days. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LOUIE GOURSAU,

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Petitioner,

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No. 2:16-CV-2363-MCE-CMK-P

vs.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JOE LIZARRAGA,

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Respondent.

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

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habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court are petitioner’s petition

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(Doc. 1), respondent’s answer (Doc. 14), and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 16).

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I. BACKGROUND

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Petitioner was found guilty following a jury trial of 40 counts of child molestation

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involving two victims and petitioner was sentenced to a term of 97 years to life in state prison.

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The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence on December 30, 2014, and

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the California Supreme Court denied review of March 18, 2015.

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

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Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

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applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

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(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

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does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

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the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

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denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

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habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

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2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

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petitioner’s claim under its “re-litigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

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(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

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perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

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evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

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petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

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claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim,

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“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167.

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Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

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not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

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court’s adjudication of the claim:

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.

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Under § 2254(d)(1), federal habeas relief is available only where the state court’s decision is

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“contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Under both

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standards, “clearly established law” means those holdings of the United States Supreme Court as

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of the time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)

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(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412) . “What matters are the holdings of the Supreme Court, not

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the holdings of lower federal courts.” Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

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banc). Supreme Court precedent is not clearly established law, and therefore federal habeas

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relief is unavailable, unless it “squarely addresses” an issue. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742,

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753-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 28 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008)).

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For federal law to be clearly established, the Supreme Court must provide a “categorical answer”

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to the question before the state court. See id.; see also Carey, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (holding that a

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state court’s decision that a defendant was not prejudiced by spectators’ conduct at trial was not

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contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s test for determining prejudice

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created by state conduct at trial because the Court had never applied the test to spectators’

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conduct). Circuit court precedent may not be used to fill open questions in the Supreme Court’s

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holdings. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74.

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In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a

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majority of the Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A

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state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by

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the Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently

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than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

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court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

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governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

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that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

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wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

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Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

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id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

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determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040,

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1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

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case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

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is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id.

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State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

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application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

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unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

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510, 520 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams, suggested

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that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court either

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unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

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unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

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Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

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decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

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or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

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75-76 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be found
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even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous.

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See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. This is because “[t]he gloss of clear error fails to give proper

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deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. at 75.

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As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

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decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

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unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6.

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The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

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denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

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848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

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are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

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AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

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The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

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the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

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law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

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III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that habeas relief is warranted because the trial court erred by
failing to give a unanimity jury instruction.
A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

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transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

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1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

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available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Middleton, 768

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F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v.

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Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state

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issues de novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Thus, a challenge to jury

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instructions does not generally give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Middleton, 768
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F.2d at 1085) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)).
However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

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Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

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infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.”

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Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

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Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a

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claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete

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miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396

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F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960).

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In general, to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot

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be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

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process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

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(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner

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must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

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conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp,

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414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate an allegedly ambiguous

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jury instruction “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

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process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

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1984)). Further, in reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire

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‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

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way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

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U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

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instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). Where an instruction is missing a

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necessary element completely, the “reasonable likelihood” standard does not apply and the court

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may not “. . . assume that the jurors inferred the missing element from their general experience or

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from other instructions. . . .” See Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994). In the
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case of an instruction which omits a necessary element, constitutional error has occurred. See id.

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It is well-established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

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element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

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(1970). Therefore, due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory

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presumptions to relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged.

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See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

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(1979). A mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

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fact if certain predicate facts are proved. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a

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permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact

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from proof of a basic fact. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

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(1979). The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any presumption remains constant – the

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instruction must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

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by the government, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 156 (citing In

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re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).

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In addressing petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

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. . . The trial court did not give either a standard specific acts
unanimity instruction, such as Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury
Instructions, CALCRIM no. 3500 (footnote omitted), or a modified
unanimity instruction, such as CALCRIM No. 3501 (footnote omitted).
Defendant now contends the trial court’s failure to give a sua sponte
unanimity instruction requires reversal.

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The court concluded that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury pursuant to CALCRIM

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No. 3501 and turned to consider harmless error:

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There is a split of [California] authority on whether the error must
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or whether it is reasonably
probable the defendant would have achieved a more favorable result had
the instruction been given (citations to state court cases omitted). Under
either standard, we conclude the failure to give the instructions was
harmless. As explained in [People v.] Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d 294
[(1990)], omission of a unanimity instruction is harmless “if the record
indicated the jury resolved the basic credibility dispute against the
defendant and would have convicted the defendant of any of the various
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offenses shown by the evidence to have been committed. [Citations].” (Id.
at p. 307; see also People v. Arevalo-Iraheta (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th
1574, 1589). People v. Thompson (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 848, set forth
this principle, as follows: “Where the record provides no rational basis, by
way of argument or evidence, for the jury to distinguish between the
various acts, and the jury must have believed beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant committed all acts if he committed any, the failure to give a
unanimity instruction is harmless. [Citation]. Where the record indicates
the jury resolved the basic credibility dispute against the defendant and
therefore would have convicted him of any of the various offenses shown
by the evidence, the failure to give the unanimity instruction is harmless.
{Citation].” (People v. Thompson, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 853).

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This is such a case. Although defendant argues that individual
jurors may have disagreed upon the type of sex acts that occurred (i.e.,
vaginal fondling, oral copulation, manual masturbation, digital
penetration), there is no affirmative evidence showing that he engaged in
some but not all of the molestations. Instead, defendant presented a
unitary defense with respect to the multiple counts of molestation.
Defense counsel sought to attack the credibility of the victims and to
portray defendant as an honest and trustworthy person who never exhibited
inappropriate behavior around children. The jury clearly rejected this
defense when it convicted defendant of all 40 counts against T.K. and J.A.
Thus, there was no basis in the evidence or arguments for the jury to have
distinguished among the types of offenses and the jury resolved the basic
credibility dispute against defendant.

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For these reasons, we hold that omission of a unanimity instruction
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (citations omitted).

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In this case, petitioner cannot show that the state court’s conclusion was either the

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result of an unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

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precedent requiring jury unanimity because, as respondent notes, jury unanimity is not

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constitutionally required. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999); Schad v.

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Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 634 n.5 (1991); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-13 (1972).

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be denied.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.

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See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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DATED: August 6, 2018
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CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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